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Abstract
This  thesis reports on research into the offences, under the Road Traffic Act 
1988 as amended, of driving, attempting to drive, or being in charge of a 
vehicle when unfit through drink or drugs, with excess  alcohol, or (under 
provisions to be brought into force) with an excess  of a specified drug. The 
research was  primarily literature-based, using legal doctrinal analysis, 
supplemented by empirical research. 
The offences are examined in the contexts  of four principles said to 
govern how the criminal law and the law of evidence are framed: the 
preconditions for strict liability, the presumption of innocence, the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the principle of legal certainty. The literature 
and case law are reviewed, and the drink- and drug-driving offences are 
found to offend all four principles. 
Uncertainty about the prescribed limit for driving with excess  alcohol 
– by far the most commonly prosecuted of the offences – emerges  as the 
most significant breach. To explore this, the scientific background to the 
offences  is  explained, and the literature on what drivers  understand the limit 
to mean is  reviewed. An original study on the point is  reported, and it is 
concluded that the drink drive limit, while scientifically precise, is not 
understood by most drivers.
Despite the difficulties of fitting these offences  into the traditional 
paradigm, it is  concluded that a way of accommodating them in the legal 
theory must be found. The possibility of an alternative paradigm is 
canvassed, perhaps being justified by the success of the drink-drive 
legislation in reducing death and injury on the roads, and by recognising a 
special responsibility on drivers, a duty which may have to include foregoing 
some of  the protections afforded by the traditional criminal law paradigm. 
[Word count: 97,115]
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Preface
This  is  a work about the law relating to drink- and drug-driving under the 
Road Traffic Act 1988, the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 and the 
substantial case law elaborating the statutory provisions. I have sought to 
explain the nature of the offences, and to place this complex body of 
regulation into the general framework of the criminal law. I find that in fact 
it defies the traditional paradigm, instead inhabiting a universe far removed 
from the world of mens rea, presumed innocence, burdens of proof and 
certainty of legislation that I learned about as an under-graduate. Its  failure 
to meet the standards traditionally said to govern how the criminal law is 
framed poses a challenge for legal theorists. I suggest that this be resolved by 
contemplating a different paradigm – one that acknowledges and 
accommodates  the extraordinary contribution this area of law has made to 
reducing death and injury on the road, and recognises a special position, vis-
à-vis the law, of  those who drive.
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Chapter 8. 
At the University of Sheffield, I would like to thank Professor Sir Tony 
Bottoms, who first encouraged me to higher study, my Ph.D supervisor 
Michael Jefferson for his  unfailing support and good cheer, Natasha Taylor 
(now at the Higher Education Academy) for her boundless  and generous 
enthusiasm as  she helped me through the novelty and intricacies of data 
analysis, and, more recently, Andrew Costello for reading and commenting 
on my draft thesis.
Neil Corre of counsel first sparked my interest in this intriguing area 
of law. That interest has since been sustained with the help of Paul 
Williams, Head of Forensic Support at Lion Laboratories  who kindly read 
and commented on Chapter 6, and Roger Agombar, consultant in law and 
police procedures. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The drink- and drug-driving offences  under the Road Traffic Act (“RTA”) 
19881  have received little scholarly attention.2  This is  surprising given the 
road safety objective of the legislation,3 the number of prosecutions 4 and the 
exceptionally high conviction rate.5 
The offences  are also remarkable in that a small group of statutory 
provisions6 has  given rise to a disproportionately large body of case law.7 
Given the period of time since the legislation was first introduced, it might 
be expected that most points which could arise would have been brought 
1
1  Driving, attempting to drive or in charge when unfit through drink or drugs (s 4) and driving, 
attempting to drive or in charge when over the prescribed limit (s 5). New offences of driving, 
attempting to drive or in charge with an excess of a specified controlled drug were introduced by 
Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56, and will come into force from a date to be appointed.
2  With the notable exceptions of Claire Corbett, Car Crime (Willan 2003) and Sally Cunningham, 
Driving Offences. Law, Policy and Practice (Ashgate 2008). Some reasons why the equivalent offences in the 
United States do not feature in criminological and jurisprudential writing and research have been 
suggested: James B Jacobs, Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma (University of Chicago Press 1989) xx et 
seq.
3 Road traffic fatalities in Great Britain attributed to drink-driving fell steadily from 1,640 in 1979 to 
an estimated 290 in 2012. Serious injuries fell from 8,300 to 1,210, and slight injuries from 21,490 to 
8,500 over the same period. See Department for Transport, Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain: 
Estimates for Accidents Involving Illegal Alcohol Levels: 2012 (provisional) and 2011 (final) <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/226068/accidents-
involving-illegal-alcohol-levels-2011-2012.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013. 
4  In 2012 there were over 60,000 prosecutions for the drug- and drink-driving offences in England 
and Wales. Although this has dropped considerably over the years (from a peak of 107,000 in 2004), 
there are still, for example, more than twice as many prosecutions for drug- and drink-driving than for 
driving without due care and attention. See Ministry of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Quarterly - 
December 2012, 30 May 2013, Table 8.1, and Motoring Tables, Tables 6.1 and 6.6 <https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-update-to-
december-2012> accessed 27 November 2013.
5 In England and Wales in 2012, there were 55,300 convictions for driving after consuming alcohol or 
taking drugs – a conviction rate of 91 per cent. This compares with a conviction rate of 83 per cent 
for all criminal offences and 90.1 per cent for motoring offences as a whole: Ministry of Justice, 
Criminal Justice Statistics Quarterly - December 2012, 30 May 2013, Table Q4.3 <https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-update-to-december-2012> accessed 27 
November 2013. For the offence of driving with excess alcohol, which is the most commonly 
prosecuted, 96 per cent of  49,000 defendants were convicted, ibid, Motoring Tables, Table 6.1.
6 The principal provisions in RTA 1988 comprised ten sections when the Act was first passed; this had 
grown to fifteen by October 2013 with the prospect of a further section to be added pursuant to 
Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56 (see fn 1 above).
7  There are almost 800 relevant decisions of the higher courts on points of law arising out of the 
drink- and drug-driving provisions: PM Callow, The Drink Drive Offences. A Handbook for Practitioners 
(Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 2011) Table of  Cases.
before the courts and settled, but the challenges continue.8  The result is a 
body of  law of  surprising complexity. 
The consequences  of conviction for many of these offences  go beyond 
the immediate penalty of a fine, a community order or even imprisonment. 
They include disqualification from driving, which is not only an 
inconvenience to the offender, but may lead to loss of employment and, in 
due course, to greatly increased insurance premiums. These factors may well 
account for the readiness of some defendants  to try to avoid conviction. The 
media have made much of what are perceived to be “loopholes”, especially 
when the defendant is someone in the public eye.9 The statistics, however, 
show that the legislation is robust, and successful defences are few and far 
between.10 Motorists have fared little better when taking appeals on points  of 
law. Between 2007 and 2012 (inclusive), sixty-one appeals  on points  of law 
concerning the drink- and drug- driving offences were taken to the High 
Court. Of these, only seventeen11  were decided in favour of the motorist. 
Nor have appeals against verdict or sentence often succeeded.12
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8  Between 2010 and 2012, the higher courts dealt with nineteen appeals concerning drink-driving: 
Persaud v DPP [2010] EWHC 52 (Admin) (QBD); Rose v DPP [2010] EWHC 462 (Admin); Coxon v 
Manchester City Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 712 (Admin); Balogun v DPP [2010] EWHC 799 
(Admin); CPS v Jolly [2010] EWHC 1616 (Admin); Moore v DPP [2010] EWHC 1822 (Admin); Kohler v 
DPP [2010] EWHC 2886 (Admin); Cox v DPP [2010] EWHC 3589 (Admin); Hallett v DPP [2011] 
EWHC 488 (Admin); Atkinson v DPP [2011] EWHC 706 (Admin); Hawke v DPP [2011] EWHC 1345 
(Admin); Bielecki v DPP [2011] EWHC 2245 (Admin); Avery v DPP [2011] EWHC 2388 (Admin); DPP 
v Heathcote [2011] EWHC 2536 (Admin); Moore v Preston Crown Court [2011] EWHC 3780 (Admin); 
Ryder v CPS [2011] EWHC 4003 (Admin); Santos v Stratford Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWHC 752 
(Admin); Stanesby v DPP [2012] EWHC 1320 (Admin); Afolayan v CPS [2012] EWHC 1322 (Admin); 
and one concerning drug-driving: Angel v Chief Constable  of South Yorkshire [2010] EWHC 883 (Admin) 
(DC).
9 See, for example, ‘Rare Failure for ‘Mr Loophole’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5279672.stm> 
accessed 27 November 2013, and ‘Mr “Loophole” gets Lloyd Drink-drive Case Dropped’ <http://
www.heraldscotland.com/mobile/news/crime-courts/mr-loophole-gets-lloyd-drink-drive-case-
dropped.17051801> accessed 27 November 2013. ‘Mr Loophole’ is the Manchester-based solicitor 
Nicholas Freeman.
10 See the statistics on convictions in fn 5 above. 
11  Ng v DPP [2007] EWHC 36 (Admin); Mckeon v DPP [2007] EWHC 3216 (Admin) (DC); Piggott v 
DPP [2008] EWHC 305 (Admin) (DC); Roberts v DPP [2008] EWHC 643 (Admin); McNeil v DPP 
[2008] EWHC 1254 (Admin); Plackett v DPP [2008] EWHC 1335 (Admin); Brett v DPP [2009] EWHC 
440; Mason v DPP [2009] EWHC 2198 (Admin); Williams v DPP [2009] EWHC 2354 (Admin); 
Goldsmith v DPP [2009] EWHC 3010 (Admin); R (on the Application of Cox) v DPP [2009] EWHC 3595 
(Admin); Charles v DPP [2009] EWHC 3521 (Admin); Visvaratnam v Brent Magistrates’ Court [2009] 
EWHC 3017 (Admin); Persaud v DPP [2010] EWHC 52 (Admin) (QBD); Balogun v DPP [2010] EWHC 
799 (Admin); Hallett v DPP [2011] EWHC 488 (Admin); Hawke v DPP [2011] EWHC 1345 (Admin).
12  In 2012, only 213 of 791 (31%) appeals to the Crown Court against verdict or sentence were 
allowed: Freedom of Information Request 85822 by the author to the Ministry of Justice, 21 October 
2013. 
The higher courts having condemned unmeritorious arguments in no 
uncertain terms:
• “the ingenuity of defendants  and their advisers  in confronting the 
breathalyser legislation has been spectacular”;13 
• “the unproductive exercise of legal ingenuity … may lead … to 
unmeritorious acquittals”;14 
• “there have been too many attempts  before the courts  to seek to 
avoid the conviction of those who have driven with excess  alcohol by 
raising unmeritorious formal points”;15
• “the vital requirement that the Crown prove its  case in criminal 
proceedings  is  an instrument of justice and not an invitation to 
disreputable technicality.”16
The drug- and drink-driving offences attract media interest in other 
contexts, notably calls  to lower the drink-drive limit and to introduce 
random breath-testing,17 individual cases  where the consequences  of drug- 
or drink-driving have been newsworthy,18  high-profile reviews such as the 
North Report in 2010,19 and the new offences  of driving with an excess of a 
specified drug.20
They are also inherently interesting by reason of being based on a 
body of  scientific facts about how drugs and alcohol affect driving skills. 
As if all this  were not enough to stimulate attention, these offences also 
engage a number of fundamental principles of law – the preconditions  for 
strict liability, the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and legal certainty, and raise serious  questions  concerning 
conformity with those principles, and the extent to which, and the 
circumstances in which, exceptions may be justified. 
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13 Sheldrake v DPP [2003] EWHC 273 (Admin) (DC) [128] (Henriques J).
14 DPP v Ormsby [1997] RTR 394 (DC) 402 (Leggatt LJ).
15 Malcolm v DPP [2007] EWHC 363 (Admin) [38] (Stanley Burnton J).
16 Jones (Vivian) v DPP [2004] EWHC 3165 (Admin) [6] (Laws LJ). 
17  Subjects not explored in this work, although in 2010 the North Report recommended both: Sir 
Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) paras 4.27 and 4.115.
18 See, for example, ‘Drink Driver who Caused Death of Girl Before she was Born Jailed in Landmark 
Case’ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9272283/Drink-driver-who-caused-death-
of-girl-before-she-was-born-jailed-in-landmark-case.html> accessed 27 November 2013.
19 See, for example, ‘Report Calls for Drink-drive Limit to be Reduced’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
uk/8742769.stm> accessed 27 November 2013.
20  For example, ‘One Spliff and You’re off the Road: Crackdown on Drug Driving’, London Evening 
Standard 9 July 2013: <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/one-spliff-and-youre-off-the-road-
crackdown-on-drug-driving-8697798.html> accessed 27 November 2013.
Having set out some of the reasons why this group of offences  seemed so 
fascinating, I next describe how my research programme came about and 
how I framed it. 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
In connection with my professional work, I had spent much time tracing and 
reading judgments  in drink- and drug-driving cases.21  The case law is 
voluminous  and complicated, and while underlying principles of criminal 
law are sometimes mentioned in the judgments, they are rarely elaborated in 
any detail. For example, how can the requirement22 to provide a specimen 
for analysis  – in effect, to provide the evidence for the prosecution – be 
reconciled with the privilege against self-incrimination? Other principles 
traditionally thought to underlie the criminal law often seemed to be 
overridden or ignored. As a lawyer I wanted to look in more detail at the 
substance of the offences, to see how they fit with our notions  of the 
framework within which the criminal law is  constructed. Is there something 
special about this group of offences, setting them apart from the rest of the 
criminal law, or indeed from the rest of road traffic law? When the 
opportunity arose to undertake research with a view to the degree of Ph.D, 
the subject was obvious. 
The aim of my research was, therefore, to elucidate the nature of 
these offences, to question how, if at all, they fit the paradigm of the 
criminal law,23 to identify issues arising, and to suggest consequences  for the 
overall theory of the criminal law, perhaps concluding that the theory 
should be adjusted to accommodate this group of  offences. 
 After much deliberation, my research questions  finally crystallized in 
the following terms:
• what is the nature of  these offences? 
• to what extent do they comply with or breach the principles 
said to underlie the criminal law?
• can any such breaches be justified? 
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21  By commission from Lion Laboratories, the manufacturers of much of the breath-testing 
equipment used throughout the world. This work was originally undertaken for private purposes, but 
was later published as Drink Drive Case Notes (2nd edn, Callow Publishing 2007).
22 Under RTA 1988, s 7; see further below.
23  I use the words “criminal law” widely, to encompass not only the substantive law but also the 
procedure for investigating and prosecuting the offences.
• what are the consequences (if any) for legal theory of any such 
breaches, whether justified or not?
• are there any other consequences or implications?
Unsurprisingly, my hypothesis  was that the law relating to the offences 
would prove complex and difficult. It would also offend many of the 
traditional principles of criminal law, but a way of forgiving such deviations 
might need to be found. 
I made a number of assumptions. Although these may be self-evident, 
they are listed here for the sake of  completeness:
• that it is  in the interests  of public safety to limit the amount of 
alcohol which may be consumed before driving;
• that the major principles of law are broadly accepted and that 
it is  a legitimate analytical exercise to seek to apply them to a 
particular area of  law;
• that the provisions selected for study should conform to the 
principles  of the criminal law as a whole; or that, if they do 
not, any exceptions or deviations should be justified.
METHOD
My research was primarily literature-based, adopting legal doctrinal analysis 
as  the main method, but supplemented by a piece of empirical research 
described in detail in Chapter 8. The legal doctrinal approach allowed for 
appropriate processes of analysis, review, evaluation and appraisal of the 
materials  which form the basis  of the work. I studied the relevant legal rules 
(both statutory and deriving from the case law), and analysed them by 
reference to established principles as expounded in the legal literature, with 
a view to acknowledging consistency, and to identifying and seeking 
explanations for inconsistencies, conflicts  and contradictions. I evaluated 
how the cases engage with fundamental principles  of English law, and those 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.24  I expected that this 
would illustrate how the courts  endeavour to apply the rules  to achieve just 
solutions on the facts of particular cases, even though the effect may be that 
principles  are not applied uniformly, or perhaps, not even at all –  an 
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24 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of 
Europe, Rome, 4.XI.1950 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 
27 November 2013.
example of the “inherent tension between the legal practice and legal 
scholarship”.25 
This  method was intended to reveal much about the characteristics of 
the offences and demonstrate the extent to which they conform to, or 
contradict, the principles of the criminal law, and facilitate the development 
of  the thesis in the light of  the empirical work.
Given the vast body of case law and the wide remit of the research 
questions, the literature search was confined largely to the jurisdictions of 
England and Wales  and Scotland, taking in decisions  of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, but 
with some exceptions to include a small number of works originating in 
other jurisdictions, where they were of  special relevance. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK
The remainder of this introductory chapter includes a brief summary of the 
relevant statutory provisions. The principles of law engaged are then 
identified. There follows a review of the legal literature touching on the 
drink- and drug-driving offences, such as it is. 
Chapters 2 to 5 comprise the legal doctrinal work which is  the 
theoretical basis for my project, focusing on fundamental principles of 
English criminal law – strict liability and mens rea, the presumption of 
innocence and reverse burdens of proof, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the principle of certainty. Each chapter takes  much the 
same form, introducing the issue in question, examining the theoretical 
background and the literature, then moving on to the statutory provisions 
and the case law. In all contexts, I found the legal principles compromised.
It soon became clear that the need for certainty in the criminal law 
gives rise to a major problem in relation to the offences of exceeding the 
prescribed limit for alcohol. How are drivers to know what they must do, or 
rather what they must not do, to avoid exceeding the limit? The problem is 
that the limit is expressed as  the concentration of alcohol in the body – the 
result of drinking, while drivers naturally think in terms of how much they 
may drink. The relationship between how much is  drunk and the resulting 
concentration of alcohol in the body is  complex, depending on many 
physiological and circumstantial factors. This issue soon came to the 
forefront of my work, leading me to conclude that the principle of legal 
certainty is severely compromised in relation to the prescribed limit, with 
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25  D Manderson and R Mohr, ‘From Oxymoron to Intersection: An Epidemiology of Legal 
Research’ (2002) 6(1) Law Text Culture 10.
serious consequences for both drivers and the theoretical framework of the 
criminal law. A much greater part of my thesis  is  therefore devoted to this 
principle than to the others. To explain the issues in play, Chapter 6 includes 
an overview of the relevant scientific facts. These facts not only underlie the 
statutory provisions, but provide the basis for evaluating how drivers 
understand and interpret the statutory provisions in practice. This  is 
followed by a description of how these facts have been dealt with by the 
courts. Chapter 7 contains a review of the literature on drivers’ 
understanding of the statutory prohibitions, revealing much ignorance, and 
calling in question the clarity of the provisions. Chapter 8 describes my own 
piece of research into what drivers  think the prescribed limit means, 
confirming a high degree of misunderstanding. In Chapter 9, I explain my 
finding that the prescribed limit offends the principle of  certainty. 
In Chapter 10, I conclude that my thesis  is  borne out and consider the 
consequences. While the drink- and drug-driving offences depart from the 
general principles of the criminal law in many respects, I nevertheless seek 
to justify these departures, and consider the possibility that they signal an 
alternative paradigm. 
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Background
Early legislation featured, in various forms, an offence of driving when unfit 
to do so through drink or drugs.26  It was  defined by reference to the 
impairment of driving skill, regardless  of the quantity of alcohol or drugs 
which may have been in the body. 
In 1967, a prescribed limit for alcohol was  introduced.27 It was, and 
still is, eighty milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.28 The offences 
of unfitness through drink or drugs  remained, but it became an offence 
simply to be over the limit, regardless of ability to drive. At the same time, 
the “breathalyser” was introduced as a method of preliminary screening to 
provide an indication of whether or not a driver might be over the limit. 
Following a positive breathalyser test, alcohol concentration was measured 
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26 See, for example, Criminal Justice Act 1925, s 40, extending the offence of being drunk in charge so 
as to apply to mechanically propelled vehicles, and RTA 1930, s 15, creating the offence of being 
under the influence of drink or a drug to  such an extent as to  be incapable of having proper control of 
a vehicle, quoted in Louise Butcher, Driving: Alcohol, House of Commons Library Standard Note 
SN788, last updated 11 April 2013, 2. 
27 By Road Safety Act 1967, s 1.
28 Or 107 milligrams of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  urine.; see also p 14.
by laboratory analysis  of a specimen of blood or urine. New offences  of 
refusing to take a breath test or to supply a specimen were created.29  The 
prescribed limit applied to alcohol only.
The Transport Act 1981 contained provisions reflecting the fact that 
technology had advanced to the point where alcohol in the body could 
accurately be measured by analysing breath, using a machine which could 
be installed at police stations. This  avoided having to send body fluids to a 
laboratory for analysis. Preliminary (or “roadside”) testing continued. 
Persons whose roadside tests were positive were arrested and required to 
provide breath specimens for analysis, although there remained certain 
circumstances in which blood or urine specimens, rather than breath 
specimens, could be required. The results  of analysing the specimen 
provided the evidential base for any prosecution. This continues  to be the 
usual procedure, now under RTA 1988, sections 4 to 11. The Road Traffic 
Offenders Act (“RTOA”) 1988 contains further provisions  concerning the 
use in evidence of  specimens of  breath, blood or urine. 
The Offences
Section 4, RTA 1988 provides  for the offences of driving, attempting to 
drive or being in charge of a vehicle when unfit through drink or drugs. The 
section is headed “Driving or being in charge when under influence of drink 
or drugs”, and the expression “under the influence” is sometimes  used as  an 
alternative to the word “unfit”. Unfitness  to drive means  that the ability to 
drive properly is impaired.30  A person accused of an “in charge” offence 
may be deemed not to have been in charge if there was no likelihood of 
driving while remaining unfit through drink or drugs. It is for the accused to 
show, on a balance of  probabilities, that there was no such likelihood.31
Section 5 concerns the more commonly prosecuted offences – driving, 
attempting to drive, or in charge with excess  alcohol. Again, a person said to 
have been “in charge” may be deemed not to have been in charge upon 
showing, again on a balance of probabilities, that there was no likelihood of 
driving while over the limit.32
Section 5A RTA 1988,33 when in force, will create offences of driving, 
attempting to drive or being in charge with a concentration of a specified 
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29 Road Safety Act 1967, ss 2(3) and 3(3) respectively.
30 RTA 1988, s 4(5); see pp 209–211.
31 Morton v Confer [1963] 1 WLR 763 (DC); see pp 90–94.
32 CPS v Thompson [2007] EWHC 1841 (Admin) (DC); see pp 90–94.
33 Inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56, to come into force from a date to be appointed.
controlled drug above a specified limit. At the time of writing,34 the section 
has not been brought into force and no regulations  specifying controlled 
drugs or limits have been made.35
There is clearly some overlap between unfitness  to drive through 
drink, and being over the prescribed limit. A driver may be unfit to drive 
long before reaching the prescribed limit, while another may just possibly be 
able to drive unimpaired while over the limit.36 A similar overlap – between 
being unfit to drive through drugs  and being over the limit for a specified 
controlled drug – may also arise.37 Most prosecutions 38 are for driving with 
excess alcohol contrary to section 5, but the section 4 offences continue to be 
important, and will remain so after section 5A comes into force, as the basis 
for proceeding against someone who is  impaired but not over the limit, who 
is impaired but fails to provide a specimen, or who is impaired by a drug 
which is not specified for the purposes of  section 5A. 
Section 3A creates  the offence of causing death by driving without due 
care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other road users 
(“careless  driving”) when the driver is unfit through drink or drugs, has 
excess alcohol or has committed one of the “failing” offences.39 This offence 
is mentioned here for the sake of completeness, in that the definition refers 
to the states of unfitness  to drive and of being over the prescribed limit, and 
of failing to provide a specimen for analysis. It is  those aspects only which 
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34 December 2013.
35 Although draft regulations have been issued for consultation: Department for Transport, Regulations 
to Specify the Drugs and Corresponding Limits for  the New Offence of Driving with a Specified Controlled Drug in the 
Body Above a Specified Limit – A Consultation Document, July 2013 <https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211220/consultation-document.pdf> accessed 27 
November 2013.
36 Although this is less likely; see H Moskowitz and others, ‘Driver Characteristics and Impairment at 
Various BACs’ US Department of Transportation 2000, 22–23 <http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/
9000/9500/9512/impairment.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013, reporting findings that the majority 
of the driving population is impaired in some important measures at blood alcohol concentrations as 
low as 20 milligrammes per 100 millilitres (the limit in England and Wales is 80). There was no 
evidence of a blood alcohol level below which impairment does not occur. See also Amanda Kiloran 
and others, Review of Effectiveness of Laws Limiting Blood Alcohol Concentration Levels to Reduce Alcohol-related 
Road Injuries and Death (Centre for Public Health Excellence NICE 2010) 44 <http://www.nice.org.uk/
media/3fe/1a/bloodalcoholcontenteffectivenessreview.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013, and 
Chapter 6. 
37 Although this is less likely, given the relatively low concentrations expected to be specified for drugs; 
see p 206.
38 49,000 out of  60,000 in 2012 (82%); see fn 5 above.
39  Failing to provide a specimen for analysis contrary to RTA 1988, s 7(6), or failing to permit the 
analysis of a specimen taken while the driver was incapable of consenting, contrary to RTA 1988, s 
7A(6). See below.
are considered here; neither causing death nor careless driving is  referred to 
further except where it is helpful to do so for comparative or illustrative 
purposes. The offence under section 3A is  one of four offences  of causing 
death under the 1988 Act. The remaining three40 do not feature alcohol or 
drugs, and are not considered in this work. 
It is an offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to co-operate in a 
preliminary test, to provide a specimen for analysis, or to permit the analysis 
of  a specimen taken while the subject was incapable of  consenting.41
The Investigation
The procedure for investigating a suspected offence42  usually starts  with a 
preliminary screening test, often at the roadside, to establish whether or not 
a suspect is likely to be unfit or over the limit. If the test is positive, the 
suspect is  arrested and taken to a police station where specimen(s) are taken 
and analysed. It is  the result of this  analysis which forms the basis of any 
prosecution. 
A constable may require a person to co-operate with a preliminary 
test43 if  the constable reasonably suspects that:44
• the subject is  driving, attempting to drive, or in charge with 
alcohol or a drug in the body, or is  under the influence of a 
drug; 
• the subject has been driving, attempting to drive or in charge 
with alcohol or a drug in the body or while unfit to drive 
because of a drug, and still has alcohol or a drug in the body or 
is still under the influence of  a drug;
• the subject has been driving, attempting to drive or in charge 
and has committed a moving traffic offence; 
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40  The remaining three are causing death by dangerous driving (s 1), causing death by careless or 
inconsiderate driving (s 2B) and causing death by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured (s 
3ZB). 
41 See pp 55–58.
42 Set out in RTA 1988, ss 6, 6A to 6E, 7 and 7A.
43  Or up to three preliminary tests when s 5A (see pp 8–9) is in force. This is to take account of the 
fact  that a single preliminary drug test will likely facilitate testing for a limited range of drugs only (the 
only device approved as at  27 November 2013 tests for cannabis only), and to allow for testing for 
both alcohol and drugs. See RTA 1988, s 6C(3), inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56, sch 22, 
para 3(3) and Department for Transport, Regulations to Specify the Drugs and Corresponding Limits for the New 
Offence of Driving with a Specified Controlled Drug in the Body Above a Specified Limit – A Consultation Document, 
July 2013, paras 12.4, 12.5 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/211220/consultation-document.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
44 RTA 1988, s 6(1) to (5).
• following an accident owing to the presence of a motor vehicle, 
the subject was  driving, attempting to drive or in charge at the 
time of  the accident.
There is, therefore, no power randomly to administer breath tests, 
although there is  no restriction on stopping vehicles at random, and then 
requiring a specimen if the officer suspects  the driver has been drinking.45 It 
is  an offence, without reasonable excuse, to fail to co-operate with a 
preliminary test.46
There are three types of  preliminary test:47
• a preliminary breath test, using an approved device;
• a preliminary impairment test in which a specially trained 
constable observes  the subject performing certain tasks (such as 
standing on one leg while counting) and observes the person’s 
physical state, in accordance with a code of  practice;
• a preliminary drug test, using an approved device.48 
A constable may arrest a person who fails  a preliminary test. There is 
also power to arrest a person who fails to co-operate with a preliminary test 
if the constable reasonably suspects  that the person has alcohol or a drug in 
the body. A patient at a hospital may not be arrested.49 
Following an accident, a constable who reasonably suspects  that a 
person has been injured has a power of entry, using reasonable force if 
necessary, to require a person to co-operate in a preliminary test or to arrest 
a person.50 There is no express  power to enter a suspect’s  private property in 
other circumstances. 
Section 7 sets  out the procedure for providing specimens  for analysis, 
usually at a police station, following arrest. The provisions are outlined here, 
and described in greater detail in Chapter 4. A constable who is 
investigating whether or not an offence under section 3A, 4 or 5 has  been 
committed may require two breath specimens for immediate analysis, or a 
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45 Chief  Constable of  Gwent v Dash [1986] RTR 41 (DC).
46 RTA 1988, s 6(6); see pp 55–56, 102 et seq and 151 et seq.
47 RTA 1988, ss 6A, 6B and 6C.
48  At the time of writing (December 2013), one device has been approved for this purpose: the 
Draeger Drug Test 5000, which tests for THC, the main ingredient of cannabis and is approved for 
use at police stations only. See Home Office, Preliminary Drug Testing Device Approval 2012.
49 RTA 1988, s 6D. 
50 RTA 1988, s 6E.
blood or urine specimen to be analysed at a laboratory.51 Breath specimens 
are analysed using what is referred to in the legislation as an approved 
device, now also known as an evidential breath testing instrument (“EBTI”). 
In anticipation of the type approval of portable EBTIs, the section also 
contains provisions facilitating evidential breath testing elsewhere than at a 
police station.
 Sometimes it is not feasible to analyse breath specimens  for alcohol – 
the device may be out of order, or the suspect may be in hospital. In these 
cases,52  a specimen of blood or urine may be required instead. Breath 
cannot be tested for drugs, so that where drugs are suspected, the specimen 
must be one of  blood or urine.
Whether a specimen is to be of blood or urine is a matter for the 
constable.53 Blood specimens are taken by a medical practitioner or a health 
care professional, but if the practitioner advises  that there are medical 
reasons  for not taking blood, the constable may then require a urine 
specimen.54  In that case, a first specimen of urine is discarded and the 
second specimen must be produced within an hour of the initial 
requirement.55
It is  an offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to provide a 
specimen,56 but the constable must, when requiring a specimen, warn the 
person that failure to provide it may render the person liable to 
prosecution.57  The expression “reasonable excuse” is  not defined and has 
given rise to a substantial body of  case law.58 
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51 RTA 1988, s 7(1). Section 7 is to be amended from a date to be appointed (under Crime and Courts 
Act 2013, s 56, sch 22, para 5) to provide a similar power to require a specimen of blood or urine 
where the officer is investigating a suspected offence under the new s 5A (above, pp 8–9).
52 Set out at p 147.
53 RTA 1988, s 7(4); see p 148.
54 RTA 1988, s 7(4A); see p 148.
55 RTA 1988, s 7(5); see p 149.
56 RTA 1988, s 7(6); see pp 151–155.
57 RTA 1988, s 7(7); see p 149. 
58 The leading case is R v Lennard [1973] 1 WLR 483 (CA), in which it was held that, for an excuse to 
be reasonable, the person must be physically or mentally unable to provide the specimen, or its 
provision would entail a substantial health risk. Drivers facing disqualification have since sought to 
bring many more sets of circumstances within the definition, but have largely failed. See for example, 
PM Callow, The Drink-Drive Offences: A Handbook for Practitioners (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 2011) 194 – 
204, and pp 151–155 below.
A blood specimen may, in certain circumstances, be taken without 
consent from a person who is  incapable of consenting59 – usually someone 
who is  unconscious. The power arises  where the person has been involved in 
an accident, and there would otherwise be power to require a specimen. 
The specimen may not be laboratory tested without the person’s  consent, 
although failure without reasonable excuse to give such consent is an 
offence.60
Challenges to the procedures followed in individual cases have been 
legion, and much of  the resulting case law is discussed in later chapters.
Potential defendants have an advantage in that, of the two breath 
specimens analysed, that which yields the higher reading is disregarded, and 
the specimen which produces the lower reading is used in any proceedings.61
Further, if the lower reading is 50 microgrammes or below (the limit is 
35), the “driver’s  option” or “statutory option” procedure62 comes  into play. 
This  allows the suspect to elect to provide a blood or urine specimen to 
replace the breath specimen. The suspect may ask for part of the specimen, 
and may have it independently analysed. With increasing confidence in the 
accuracy of the evidential breath testing devices, however, the abolition of 
the driver’s option now seems likely.63 
There is protection for hospital patients,64 requiring consultation with 
the medical practitioner in charge of the case before a patient is required to 
co-operate in a preliminary test or provide a specimen. The constable may 
not proceed if the doctor objects  on the ground that to do so would be 
prejudicial to the proper care and treatment of  the patient. 
Persons who have been investigated may be detained at the police 
station until no longer unfit or over the limit.65 The power is  not available, 
however, where it ought reasonably to be apparent that there is  no likelihood 
of driving or attempting to drive while unfit or over the limit. A patient at a 
Chapter 1: Introduction
13
59 RTA 1988, s 7A; see p 150. 
60 RTA 1988, s 7A(6); see p 150. 
61 RTA 1988, s 8(1); see p 146.
62 Under RTA 1988, s 8(2).
63  Sir Peter North, Report of the Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) para 4.61; 
Department for Transport, Enforcement Procedures against Drink Drivers and Other Offenders – A Consultation 
Document, November 2012, paras 4.1–4.21 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/14959/drink-driving-consultation.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013; 
Draft Deregulation Bill, Cm 8642, 2013, s 24, sch 9, para 1. 
64 In RTA 1988, s 9; see p 151.
65 RTA 1988, s 10.
hospital may not be arrested and taken to a police station if it would be 
prejudicial to the patient’s proper care and treatment. A constable must 
consult a medical practitioner on questions concerning the impairment 
through drugs of  any detainee, and must act on the advice given. 
The Department for Transport has prepared a series of pro formas for 
use by police officers investigating drink-drive offences, to ensure that the 
procedure is carried out fully and correctly, and to provide a 
contemporaneous record of the procedure in individual cases.66  The fact 
that these forms total some seventy-five pages reflects the complexity of the 
procedures, and the number of issues which can arise during an 
investigation. The forms have no special status in law.67 
The Prescribed Limit
The prescribed limit for the purpose of  the excess alcohol offences is:68 
• 35 microgrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  breath,
• 80 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  blood, or
• 107 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  urine,
or such other proportion as may be prescribed. 
Despite many calls to lower the limit,69 the above table has  never been 
amended. The limit clearly contemplates that drinking before driving is 
permitted, up to a certain point. That point is, however, expressed in terms 
of the amount of alcohol found in the body, not in terms of the amount 
consumed. It is  common knowledge that the effects of alcohol depend on 
factors such as  its  strength, the amount drunk, the time over which it is 
drunk, the speed at which it is absorbed and eliminated, and the body 
weight and gender of the person concerned. These issues make it more 
difficult for an ordinary individual to know whether or not, having taken 
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66  The principal form is form MG DD/A: Drink/Drugs: Station Procedure, general. There are 
supplementary forms for use where a blood or urine specimen is being required (Form MM DD/B), 
for the procedure at a hospital (MG DD/C) and in other circumstances. The forms can be viewed at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/manual-of-guidance-drink-and-drug-driving-mgdd> 
accessed 27 November 2013.
67 Forms MG DD/A and B were described by Turner J, in DPP v Smith (Robert James) [2000] RTR 341 
(QBD), 349, as “no more than what I would describe as the “plain man’s guide” to a simple 
understanding of the procedures … to ensure, in a practical way, that those called upon to operate the 
procedures do not omit a relevant step; that, at stages where there is a choice of steps, they appreciate 
that  such a choice exists; and it  also offers quite clearly common sense guidance as to the way in which 
choices should be exercised when they fall to be made.”
68 RTA 1988, s 11(2). 
69 Most recently, in the North Report (Sir Peter North, Report of the Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law 
(HMSO 2010) para 4.27). See also, for example, British Medical Association, Drink Driving Limit 
Demand, 25 February 2012 <http://bma.org.uk/news-views-analysis/news/2012/february/drink-
driving-limit-demand> accessed 27 November 2013.
alcohol, he or she is likely to be under or over the limit. For as  long as  it is 
permitted to drink before driving, this  question of interpreting the limit is  of 
real practical significance and is considered at length in this work.70
The Act goes on to stipulate what constitutes  co-operation with a 
preliminary test, and what constitutes providing a specimen of breath for 
analysis.71 The subject must consent to the taking of any blood specimen, 
and certain persons are authorised to take such specimens.72
Use of  Specimens in Proceedings
The result of analysing a specimen is  to be taken into account in any 
prosecution that follows.73 It is to be assumed that the alcohol level74 at the 
time of the alleged offence was  no lower than in the specimen. This  is 
commonly known as  the “statutory assumption” and is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. It applies  even though the alcohol concentration may have been 
rising (because alcohol was  still being absorbed) or falling (because alcohol 
was  being eliminated) between the time of the alleged offence and the time 
the specimen was  provided. To ensure that the analysis  reflects  as  accurately 
as  possible the alcohol-concentration at the time of the alleged offence, 
specimens are taken as  soon as possible. The procedure may not be delayed, 
even for the suspect to take legal advice.75 
The statutory assumption may be displaced76  by what is  sometimes 
called the “hip flask defence”, where the defendant establishes, on a balance 
of probabilities, that it was alcohol consumed after  the alleged offence which 
caused the defendant to be unfit or over the limit. 
A blood specimen is  disregarded if it was not taken with the 
defendant’s  consent and by the appropriate professional person. A blood 
specimen taken from a person incapable of consenting is to be disregarded 
unless the person gave permission for it to be analysed.77
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70 In Chapters 5 to 8.
71 RTA 1988, s 11(3).
72 RTA 1988, s 11(4); see p 149.
73 RTOA 1988, s 15(2).
74  Or, in due course, the drug level; RTOA 1988, s 15(2)(b), to come into force from a date to be 
appointed.
75 This is discussed further at pp 105–106 and 154–155.
76 Under RTOA 1988, s 15(3); see pp 111–113. Similar provisions will apply to the offences of excess 
specified drugs: RTOA 1988, s 15(3A), to come into force from a date to be appointed.
77 RTOA 1988, s 15(4).
There are provisions concerning the procedure for dividing a blood 
specimen into two parts and, upon request, giving one part to the suspect.78 
Penalties
The drink- and drug-driving offences are triable summarily only. The 
penalties are set out in part 1 of schedule 2 to the RTOA 1988. The offences 
of driving or attempting to drive when unfit or with excess  alcohol79 carry 
more severe maximum penalties than the offences  of being in charge in such 
a condition. The maximum penalty for failing to supply an evidential 
specimen is the same as  that for the offence which was  being investigated, 
and so again is higher where the police were investigating driving or 
attempting to drive, rather than being in charge.80  It is  not, therefore, to a 
defendant’s  advantage to fail to provide a specimen.81 Failing to co-operate 
with a preliminary test attracts a lower penalty. 
The sentencing court is obliged to consider disqualifying the offender 
from driving. Disqualification is  obligatory for the driving or attempting to 
drive offences, and for causing death by careless driving when unfit or over 
the limit, but is a matter for the discretion of the court in an “in charge” 
case. For failing to provide specimens, disqualification again depends on the 
offence which was  being investigated, and is  obligatory in the driving or 
attempting to drive cases, and discretionary in the “in charge” cases. 
Where disqualification is obligatory, the minimum period of 
disqualification is usually twelve months, unless  for special reasons  the court 
thinks  fit to disqualify for a shorter period, or not at all.82 The expression 
“special reasons” is  not defined in the legislation, and has  given rise to an 
abundance of case law.83  The court may order that a disqualification for 
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78 RTOA 1988, s 15(5); see pp 149–150.
79  Or, in due course, with concentration of a specified controlled drug above the specified limit (by 
amendment of sch 2 pursuant to Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56, sch 22, para 4(4), to come into 
force from a date to be appointed).
80 Strangely, however, the equivalent distinction appears not to have been made in relation to  the new 
offences of driving, attempting to  drive or in charge with concentration of a specified controlled drug 
above the specified limit. This may be the result of  an oversight in drafting.
81  Although a person who is greatly over the limit may receive a lesser penalty by failing to provide 
than if  sentenced on the basis of  an actual alcohol concentration reading.
82 RTOA 1988, s 34. In certain circumstances the minimum period of disqualification is greater than 
twelve months.
83  The leading case is Whittall v Kirby [1947] KB 194 (DC). For a reason to be “special”, it must be a 
mitigating or extenuating circumstance; it must not amount in law to  a defence to the charge; it  must 
be directly connected with the commission of the offence and it  must be a matter which the court 
ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment. 
twelve months or longer may be reduced if the offender satisfactorily 
completes an approved course.84 
The Sentencing Council has provided guidelines  on the drink-drive 
offences.85
The principles  of law which arise out of the provisions summarised above 
are next identified. 
THE PRINCIPLES ENGAGED
Four major principles of law arise in relation to the drink- and drug-driving 
offences. 
Strict Liability
All the drink- and drug-driving offences discussed in this  work are offences 
of strict liability.86 This  is  usually interpreted as meaning that guilt can be 
established without proof of the defendant’s  intention to commit the offence 
charged, knowledge that he or she was committing it, or recklessness  as to 
whether he or she was committing it. While it would be all too easy for a 
defendant to escape conviction by, for example, claiming not to have been 
aware of being over the limit, leaving the prosecutor with the near-
impossible task of refuting the assertion, it is  rather less straightforward to 
reconcile strict liability for these offences  with the arguments advanced in 
the literature for and against such liability. By contrast, a person may not be 
convicted of failing to provide a specimen in the absence of a warning that 
failure constitutes  an offence,87 suggesting that strict liability does not apply 
to these offences. The literature on strict liability is  reviewed, and these 
issues considered in detail, in Chapter 2. 
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84  RTOA 1988, ss 34A, B and C. RTOA s 34B contains further provisions for shortening periods of 
disqualification by complying with an alcohol ignition interlock programme order made by the court. 
An alcolock is a device fitted to a motor vehicle which prevents the vehicle from being driven unless 
the driver provides satisfactory breath specimens into the device both before and while driving. 
Government has, however, made clear that the provisions will not be brought into force because the 
cost of implementing and enforcing such a scheme are likely to be disproportionate: The Government’s 
Response to the Reports by Sir Peter  North CBE QC and the Transport Select Committee on Drink and Drug Driving 
(Cm 8050, 2011) para 8.3.
85  Sentencing Council, Magistrates’ Courts Sentencing Guidelines, 124–126 <http://sentencingcouncil. 
judiciary.gov.uk/docs/MCSG_Update9_October_2012.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
86 See, for example, R v Drummond [2002] EWCA Crim 527.
87 DPP v Jackson, Stanley v DPP [1999] 1 AC 406 (HL).
The Presumption of  Innocence and Reverse Burdens of  Proof
The general rule of the criminal law is  that a defendant is  innocent until 
proved guilty and that it is for the prosecution to establish guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt.88 If, however, the defendant to an allegation of being in 
charge is to avoid conviction on the basis  that there was  no likelihood of 
driving while remaining unfit or over the limit,89 it is for the defendant to 
prove the absence of likelihood, on a balance of probabilities. Furthermore, 
expert evidence is  often required.90  This reverse burden of proof 
compromises the presumption of innocence and raises  questions of 
justification and acceptability. 
The statutory assumption that the alcohol level at the time of an 
alleged offence was no less than that in the specimen91  is an irrebuttable 
presumption of law,92  again raising questions  of the presumption of 
innocence, while the “hip-flask defence”93  also places  a legal burden of 
proof on the defendant.94  By comparison, if a defendant raises a matter 
amounting to a “reasonable excuse” for failing to provide a specimen, it falls 
to the prosecution to negative the claim.95 
These problematic issues  concerning onuses of proof and their 
relationship to the presumption of innocence are examined in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The House of Lords has  ruled that the requirement to provide a breath 
specimen constitutes  a substantial encroachment on the common law right 
of a citizen not to be compelled to incriminate himself.96 The same surely 
applies to the provision of blood and urine specimens. As already noted,97 
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88 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL).
89 Under RTA 1988, ss 4(3) and 5(2); see pp 90–94.
90 DPP v Frost [1989] RTR 11 (QBD).
91 Under RTOA 1988, s 15(2); see pp 105–107.
92 Parker v DPP [2001] RTR 16 (QBD); see p 107.
93 Under RTOA 1988, s 15(3); see pp 111–113.
94 Dawson v Lunn [1986] RTR 234 (QBD).
95  DPP v Boden [1988] RTR 188 (QBD); DPP v Szarzynski [1993] RTR 364 (QBD); McKeon v DPP 
[2007] EWHC 3216 (Admin) (DC). See p 102–104.
96 Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446 (HL) 458.
97 Above, p 16.
failure to provide specimens  – in effect, to provide the prosecution with the 
evidence it needs – attracts  a penalty broadly equivalent to the penalty for 
the principal offence. Self-incrimination further undermines the 
presumption of innocence, yet the privilege is  routinely breached in drink- 
and drug-driving investigations. This  is an important issue of principle 
which has  not been addressed in any depth in the literature. It is tackled in 
Chapter 4.
Legal Certainty
The principle of legal certainty embraces  the idea that those to whom the 
law applies  should have notice of its requirements and should be able to 
foresee what behaviour will amount to committing an offence. It has  been 
noted above that the prescribed limit is  defined in terms  of the alcohol 
concentration in the body, not the amount consumed, and that the amount 
which a person may consume without reaching the limit depends on a 
number of factors. Research indicates  a wide range of interpretations  of the 
prescribed limit, such that drivers are highly unlikely to know whether or not 
they are offending unless  they are stopped and tested. The principle of legal 
certainty is reviewed in Chapter 5, before moving on to examine other 
aspects of  certainty in relation to drink- and drug-driving.
Having identified the points  of principle arising, I next outline my approach 
to the literature. 
THE LITERATURE
The literature and case law selected for study fell broadly into the following 
subject areas:
• the legal nature of the drink-and drug-driving offences. 
Materials proved scarce, but what there is, is  reviewed in this 
chapter, below;
• the paradigm of the criminal law – the principles by reference 
to which it is  said the criminal law is  framed. Here the search 
was  much more fruitful, yielding a wealth of scholarship, 
selected parts of  which are reviewed in Chapters 2 to 5;
• the scientific aspects  of drink-and drug-driving, confined to 
materials  written for those who are not scientifically trained. I 
was  satisfied that these were sufficient for the purposes of 
explaining the scientific principles which underlie the law, and 
these sources are referred to in Chapter 6;
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• studies of how drivers  interpret the drink- and drug-driving 
laws. These make an important contribution, and are reviewed 
in Chapter 7, in support of the argument that the prescribed 
alcohol limit breaches the principle of  legal certainty. 
While it was at first disconcerting to find so little scholarly work directly on 
the legal aspects  of the offences, or indeed on road traffic law in general, the 
abundance of material on the principles of criminal law provided an 
opportunity for originality in applying those principles in an area which has 
received so little attention. Although there is a wide literature on many other 
aspects  of drug- and drink-driving,98 my review was  confined to the aspects 
listed above. 
THE NATURE OF THE OFFENCES
The behaviour comprising the drink-drive offences – drinking alcohol, and 
driving, are, of course, entirely legitimate activities in themselves; it is the 
combination which may give rise to an offence. The same applies to drug-
driving when the drugs were legitimately acquired. 
Seriousness
With the exception of drink-driving, road traffic offences in general tend to 
be thought of not as “real” crimes, as  not deserving of censure.99 
Commentators have suggested a number of  reasons for this:
• when laws  regulating motor traffic were first introduced in the early 
twentieth century, the conduct regulated fell outside those areas 
traditionally seen as  criminal (murder, riot and theft), and applied to 
classes  of society (the car-owning upper and, later, middle classes) 
whose ordinary activities  had not before been regulated in such a way 
and who were not associated with criminal behaviour;100 
• the absence of  intention to harm others;101 
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98  Such as the reasons people offend, the frequency of offending, the profiles of drink-drivers, the 
likely effects of  a lower limit, and the various enforcement, deterrent and rehabilitative measures.
99 Sally Cunningham, Driving Offences. Law, Policy and Practice (Ashgate 2008) 169, 172.
100  Clive Emsley, ‘Mother, what did Policemen do when there Weren’t any Motors? The Law, the 
Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 1900–1939’ (1993) 36 The Historical Jnl 357; 
Claire Corbett, Car Crime (Willan 2003) 15, 30; David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th 
edn, OUP 2011) 1125.
101  Claire Corbett and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, 
Viewed from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32 Brit J Criminology 537, 544; Claire Corbett, 
Car Crime (Willan 2003) 28.
• the absence of  intention to make a dishonest personal gain;102
• the social acceptability (perhaps even normality) of breaking at least 
some traffic rules;103
• the low chance of being caught and the relatively low penalties;104 
motorists can commit several offences before being disqualified under 
the “totting up” rule;105
• the fact that an accused motorist often need not even attend court;106
• the widespread use of the word “accident” to describe incidents 
which may well feature offending behaviour,107  suggesting that no 
one was to blame, that the incident resulted from unforeseen 
circumstances – the weather, the road conditions, or other drivers, for 
example, making it easy for a driver to displace responsibility to 
others. There is support for this in the research finding that most 
drivers  believe their driving to be more skilled and less risky than that 
of others,108 and that traffic offences  are perceived to result from lack 
of  concentration rather than deliberate breaking of  the rules;109
• the fact that forms such as  job applications may ask for details of an 
applicant’s convictions, but specify that certain road traffic offences 
may be omitted;110
• the absence of a Home Office core objective for police to investigate 
and reduce road offences;111 
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102 Claire Corbett, Car Crime (Willan 2003) 28.
103  Claire Corbett and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, 
Viewed from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32 Brit J Criminology 537, 544.
104 Ibid.
105 Claire Corbett, Car Crime (Willan 2003) 26.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid, 31.
108  Ola Svenson, ‘Are we all Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?’ (1981) 47 Acta 
Psychologica 143. It is of course impossible that the majority of drivers can be more skilful and/or 
less risky than average. 
109 L Brook, Attitudes to Road Traffic Law (Transport and Road Research Laboratory 1987) 28, reporting 
that  70 per cent of 1,416 respondents who completed a questionnaire agreed or strongly agreed with 
the proposition that most road traffic offences occur because of lack of concentration, rather than 
drivers deliberately breaking the law.
110  Claire Corbett  and Frances Simon, ‘Police and Public Perceptions of the Seriousness of Traffic 
Offences’ (1991) 31 BJ Crim 153, 154.
111 Claire Corbett, Car Crime (Willan 2003) 27.
• the reluctance of politicians to risk alienating motorists, who 
constitute a large body of  voters, by severe measures.112
Another indicator of the low level of seriousness attached to road 
traffic offences  is  the proposition that many of them are so straightforward 
that they no longer warrant being brought before a full court.113 
Government has suggested that some 500,000 simple road traffic cases  could 
be heard away from traditional courtrooms, perhaps  by a single magistrate 
sitting in an office.114 This number represents  well over half of the 819,000 
cases in magistrates’ courts for offences relating to motor vehicles in 2012.115
Drink-driving, however, seems to be an exception to the perception 
that road traffic offences are not “real crime”. It carries  a degree of stigma 
normally attached to more paradigmatic offences.116 It has been said to be 
publicly regarded as a serious criminal offence involving inherently wrongful 
conduct.117 Public education campaigns  against drinking and driving may 
have much to do with this.118  The emergence of groups such as  the 
Campaign Against Drinking and Driving,119  and the public favouring of 
random breath testing have been cited as possible reasons.120  A study 
reported in 1991 showed that driving when the driver thought he or she was 
over the limit, whether or not the driver also felt that his  or her ability to 
drive was  affected, was considered more serious (by both police and public) 
than twenty-four other road traffic offences, ranging from driving while 
disqualified down to parking and minor speeding offences.121 This  reflects an 
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112 Ibid, 34.
113 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS. A Strategy and Action Plan to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 
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earlier study in which driving after drinking too much was considered the 
second most serious of eight offences, second only to injuring a pedestrian 
while driving carelessly.122 Driving after drinking is  now widely perceived as 
“very wrong indeed”.123 There has  been a cultural shift in that the majority 
of the public no longer considers drink-driving acceptable.124 Indeed, there 
are suggestions  that the legislation itself may have played a part in bringing 
about this general view.125 It has been remarked that, unlike other offences 
designed to promote safety, such as speeding, drink-driving has become an 
accepted use of government power to limit autonomy behind the wheel.126 
Driving while intoxicated has been cited127 as  an example of the creation of 
unwarranted risk of injury, which can straightforwardly be characterised as 
wrongful. Finally, in a civil case128  concerning an exclusion clause in an 
insurance policy, the Queen’s Bench Division held that driving when unfit 
through drink was not an offence of inadvertence or negligence, but one 
requiring a degree of  moral culpability or turpitude.
The seriousness  of drink-driving has  not, however, been universally 
accepted. One commentator, writing in 1994, said that many people think of 
the drink-driver as not on the right side of the law, but not as  a 
“criminal”.129  He posits  a number of explanations, for example, that 
conviction does not carry enough stigma, that drink driving even without 
being caught does  not carry enough disapproval, and that drink-drivers  do 
not attract fear or abhorrence as do those who commit other types  of 
crime.130 
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It has  been argued131  that the risk presented by individual drink-
drivers is exaggerated. The basis for this argument is: 
• although statistics show the totality of harm (to both people 
and property) caused by drink-drivers, there is  no way of 
allocating to individual drivers the risk posed; it may be that 
many pose no risk at all, while others pose great risk;
• a fixed blood alcohol limit bears no necessary or consistent 
connection to actual driving behaviour; some aspects of 
drunken behaviour, such as taking risks and aggression, are not 
necessarily caused by alcohol at all; 
• there is an unjustifiable assumption that alcohol is to blame for 
an incident in which a drink-driver is at fault; other factors 
(such as road conditions) are not properly taken into account.
In the context of the appropriate penalties  for drink-driving, Husak132 
proposes that drink-driving is  not a serious offence at all. Driving is a 
dangerous  activity in itself, he points  out, and drink-driving is  not necessarily 
any more dangerous than driving when sober. He justifies  this  on the ground 
that there is  no demonstrable difference in the relative culpability of drivers 
who have taken drink and those who have not, or in the risks posed by each. 
He proposes, albeit tentatively, that the more precautions it is reasonable for 
others  to take to avoid the harm which the offence is  designed to obviate, the 
less serious  the offence; in the context of road traffic, it is incumbent on the 
state and individuals to take a wide range of measures  to reduce risks posed 
by other drivers, whether or not they have been drinking. A second tentative 
suggestion is  that the offence must be of low seriousness if different people 
can engage in it yet create differing degrees of risk, in that different blood 
alcohol levels product different degrees of  impairment.
While the views  described above may at first glance appear 
unconventional, they should probably not be dismissed entirely, especially in 
view of a UK research finding that driving behaviour is impaired more by 
reason of a telephone conversation than by having a blood alcohol level at 
the prescribed limit.133 In Chapter 2,134 however, I argue that drink-drivers 
are rarely morally innocent.
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Technology-Led
The excess alcohol offences  are also special in that they are proved by 
operation of technological devices.135  Much of the underlying legislation 
can perhaps now be described as  “technology-led”, in the sense that the 
legislative provisions could not have been implemented unless  the requisite 
scientific procedures were in place or reliable measuring equipment was 
available. Thus, evidential breath-testing was first introduced by the 
Transport Act 1981, once reliable breath-analysis machines  had been 
developed. The RTA 1988 now contains  provisions facilitating evidential 
breath testing elsewhere than at a police station, although these provisions 
are not yet in operation because portable evidential breath testing 
instruments have not yet been approved. 
In 2011 the Home Office published a guide to type approval 
procedures  for preliminary drug testing devices136 and a later invitation to 
manufacturers  to submit devices  for approval,137 to provide further aids to 
detecting drug-driving offences. 
Non-Paradigmatic
It has  been suggested that road traffic offences as  a whole are perceived as 
falling outside the paradigm of criminal liability.138 This in turn raises  the 
question of defining the paradigm in the first place. Perhaps it is  acceptable 
to adopt Duff ’s  perspective139 that the law exhibits a spectrum of doctrines, 
rules  and definitions ranging from the most specific (in particular those 
defining offences) to the most general. Duff locates the “general part” of the 
criminal law towards one end of that spectrum, and it seems fair to equate 
the paradigm with such general rules. In any event, for my purposes, the 
paradigm includes  at least the general principles which form the headings to 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this  work, and questions  of harm and 
endangerment discussed below. There are other principles  which are not 
offended by the drink- and drug-driving offences – the principle of non-
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retroactivity140  and of (arguably) non-liability for omissions141  are two 
examples.
 It has been said that the road traffic offences fall outside the 
paradigm because they lack two elements of paradigmatic crime: harm and 
blame.142 All the offences  described in this work, except for causing death by 
careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs, can be 
committed without any harm arising. On the other hand, they do attract a 
considerable element of blame – a subject discussed in some detail in 
Chapter 2. 
Clarkson143  says that a paradigmatic crime is one in which a person 
intentionally causes  a prohibited harm. Some crimes  may depart from the 
paradigm, but such departures must be justified and should attract lower 
sentences. He cites dangerous  driving and careless driving as  examples of 
double departures from the paradigm in that they are committed in the 
absence of  both intention and harm. 
Endangerment
The criminal law has  certain preventive functions, and these include the 
criminalisation of  conduct which creates the risk of  certain harms.144 
With the exception of causing death by careless driving while under 
the influence of drink or drugs, all the offences  described in this work fall 
into this  category of “endangerment” or “conduct” offences, the offences 
consisting in conduct which gives rise to a risk even though that risk often 
comes to nothing. Causing death by careless driving, by contrast, is  a result 
crime, where a specific harm must be shown to make out the offence.145 
Whether it is  just to criminalise conduct that could lead to harm 
depends, it has been said, on balancing, on the one hand, the seriousness of 
the possible harm and the likelihood of its occurrence, against, on the other 
hand, the social value of the conduct and the degree of intrusion on the 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
26
140 See, for example, AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th 
edn, Hart 2013) 22, and p 184.
141 See, for example, AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th 
edn, Hart 2013) 66 et seq.
142  Sally Cunningham, Driving Offences Law, Policy and Practice (Ashgate 2008) 3–4; CMV Clarkson, 
Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 4.
143 CMV Clarkson, Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 130–131.
144 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 38. See also, 
for example, RA Duff, Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2009) 125–
126.
145 Sally Cunningham, Driving Offences. Law, Policy and Practice (Ashgate 2008) 4.
citizen’s life which criminalisation would cause.146  Thus drink-driving is 
prohibited, while walking down the street when drunk is not.147  The 
potential to cause harm, without actually doing so, has been said to be a key 
feature distinguishing motoring offences from other criminal offences.148 
The drink-drive offences  have also been described as “status” or 
“situation” offences, in that the offences are made out by proving a specified 
state of affairs; the state of being in charge when unfit, for example, is  the 
actus reus of  an “in charge” offence.149 
In the same vein, drink-driving has been described as an anticipatory 
offence, punishing conduct that is not harmful on each occasion it is 
performed.150 
The American commentator James Jacobs151 describes a drink-driver 
as  a ticking bomb, who is  punished for creating a significant risk of injury or 
death to other road users. Since the drink- and drug-driving offences do not 
require any harm, he continues, they are inchoate and pre-emptive, 
proscribing behaviour before its dangerousness  is  manifest. They are 
incompatible with a criminal jurisprudence that emphasises  individual 
culpability, and fit uneasily into the law of crimes. A fixed blood-alcohol 
limit is a prophylactic safety standard.152 
Duff defines endangerment as the creation, by act or omission, of a 
significant risk that another person will suffer harm.153  Non-consummate 
endangerment offences are those which are committed even though no 
Chapter 1: Introduction
27
146  AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th edn, Hart 2013) 
649–650; AP Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart 2011) 45, 67–68; RA Duff, Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the 
Criminal Law (Hart 2009) 156.
147  AP Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(Hart 2011) 55–56.
148 Claire Corbett, Car Crime (Willan 2003) 29.
149 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th edn, OUP 2011) 63. See also CMV Clarkson, 
Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 45. 
150 Douglas N Husak, ‘Is Drunk Driving a Serious Offense?’ (1994) 23 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
52, 66.
151 James B Jacobs, Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma (University of  Chicago Press 1989) 59 et seq.
152  Ibid, 71. Compare prophylactic crimes, said to be distinct from endangerment offences in that the 
risk of harm does not arise directly from a prohibited act, but only after some further human 
intervention: AP Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart 2011) 79.
153  RA Duff, ‘Criminalizing Endangerment’ in RA Duff and Stuart P Green (eds), Defining Crimes: 
Essays on the Special Part of  the Criminal Law (OUP 2005) 46.
harm materialises.154  On this basis, I take it that causing death by careless 
driving when unfit or over the limit would be a consummate endangerment 
offence, while the remaining drink- and drug-driving offences would be non-
consummate endangerment offences. 
Duff155  goes on to identify two types of endangerment offence – 
explicit and implicit. Explicit endangerment offences are those in which a 
person commits an offence by creating a risk which is  specified in the 
definition of the offence, while implicit endangerment offences are those 
which consist in behaviour which is  liable to lead to harm, but the risk is not 
specified in the definition of the offence. Duff cites driving when unfit as  an 
explicit endangerment offence (the risk being, presumably, the unfitness), 
while driving with excess alcohol is  an implicit endangerment offence which 
does  not include in its statutory formulation a definition of the relevant 
endangerment. This  distinction must be based on the assumption that 
driving when over the limit is  not in itself a risk. This  presents  a difficulty. 
While it is  just possible that a person who is over the limit may be able to 
drive without creating a risk, it is unlikely. The evidence is that almost any 
amount of alcohol impairs driving skills, rendering the person unfit to 
drive,156  such that both unfitness to drive and being over the limit are 
endangerments in themselves. This is not necessarily to undermine Duff ’s 
argument, but simply to question whether this  particular example is as apt as 
he may have thought.157
Duff argues  that, in general, the law should not prohibit conduct 
which is  intrinsically harmless since this fails  to treat citizens as  responsible 
agents, but he makes an exception for situations in which there is  reason to 
think that individuals  cannot be trusted to judge for themselves, citing the 
drink-drive offences as examples.158
Drink-driving and exceeding a speed limit have been described as 
internal endangerment rules  in that they provide protection to the members 
of the group (drivers) whose conduct is being regulated. It is  a scheme of 
mutual protection, providing reciprocal benefits.159 If all drivers abide by the 
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rules, they are protected from their own excessive speed (or, presumably, 
driving with excess alcohol) and from that of other drivers. I revisit the idea 
that drivers are in some special position vis-à-vis  each other in Chapter 
10.160 
The offence of drink-driving addresses a remote risk in the sense that 
some contingency (the presence of another vehicle on the road, perhaps) 
must come about before harm – damage to other persons or property – 
materialises. It has also been called an offence of abstract endangerment, in 
that the harm anticipated, which was  the reason for the legislation, is  not 
mentioned in the statutory formulation of the offence161  – a perception 
reminiscent of Duff ’s  distinction between explicit and implicit 
endangerment offences, described above. Crimes in which the prospective 
harm is not specified in the definition of the crime are designated “non-
constitutive” crimes  by Simester and von Hirsch;162  and endangerment 
offences  are a type of non-constitutive offence.163  Simester and von 
Hirsch164 give as  an example of an abstract endangerment offence breaking 
a 70 m.p.h. speed limit – not only does the statutory provision creating the 
offence not specify the harm sought to guard against, but breaking the limit 
is  an offence even if it gives rise to no real risk. Such abstract formulations, 
the argument goes, also protect against the secondary risk of mistake by the 
driver, by specifying what measures are appropriate to avoid the risk of 
harm. Thus, the prohibition on driving too fast is  more easily obeyed when 
formulated as  a speed limit. The writers  give another example – “how much 
alcohol can I safely drink?” suggesting that they bring drink-driving into this 
category of offence. This  seems to be an over-simplification of a highly 
complex issue; as will be seen,165 the drink-drive limit is  far more difficult to 
understand and observe than a speed limit.
The “in charge” offences  concern even remoter harm in that they 
prohibit conduct which has no adverse consequences  in itself, but may lead 
to a further act (driving) that creates a risk of harm. The offence depends  on 
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the making of an intervening choice, but the conduct is  punishable whether 
or not that choice is made.166 
Mala in se; Mala Prohibita
Returning to Duff, elsewhere167 he says that driving when impaired by drink 
or drugs is a mala in se offence, that is, it comprises behaviour which is  wrong 
in itself, regardless  of the fact that it is prohibited by law, since it exposes 
others  to an unjustified risk of harm. Traditional examples of mala in se 
offences  are murder, rape and theft. On the other hand, mala prohibita 
offences  are those comprising behaviour which is  wrongful only because it is 
prohibited by the criminal law. Driving when over the prescribed alcohol 
limit, Duff argues, often comprises  the mala in se of exposing others  to an 
unjustified risk of harm, but not always so, because, again, some people are 
able to drive quite safely even when over the limit. These offences are 
neither purely mala in se nor purely mala prohibita. 
Husak168 describes them as  “hybrid offences” and, in an argument 
concerning the justification for punishment for such offences, adopts  the 
same view that driving with excess  alcohol does not necessarily feature any 
malum in se since, he says, some people may drive safely even when over the 
limit. He construes  Duff as  meaning that a majority of those who commit a 
hybrid offence commit a malum in se and questions whether it is right for the 
state to punish those who commit an act simply because that act is wrongful 
when committed by a majority of  people. 
As I have already argued, these classifications of offences  are not 
wholly convincing in that they seem to imply, in error, that quite some 
numbers of  people who are over the limit may be able to drive safely. 
Clarkson169 cites Feinberg’s proposition that criminalisation is  justified 
to prevent or reduce harm to others, and that the more serious the 
threatened harm, the less probable it need be. Clarkson then proceeds on 
the basis that the drink-drive limit has  been set quite low, concluding that the 
potential harm (the death of or serious injury to others) is  so great that it is 
justifiable to criminalise the mere fact of driving while over the limit even 
though, statistically, it might not be very probable that the harm would 
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materialise. Clarkson does  not say on what basis  he describes the drink-drive 
limit as  “quite low”, but those who argue in favour of lowering the limit 
would almost certainly disagree with him, and he might be surprised to 
know just how much some people can drink before reaching the limit.170 
None of the literature reviewed above has the drink-drive offences  as the 
primary focus, but the offences  are mentioned in the discourses  cited to 
illustrate various arguments and classifications  of offences. I am 
uncomfortable with Duff ’s reference to the drink-drive offences to support 
his distinction between implicit and explicit endangerment offences, with the 
basis  for Simester and von Hirsch’s classification of drink-driving as an 
abstract endangerment offence, and with Husak’s  categorisation of drink-
driving as a hybrid offence. It seems to me that the small possibility that a 
person may drive without danger to others  even when over the limit has 
been taken too far, and that the true nature of the offences has not been fully 
appreciated.
CONCLUSION
In this opening chapter I have outlined the reasons I believe the drink- and 
drug-driving offences are worthy of academic attention, set out the contours 
of my research project, summarised the statutory regime, and looked at 
what literature there is  on the offences in general. They are referred to as an 
exception to the common perception that road traffic offences are not “real 
crime”, but the view that they are serious  offences  is  not universal. The 
drink-drive offences are given as examples of particular categories  of offence 
– of offences  of endangerment of various  kinds, and as a combination of 
mala in se and mala prohibita. That is all very interesting, but there is  much 
more to discover about these offences. I now turn to the major principles 
engaged, starting with the question of  strict liability. 
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Chapter 2: Strict Liability
INTRODUCTION
This  chapter is on strict liability and how it features  in the drink- and drug-
driving offences. The case law establishes a presumption in favour of mens rea 
as  a precondition for criminal liability, which is  to be departed from only in 
certain circumstances. Mens rea is said to relate to a defendant’s mental state,1 
comprising different degrees  of awareness by a person that what he or she is 
about to do will bring about a prohibited harm. Many commentators  have, 
however, lamented the ease and frequency with which the presumption has 
been overridden, with the result that many offences require no mental 
element at all, and are instead offences of  strict liability.
I first briefly review the theoretical background to the concepts of 
strict liability and mens rea, and the case law, then examine the drink- and 
drug-driving offences  to relate them to the principles identified in the 
literature. I conclude that, despite a strong presumption in favour of mens rea, 
the principal drink- and drug-driving offences  are offences of strict liability, 
but that this can be justified. 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Nature of  Strict Liability
To the extent that mens rea, in the sense of intention, knowledge, recklessness 
or other specified mental state,2  in relation to one or more elements of an 
offence, does not have to be proved for a prosecution to succeed, the offence 
is one of  strict liability.3
In the early case of Woodrow,4  the defendant was held liable for 
possessing adulterated tobacco, even though the adulteration would have 
been discoverable only by “a nice chemical analysis”; and in Hobbs v 
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Winchester Corporation,5 a butcher was convicted of selling unsound meat even 
though he could not have discovered the disease which affected the meat 
unless  he had an analyst on the premises – both cases in which the 
references to scientific analysis  seem particularly apt in the context of 
breath, blood and urine specimens. In Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v 
Storkwain,6 the defendant company was  convicted for supplying medicines, in 
contravention of the Medicines  Act 1968, against forged prescriptions, even 
though the defendant did so in good faith. All these are widely quoted 
examples of  strict liability offences. 
Green7 identifies six meanings which have been given to the term strict 
liability, but argues  that it should be confined to offences  omitting the 
requirement for mens rea in relation to at least one material element of the 
offence, such that there is  liability in the absence of intent, purpose, 
knowledge, belief, recklessness, negligence or some other prescribed mental 
state. He characterises  strict liability in this sense as  “formal” strict liability, 
as  opposed to substantive (or broad, or moral) strict liability, under which a 
person can be convicted without a showing of moral fault. His reasons 
include that mens rea in his narrow sense can be determined fairly easily, 
while in the sense of blameworthiness, it is  more likely to be difficult and 
cause controversy. Nevertheless, he concludes, eliminating the requirement 
for mens rea remains a radical (if now common) departure from the paradigm 
of  criminal responsibility.
Green goes on to say that offences of formally strict liability can be 
divided into those of pure strict liability where no mens rea is required as  to 
any aspect of the offence;8  and impure strict liability where mens rea is 
required for at least one element but is  not required for at least one other 
element.
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Fault
Other commentators make the same distinction between “formal” and 
“substantive” strict liability as does Green.9 Husak goes on to point out that 
an offence may be one of formal strict liability without any requirement that 
the defendant be at fault in any way, although fault is not necessarily 
dispensed with. Conversely, a person may be at fault despite the absence of a 
requirement for mens rea, and not all instances  of formal strict liability 
necessarily lead to the conviction of the innocent. Fault, Husak continues, 
involves  a moral, extra-legal judgment (which may be controversial) about 
whether a person deserves blame. 
Despite early definitions of mens rea in terms such as  “an evil intention, 
or a knowledge of the wrongfulness  of the act”,10 Ormerod stresses that mens 
rea is  concerned with legal, not moral, guilt. It is possible (although 
exceptional) for a person to have mens rea even though no reasonable person 
would regard the person’s state of mind as  blameworthy.11  Husak 
comments 12 that there is  a persistent but unfortunate tendency to equate 
liability without mens rea and liability without fault. Fault and mens rea are not, 
he insists, synonymous; mens rea is not a sufficient condition for fault. 
While commentators such as  Ashworth and Horder say that offences 
which require only minimal fault or no fault at all are usually termed 
offences  of strict liability,13  and refer to intention, recklessness  and 
knowledge as  “fault requirements”14 which go to make up mens rea, these 
references to fault should be taken to mean legal, not moral, fault. Other 
commentators seem to proceed on the basis  that fault and mens rea are 
synonymous.15
John Gardner,16 again acknowledging the distinction between formal 
and substantive strict liability, adopts the terms, “the mens rea principle” 
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requiring criminal wrongs  to have certain constituents, here intention or 
awareness of the wrong-making features  of the action in question; and the 
“fault principle” – a principle regulating the conditions  for imposing 
criminal liability in the first place, rather than the constituents  of a 
particular offence. 
Chan and Simester17 again point out that, while mens rea is  relevant to 
fault, proof of mens rea does not of itself necessarily establish fault. In the 
offence of causing death by dangerous  driving, liability in relation to the 
death is  strict, but there is  culpability in relation to the offence as a whole – it 
is  the risk of just such an occurrence that makes it wrong to drive 
dangerously in the first place. Examining the functions  of mens rea, the 
authors refer to the “gateway role” of some activity-specific prohibitions. 
They give as  an example the offence of rape. While sexual intercourse is in 
itself a perfectly lawful activity, matters  of consent are so closely bound up 
with it that those engaged in it are, implicitly, on notice that questions of 
consent are in play; this  generates an immediate and obvious duty to 
consider the matter of consent; failure to be alert to such a question is  itself 
ground for condemnation. Again, this  is  a helpful concept in the drink- and 
drug-driving offences and I return to it later.18
Roberts  stresses  that procedural devices such as strict liability and 
reverse onus provisions  are not interchangeable with definitional elements  of 
an offence; the morally unacceptable elements must be encompassed in the 
definition of the offence, not relegated to a secondary provision specifying 
defences, a reverse burden or some other procedural mechanism; if the law 
is to have moral authority, the moral message should be clear.19
Highlighting fault as an independent issue, distinct from the 
constituents  of mens rea, is useful in relation to the drink- and drug-driving 
offences. I adopt this distinction, and discuss it further below.20
In differentiating attacks from endangerments,21  Duff argues22 that 
mens rea is  required for the former, but not the latter; endangerment need 
involve only an actus reus, an act or omission that actually creates a suitable 
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risk. Liability for endangerment can, therefore, he argues, be strict since the 
wrong consists in the failure of  proper concern.
Mens Rea
The term mens rea is generally understood to mean the mental element of an 
offence – the “guilty mind”.23  The form it takes varies from offence to 
offence, depending on the statutory definition and/or the relevant case law.24 
Mens rea commonly comprises:
• intention,25 as in the case of theft – the dishonest appropriation 
of property belonging to another with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of  it;26
• recklessness  as  to a consequence of an action,27 as in the case of 
criminal damage, defined as  destroying or damaging another 
person’s  property, either intending to do so, or being reckless as 
to whether it would be destroyed or damaged;28
• knowledge, wilfulness, belief or suspicion.29  For example, 
knowingly and wilfully travelling by train beyond the distance 
paid for, with intent to avoid payment;30 wilfully obstructing a 
constable in the execution of the constable’s  duty;31  and 
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disclosing information knowing, or having reasonable grounds 
to suspect that it is information of  a certain kind.32 
The above list is not exhaustive, and many other forms, such as malice 
or dishonesty, or the frame of mind suggested by the words “with a view 
to”33 also occur.
Mens rea which takes the form of intention or knowledge is said to be 
the most culpable, followed by recklessness, belief  and suspicion.34
Negligence
“Negligence” here means conduct which falls  below a given standard, 
usually that of a reasonable person.35 The weight of opinion appears  to be 
that negligence is not of itself sufficient to constitute mens rea, although it 
may be a constituent of  fault and so ground criminal liability. 
Ormerod is of the view that, if the term mens rea is used to embrace all 
the varieties  of fault that may give rise to criminal liability, then negligence is 
included within it, but if mens rea is  taken in its traditional sense of the 
“guilty mind”, then negligence is not a type of  mens rea.36
Ashworth and Horder37  recognise that a number of offences, 
including careless driving38  and dangerous  driving39, are based on 
negligence. They acknowledge that defining offences  in this way has been 
criticised because it derogates from the principle that liability should depend 
on the defendant’s having intended the outcome of his  or her action, or at 
least having been aware of it as a possibility. In an offence defined by 
reference to negligence, no such intention or awareness need be proved; it is 
enough that a reasonable person would have been aware of the 
consequences. Although it may be fair to hold accountable someone who 
could have behaved otherwise if there were sufficient signals to alert a 
reasonable citizen to the need to take care, that does not necessarily mean 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
38
32 Contrary to Serious Crime Act 2007, s 69.
33  As, for example, in Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, s 143(2)(d), prohibiting the 
placing or keeping in place in a specified part of Parliament Square any sleeping equipment with a 
view to its use for the purpose of  sleeping overnight there.
34 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th edn, OUP 2011) 106.
35 Ibid, 146.
36 Ibid, 147.
37 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of  Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 181–185.
38 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 3.
39 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 2.
that negligence is  an appropriate standard for criminal liability. Ashworth 
and Horder are of the view that it could be justified only if certain 
conditions  are fulfilled. Those conditions are that the potential harm is 
great; the risk of its occurrence is obvious; the person in question has a duty 
to avoid the risk; and that person has  capacity to take the required 
precautions.40  In many situations, such a person would be sufficiently 
culpable to justify criminal sanctions. Ashworth and Horder conclude that 
negligence is more acceptable as  a form of fault than as a form of mens rea – 
we may define offences by reference to negligence (as in the cases of careless 
driving and dangerous driving), but they are still strict liability offences. 
Simester and Sullivan41  adopt a broadly similar view, again 
highlighting careless  driving as  an example of an offence where the 
negligence relates  to the prohibited behaviour itself, rather than to the 
consequences or circumstances of some other act. They suggest that the 
standard in such offences is objective, referring to a 1938 case42  where the 
test for careless driving was said to be:
an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in 
relation to the safety of other users  of the highway. It is  in no 
way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience 
to be attained by the individual driver. …
The standard may be higher where the person in question has special 
knowledge or skill; in dangerous driving and careless driving, the court is to 
have regard43  to any circumstances  shown to be within the driver’s 
knowledge. But skills  below those normally to be expected may or may not 
favour an accused; a learner driver doing his  or her best but falling below 
the required standard44 would not escape conviction for careless driving.45 
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One final point on negligence is that offences defined by reference to it 
have the advantage that they signal the degree of care which will ensure 
immunity from conviction.46
The Presumption in Favour of  Mens Rea
The case law is to the effect that there is  a presumption that mens rea is  a 
precondition for criminal liability. The Queen’s Bench Division articulated 
the presumption in 1895, saying that mens rea is  an essential ingredient of 
every offence, but can be displaced either by the words of the statute which 
creates  the offence, or by the subject matter of the statute; both must be 
considered.47 
	 The presumption was restated in Sweet v Parsley,48 the House of Lords  
insisting on mens rea where Parliament had not intended to criminalise those 
who are not blameworthy.
In 1985, the Privy Council stated the principles as follows:49
(1) there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a 
person can be held guilty of  a criminal offence; 
(2) the presumption is particularly strong where the offence is 
“truly criminal” in character; 
(3) the presumption applies  to statutory offences, and can be 
displaced only if this  is  clearly or by necessary implication the 
effect of  the statute; 
(4) the only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is 
where the statute is concerned with an issue of social concern, 
and public safety is such an issue; 
(5) even where a statute is  concerned with such an issue, the 
presumption of mens rea stands  unless  it can also be shown that 
the creation of strict liability will be effective to promote the 
objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to 
prevent the commission of  the prohibited act.
More recently, the House of  Lords said that:
the starting point for a court is  the established common law 
presumption that a mental element, traditionally called mens rea, 
is  an essential ingredient unless  Parliament has  indicated a 
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contrary intention either expressly or by necessary 
implication.50
The presumption relates to “all elements of the offence” unless 
Parliament intended otherwise.51
Displacing the presumption
The five principles  in Gammon have been applied inconsistently, and the 
courts have been ready to find exceptions.52 A survey, reported in 1996,53 of 
all indictable offences listed in Archbold54 showed that half included at least 
one element which did not require mens rea to be shown to establish guilt. If 
the less  serious  either-way and summary-only offences 55 were also taken into 
account, the proportion of strict liability offences would almost certainly be 
even greater.
Most offences  are created by statutory provisions which are silent as to 
mens rea, leaving to the courts the task of deciding what Parliament 
intended.56  The language of the statute is an important method of 
determining whether or not the presumption in favour of mens rea is  to apply. 
Words such as  “intentionally”, “recklessly”, “maliciously” and “knowingly” 
argue in favour of  mens rea.57
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Offences which are “truly criminal”
The presumption is particularly strong if the offence in question is “truly 
criminal” in character,58  although the judgment in Gammon gives no 
guidance on the meaning of these words. Many offences  are obviously and 
immediately truly criminal while many others are clearly not truly criminal, 
but it can be difficult to draw the line.59 
The phrase “truly criminal” has been equated with offences which are 
“overtly wrongful”, such as  murder and assault, which attract moral 
condemnation, as opposed to those which are “quasi-criminal”, “public 
welfare” or “regulatory” and attract little or no stigma.60  An obvious 
example of the latter is  a parking offence. The lower the stigma attaching to 
conviction for an offence, the less  the need for a mens rea element,61 while the 
“more serious or more disgraceful the offence the greater the stigma”.62 
Quasi-criminal offences have been said to lack a key underlying feature 
which sets the criminal law apart from the civil – the declaration of 
reprehensible wrongdoing implicit in a verdict of guilty and the punishment 
of  an offender.63 
In seeking to distinguish between quasi-criminal regulations  and true 
stigmatic crimes, Stumer64 suggests that a rough distinction can be drawn on 
the basis that criminal offences are those which involve conduct so 
reprehensible that it ought to be prohibited completely – murder, sexual 
assault, fraud, robbery and theft, for example. Regulatory offences relate to 
conduct which has  potential to create conditions  which are dangerous  to 
others, but which is  not so obviously wrongful that it should be prohibited in 
its entirety; such offences arise in the contexts  of regimes regulating matters 
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such as workplace health and safety, environmental protection, licensing 
regimes and road traffic.
In an early judgment, examples  of “acts  which are not criminal in any 
real sense” were given, and included offences relating to taxation, the 
possession of adulterated tobacco, and the sale of adulterated food.65 
Another example is offences under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968.66
A further factor bearing on seriousness is  the severity of the penalty 
which may be imposed.67 In particular, the availability of imprisonment as a 
penalty may be taken to indicate seriousness  such that strict liability is not 
appropriate.68 
The effect of  the statute
According to Gammon, the presumption in favour of mens rea may be 
displaced only where that is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of 
the statute. The language of the statute must be scrutinised and the 
behaviour it regulates  considered; both are relevant.69 The absence of words 
implying varieties  of mens rea, such as  “intentionally”, “knowingly”, 
“recklessly” “believing” and “suspecting” would suggest there is no element 
of  mens rea in the offence. 
The presence of a “due diligence” defence, under which an accused 
person may escape conviction by showing that he or she exercised due 
diligence (or all reasonable care, or an equivalent standard) to avoid the 
commission of the offence, is  often interpreted as meaning that the offence 
is one of strict liability.70 The Licensing Act 2003 provides many examples; 
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thus, it is a defence to a charge of selling alcohol to someone aged under 
eighteen for the defendant to show that he or she believed the person was 
eighteen or over, and had taken all reasonable steps  to establish the 
individual’s  age, or that nobody could reasonably have suspected, from the 
individual’s appearance, that the individual was under eighteen.71 
Issues of  social concern
Finally, the Privy Council in Gammon ruled that the presumption in favour of 
mens rea can be displaced only where the statute in question is  concerned 
with an issue of social concern, and it can be shown that displacing the 
requirement for mens rea will be effective to promote the objects of the statute 
by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of the 
prohibited act. 
In an early case, the Divisional Court declared that it was dealing with 
a statute (the Public Health Act 1875) passed for the protection of the 
public, and its purpose would be defeated if it were necessary to show guilty 
knowledge in the seller – here a sausage-maker who was found to be using 
unsound meat in contravention of  the Act.72
It has been suggested73 that the type of offence most suitable for strict 
liability would involve substantial public harm or inconvenience, whether 
directly or cumulatively, and relatively little stigma for an individual; “certain 
road traffic offences” are cited as examples, but, unfortunately for the 
present review, they are not further specified. Elsewhere, it is  said74 that strict 
liability is confined to “regulatory law”, where the emphasis is  on the 
preservation of standards  of safety, hygiene and environmental integrity in 
the relevant industry or activity, rather than the imposition of just deserts  for 
individual offenders.
It has been observed that it is  easier to displace mens rea and infer strict 
liability in relation to matters  which involve special skills  or which require 
licensing,75  or where the provision in question applies specifically to a 
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particular trade, profession or special activity.76  The House of Lords has 
recognised these criteria:
… where the subject matter of the statute is  the regulation of a 
particular activity involving potential danger to public health, 
safety or morals  in which citizens have a choice as  to whether 
they participate or not, the court may feel driven to infer an 
intention of Parliament to impose by penal sanctions  a higher 
duty of care on those who choose to participate and to place 
upon them an obligation to take whatever measures  may be 
necessary to prevent the prohibited act… 77 
And:
A strict responsibility may be acceptable in the case of statutory 
offences  which are concerned to regulate the conduct of some 
particular activity in the public interest. The requirement to 
have a licence in order to carry on certain kinds  of activity is  an 
obvious  example. The promotion of health and safety and the 
avoidance of pollution are among the purposes to be served by 
such controls. These kinds  of cases  may properly be seen as  not 
truly criminal. Many may be relatively trivial and only involve a 
monetary penalty. Many may carry with them no real social 
disgrace or infamy.78
Ormerod points  out that the activity in question may be one in which 
citizens generally engage, like driving a car. Since this  is  an activity of 
choice, which involves danger to others, it falls within the principle above 
and it is acceptable that some offences regulating the conduct of motorists 
should be strict.79
The degree of social danger posed by the behaviour regulated by the 
statute in question has  sometimes influenced courts in favour of finding strict 
liability; examples  given80  include dangerous drugs, the possession of 
prohibited items, and the management of premises  and pollution,81  but 
driving must fall within this principle as well.
If an offence is framed so as  to include an element defined by 
reference to an arbitrary line in relation to an element such as  time, quantity 
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or size, mens rea is  less likely to be required. The obvious  example is  speeding, 
where driving at 31 m.p.h. rather than 30 m.p.h. is  significant only because 
the law draws the line at 30. It would be “indulgent” to require mens rea – 
knowledge of  one’s speed – in such cases.82 
Arguments For and Against Strict Liability
A number of arguments are often cited to justify strict liability. For the most 
part, these seem to confer advantages on the prosecutor at the expense of 
the defendant.
Being often aimed at corporate bodies, and dealing with matters  such 
as  pollution, defective products, food and drugs, safety at work and transport 
systems, strict liability is said to protect fundamental social interests, focusing 
on the welfare of citizens.83 The protection of the public sometimes requires 
a higher standard of care on the part of those who undertake risk-creating 
activities.84  The threat of criminal liability motivates  those who engage in 
such activities to adopt precautions; this  is most compelling in relation to the 
regulation of corporate behaviour.85  Strict liability can reduce the risk of 
harms by regulating these forms of conduct, providing for penalties in the 
case of breach to motivate compliance; motoring offences  appear to serve 
just such a purpose.86  Where prevention rather than retribution is 
appropriate, as in the case of many regulatory offences, deterrence is 
apposite for strict liability.87 Bodies charged with regulating certain activities 
can negotiate compliance with the relevant law, with prosecution as a costly 
and time-consuming last resort.88  A person who must be licensed to carry 
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out a particular activity is, at least in theory, by virtue of the licensing 
process, on notice of  the risk of  committing offences.89 
While evidence of fault may well be relevant to sentencing,90  it is 
nevertheless  easier for a prosecutor to prepare a case without having to 
prove mens rea.91 The number of issues to be decided by the court is reduced, 
and the costs  are therefore often lower.92 Minor offences may not be worth 
the public expenditure which would be incurred if  fault had to be proved.93 
A defendant may be better placed than a prosecutor to understand the 
issues  in some specialised regulated activity, and it may well be easier for a 
large company than for a prosecutor to identify the person(s) at fault,94 and 
to know what went wrong or how it could have been prevented.95
In more philosophical vein, Honoré96 argues that strict liability can be 
morally justified on the basis that, as  members  of society, we are responsible 
for the outcomes  of our actions, whether good or bad, and that in general 
the good outcomes  outnumber the bad. He calls  this  “outcome 
responsibility” and acknowledges that outcomes may be dependent on luck, 
but argues that we must accept the bad luck as well as the good. 
While the arguments  in favour of strict liability are largely of a 
practical nature, the arguments  against raise matters of principle, and have 
been aired with passion and conviction. The widespread adoption of strict 
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liability has been much criticised, Husak referring to “a general climate of 
hostility to strict liability.”97
Strict liability has  been said to be inimical to traditional theories  of the 
criminal law. The criminal law is society’s  most condemnatory instrument 
and a person should not be censured for wrongdoing without proof that the 
person chose that course of action.98 If a person is  to be censured publicly 
by being labelled a criminal and sentenced, the court should be satisfied not 
only that the person caused the consequence in question, but also that he or 
she did so culpably; the criminal law should require proof of fault as a 
condition of imposing censure.99  Strict liability is said to lead to the 
conviction of those who are, morally speaking, innocent; it is  a misuse of the 
criminal law, which should be reserved for the regulation of serious wrongs 
by those who are culpably wrong.100
As has been seen,101  other commentators insist on a distinction 
between legal fault and moral fault, arguing that only those who are at 
moral fault should be punished for their wrongs  because punishment 
expresses or communicates blame.102 
Simester103 argues:
• in relation to stigmatic crimes  (which he equates  with the “truly 
criminal” discussed above), substantive strict liability (liability 
without proof of moral fault)104  is always wrong. In some 
circumstances, however, formal strict liability (liability in respect 
of an offence which features  at least one material element for 
which mens rea need not be shown)105  may be justifiable for 
these serious offences. Those circumstances  are where strict 
liability applies  only to some aspect(s) of the offence, but there 
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105 Ibid.
is  an element of blameworthiness in relation to other aspects 
for which mens rea is  required. Examples are where liability is 
strict in respect only of some non-material element, such as the 
time or place of an act, or in relation to an objective standard 
independent of individual offenders and their personal views, 
as in the cases of  careless and dangerous driving.106
• in relation to quasi-criminal, non-stigmatic regulations, formal 
strict liability may be acceptable on the basis  that the 
punishment imposed is  justifiable, not in terms of the convicted 
person’s  deserts, but in terms of deterrence, or as part of a 
regime for distributing the costs  of an activity voluntarily 
undertaken by the person convicted which puts others at 
risk.107  The fact that imprisonment may be wrong unless 
deserved does not necessarily mean that an offence which 
attracts imprisonment should not be an offence of strict 
liability, rather that the punishment must be proportionate to 
the culpability of  the person convicted.108
Husak asserts  that substantive strict liability is always  unjust in that it 
leads to punishment. Most objections  to formal strict liability relate to 
punishment, which is  often disproportionate to the degree of blame-
worthiness; punishment must always  be justified and proportionate; but 
formal strict liability may or may not be unjust.109 Elsewhere, it is  said that 
the objection to strict liability is  that the accused’s  legal liability exceeds his 
or her moral culpability in relation to one or more elements  of the 
offence.110 
Adopting a different standpoint, Horder111 argues  that the imposition 
of strict liability impinges  on significant personal liberties, including freedom 
to pursue lifestyle activities of intrinsic worth. Examples of such activities 
are the pursuit of a business, profession or hobby. By contrast, transport is 
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said to be of instrumental value only, in the sense of facilitating the pursuit 
of personal freedoms, such that there can be no objection to strict liability 
for offences such as driving without insurance, or while disqualified. 
Having reviewed the literature on strict liability and mens rea, I turn now to 
the place of strict liability in road traffic offences, and the drink- and drug-
driving offences in particular. 
ROAD TRAFFIC OFFENCES 
In General
A vast number of minor road traffic offences are offences of strict liability.112 
On the basis  that negligence is  not of itself sufficient to constitute mens rea,113 
so are a small number of much more serious road traffic offences are also 
offences of  strict liability:
• causing death by dangerous driving.114 The driving must be a 
cause of death, although it need not be a substantial or major 
cause.115  Dangerous  driving is driving which falls far below 
what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and 
it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that 
driving in such a way would be dangerous;116 
• causing serious injury by dangerous driving;117
• causing death by careless  or inconsiderate driving.118 Careless 
driving is  driving which falls  below what would be expected of 
a competent and careful driver.119 The circumstances  of which 
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the driver could be expected to have been aware, as well as 
those shown to have been within the driver’s knowledge, are 
taken into account;120 
• causing death by careless driving when under the influence of 
drink or drugs.121 There need be no causal connection between 
the drink and the death;122 
• causing death by driving when unlicensed, disqualified or 
uninsured.123
• driving while disqualified;124 
• causing or permitting another to use a motor vehicle without 
insurance.125
The Drink- and Drug-Driving Offences
None of the offences of driving or being in charge when unfit through drink 
or drugs,126 with excess alcohol127 or with an excess  of a specified controlled 
drug128 requires  mens rea. The same applies  to being unfit or having excess 
alcohol for the purposes  of the offence of causing death by careless driving 
under section 3A.129  The offences of attempting any of these actions are, 
however, in a different category, and are dealt with separately below.130 
Driving with excess alcohol is undoubtedly a strict liability offence:
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It has been said over and over again that a man who chooses  to 
combine in one evening both drink and driving a motor car 
does  so at his  peril, and it is  for him to see that the amount of 
alcohol which he consumes  does not bring the content in his 
blood above the statutory maximum. It is  his  duty to observe the 
quantity and quality of the drink that he consumes, and if he 
makes  a mistake and in fact takes  more alcohol than is  justified 
by the statutory limit, then he is guilty of  the offence …131
… the offence of driving while over the legal limit is  not an 
offence which requires  the court to ascertain the intent of the 
accused at all.132
… neither the [Road Traffic] Act nor the common law provides 
that ignorance of the presence of alcohol is  a defence to a 
charge under section 5.133
… [no mens  rea] is  required for the offence of driving with an 
excess of  alcohol … it is an offence of  strict liability.134
The quotations above relate to driving with excess alcohol, but surely 
apply equally to unfitness  through drink or drugs  and to an excess of a 
specified drug. The statutory provisions creating these offences135  are 
couched in similar terms, and there has never been any suggestion in the 
case law that unfitness  through drink or drugs gives  rise to anything other 
than strict liability. 
Driving
Whether or not strict liability applies  to the act of driving is less  clear. In an 
early case, a person got into the driving seat of a vehicle. The engine was 
running, the driver’s door was  standing open and the gear selector was in 
“drive”. He did not intend to drive or exercise control over the car, but 
accidentally depressed the accelerator, causing the vehicle to move. The 
Queen’s Bench Division distinguished the case from those featuring persons 
who were consciously seeking some movement of the car; here, the 
defendant had not intended to drive or exercise control of the vehicle; he 
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133  DPP v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 728 (QBD) 731, where the defendant was unaware that he had 
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was not therefore driving.136 While that decision suggests  that driving must 
be intended, later judgments 137 make clear that each case depends  on its 
facts, and do not refer to the mental state of  the person in question. 
In charge
An accused person’s intention is not, it seems, entirely irrelevant to the 
question whether or not he or she is in charge of a vehicle. While the 
meaning of “in charge” is, again, a matter of fact and degree,138 intention 
may sometimes have a bearing. The Divisional Court considered the status 
of a person who is  not the owner, lawful possessor or recent driver of a 
vehicle, but is in the vehicle or otherwise involved with it. Such a person 
could be in charge if voluntarily in de facto control, or, given the 
circumstances, such as  the person’s position, intentions and actions, may be 
expected imminently to assume control.139  While intention may therefore 
sometimes go towards  establishing being in charge, it is not a prerequisite for 
conviction.
There are provisions under which a defendant accused of an “in 
charge” offence can escape conviction by proving no likelihood of driving 
while unfit through drink or drugs or while over the limit. Like “due 
diligence” provisions, these again suggest strict liability,140 and are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3.141 
Excess of  a specified drug
A defence to a charge of an excess of a specified drug can be made out by 
showing that the drug in question had been prescribed or supplied for 
medical or dental purposes, and that the accused took it as  directed and in 
accordance with any manufacturer’s  advice. The drug must have been 
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lawfully in the possession of the accused person.142 Again, the presence of a 
“due diligence” defence suggests  strict liability. The defence is  discussed in 
detail elsewhere in this work.143
Thus, while there is some suggestion that a defendant’s mental state may not 
be wholly irrelevant to certain elements of the offences, there can be no 
doubt that liability is  strict in relation to being unfit through drink or drugs, 
and having excess alcohol or a specified drug.
Attempting 
By contrast, and in keeping with other offences of attempt, intention is 
required for the offences  of attempting to drive. A person is  guilty of an 
attempt to commit an offence contrary to RTA 1988 if, with intent to 
commit the full offence, the person does an act which is more than merely 
preparatory to the commission of the offence.144 A person may be guilty of 
such an attempt even if commission of the full offence is impossible.145 Mens 
rea, in the form of  intention, is clearly required.146 
Aiding and abetting, counselling and procuring
As with other offences of complicity,147  mens rea, in the form of intention, is 
required to make out the offences of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring.148  These offences  are committed only if the accused person 
intends  what he does, and knows that the principal offender will thereby be 
assisted or encouraged in some way.149 
The supervisor of a learner driver was held to have aided and abetted 
driving with excess alcohol where the supervisor knew that the driver had 
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consumed alcohol to such an extent that it was  probable that he was over the 
limit.150
To make out the offence of aiding and abetting driving with excess 
alcohol, it must be shown that the principal offender committed the offence; 
that the defendant was  aware that the principal offender had consumed 
excess alcohol, or was reckless as to the possibility that he had; and that the 
defendant aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the 
offence.151
A person who surreptitiously laced the drinks of another, who he knew 
was  going to drive, causing the other’s blood-alcohol to be over the 
prescribed limit when he drove, was guilty of procuring the offence. There 
was  a causal link between the defendant’s  act and the offence, which would 
not otherwise have been committed.152 
The “failing” offences
While driving or being in charge when unfit, with excess alcohol or with an 
excess of a specified drug are matters  of strict liability, by contrast, two of 
the three “failing” offences  call for specific prior notice of the risk of 
prosecution, such that a person may be convicted only if he or she 
committed the offence with such knowledge – a form of  mens rea. 
The Road Traffic Act 1988 creates  three offences  of failing to do as 
required by an officer investigating a suspected drink- or drug-driving 
offence. First, it is an offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to co-operate 
with a preliminary (or roadside) test,153  which may take the form of a 
requirement for breath, a preliminary impairment test, a preliminary drug 
test, or, when s 5A comes into force,154 a combination of these. It is also an 
offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to provide a specimen of breath, 
blood or urine for analysis for evidential purposes when required to do so 
(usually at a police station).155  Finally, it is  an offence to fail, again without 
reasonable excuse, to give permission for a laboratory test of a blood 
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specimen taken while the subject was incapable of consenting (usually 
because the subject was in hospital and unconscious).156 
People can fail to provide breath by not blowing hard or long 
enough,157  or at all, by sucking rather than blowing, by trying to blow 
around the tube or to block the nozzle, or by providing a single specimen 
only,158 or (in the case of  all three types of  specimen) by simply refusing.159
There is no requirement for any form of mens rea for the roadside 
offence. On requiring a specimen for evidential purposes, however, the 
officer must warn the subject that a failure without reasonable excuse to 
provide the specimen may render the subject liable to prosecution.160 
Likewise, where a blood specimen has been taken from a person incapable 
of consenting, and the officer later requires the person’s permission for the 
analysis of the specimen, the officer must warn the person that failure to 
give permission will give rise to liability to prosecution.161  It is  quite clear 
from the case law that failure to give the appropriate warning must lead to 
acquittal.162  This was so even if the defendant was not prejudiced by the 
failure to give the warning,163 and even where the defendant was a serving 
police officer and the court thought he should have been familiar with the 
procedure.164
A subject who does  not understand the warning because of an 
inadequate knowledge of  English must be acquitted.165
When breath analysis was first introduced, it might have been thought 
that one way to avoid being prosecuted would be simply to refuse to provide 
a specimen. Parliament pre-empted this  by creating the offence of failing to 
provide (and now also, of failing to consent to the analysis of a specimen 
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taken while incapable of consenting).166 That would not have been widely 
known at the time, and indeed may not now be widely known, hence the 
requirement to give the statutory warning:
I am confident that many police officers  – and lawyers  and 
judges  – are not fully conversant with the police procedure … 
and would not have the knowledge that failure to provide a 
specimen after a duly made requirement would cause a driver to 
be liable to prosecution.167
The words used to require breath specimens are: 
I require you to provide two specimens  of breath for analysis  by 
means  of a device of a type approved. The specimen with the 
lower proportion of alcohol in your breath may be used as 
evidence and the other will be disregarded. I warn you that 
failure to provide either of these specimens will render you 
liable to prosecution. Do you agree to provide two specimens of 
breath for analysis?168 
Warnings in similar terms are given when the requirement is  for blood 
or urine.169
The absence of reasonable excuse is  an element of the offence and is 
to be proved by the prosecutor; it is not a defence.170 The argument that the 
availability of a “due diligence” defence usually indicates strict liability171 is 
not therefore relevant. 
There is no requirement, when giving the warning, to say what 
amounts to a “reasonable excuse”. The term is  narrowly construed: a person 
has a reasonable excuse only if “physically or mentally unable to provide” 
the specimen, or if “the provision of the specimen would entail a substantial 
risk to health”.172  If it later turns out that the subject has a medical 
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condition which would have prevented the provision of breath, but was 
unaware of it at the time, a reasonable excuse argument does not succeed 
unless  the subject actually tried to blow.173 If the subject makes no attempt 
to provide, and offers no reason, particularly if the subject has an excuse but 
chooses not to invoke it, the subject cannot later call on that excuse.174
It is clear that no prosecution for a drink- or drug-driving offence will 
succeed if the subject is not on notice that failure without reasonable excuse 
to provide a specimen (or consent to its analysis) will give rise to the risk of 
prosecution. Although not couched in the traditional terms of intention, 
knowledge or recklessness, this  is as convincing a requirement for mens rea as 
any. The required notice is, however, limited and does not extend to 
explaining reasonable excuse. There have been no challenges to the wording 
of the warning, in particular, no suggestion that the meaning of “reasonable 
excuse” should be explained.
DISCUSSION
I have described above the presumption in favour of mens rea and the 
grounds for departing from it, and, on the other hand, the justifications for, 
and criticisms of, strict liability. I next turn to the question of how, if at all, 
strict liability can be justified for the drink- and drug-driving offences. The 
discussion is confined to the strict liability offences, that is, driving or in 
charge when unfit through drink or drugs,175 driving or in charge when over 
the prescribed limit176 or with an excess  of a specified drug,177 and to these 
elements of the offences  of causing death by careless  driving when under 
the influence of drink or drugs.178 It does  not extend to attempting to drive 
when unfit or with excess  alcohol,179  or to the offences  of failing without 
reasonable excuse to provide specimens or to consent to the analysis of a 
specimen.180
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173 Teape v Godfrey [1986] RTR 213 (QBD).
174 Martiner v DPP [2004] EWHC 2484 (Admin).
175 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 4.
176 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 5.
177 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 5A, when in force.
178 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 3A.
179 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 4 or 5.
180 Contrary to RTA 1988, ss 7(6) and 7A(6).
The Criteria in Gammon
I examine first the circumstances in which, according to Gammon,181  the 
presumption in favour of mens rea may be displaced, to ascertain whether 
any of these criteria apply. It will be seen in Chapter 3 that many of the 
same matters  are relevant in the context of the presumption of innocence 
and reverse burdens of  proof.
“Truly criminal”
According to Gammon, the presumption in favour of mens rea is  particularly 
strong when the offence is “truly criminal” in character. The meaning of the 
term “truly criminal” has been discussed above,182 where it  was  noted that 
offences  are more likely to be truly criminal if the moral condemnation 
implicit in a verdict of  guilty is appropriate, or if  conviction attracts stigma. 
As seen in Chapter 1,183 the offence of drink-driving carries  a degree 
of stigma normally attached to more paradigmatic offences,184 and is  viewed 
as  “very wrong indeed”.185 There are minority views to the contrary, only 
one of which bears  on the effect of conviction on an offender.186 In terms  of 
moral condemnation and stigma, it is submitted that the offence of driving 
with excess alcohol – by far the most commonly charged of the offences 
under discussion187 – is sufficiently serious  that the presumption in favour of 
mens rea is  strongly in play. It will be seen in Chapter 7 that it takes  a 
surprisingly large amount of alcohol to put a person over the limit, such that 
the degree of impairment of driving skills  of someone over the limit may 
well be even more serious that many people might realise. 
But what of the “in charge” and the “unfitness” elements  of the 
offences? They feature less frequently in the literature and research, and 
there are far fewer prosecutions for these offences. 
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181 Above, p 40.
182 See p 42.
183 See p 22.
184 Sally Cunningham, Driving Offences Law, Policy and Practice (Ashgate 2008) 59.
185  AP Simester and GR Sullivan, ‘On the Nature and Rationale of Property Offences’ in RA Duff 
and Stuart P Green (eds), Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of  the Criminal Law (OUP 2005) 187.
186  Roy Light, Criminalizing the Drink-Driver (Dartmouth 1994) 142, where an argument that the drink-
driver is not regarded as “criminal” is not supported by references to literature, and the assertion that 
“the criminal law has not succeeded as well as many had hoped in suppressing drink-driving” seems 
outdated in light of  the statistics quoted on p 1, fns 3, 4 and 5.
187 See p 9.
The danger addressed by the “in charge” offences  is  the risk that the 
person may in fact drive.188  That a person who is in charge cannot be 
trusted to refrain from driving has  been acknowledged,189 and is borne out 
by the fact that the statutory defences  to the “in charge” offences are based 
on no likelihood of driving.190 Nevertheless, being in charge without actually 
driving may be perceived as less  dangerous, and therefore as less  criminal, 
but there has been no research confirming this.
Turning to unfitness to drive through drink or drugs, it may well be 
that unfitness through drink would, by association with driving with excess 
alcohol, be perceived as  wrongful, but again there is  nothing to confirm this. 
While the dangers  of driving when under the influence of drugs are being 
addressed in public education,191  and by the legislature,192  not enough is 
known about how the general public perceives  drug-driving to draw any 
conclusions.193 The effects  of drugs are complex, and while there has been 
some research into drivers’ understanding of the effects of illicit drugs,194 
less is  known about their understanding of the effects of medicinal drugs. It 
may well be that, if asked, people would think driving after taking drugs is  as 
culpable as driving after drinking, although that would raise further 
questions  about the extent to which the effects of different drugs are known, 
and whether or not it is  understood that the law applies to both medicinal 
and illicit drugs. 
 Punishment is also relevant to seriousness:
Motor vehicles  are dangerous  things  and deliberately bad, 
aggressive or irresponsible driving, including drunken driving, 
merits  serious punishment especially (but not only) where it 
causes death.195
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189  RA Duff, ‘Criminalising Endangerment’ in RA Duff and Stuart P Green (eds), Defining Crimes: 
Essays on the Special Part of  the Criminal Law (OUP 2005) 63.
190 See pp 90–94.
191  The Department for Transport has run campaigns, including a TV advertisement: <http://
drugdrive.direct.gov.uk/> accessed 27 November 2013. 
192  In the new offences under RTA 1988, s 5A, of driving, attempting to drive or in charge with a 
concentration of  a specified drug in excess of  a specified limit; see pp 8–9.
193 See p 248.
194 See p 250.
195  Michael Hirst, ‘Causing Death by Driving and Other Offences: A Question of Balance’ [2008] 
Crim LR 339.
The fact that a person may be imprisoned for an offence again makes 
it more likely that it is truly criminal such that strict liability is not 
appropriate. Although the drink- and drug-driving offences are triable 
summarily only,196  they carry some of the heaviest penalties which 
magistrates may impose. The maximum penalty for being in charge when 
unfit through drink or drugs, or with excess  alcohol or an excess of a 
prescribed drug,197  is three months’ imprisonment, a level 4 fine (up to 
£2,500), or both. Disqualification from driving is  a matter for the discretion 
of the sentencing court, but if the offender is not disqualified, ten penalty 
points must be imposed. For driving when unfit through drink or drugs, or 
with excess alcohol or an excess  of a specified drug, the maximum penalty is 
six months’ imprisonment, a level 5 fine (up to £5,000), or both, coupled 
with disqualification from driving198  for a minimum of twelve months.199 
While imprisonment is  usually reserved for offences which are more serious 
in terms of the degree of impairment or alcohol reading,200 the impact of 
disqualification from driving should not be under-estimated; it can result in 
loss  of employment, and always  leads to higher insurance premiums when 
the disqualification is  over.201  In terms of the penalties, therefore, being in 
charge when unfit or when over the limit is  less serious  than driving when in 
either such condition. This  is probably as it should be, given that being in 
charge carries less risk than actually driving. 
While the availability of imprisonment as a penalty on the face of it 
suggests that strict liability is inappropriate, as noted above,202 it does  not 
necessarily mean that the offence should not be one of strict liability, but 
that punishment must be proportionate to the offender’s culpability. 
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196 That is, in the lower magistrates’ court, rather than in the higher Crown Courts.
197 When in force; see pp 8–9.
198  Subject to the possibility of arguing that there is a special reason for disqualifying for a shorter 
period or not at all: Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s 34(1); see pp 16–17.
199 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, sch 2. 
200  Sentencing Council, Magistrates’ Courts Sentencing Guidelines, 124–126, 132–134 <http://
sentencingcouncil. judiciary.gov.uk/guidelines/guidelines-to-download.htm> accessed 27 November 
2013.
201 See p 2.
202 See p 49.
The question of the seriousness  of an offence – in terms  both of how 
it is  regarded by the public and the available penalties  – is also relevant to 
the question of  reverse burdens of  proof, discussed in Chapter 3.203
The effect of  the statute
Again, according to Gammon, the presumption in favour of mens rea can be 
displaced only if this is  clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the 
statute. This seems to be undoubtedly the case in relation to all the drink- 
and drug-driving offences. The Act creates  the offences (with the notable 
exception of the offences  of failing to provide – see below) without reference 
to any words implying mens rea, and proceeds  to set out a detailed statutory 
regime for investigating suspected cases and gathering evidence which does 
not take any account of  the state of  mind of  the suspect. 
Issues of  social concern
Third, according to Gammon, the only situation in which the presumption 
can be displaced is where the statute is concerned with an issue of social 
concern. The drink- and drug-driving offences  clearly relate to issues of 
social concern in the sense of road safety. While some of the legislation goes 
as  far as  to embrace road safety in the title,204 other recent Road Traffic Acts 
have been expressed to be consolidating or amending measures, but at least 
one earlier statute cited road safety as a specific objective.205 
Another ground for displacing mens rea is that the drink- and drug-
driving legislation is part of a regime regulating special skills  which require 
licensing.206  Driving is  a matter of choice; it is a special skill, a special 
activity.207 In the Privy Council, it was said that:
All who own or drive motor cars  know that by doing so they 
subject themselves  to a regulatory regime which does  not apply 
to members  of the public who do neither. …This  regime is 
imposed not because owning or driving cars  is  a privilege or 
indulgence granted by the state but because the possession and 
use of cars  (like, for example, shotguns, the possession of which 
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204 The Road Safety Act 2006, for example.
205  The preamble to the Road Traffic Act 1962 recited “An Act to make further provision as to road 
safety and road traffic and for purposes connected therewith”.
206 Above, p 44. The requirement to be licensed is in RTA 1988, s 87. 
207 Above, p 45.
is  very closely regulated) are recognised to have the potential to 
cause grave injury.208
It will be seen in Chapter 3209  that similar arguments are raised to 
justify reverse burdens of proof, which adversely impact on the presumption 
of innocence. These arguments may be especially strong in relation to the 
drink- and drug-driving offences, given the nature of the process for 
becoming licensed to drive. Prospective drivers  must pass  both a theory and 
a practical test. The former consists of answering questions concerning the 
Highway Code, traffic signs and essential skills;210 and a hazard perception 
part. The practical test is  designed to see if candidates can drive safely in 
different road and traffic conditions and can demonstrate, through their 
driving ability, that they know the Highway Code.211  The extent of the 
testing process is  such that drivers can be expected to be aware of the many 
provisions of the Highway Code, which include a specific warning not to 
drive with excess alcohol.212 
It has been noted above that if an element of an offence, such as 
speeding, is defined by reference to an arbitrary line, mens rea is  less likely to 
be required; the example given is  speeding, where driving at 30 m.p.h. is 
acceptable, but driving at 31 m.p.h. is not.213 The argument surely applies  in 
relation to the prescribed limit for the purposes of the excess  alcohol 
offences,214 although the term “arbitrary”, which suggests  something rather 
less considered than was in fact the case in relation to the prescribed limit,215 
may not be the most apt.
The objects of  the statute
Finally, the court in Gammon ruled that even where a statute is  concerned 
with an issue of social concern, the presumption of mens rea stands unless it 
can also be shown that strict liability would be effective to promote the 
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208 Brown v Stott [2003] AC 681 (PC) 705.
209 See pp 85–87.
210  Two practice theory tests, each comprising 50 questions, are available online at <http://
www.safedrivingforlife.info/practicetheorytest/practicetests_car.html> accessed 27 November 2013, 
when they did not contain any questions relating to drink or drugs.
211 <https://www.gov.uk/practical-driving-test-for-cars> accessed 27 November 2013.
212 <https://www.gov.uk/rules-drivers-motorcyclists-89-to-102/alcohol-and-drugs-95-to-96> accessed 
27 November 2013.
213 Above, p 46.
214 And, in due course, to the specified limits under RTA 1988, s 5A, when in force; see pp 8–9.
215 See pp 192–194.
objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the 
commission of the prohibited act. The statistics noted above216 clearly show 
a steady and dramatic reduction in road traffic fatalities  and serious injuries 
attributed to drink-driving. That, coupled with the fact that drink-driving is 
viewed more seriously now than in earlier years,217 indicate that, certainly in 
relation to drink-driving, if not to drug-driving, the legislation has made a 
substantial contribution to improving road safety. I return to this theme in 
Chapter 10.218
On the basis  of the criteria in Gammon, therefore, the excess  alcohol offences 
fall into the class of the truly criminal such that mens rea should be a 
requirement. Whether the “in charge” offences, and the offences  of 
unfitness  through drink or drugs, are also truly criminal is  less clear. While 
there seems  to be no basis, in terms of the stigma attaching or of the 
blameworthiness of offenders, for concluding that they are, likewise there is 
little to suggest that they are not truly criminal. The same arguments  can, no 
doubt, be made for the new offences  of excess specified drugs,219 which are 
couched in the same terms of  the excess alcohol offences. 
In terms of maximum penalties, driving when unfit and driving with 
excess alcohol (and, in due course, with excess of a specified drug) are of 
equal seriousness, and more serious than the “in charge” offences. But all 
attract sentences  of imprisonment. Some commentators argue that 
imprisonment may be consistent with strict liability, while others say that the 
possibility of imprisonment may be taken to indicate that mens rea ought to 
be a requirement. 
The remaining criteria in Gammon – the effect of the statute, issues  of 
social concern and the promotion of the objectives of the legislation – all 
support an argument that mens rea can be dispensed with for all the drink- 
and drug-driving offences. 
Overall, the criteria in Gammon do not provide a comprehensive set of 
justifications for dispensing with mens rea in relation to the drink- and drug-
driving offences under discussion. 
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217 See pp 22–23.
218 See p 309.
219 Under RTA 1988, s 5A when in force; see pp 8–9.
Fault
The distinction between, on the one hand, the constituents  of mens rea, and, 
on the other, fault, was noted above.220 In relation to the drink- and drunk-
driving offences, although mens rea in the sense described earlier221  is not a 
prerequisite for conviction, the requirement for fault is  nevertheless met. It is 
submitted that drink-drivers, and possibly also drug-drivers, are rarely 
morally innocent, and that John Gardner’s “fault principle”222 is met. 
To drive after drinking is to risk failing in the duty to remain within 
the limit. Drink-drivers may intend to drive when over the limit; they may 
know or suspect that they are doing so; they may be reckless, careless  or 
negligent as to whether or not they are doing so. All these are worthy of 
blame and constitute fault, especially as the dangers of driving after drinking 
are so widely known. It may well be the very absence of mental element – 
the lack of forethought, the lack of care, the risk-taking – which constitutes 
fault. 
This  is  in line with Ashworth and Horder’s  view that negligence may 
be more acceptable as a form of fault than as a form of mens rea.223 It is also 
said that,224  to determine a person’s  just deserts, we must look beyond the 
formal culpability with respect to each element of an offence, and view the 
person’s  culpability in the context of the offence as a whole; assessing 
blameworthiness involves an evaluation of a person’s actions, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the person’s state of  mind. 
As the question of consent is engaged in circumstances which may 
give rise to an allegation of rape,225  so too, a person about to drive after 
drinking or taking a drug must realise that the questions  of fitness to drive 
and/or the prescribed limit, are in play. The risk that the person’s  behaviour 
amounts to an offence is worthy of condemnation. This is  especially so in 
relation to alcohol, given that most people under-estimate how much drink 
will take them over the limit,226 so that those who do prove to be over the 
limit may well have drunk far more than they believed would take them to 
the limit. 
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224 CMV Clarkson, Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 56.
225 See p 36.
226 See pp 240–244.
It has  been argued that actions  are serious enough to merit 
punishment if they demonstrate unwillingness to be guided by a value in the 
appropriate way, including where someone takes an unjustified risk of 
violating such a value.227 As in the case of offences of endangerment,228 the 
wrong consists in failure of proper concern. The drink- and drug-driving 
laws, based in the promotion of  road safety, surely fall within this argument. 
All these elements  of fault on the part of a person who fails  to ensure 
that he or she is within the limit or fit to drive, suggest that there is  a 
standard to be met, and that failure to meet that standard amounts to a form 
of  fault sufficient to ground criminal liability.229
Deterrence
The argument that strict liability can be justified on the ground that it acts 
as  a deterrent has usually been raised in the context of corporate bodies 
undertaking hazardous processes which engage issues such as food safety or 
the avoidance of pollution. Nevertheless, there seems no reason why strict 
liability should not act as a deterrent to taking the risk of committing a 
drink- or drug-driving offence. Indeed, there is much to suggest that this is 
so.230
Ease of  Prosecution
This  justification for strict liability – ease of prosecution – seems on the face 
of it to apply to the drink-drive offences. The high conviction rate231 appears 
to bear this out. On the other hand, it is necessary to prove that the 
sometimes complex procedure has been carried out fully and correctly, and 
in defended cases, this may not always be easy. 
CONCLUSION
In relation to the offence of driving with excess  alcohol, the presumption in 
favour of mens rea is particularly strong because the offence is one which can 
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229 See above, pp 38–39.
230 See p 22, fn 118; and pp 274–277.
231 See p 1.
be described as  truly criminal.232  This  is  a compelling argument against 
strict liability. It is  not entirely clear that the same can be said of the 
remaining drink- and drug-driving offences. While the balance of the 
arguments  may just tip in favour of saying that it can, the question need not 
be definitively answered in view of the strength of the arguments  justifying 
strict liability. 
The arguments which can be advanced to justify strict liability for 
driving when unfit or with excess alcohol are:
• those who drive after consuming drink or drugs  knowingly take 
a risk that they may break the law;
• the excess  alcohol offences feature a fixed point on a 
continuum which defines the offences.
The following justifications  also apply to the offences  of driving when 
unfit or with excess  alcohol, but, in addition, to the “in charge” offences  and 
the drug-driving offences:
• the effect of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is that liability should 
be strict;
• the Act regulates matters of  social concern;
• the behaviour regulated – driving – requires special skill and is 
subject to a well developed licensing system;
• strict liability promotes the objects of  the statute;
• the legislation demonstrably has a deterrent effect;
• it is  clearly easier to prosecute the offences as strict liability 
offences without having to show mens rea. 
The most compelling of these arguments  is  that someone who drives 
after drinking is aware of the risk of breaking the law, yet goes ahead; this  is 
sufficiently culpable to justify conviction without a showing of mens rea. This 
falls  within Simester’s  concession233  that formal strict liability may be 
justified for stigmatic crimes  where liability is  strict in relation to an objective 
standard independent of individual offenders and their personal views; the 
examples  given are careless  and dangerous driving, but excess alcohol surely 
qualifies too. In relation to being in charge, it has been suggested that a 
person could fairly be blamed for voluntarily putting himself in a position 
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where he knew or ought to have known of the risk that he might be over the 
limit when about to drive.234 
In relation to the remaining offences, the most convincing argument, 
and it applies to drink-driving too, is  the fact that driving is  a complex 
activity, subject to a great many rules and regulations and impinging upon 
many other members  of society. It seems only reasonable that those who 
undertake the inherently dangerous activity of driving must accept special 
responsibility – including strict liability in relation to many offences  – for 
what they do. 
The strongest argument for dispensing with mens rea is  the obvious one 
of the ease with which a defendant could assert ignorance of the fact that he 
or she was  unfit or over the limit, and the difficulty for the prosecution of 
ousting such an assertion. As will be seen in Chapter 7, it is virtually 
impossible for an individual to recognise the point at which the limit is 
reached – even more difficult for a prosecutor to prove a driver’s awareness 
of  such a point. 
While strict liability for the principal drink- and drug-driving offences 
can be justified, the “failing” offences are different. It has been seen that a 
person cannot be convicted without first having been warned of the 
possibility of prosecution for failing to do as  the investigating officer 
requires. In light of the novelty of the drink-driving investigative procedures 
when first introduced, and the strong likelihood that suspects would have no 
idea that failing to provide a specimen would itself be an offence, let alone 
one which is  as serious, in terms  of penalty, as actually driving or in charge 
when unfit or over the limit, it seem wholly reasonable to require that the 
warning be given, so importing a requirement for a form of  mens rea.
Closely allied to questions  of mens rea, the state of the mind of an accused 
person and strict liability, is the presumption of innocence, and its  place in 
the drink- and drug-driving offences. These matters are the subject of the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Presumption of  Innocence
INTRODUCTION
This  chapter concerns the presumption of innocence and its  bearing on a 
number of aspects of the drink- and drug-driving offences. The principle 
that a person is  presumed innocent until proved guilty is  said to be a 
fundamental tenet of English law and has  been recognised in many 
international instruments  and agreements. Statutory presumptions of law 
may impinge on this principle. So too may reverse burdens  of proof, which 
impose on a defendant, rather than the prosecutor, the task of proving some 
aspect of a case to some degree of persuasiveness. The drink- and drug-
driving offences feature both a presumption of law and a number of reverse 
burdens.
To evaluate the tension between the presumption of innocence and 
the drink- and drug-driving offences, I explore the theoretical background, 
the literature and the case law, before moving on to outline the statutory 
provisions in question and the case law arising from them. I identify an 
irrebuttable presumption of law and two reverse burdens which are difficult 
to justify by reference to most of  the theory, but propose a way forward. 
THE BACKGROUND
The common law presumption of innocence is encapsulated in the much-
quoted mantra: 
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden 
thread is always to be seen, that it is  the duty of the prosecution 
to prove the prisoner’s guilt.1 
For the purposes  of this discussion, the presumption of innocence is 
taken to mean that the prosecution must bear the burden of proving, beyond 
reasonable doubt, the guilt of  the accused.2 
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1  Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL) 481. For a history of the development of the presumption, 
from Roman times to Woolmington, see Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence. Evidential and Human 
Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 1–8.
2  See, for example, AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th 
edn, Hart 2013) 55–57. Elsewhere, the term is also used to mean that pre-trial procedures are to be 
conducted as though the suspected person were innocent; see Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the 
Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E&P 241, 243–244; Liz Campbell, ‘Criminal Labels, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 76 MLR 681, 
683 et seq.
The presumption was  restated with equal simplicity in article 6(2) of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights  and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”):3
[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
Article 6(2) is  to be read in conjunction with section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which requires  domestic legislation to be read in a way 
which is compatible with the Convention rights, so far as it is  possible to do 
so. 
The presumption of innocence has  also been articulated in a number 
of instruments to which the United Kingdom is party, including the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights4  and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of  the European Union.5
Rationale
The requirement that a criminal case be proved beyond reasonable doubt 
provides for a high standard of certainty about a defendant’s guilt,6  so 
reducing the possibility of erroneous convictions. It is better for the guilty to 
go free than for the innocent to be convicted.7 The presumption is directly 
grounded in a concern to avoid the intrinsic moral wrongness of punishing 
people who should not be punished.8  It counters  any tendency to assume 
that a defendant is guilty merely by virtue of  having been accused.9
The state has wide powers  of investigation, prosecution, trial and 
sentencing, and the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt goes some way towards  redressing this  imbalance between 
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(2004) 67 MLR 402; Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 
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Innocence’ (2013) 21 Jnl Pol Phil 44. 
9  Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 33 et 
seq. 
the resources  of the state and those of the individual.10 The consequences  of 
wrongful conviction are greater for the convicted person than for the 
prosecutor, and fall entirely on the convicted person.11 
Procedural and Substantive Approaches
Some commentators12  take the view that the presumption of innocence 
relates  only to the procedure in a criminal trial, in the sense that it gives  the 
prosecutor the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the constituents 
of the offence as  defined in the relevant statute, but does  not bear on how 
the offence is formulated in the first place. Ashworth13 gives as an example a 
hypothetical offence of causing serious injury, without any requirement for 
intention or recklessness. Under the procedural approach, the presumption 
of innocence would be complied with if the prosecution proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that a serious injury was caused, even though this  would 
take no account of the possibility that the injury was entirely accidental, so 
contravening the principle that people should not be convicted unless 
blameworthy.14
Other commentators 15 consider that, regardless of how an offence is 
drafted, the substance is  relevant to the presumption of innocence. If an 
offence is  defined so that it does not include a sufficient degree of culpability 
or blameworthiness, the presumption is  breached. Duff,16 for instance, takes 
the view that the presumption of innocence requires that defendants be 
convicted only on proof beyond reasonable doubt of what the law 
legitimately defines as  culpable wrongdoing. This is usually called the 
substantive approach, and is discussed in greater detail below.17
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10  Paul Roberts, ‘Taking the Burden of Proof Seriously’ [1995] Crim LR 783, 787; Andrew 
Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E&P 241, 250; Andrew Stumer, 
The Presumption of  Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 33.
11 Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of  Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 36.
12 Notably Paul Roberts, see below, p 82.
13 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of  Innocence’ (2006) 10 E&P 241, 253.
14  For another example, see RA Duff, Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law 
(Hart 2009) 199.
15 For example, Victor Tadros and Stephen Tierney, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2004) 67 MLR 402.
16 RA Duff, ‘Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence’ in AP Simester 
(ed), Appraising Strict Liability (OUP 2005) 134. 
17 See pp 82–84, 94–97.
Tadros18 makes  a similar distinction between what he calls the classical 
theory of the presumption of innocence – that it protects  against conviction 
of an offence where it has  not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that 
the conduct fell within the definition of the offence; and the moral theory, 
protecting against conviction where the conduct is of a kind which ought 
not to be criminal. 
Stumer19  divides the procedural approach into the narrow and the 
broad. Under the narrow procedural approach, the prosecution must bear 
the burden of proving the core aspects  of an offence, leaving it to the 
defendant to prove any defence, excuse or exception. The broad procedural 
approach requires the prosecution to prove all such matters – both core and 
peripheral aspects of the offence, including the absence of defences, 
justifications, or excuses.
These different approaches  emerge in more detail in the literature 
review below.20
Inroads
Inroads  into the presumption of innocence have been evident for some 
time.21 It is  said to be all too easy to take for granted or neglect the practical 
and political significance of fundamental principles.22  Many offences  are 
defined in such a way that the prosecution has  to prove little, the defence 
bearing the burden of exculpation.23 It was reported in 1996 that some forty 
per cent of offences  triable in the Crown Court appear to violate the 
presumption, the researchers noting with regret, “the apparent casualness 
with which Parliament has continued to add to the number of 
derogations”.24  In summary trials, the defendant has the statutory task of 
proving any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, whether 
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18 Victor Tadros, ‘Rethinking the Presumption of  Innocence’ (2007) 1 Crim Law & Philos 193, 197.
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seq.
20 See pp 80–89. 
21  The golden thread “is, to say the least, a little frayed at the edges”: Ben Fitzpatrick, ‘House of 
Lords: Reverse Burden and Article 6(2) of the ECHR: Drunk in Charge; Terrorism Offence’ (2005) 
67 JCL 193. 
22 Paul Roberts, ‘Taking the Burden of  Proof  Seriously’ [1995] Crim LR 783, 785. 
23  Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 72. See also 
Glanville Williams, ‘The Logic of  “Exceptions”’ (1988) 47 CLJ 261, 263.
24  Meredith Blake and Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal 
Law’ [1996] Crim LR 306, 314.
or not provided for in the enactment creating the offence.25  Ashworth 
identifies  four ways26  in which the presumption of innocence is being 
undermined, including its  erosion by exceptions, defences or presumptions, 
under which the defendant has to prove some fact to avoid conviction.
Tadros27points  out that the presumption of innocence is  set out in 
article 6(2) without qualification. Other rights articulated in the Convention 
may be modified in certain circumstances, for example, where “necessary in 
a democratic society”.28  He examines whether there could be any 
justification for interfering with the presumption of innocence even if the 
reference to necessity in a democratic society were to apply to it. He 
concludes not, going so far as to say that the right in article 6(2) should be 
regarded as inviolable.
Having outlined the concept of the presumption of innocence and the 
encroachments  upon it, I turn to two aspects of the law which may offend it 
– legal presumptions and reverse burdens of  proof.
LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS
Legal presumptions are statutory provisions  requiring a court to reach a 
specified conclusion upon proof of a specified fact. They leave no discretion 
to draw inferences.29 
They are often rebuttable by the defence. For example, in proceedings 
under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, it is presumed that a dog is a dog bred 
for fighting, or other specially dangerous dog, unless  “the contrary is  shown 
by the accused by such evidence as the court considers sufficient”.30 
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212.
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29 Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of  Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 13.
30 Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, s 5(5).
Some presumptions, on the other hand, are irrebuttable. For example, 
in a drink-driving prosecution, it is  to be assumed (irrebuttably31) that the 
proportion of alcohol in the accused’s  breath, blood or urine32 at the time of 
the alleged offence was  not less than in the specimen provided later.33 Such 
irrebuttable presumptions  lighten or qualify the prosecutor’s probative 
duty.34 They are said to be more in the nature of substantive rules of law 
that contribute to the definition of the offence in question, given that they 
allow no scope for adducing evidence to undermine them.35 They have been 
criticised as serving no other purpose than to enact substantive criteria of 
criminal liability in procedural disguise,36  and as undermining the 
presumption of innocence by mandating the conviction of those who have 
not been proved substantively guilty beyond reasonable doubt.37 
REVERSE BURDENS OF PROOF
As noted above, reverse burdens of proof place on the defendant, rather 
than the prosecutor, the task of proving some aspect of a case, to some 
degree of persuasiveness.38  This may mean rebutting a presumption, or 
proving an exception or defence. Reverse burdens raise the question of the 
extent to which they compromise the presumption of innocence by 
modifying the usual duty of the prosecutor to establish guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt. Most reverse burdens are specifically created by statute.39 
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34 RA Duff, ‘Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence’ in AP Simester 
(ed), Appraising Strict Liability (OUP 2005) 132.
35 Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of  Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 13.
36  Paul Roberts, ‘Strict Liability and the Presumption of Innocence: An Exposé of Functionalist 
Assumptions’ in AP Simester (ed), Appraising Strict Liability (OUP 2005) 184.
37  RA Duff, ‘Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence’ in AP Simester 
(ed), Appraising Strict Liability (OUP 2005) 135.
38 See, for example, Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264 (HL) [1]. 
39 See, for example, Paul Roberts, ‘Taking the Burden of  Proof  Seriously’ [1995] Crim LR 783, 789. 
Types of  Reverse Burden
Evidential
Two types of reverse burden have been identified. The first is  the less 
onerous “evidential” burden, requiring a defendant to raise a reasonable 
doubt as  to a matter, which the prosecution must then negative beyond 
reasonable doubt. For example, the exemptions to illegal hunting with dogs40 
have been found to give rise to an evidential burden.41 Evidential burdens do 
not breach the presumption of innocence and are compatible with article 
6(2) ECHR.42 
There is  no universally accepted formula to describe how much 
evidence must be put before the court to satisfy an evidential burden,43 but 
the defendant must raise “a live issue fit and proper to be left to the jury”,44 
an arguable case,45  or “an issue as to the matter in question fit for 
consideration by the tribunal of fact.”46  An evidential burden is  not a 
burden of proof; it can be discharged by something short of proof,47 
although the mere allegation of some fact would not be sufficient to satisfy 
the burden.48  Nor would an entirely self-serving out-of-court statement.49 
The accused need not necessarily give evidence; what witnesses  in the case 
have said may be sufficient.50 The burden is not illusory; the accused must 
put before the court evidence which, if believed, could be taken by a 
reasonable jury to support the defence case.51
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42  R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2  AC 326 (HL) 379; AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s 
Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th edn, Hart 2013) 58–61; David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal 
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43 Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of  Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 17.
44 R v Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841 (CCA), 846.
45 R v Lang [2002] EWCA Crim 298 [31].
46 Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264 (HL) [1].
47 Richard Glover, ‘Codifying the Law on Evidential Burdens’ (2008) 72 JCL 305, 308; Jayasena v The 
Queen [1970] AC 618 (PC) 624.
48 Andrew Stumer, The Presumption of  Innocence. Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) 17.
49 Thynne v Hindle [1984] RTR 231 (QBD) 244, a “hip flask defence” case.
50 Salmon v HM Advocate [1999] JC 67, 75. 
51 R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 [90].
Legal or persuasive
The second and more onerous reverse burden is the legal burden, also called 
a persuasive burden, requiring a defendant to prove something on the 
balance of probabilities. For example, the defence under section 1(5) of the 
Firearms Act 1982 – that the accused did not know and had no reason to 
suspect that an imitation firearm was so constructed or adapted as to be 
readily convertible into a firearm – has been held to impose a legal burden.52 
Legal burdens are subject to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 
1998,53 and their compatibility with the Convention rights  therefore falls  to 
be considered. If found incompatible, a reverse legal burden must be 
reinterpreted as an evidential burden to bring it within section 3,54  or the 
provision in question must be declared incompatible with the ECHR.55
Objections
Reverse burdens  have been said to reverse the presumption of innocence, 
replacing it with a presumption of criminality,56  and to be “repugnant to 
ordinary notions  of fairness”.57 The fact that a defendant may be innocent 
does  not necessarily equip the defendant to prove it.58  If the defendant is 
able to adduce enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about guilt, but 
not enough to come up to the balance of probabilities, the defendant is 
convicted, even though there remains a reasonable doubt about guilt.59 
Thus, where a defendant just fails  to prove a reverse burden, a mere 49 per 
cent chance of  guilt is enough to result in conviction.60 
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Having outlined the presumption of innocence, presumptions  of law and 
reverse burdens, I move on to review the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and of  the domestic courts on these issues.
THE CASE LAW
Although the right in article 6(2) (to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty61) is set out in the Convention without any words  of qualification, the 
case law indicates that it may, subject to certain limits, be modified. 
The European Court of  Human Rights 
In Salabiaku v France,62 the appellant had been convicted under a provision of 
the French Customs Code which provided for a presumption that a person 
found in possession of certain items  was guilty of smuggling them. He 
argued that the presumption offended article 6(2). The ECtHR recognised 
that presumptions  of fact or law operate in every legal system. It held that 
article 6(2) requires  such presumptions to be kept within reasonable limits, 
which take into account the importance of what is  at stake and maintain the 
rights  of the defence, and that they must not be arbitrary. The presumption 
in question was held compatible with article 6(2).63
Although Salabiaku concerned a presumption of law, the court’s finding 
has been generally accepted as the standard interpretation of the 
presumption of innocence in article 6(2) in cases involving reverse burdens 
as well as presumptions of  law.
In a later case,64 the ECtHR said that, in employing presumptions, the 
means must be reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be 
achieved.
The House of  Lords 
Although the domestic courts have been called upon to examine reverse 
burdens for compatibility with article 6(2), no consistent principles  for 
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determining such compatibility have emerged. This has  been lamented in 
many quarters.65 
Kebilene66  concerned the offence67  of possessing an article in 
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the article was  held 
for a purpose connected with terrorism. An accused could avoid conviction 
by proving absence of terrorist purpose, or by proving no knowledge of (or 
no control over) the article(s) in question.68 Since the Human Rights Act had 
not been in force at the relevant time, the comments  of the House of Lords 
on the compatibility of the defence with article 6(2) were obiter, but have 
nevertheless  been influential. The House recognised that article 6(2) does 
not absolutely prohibit reverse burdens, whether evidential or legal, but in 
each case the presumption subject to the reverse burden must be within 
reasonable limits. In deciding where that balance lies, it was  useful to 
consider:
• what the prosecution has to prove in order to transfer the onus 
to the defence;
• the nature of the burden on the accused, whether it is  likely to 
be difficult to prove, or within the accused’s knowledge, or 
something to which the accused readily has access;
• the nature of the threat faced by society which the provision is 
designed to combat.
In Lambert,69 the defendant had been convicted of possession of a controlled 
drug with intent to supply.70 It would have been a defence71 for him to prove 
that he neither knew, nor suspected or had reason to suspect, that the bag 
found in his possession contained drugs. He appealed on the ground that the 
legal burden of proving the defence conflicted with the presumption of 
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68 Prevention of  Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s 16A(3), (4).
69 R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37.
70 Contrary to Misuse of  Drugs Act 1971, s 5(3).
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innocence under article 6(2). Again, the Human Rights Act did not apply 
since it had not been in force at the relevant time, but the House of Lords 
provided dicta. The principle of proportionality required the House to 
consider whether there was a pressing necessity to impose on the defendant 
a legal rather than an evidential burden; it would be difficult to show that 
only a reverse legal burden would overcome the prosecution’s difficulties  of 
proof in a possession of drugs case, and the defence was therefore to be read 
as imposing an evidential burden only. 
In R v Johnstone,72  a defence under the Trade Marks Act 1994 was 
found to impose a legal burden which was compatible with article 6(2). As  in 
Kebilene, the language used was  the language of balance – it must be fair and 
reasonable to deny a defendant the protection normally guaranteed by the 
presumption of innocence. There was no discussion of whether an 
evidential burden would have sufficed. 
The presumption of innocence next came before the House of Lords 
in the conjoined cases  Sheldrake v DPP and Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 
2002).73 Sheldrake is  of particular interest since it concerned an offence of 
being in charge with excess alcohol.74  The motorist argued that the 
defence75  of no likelihood of driving while remaining over the limit 
infringed the presumption of innocence in article 6(2) if interpreted as 
imposing a legal burden of proof, and that it should be interpreted as 
imposing an evidential burden only. He further argued that the risk of 
driving was  an essential element of the offence, and the prosecution should 
be required to prove the existence of  that risk beyond reasonable doubt.
The House of Lords reviewed the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and 
identified a number of factors  as  relevant to the reasonableness  or 
proportionality of a legal presumption. These included the opportunity 
given to the defendant to rebut the presumption; flexibility in applying the 
presumption; the importance of what is  at stake; and the difficulty a 
prosecutor may face in the absence of a presumption. The House of Lords 
was  clear that there is  no general rule for decisions of this kind, and that 
each case must be dealt with on its  merits.76  The House found that 
likelihood of driving was not an element of the offence. Nevertheless, the 
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reverse burden infringed the presumption of innocence,77  but could be 
justified because it was aimed at the legitimate objective of preventing death, 
injury and damage, and because it met the tests  of acceptability for a 
presumption of fact identified by the ECtHR jurisprudence. The reverse 
burden was reasonable and in no way arbitrary; the defendant had every 
opportunity to show that there was no likelihood of driving while over the 
limit. Furthermore, the likelihood of driving was  a matter so closely 
conditioned by the defendant’s own knowledge and state of mind that it was 
more appropriate for the defendant to prove unlikelihood of driving, than 
for the prosecutor to prove likelihood. The imposition of a legal burden did 
not go beyond what was necessary. It was  not to be “read down” under 
section 3 of  the Human Rights Act 1988 to an evidential burden.
The conjoined case, Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002), 
concerned an offence of belonging to, and professing to belong to, a 
proscribed organisation.78  It would be a defence79  to show that the 
organisation in question had not been proscribed at the relevant time and 
that the defendant had not taken part in its activities while it was proscribed. 
The House of Lords  found that Parliament had intended a legal burden of 
proof, but that there was  a real risk that an innocent person would not be 
able to discharge such a burden and that the presumption of innocence 
would be infringed. The imposition of a legal burden was not a 
proportionate and justifiable legislative response to the threat of terrorism. 
While security considerations carried weight they did not absolve the state 
from its  duty to ensure basic standard of fairness were observed. The burden 
was therefore read down to an evidential burden. 
THE LITERATURE
Lack of  Principle
The decisions in Sheldrake and Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 2004) have 
been criticised as providing no clear guidance on how to interpret statutes 
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which impose reverse burdens.80 In 2005, Dennis81 reviewed the case law, 
noting that the courts had approached each reverse burden case individually. 
He identified six factors, about which there were varying degrees of judicial 
uncertainty and inconsistency, as  having featured, to different degrees of 
persuasiveness, in their decision-making: 
• given the requirement82 to interpret domestic legislation so as 
to be compatible with Convention rights, the extent to which 
courts defer to the will of Parliament concerning where the 
burden of  proof  is to lie; 
• the seriousness  of offences. The suggestion is that interference 
with the presumption of innocence may more easily be justified 
in respect of  less serious offences; 
• the distinction between elements of an offence and defences. A 
reverse burden may be less acceptable in respect of an essential 
element of an offence, or in respect of something which goes  to 
its “true nature” or “gravamen”;
• the maximum penalty. Although it might seem that reverse 
burdens should be less  acceptable in respect of offences 
carrying higher penalties, the decisions are inconsistent;
• ease of proof and the peculiar knowledge of the defendant, 
embracing the idea that the burden of proof may properly lie 
with whichever party would have least difficulty discharging it;
• the presumption of innocence, which has  been interpreted in 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR largely as a procedural 
safeguard. 
Many of  these issues are discussed in greater detail below.
Seriousness and the Balancing of  Interests
Hamer83 has also sought to reconcile the cases  in the quest for principle. He 
acknowledges the tension between, on the one hand, the presumption of 
innocence and the weight it gives to the defendant’s right to avoid mistaken 
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conviction; and, on the other hand, society’s  interest in law enforcement 
which may sometimes be at the expense of the defendant’s rights. Reversing 
a burden so that a defendant is  required to prove his innocence, albeit only 
on a balance of probabilities, increases  the risk of mistaken conviction 
(although it reduces  the risk of erroneous acquittal), so favouring society’s 
interest in law enforcement at the expense of  the individual’s rights. 
Ashworth84  points out that combating a particularly prevalent and 
serious offence may argue in favour of overriding the presumption of 
innocence, but at the same time, the defendant has an interest in protection 
from wrongful conviction because of  what is at stake. 
Stumer85 accepts that the community interest in preventing, deterring 
and punishing crime increases  with the seriousness of the offence, but so too 
does  the interest of a defendant in avoiding wrongful conviction. He 
contends that the values  protected by the presumption of innocence are too 
important to be limited on the basis of  a competing public interest. 
Elements of  an Offence Distinguished from Defences 
Among the factors identified by Dennis 86 is the distinction between elements 
of an offence and defences, the courts sometimes, although not invariably,87 
having found that the prosecutor must prove all the essential elements of an 
offence. 
Roberts 88 insists  that any distinction between elements of the offence 
and defences depends on the language of the statute in question. For him, 
the presumption is procedural, not substantive. Substance and procedure are 
independent dimensions of penal law.89  Interpreting a statutory offence 
should be a discrete exercise independent of applying the presumption of 
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innocence. In practice, if a statutory offence is  interpreted according to 
normal principles, then the presumption of innocence is  applied to it, with 
the result that the definition of the offence is  modified, then a substantive 
conception of the presumption of innocence is  in operation. This  should not 
be so, he argues. The definition of the offence should itself encapsulate the 
moral wrong proscribed, thereby making clear where potential criminal 
liability lies.
Substance or Gravamen
While a procedural interpretation of the presumption of innocence depends 
on the distinction between elements of an offence and defences, the 
“gravamen” approach addresses the substance of the offence, which may 
include elements of the offence and of a defence.90  Hamer91  argues  that 
reverse burdens  are less likely to be acceptable if they relate to matters 
crucial to the criminality or gravamen of an offence, although he recognises 
the difficulties of  identifying such matters.
Tadros and Tierney,92 adopting a substantive approach, argue that it 
should be for the prosecutor to prove those factors which comprise the 
mischief at which Parliament aimed when creating the offence, such that a 
reverse burden is acceptable only if it does not require the defendant to 
prove an element of the offence. Likewise, for Stumer,93  the real question 
ought to be whether a person comes within the scope of what was intended 
to be prohibited, and both elements and defences are relevant to that – a 
person who falls within a defence was not intended to fall within what was 
intended to be prohibited.
Dennis94  also considers an approach which takes into account the 
rationale of the offence and the extent to which the prohibited conduct is 
blameworthy or “properly criminal”. If the prohibition extends  to conduct 
which is  not in itself blameworthy or morally criminal, the effect of a reverse 
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onus  provision may be to require the defendant to prove innocence in 
morally substantive terms; this would be objectionable as disproportionate. 
Duff95 distinguishes between, on the one hand, offences (to be proved 
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt) and defences (to be proved by 
the defence on at least an evidential burden); and, on the other hand, 
between criminal responsibility and criminal liability. Proof of the offence 
establishes that the accused is criminally responsible for committing the 
offence and must answer for it. At this  point, the accused, if not admitting 
guilt, may still be able to avert criminal liability by offering a justification or 
excuse, and has at least an evidential burden. The presumption of 
innocence requires that a person be presumed innocent until proved 
criminally responsible; at that point it is  up to the accused to rebut the 
presumption of guilt by offering an answer that blocks  the presumptive 
inference from responsibility to guilt.
Glover96  points  to the dangers of making decisions  about the 
legitimacy of reverse burdens on the basis of their gravamen, citing Sheldrake 
as  an example of how difficult it can be to be sure of the defining features  of 
an offence – a point I come back to later in this chapter.97
Stumer98 dismisses gravamen as a guide to the acceptability of reverse 
burdens. Gravamen can be defined either by reference to the characteristics 
of the offence which make it wrongful and suitable for criminal sanctions, or 
by reference to the conduct which Parliament intended to control, but both 
depend on controversial theories of what is wrongful and switch attention 
away from the words of  the statute to far more nebulous concepts.
Maximum Penalty
It might be expected that, the more serious the consequences of conviction, 
the less  likely it is that a reverse burden would be acceptable. Hamer is  of 
the view that the cases  largely bear this  out.99 He suggests that the offence in 
Sheldrake, of being in charge while over the limit, could be viewed as a mere 
traffic offence although it does  carry a possible prison sentence, but goes no 
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further than concluding that the offence in Sheldrake is  less serious  than those 
in Lambert100  (possession of drugs with intent to supply) and Attorney General’s 
Reference (No 4 of 2002)101  (membership of a proscribed terrorist 
organisation). Ashworth102  cites  both Lambert and Attorney-General’s Reference 
(No 4 of 2002) as  cases in which the House of Lords  treated high maximum 
sentences (ten years and life) as favouring insistence on the presumption of 
innocence, and one103  in which the approach was less clear-cut. He argues 
that where deprivation of liberty is  a possible penalty, there is  no place for a 
reversal of  proof.
Dennis,104  on the other hand, finds maximum penalty an uncertain 
guide to the acceptability of a reverse burden, citing cases where reverse 
burdens were upheld even though penalties of up to five years’, seven years’ 
and ten years’ imprisonment were available. 
Simester and Sullivan suggest that the principle should be that, for 
stigmatic crimes  involving proof of culpability and a potential sentence of 
imprisonment, reverse legal burdens should always be reduced to evidential 
burdens.105 Dennis takes a similar view.106
Justifying Legal Reverse Burdens and Legal Presumptions
The objections to legal reverse burdens are summarised above.107  There 
have, however, been a number of suggestions  for ways  in which, and 
circumstances in which, such burdens may be acceptable. 
Dennis108 canvasses what he calls  voluntary acceptance of risk. This 
concept is  engaged when a person participates  in a regulated activity from 
which the person intends to derive benefit. Such participation carries  a 
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corresponding burden of having to disprove an assumption of blame for 
certain acts committed in the course of  the activity. 
Likewise, Glover has proposed109  that reverse legal burdens  may 
generally be justified under what he calls  a “licensing approach”. If a person 
voluntarily engages in a lawful, regulated activity which presents a serious 
risk or danger to the public, in so doing that person accepts any reverse legal 
burden as a condition of being licensed or permitted (either specifically, or 
by the absence of constraint) to engage in the activity. He suggests  that 
driving offences could be included within such a definition, where the use of 
the term “licensing” is of  course especially apt. 
Dennis’s  and Glover’s approaches are reminiscent of the argument 
described in Chapter 2,110  that it is legitimate to displace mens rea for the 
drink- and drug-driving offences  because the legislation is  part of a regime 
regulating special skills which require licensing.
Stumer111  says  that the characterisation of offences as  regulatory is 
unhelpful to the question of the acceptability of reverse burdens; what 
matters  is what is  at stake for the defendant. But he does concede that, if the 
penalties are low, voluntary participation in a regulated sphere of activity 
might be relevant to justifying a reverse burden.112 
Duff113 also says that it is  not unreasonable that those who engage in 
activities  which create risks of serious harm, beyond those which are 
acceptable as features of normal life, should bear the additional 
responsibility of rebutting a presumption. But he exempts drivers from these 
special responsibilities  because, he says, driving is an “ordinary” rather than 
a specialised activity, creating a “normal” level of risk which is part of 
everyday life. The example he gives is  that a driver who drives satisfactorily 
is not thereby equipped to prove having driven with due care and attention. 
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In relation to irrebuttable legal presumptions, Duff114  goes on to say 
that these are consistent with the presumption of innocence only if it can be 
shown that there is  no scope for a defendant to admit the fact proved yet 
deny the presumption which ensues; proof of the fact should constitute 
irrefutable proof  of  the presumption. 
Hamer115 suggests that the public interest in law enforcement is likely 
to come to the fore, to justify a reverse burden, in a “regulatory regime” 
where, although the offence in question features  significant harm, the 
penalties are relatively light. By regulatory regimes Hamer means those 
established to respond to practical rather than moral concerns, such as food 
and drug production, environmental protection and safety in the workplace. 
These regimes feature situations  where a defendant should be considered to 
have chosen to engage in the activity, with notice of the conditions  attaching 
to it. Hamer admits, though, that driving is less straightforward; while 
drivers  are on notice that driving is regulated, this  would not justify, for 
example, a presumption that a person is  driving dangerously unless the 
person can prove otherwise.
Roberts  says  that a reverse burden may be justified where (inter alia) it is 
necessary to save a criminal prohibition from being unenforceable or 
virtually unenforceable.116  He gives as an example a presumption that a 
person refusing to give a breath sample at the roadside has  been driving with 
excess alcohol. There is of course no such presumption in road traffic law. 
Instead, the legislature made such a refusal an offence in itself.
Ease of  Proof  and Peculiar Knowledge
There is  an argument that if a matter can be proved more easily by the 
defendant than by the prosecutor, the objection to a reverse burden is 
reduced.117
Clearly some reverse burdens  are easier to prove than others; 
demonstrating possession of a licence may be perfectly compatible with the 
presumption of innocence where it is reasonable that a person must be 
Chapter 3: The Presumption of  Innocence
87
114 RA Duff, ‘Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence’ in AP Simester 
(ed), Appraising Strict Liability (OUP 2005) 143.
115  David Hamer, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act’ (2007) 66 
CLJ 142, 146 et seq.
116 Paul Roberts ‘The Presumption of Innocence Brought Home? Kebilene Deconstructed’ (2002) 118 
LQR 41, 63.
117 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E&P 241, 266–267. 
See also David Hamer, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing 
Act’ (2007) 66 CLJ 142, 158–159.
licensed in the first place to participate in the activity in question.118 Indeed, 
the Divisional Court has held that it is  wholly proportionate that a defendant 
who disputed that he was driving while disqualified had the burden of 
establishing that he was entitled to drive.119 An example of a burden which 
would be difficult for a defendant to prove would be the chemical 
composition of a substance found in his  possession, which would give rise to 
very real practical difficulties, especially as such substances are normally 
seized by the police.120 But ease of proof is not in itself a reason to reverse a 
burden, rather difficulty of  proof  is a reason not to reverse the burden.121
The “peculiar knowledge” concept is to the effect that if a matter is 
solely within the knowledge of the defendant, it may be more acceptable 
that the defendant should bear the burden of proving it. It is another of the 
factors identified by Dennis as having featured in the courts’ decision-
making on reverse burdens.122 
Ashworth and Horder find this approach is acceptable in relation to 
certain matters, but should be kept within limits. It should not be extended 
to any matter within an individual’s  peculiar knowledge, since this could 
encompass elements such as  intention, knowledge and other aspects  of mens 
rea, and would undermine the presumption of innocence completely.123 In 
any event, state of mind is not so easily proved as is possession of a 
licence.124
Stumer125 argues that the question of knowledge possessed only by the 
defendant can easily be resolved by imposing an evidential burden under 
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which the defendant must disclose any such matter to the prosecution. It can 
then be scrutinised and tested in the normal way. There is  no need for a 
legal burden.
My review of the case law has revealed no consistent principles  about the 
circumstances in which the presumption of innocence may be put aside, 
while the literature shows some commonality of views among scholars, but 
no definitive consensus about where the lines are to be drawn. 
I turn next to the drink- and drug-driving offences, pinpointing the 
situations in which the presumption of innocence is  in play, and identifying 
and evaluating how it has been dealt with in those situations. 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
In the context of the drink- and drug-driving offences, there are five 
situations in which the presumption of  innocence falls to be considered:
• no likelihood of driving: a person accused of being in charge when 
unfit to drive through drink, or when over the limit,126  or (in 
due course) while having an excess of a specified drug127 can 
escape conviction by proving there was  no likelihood of driving 
while remaining in such a condition;128
• the “medical defence” to a charge of driving, attempting to drive or 
being in charge with a specified controlled drug in excess of the 
specified limit for that drug,129  when in force. It will be a 
defence130 to show that the drug in question had been supplied 
to the accused for medical or dental purposes, that the accused 
took it as directed by the prescriber or supplier, and in 
accordance with any manufacturer’s or distributor’s  instruc-
tions, and that the accused was  lawfully in possession of the 
drug.
• reasonable excuse: a person charged with failing without 
reasonable excuse to co-operate with a preliminary test, or to 
provide a specimen, or to consent to the analysis  of a blood 
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specimen taken while incapable of consenting,131  may claim 
that there was a reasonable excuse; it is then for the prosecution 
to negative the proffered excuse;
• the statutory assumption132  that the proportion of alcohol, or (in 
due course) of a specified drug,133 in a defendant’s body at the 
time of the alleged offence was not less  than that found in the 
specimen taken later;
• the “hip-flask defence” or “post-incident consumption”: the statutory 
assumption may be displaced if the defendant can show that 
the unfitness through drink, or excess  over the prescribed limit, 
was  caused by alcohol consumed after the alleged offence.134 
There will be similar provisions in relation to an excess of a 
specified drug.135
Each of  these situations is examined in turn below.
IN CHARGE: NO LIKELIHOOD OF DRIVING
The Statutory Provisions
Section 4 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 provides for the offences  of driving 
or attempting to drive, or being in charge of, a vehicle while unfit through 
drink or drugs. Section 5 establishes  the same offences (driving, attempting 
to drive, or in charge) by a person who has consumed so much alcohol that 
the proportion of it in the breath, blood or urine exceeds the prescribed 
limit. In due course, s 5A will establish the same three offences by a person 
having a concentration of a specified controlled drug above the specified 
limit.136  A person accused under the “in charge” leg of these groups  of 
provisions can escape conviction upon proof  that:
• at the material time the circumstances  were such that there was 
no likelihood of his driving so long as the defendant remained 
unfit … ;137 or 
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• at the time of the alleged offence the circumstances were such 
that there was no likelihood of driving whilst the proportion of 
alcohol in the breath, blood or urine remained likely to exceed 
the prescribed limit;138 
• at the time of the alleged offence the circumstances were such 
that there was no likelihood of driving whilst the proportion of 
the specified controlled drug in the blood or urine remained 
likely to exceed the specified limit for that drug.139
The provisions  are couched in somewhat different terms. Under the 
first, a person is to be “deemed” not to have been in charge upon proving no 
likelihood of driving; under the second and third it is  “a defence” to prove 
no such likelihood. In relation to the first two, the Queen’s  Bench Division 
decided that, at least for the purposes of the case in question “the essential 
problems to which those two provisions  give rise are not significantly 
different”.140  In the House of Lords, Lord Bingham remarked that there 
appeared to be “no very good reason (other than history) for the adoption of 
these different legislative techniques, but the outcome is  effectively the 
same”.141  In Wilkinson, it is  submitted that these differences  are “purely 
semantic”.142  For the purposes of the present discussion, the difference in 
drafting likewise appears of  no significance. 
The Case Law
The nature of  the offences
The meaning of the expression “in charge” is  critical to the question of how 
the presumption of innocence applies in such cases. Whether or not a 
person is in charge of  a vehicle is a matter of  fact and degree in each case.143 
In Watkins,144  the Queen’s Bench Division said that being in charge 
was  the lowest on the scale of drink-drive offences, the next being 
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attempting to drive, and the highest, driving; a person may be in charge 
while neither driving nor attempting to drive. The aim of  the offence was:
… to prevent driving when unfit through drink. The offence of 
being ‘in charge’ must therefore be intended to convict those 
who are not driving and have not yet done more than a 
preparatory act towards  driving, but who in all the 
circumstances  have already formed or may yet form the 
intention to drive the vehicle, and may try to drive it whilst still 
unfit.
The prosecution must prove some connection (which may be less than 
attempting to drive) between the person who is  unfit and a motor vehicle on 
a road or public place, but the nature of that connection is elusive. The 
court distinguished two situations: 
• the owner or lawful possessor of a vehicle, or someone who has 
recently driven it, is in charge of it unless shown to be no 
longer in charge. Such a person would no longer be in charge if 
he or she has put the vehicle in someone else’s  charge, or has 
ceased to be in actual control and there is  no realistic possibility 
of resuming actual control while unfit, as where the person is at 
home in bed for the night, is a great distance from the car, or 
the vehicle is taken by someone else;
• in relation to someone who is  not the owner, lawful possessor or 
recent driver, but is  sitting in the car or is otherwise involved 
with it, the question is whether the person has assumed being 
in charge. Such a person is  in charge of the vehicle if 
voluntarily in de facto control of it, or, given the circumstances 
(such as  the person’s  position, intentions  and actions) may be 
expected imminently to assume control – as where the person 
has gained entry to the vehicle and evinced an intention to take 
control of it, although gaining entry may not be necessary if 
there is some other manifestation of intention, such as stealing 
the keys in circumstances indicating an intention to drive it.
Despite all the above – the purpose of the provisions, and the 
relevance of control of the vehicle –  the court in Watkins nevertheless  found 
that the “in charge” offences  included no element of likelihood of driving 
and it was not for a prosecutor to prove such likelihood. This may reflect the 
fact that the offence was first created without the “no likelihood of driving” 
escape route, which was introduced by the Road Traffic Act 1956. Hansard145 
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recites an assumption that the original purpose of the “in charge” offences 
was  that a person in charge of a car should not be under the influence such 
as  to render him incapable of controlling it. Such a person might have no 
intention of driving but might, for example, inadvertently release the brake, 
causing the vehicle to roll away. 
In the leading case of Sheldrake,146 the House of Lords confirmed that 
the prosecutor must prove the being in charge, coupled with the impairment 
or excess  alcohol, but not likelihood of driving. I discuss  this  further 
below.147
Burden of  proof
The burden of proving no likelihood of driving while remaining unfit falls 
on the accused, and the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities.148 
In Sheldrake, the House of Lords confirmed that the burden of proving no 
likelihood of driving while remaining over the limit is a legal burden on the 
defendant, which was compatible with the presumption of innocence in 
article 6(2) of the ECHR.149 The reverse burden could be justified because it 
was  aimed at legitimate road safety objectives and met the tests of 
acceptability for a presumption of fact identified by the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, in that it was reasonable and in no way arbitrary.
Discharging the burden of  proof
It is not enough for a defendant simply to assert having had no intention to 
drive while unfit or over the limit; it is absence of likelihood that must be 
proved. Intention may be relevant,150 but it is not definitive of  the issue.151
Expert evidence may be necessary to support an argument of no 
likelihood of driving. Where a defendant was accused of being in charge 
while unfit, and with being in charge while over the limit, the Divisional 
Court emphasised the distinction between the two offences. It found that, 
while justices  may be able to decide for themselves, on the evidence, whether 
or not the defendant was  unfit, the position is entirely different in respect of 
being in charge while over the limit, where the question is  “the rate of 
decline over a given period of the blood- or breath-alcohol level”. Given the 
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lapse of time before the defendant next planned to drive (at most, some six 
hours), and the high reading (nearly three times the limit), the court 
concluded that it was not possible to discharge the burden of no likelihood 
of driving while over the limit without expert evidence.152  It may well be 
that the courts will adopt the same approach in relation to the new offences 
of  excess of  a specified controlled drug.153
Discussion
Procedural approach
On the basis of the procedural approach to the presumption of innocence154 
– that the prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt the constituents 
of the offence, as  defined in the statute – the presumption of innocence is 
met in the provisions  on no likelihood of driving. There is no reference to 
likelihood of driving in the sections creating the offences and it need not be 
proved by the prosecutor, even though the purpose of the offence is  to 
prevent driving when unfit or over the limit. 
The House of Lords in Sheldrake took such a procedural approach, 
finding that the statutory ingredients of the offence contain no reference to 
doing an act preparatory to driving or forming an intention to drive. There 
could be no complaint if the original enactment of the offence had not been 
modified to include the exculpatory provisions  on no likelihood of driving.155 
This  neatly illustrates what Tadros156  highlights  as  a problem with the 
classical approach to reverse burdens – it suggests  that where a statute 
provides for a defence, and it is for the defendant to prove the defence, the 
presumption of innocence is interfered with, but there would be no such 
interference in the absence of  the defence. 
Substantive approach
A substantive approach,157  applying the presumption of innocence to the 
substance or gravamen of the offence, would mean that the question of 
likelihood of driving could be tested for compliance with the presumption of 
innocence only if such a likelihood – or at least a risk of driving – is a 
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component of the offence. This  is  contrary to what the House of Lords 
found, but there are grounds for questioning that finding. I contend that if 
likelihood (or at least, risk) of driving is  not a constituent of an “in charge” 
offence, then, given the definitions  of “in charge” and “attempting to drive”, 
it is very difficult to see quite what being “in charge” does comprise. 
The Hansard extract mentioned above,158 to the effect that the original 
purpose of the “in charge” offences was  that a person should not be under 
the influence such as  to be incapable of controlling a vehicle, is  strained. If 
the issue is whether or not a person is capable of controlling the vehicle, the 
person would surely have to be in some situation where the question of 
control arises. It is difficult to imagine any such circumstance in which the 
person would not also be so close to driving or attempting to drive that there 
is at least a risk of driving. The example quoted in Hansard, of inadvertently 
releasing the brake, causing the vehicle to roll away, is questionable in that 
these circumstances  would likely not amount to being in charge at all, but to 
driving or attempting to drive. A defendant who boarded a coach and, for a 
joke, released the handbrake, but then could not control the coach and bring 
it to a stop, appealed against conviction for driving with excess alcohol on 
the ground that he had not been driving.159  The Divisional Court, albeit 
somewhat reluctantly, upheld the finding of the court below that the 
appellant had indeed been driving. 
There is no statutory definition of “in charge”, but the case law, while 
not putting it in quite these words, suggests  that a person is not in charge 
unless  the circumstances are such that there is  some risk of driving. The 
judgment in Watkins deals with the concept of being in charge by reference 
to whether or not a person is  in actual control, or has assumed control, or 
who may be expected to assume control, of a vehicle. The use of the word 
“control” suggests  something close to the possibility of driving, while the 
examples  of circumstances in which a person would not be in control – in 
bed asleep, or a great distance away from the car – comprise situations 
where there is little risk of  driving. 
The following circumstances  have been found to amount to being in 
charge:
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• where a motor cyclist was in the car park of a pub, drunk; his 
friends  had arranged for someone else to ride his  motor cycle 
away, but he did not know of  that;160 
• where a defendant was supervising a learner driver;161 
• where an accused was  seen approaching his car, keys in hand. 
He stumbled. When the officer reached him, he was  sitting in 
the driver’s seat, but had not started the engine. 
In all these situations, there is clearly some element of control, but 
inherent in each is  some risk of driving. The motor cyclist did not know that 
other arrangements had been made, and so might have ridden himself; a 
supervisor may have to take over control of the vehicle, such as would 
amount to driving;162  if a person stumbles into the driving seat of a car 
there may well be a risk that he may drive it. On these cases, being in charge 
seems broadly equivalent to attempting to drive, but without, necessarily, the 
intention needed for an attempt.
When Sheldrake was  before the High Court, that court adopted the 
words  of Taylor LJ in Watkins, quoted above, finding that the offence of 
being in charge is  aimed at those who may try to drive while still unfit, or 
put themselves in a situation where there is a risk that they may drive while 
still unfit.163 There was a contravention of the presumption of innocence in 
article 6(2) of the Convention in that a person could be convicted of being 
in charge with excess  alcohol even though the court was not sure that there 
was  a likelihood of driving. The burden of proof was  therefore read down 
from a legal burden to a persuasive burden. Just as the prosecution must 
prove driving or attempting to drive in relation to the other offences, so too, 
the Divisional Court said, it must prove that there was  a real risk that a 
person in charge would drive.164 
The House of Lords, as has  been seen, disagreed, finding that “a 
person in charge of a car when unfit to drive it may properly be expected to 
divest himself of the power to do so (as  by giving the keys  to someone else) 
or put it out of his power to do so (as by going well away).”165 The examples 
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of ways to divest oneself of being in charge do not seem to bear much 
scrutiny. It is all very well to say one may give the keys  to someone else, but if 
I am in the pub, drunk, and give my car keys  to my friend, it would be 
difficult to argue that I was  not in charge, certainly for as  long as I could 
simply ask for the keys back. And “going well away” likewise embraces many 
circumstances. It seems inconceivable that there would be any question of 
my being in charge if I leave my car at home and am drunk two hundred 
miles  away. But where a person abandoned a vehicle on a garage forecourt 
and walked away without locking it, he was found to have been still in 
charge of it when police came upon him half a mile away.166 “Going well 
away” seems simply to beg the question, “how far?” 
Lord Carswell referred to being in charge when over the limit as an 
anti-social act.167 He did not elaborate further, and it is difficult to imagine 
how being drunk in charge is any more anti-social than being drunk in any 
other circumstances, unless the possibility of  driving arises.
Thus the problem with the view taken by the House of Lords  is  that it 
is  extremely difficult to visualise situations in which a person would be in 
charge without there also being at least some risk of driving. The preferable 
view, I suggest, is that risk or likelihood of driving is  an integral part of the 
“in charge” offences, such that the imposition of a legal burden of 
disproving that offends the presumption of innocence and should instead be 
an evidential burden. 
Of course risk is  not the same thing as likelihood. Likelihood suggests 
more probable than not, while risk may be no more than a few percentage 
points of possibility. If it is accepted that being in charge comprises at least a 
risk of driving, it would remain acceptable for the reverse burden to be 
couched in terms of “no likelihood”, in that “no likelihood” would be less 
difficult to prove than the far more demanding “no risk”, although again it 
should be interpreted as an evidential burden rather than a legal burden.
Ease of  proof
It has been said that reverse burdens may be less objectionable if they relate 
to matters  which can be proved more easily by the defendant than by the 
prosecutor.168  This gives rise to the question whether the absence of 
likelihood of driving equips a person to prove that fact; if there truly was  no 
likelihood that he would drive, and can raise that possibility before the court, 
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yet cannot prove it on the balance of probabilities, the presumption of 
innocence is breached. 
“Likelihood” is  defined in the Oxford English Dictionary169 as “something 
that is  likely, a probability”, making this a complex intellectual exercise of 
proving, on the balance of probabilities, that there was no probability that 
the defendant would drive. 
In Sheldrake, the House of Lords remarked that likelihood of driving 
was  a matter so closely conditioned by the defendant’s  own knowledge and 
state of mind that it was  more appropriate for the defendant to prove 
unlikelihood of driving, than for the prosecutor to prove likelihood. 170  
Hamer171  criticises  this on the ground that the defendant’s  peculiar 
knowledge of his  own mind does not necessarily facilitate proving the matter 
in question. This may be to give the defendant’s state of mind too great a 
role in the matter, for, as has  been seen, the crux is  likelihood rather than 
intention.172  But Hamer goes on to say that, knowing the restrictions  on 
drink-driving, the driver might reasonably be expected to put himself in a 
position where he could demonstrate no likelihood of driving while over the 
limit – something perhaps more easily suggested than done.
There are surely circumstances  in which it might be extremely difficult 
to prove no likelihood of driving. Padfield173 counsels, “don’t ever wash your 
car when drunk: you may be convicted of this offence”. And Mason174 refers 
to situations where, following a domestic dispute, a party simply resorts to 
sitting in the car as a place of refuge, not as  a means of transport. It is 
difficult to imagine that the car washer or the retreating partner would 
reasonably be expected to be able to prove no likelihood of  driving. 
Conclusion
I have argued that, despite the decision of the House of Lords in Sheldrake, a 
characteristic of being in charge of a vehicle must be that there is at least a 
risk that the person in charge will drive and thereby endanger others. 
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Without an element of risk of driving, the offence is surely as hollow as 
Ashworth’s hypothetical offence of causing serious injury.175  On a 
substantive or gravamen approach, the reverse burden breaches  the 
presumption of innocence in giving the defendant the task of disproving this 
element of the offence. Even if a procedural approach is adopted, such that 
the presumption is  met, the offence falls  foul of the principle that people 
should not be convicted unless blameworthy.176 I conclude that the reverse 
burdens of proving no likelihood of driving while remaining unfit or over 
the limit should be evidential only, which would render them compatible 
with the presumption of  innocence in article 6(2). 
I turn now to two matters featuring evidential burdens  only: the medical 
defence to the new excess  drug offences, and reasonable excuse for failing to 
provide specimens. 
EXCESS DRUGS: THE MEDICAL DEFENCE
There is to be a defence to the new offences of driving, attempting to drive 
or in charge with a concentration of a specified controlled drug above the 
specified limit.177 The legislature intends  to “avoid the new offence catching” 
drivers  who have taken properly prescribed or supplied drugs as  directed, 
and in accordance with any manufacturer’s or supplier’s instructions, so far 
as  consistent with the directions.178  In pursuit of that aim, most of the 
proposed limits are said to reflect levels  of drug-taking in excess of normal 
therapeutic doses.179  Under section 5A(3), it will be a defence for a 
defendant to show that:
• the drug in question had been prescribed or supplied to the 
defendant for medical or dental purposes;
• the defendant took the drug in accordance with any directions 
given by the person who prescribed or supplied it, and with any 
accompanying instructions (as far as  consistent with any such 
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directions) given by the manufacturer or distributor of the 
drug; and
• that the defendant was in lawful possession of the drug 
immediately before taking it.
The defence is likely to arise rarely since those taking such drugs in 
normal dosages  would not, presumably, be expected to show concentrations 
above the specified levels. 
Subsection (5) specifically addresses  the burden of proving the defence, 
providing that if the defendant adduces evidence that is  sufficient to raise an 
issue with respect to the defence, the court must assume that the defence is 
satisfied unless  the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
In the consultation document, it is said that:
The defence places  an evidential burden on a person accused of 
committing the offence. This  means  that the accused person 
must simply put forward enough evidence to “raise an issue” 
regarding the defence that is  worth consideration by the court, 
It is  then for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that the defence cannot be relied upon.180 
Quite how this will work in practice is  difficult to foresee. The 
evidence needed to satisfy an evidential burden of this  kind is  reviewed 
above.181 In relation to reasonable excuse, I will argue that even though the 
burden of proof is evidential only, it may be extremely difficult to raise the 
requisite issue.182  In relation to the new defence, presumably something 
more than a simple assertion will be required. It will not always  be easy to 
prove that a drug was  prescribed, since the prescription will have been given 
up to the pharmacy which dispensed it, so that a defendant may have to go 
back to the prescriber for evidence.183 A suspect who still has the packaging, 
showing the date the drug was dispensed, to whom it was dispensed, and 
directions  for taking it, may be better placed. A defendant who had taken an 
over-the-counter drug may be able to satisfy section 5A(3) by producing the 
packaging and a dated receipt for the purchase. Similar issues seem likely to 
arise in relation to showing that possession of  the drug was lawful. 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
100
180 Ibid, para 11.2.
181 See p 75.
182 See pp 102–103, 104.
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It is difficult to imagine how a defendant is to raise the issue of having 
taken the drug as  prescribed and/or as  directed unless, perhaps, there 
happens to be a witness  who saw the drug being taken. There could be a 
problem if the practitioner who prescribed the drug told the defendant that 
taking it would not affect driving, but that contradicts the wording on the 
dispensary label and/or in the product information leaflet. It may be that 
doctors will be called on to give evidence of  directions given orally. 
There has been little research into how directions about medicines are 
understood,184  and this  may have implications for the new defence. There 
may be defendants  who believe they were following directions  or 
instructions, but had misunderstood them and in fact were not.
Apart from the question of the evidence a defendant will have to raise 
to plead the defence is  the matter of how prosecutors will then go about 
disproving such matters. Since the limits  are to equate with an excess over 
therapeutic doses, anything substantially over the limit might be accepted as 
evidence that the drug was not taken in accordance with the relevant 
directions  and/or instructions, but the difficulty would be to pinpoint quite 
how far over the specified limit would be enough to disprove the defence.
Section 5A(4) goes  on to provide that the defence is not available if the 
defendant’s actions were:
• contrary to any advice given by the person who prescribed or 
supplied the drug about the time which should elapse between 
taking the drug and driving; or
• contrary to any accompanying instructions (so far as  consistent 
with any such advice) about those matters  given by the 
manufacturer or distributor of  the drug.
These provisions  address compliance with advice concerning the time 
between taking a drug and driving, and limit the scope of the defence in 
section 5A(3). Presumably any assertion of failure to comply will fall to be 
proved by the prosecution, who may have to deal with the difficulties  of 
establishing exactly when a drug was taken, the time which elapsed before 
driving, and exactly what directions  (over and above, or in contradiction of, 
those appearing on the pharmacy label or product information leaflet) were 
given. 
The original offence of unfitness to drive through drink or drugs185 
will continue alongside the new offence. There seems nothing to prevent a 
person who is  taking medication fully in accordance with all directions and 
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advice from being charged with the offence of driving while unfit. Such a 
person would be disadvantaged compared with someone charged under 
section 5A, in that the defence under section 5A(3) would not be available. 
In so far as the new defence specifically provides  for an evidential burden, it 
appears not to offend the presumption of innocence. The second evidential 
burden arising relates to reasonable excuse for failing to provide specimens.
FAILING WITHOUT REASONABLE EXCUSE
The Statutory Provisions
As already noted,186 it is an offence, when required to do so, to fail without 
reasonable excuse:
• to co-operate with a preliminary test (usually at the roadside);
• to provide a specimen for analysis  for evidential purposes 
(usually at a police station); or
• to give permission for a laboratory test of a specimen of blood 
taken when the subject was incapable of consenting (usually 
because of  unconsciousness).187
The Case Law
The prosecution must prove all the elements of these offences  beyond 
reasonable doubt. The absence of reasonable excuse is  an element of the 
offence, not a defence.188  A defendant wishing to argue that there was  a 
reasonable excuse must raise the issue. The onus is then on the prosecution 
to negative the argument.189  The court must be satisfied to the criminal 
standard – beyond reasonable doubt – that the defendant had no reasonable 
excuse.190 
	 The classic statement of what constitutes a reasonable excuse remains 
that in R v Lennard, where the Court of  Appeal said that:
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
102
186 See p 55. 
187 Contrary to RTA 1988, ss 6(6), 7(6)  and 7A(6) respectively. 
188  McClory v Owen-Thomas 1990 SLT 323 (HCJ) 325, cited with approval in Piggott v DPP [2008] 
EWHC 305 (Admin) (DC) [17].
189 Rowland v Thorpe [1970] RTR 406 (QBD).
190 R v Harling (1971) 55 Cr App R 8. See also DPP v Boden [1988] RTR 188 (QBD); DPP v Szarzynski 
[1993] RTR 364 (QBD); and Mckeon v DPP [2007] EWHC 3216 (Admin) (DC). 
no excuse can be adjudged a reasonable one unless  the person 
from whom the specimen is  required is  physically or mentally 
unable to provide it or the provision of the specimen would 
entail a substantial risk to his health.191
 Some years  later, in the House of Lords, Lord Edmund Davies 
remarked, obiter, that he was not wholly persuaded that only physical or 
mental inability to comply with the requirement could constitute a 
reasonable excuse.192 Nonetheless, the definition has not been widened, and 
the multiplicity of arguments  advanced by defendants  in their attempts to 
bring their own circumstances within the scope of reasonable excuse have 
largely failed.193
To raise a question of reasonable excuse, the defendant must establish 
a causative link between the condition claimed and the inability to provide 
the specimen(s).194 While the judgments  do not specify what is meant by a 
“causative link”, they do suggest that the medical evidence should indicate 
that the failure to provide was a result of  the condition in question.
The cases demonstrate that, in the absence of expert evidence of 
some condition which amounts to a physical or mental inability to provide, 
an argument of reasonable excuse is  unlikely to succeed. Although it has 
been said that the court in Lennard “did not intend to lay down something 
rigid and exhaustive”,195  the case law clearly shows that the test has  been 
applied rigorously and has remained narrow in scope. This  is so even 
though, since the decision in Lennard, evidential breath testing has been 
introduced as  the preferred alternative to blood or urine testing. In the 
context of a decision that even legal advice not to provide a specimen does 
not afford a defendant a reasonable excuse, the steadfast application of the 
decision in Lennard has  been described as a “harsh gloss on the wording of 
the Act”.196
Reasonable excuse is discussed further in Chapter 4,197 in the context 
of  the privilege against self-incrimination.
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The Reverse Burden
The burden of proof on the defendant is  evidential only, in the sense that 
the task is  to raise a reasonable doubt as  to the matter in question,198 rather 
than the more onerous legal or persuasive burden, calling for proof on the 
balance of probabilities. Since the burden is  evidential only, it is compatible 
with the presumption of innocence in article 6(2) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights  and Fundamental 
Freedoms.199 
While the burden is  evidential only, it is not necessarily a light one, 
given that medical or other expert evidence is usually needed.200 
It is  an indicator of the complexity of these issues that the Crown 
Prosecution Service advises crown prosecutors, if reasonable excuse based 
on medical evidence is  raised, to require the defence to provide the evidence 
before the hearing or seek an adjournment for the purpose.201
Discussion
While the evidential burden in the “without reasonable excuse” offences 
clearly does not offend the presumption of innocence, the weight of the 
burden on the defendant is of some interest. As noted above,202 an evidential 
burden requires the defendant to proffer something more than a mere self-
serving assertion of some excuse, but less  than proof on the balance of 
probabilities. The requirement for expert defence evidence seems a relatively 
heavy burden, especially as most defendants  would have to pay privately for 
the services of an expert, raising the question of the imbalance of resources 
between the state and the individual.203 On the other hand, it is  difficult to 
imagine what else might be sufficient properly to raise the question and to 
put the prosecution on adequate notice of what it has to disprove. The 
challenge for a defendant seems to arise not so much from the fact that the 
burden is evidential, but that the term “reasonable excuse” has been so 
narrowly defined. 
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As will be seen in Chapter 4,204 however, the procedure for requiring 
specimens is  such that any medical reason for inability to provide breath or 
blood is  likely to come to light during the investigation, such that the 
investigating officer can require blood if there is a medical reason why 
breath cannot be provided, or urine if there is a medical reason why blood 
cannot be provided. 
The question of reasonable excuse does  not, therefore, compromise the 
presumption of innocence. The same cannot, however, be said for the next 
matter to be considered in this chapter – the statutory assumption 
concerning the result of  analysing a specimen. 
EXCESS ALCOHOL: THE STATUTORY ASSUMPTION
The Statutory Provisions
The “statutory assumption” in section 15(2)(a), Road Traffic Offenders Act 
1988 is as follows: 
it is  to be assumed, subject to subsection (3) below, that the 
proportion of alcohol in the accused’s  breath, blood or urine at 
the time of the alleged offence was  not less  than in the 
specimen.
Section 15(2)(b) makes  a similar provision in relation to drugs  and will 
come into force along with the new offences under section 5A.205
These provisions  reflect the fact that it may not be possible to take a 
specimen until some time after a driver is stopped or until some time after 
the incident being investigated. This  may be because of the time which 
elapses before police learn of an incident, the time it takes police to arrive at 
the scene, delays  travelling from the scene to the police station, or delays at 
the police station. During that time, alcohol206 may be being absorbed or 
eliminated, or even both,207 such that the level shown by the analysis  of the 
specimen may be either lower or higher than at the time of the suspected 
offence. To minimise any such discrepancies, delay in taking a specimen is  to 
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be avoided.208 The introduction of roadside evidential testing for alcohol209 
will further reduce the scope for delay. The statutory assumption is clearly 
aimed at ruling out any argument that the reading upon which a 
prosecution is based was higher than at the time of the alleged offence, 
because of alcohol210  which had been consumed but not absorbed at the 
time of  the incident. 
The assumption works both ways. Often, the suspect is eliminating 
alcohol between the time of the incident and the time of giving the 
specimen. The assumption advantages  such a person in that the analysis 
shows a concentration lower than at the time of the incident. But this is  not 
always  the case. If a person consumes a large amount of alcohol quickly, 
immediately before driving, the concentration in the body may still be rising 
when evidential specimens  are taken. Although there would rarely be much 
sympathy for such a driver,211 the assumption could operate to his  or her 
disadvantage, showing a level higher than at the time of  driving. 
The Case Law
The case law on the statutory assumption relates  to alcohol specimens only, 
but there would seem to be no reason to think it will not apply equally to 
drugs when the new offences under section 5A are in force.
The assumption is  irrebuttable; a defendant may not adduce evidence 
to show that at the time of the offence charged, he or she must have been 
below the limit.212
The statutory assumption is  that the alcohol concentration at the 
crucial time was  no less than in the specimen. Consequently, there is  nothing 
to prevent a prosecutor from adducing evidence that at the time of the 
offence the accused’s alcohol concentration was higher than in the 
specimen, a process known as “back-calculation” or “back-tracking”.213  
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In Parker,214 the statutory assumption was  challenged as incompatible 
with articles  6(1) and 6(2), ECHR. The argument before the Divisional 
Court was that the assumption should be construed as rebuttable because:
• to prevent a defendant from calling evidence to establish that 
he had been below the limit while driving could lead to the 
conviction of  an innocent driver;
• the fact that the prosecution is  entitled to calculate back to 
demonstrate guilt, but that the defendant is  not entitled to do 
the same to establish innocence, amounts  to inequality of arms 
– an imbalance between the resources of the prosecutor and 
those of  the defendant which disadvantages the latter;
• the driver who consumes alcohol before, but not after, driving is 
at a disadvantage compared with a driver who takes alcohol 
after driving and invokes section 15(3) (below). 
The court rejected these arguments, confirming that section 15(2) 
provided for an irrebuttable presumption. In practice, most drivers who 
provide evidential specimens  have already failed a preliminary breath test, 
suggesting excess alcohol. Delay before providing evidential specimens 
normally worked in favour of a suspect, but it went against the purpose of 
the legislation for a motorist to argue that he drank a great deal immediately 
before driving which would not have registered on a preliminary breath test, 
but would register on an evidential test. The legislation was aimed at 
preventing consumption of large quantities  of alcohol before taking charge 
of a vehicle. The presumption of innocence was  not offended by assuming 
that the amount of alcohol shown by a breath or blood analysis was the 
quantity at the time of driving or being in charge. Even if that was taking it 
too far, having regard to what was at stake, the assumption was reasonable.
In a later case,215 the Administrative Court applied Parker, reiterating 
that the statutory assumption is  wholly proportionate to the situation where 
a person has  drunk alcohol and then drives. It is  a fair compromise between 
the risk posed to the public by someone who drinks  before driving, and the 
fact that the prescribed limit is  artificial. Parliament preserved the right to 
have a drink before driving, but imposed the statutory assumption. 
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Discussion
It has been noted above that irrebuttable presumptions reduce the 
prosecutor’s task,216 and the statutory assumption provides  an example. The 
definitions of the drink- and drug-driving offences all include references  to 
time. Under section 4, the offences  are of being unfit when driving, 
attempting to drive or in charge. Likewise, under the new section 5A, the 
offences  will be of driving, attempting to drive or in charge when there is  in 
the defendant’s  body an excess  of a specified controlled drug. Where the 
analysis of an evidential specimen is  in evidence,217  the effect of the 
statutory assumption is  to relieve the prosecution of the task of proving that 
the alcohol or drug level shown by analysing the specimen related to the 
time when the accused was driving, attempting to drive or in charge. 
Under section 5, the offences are of driving, attempting to drive or in 
charge after consuming so much alcohol that the limit is  exceeded. Driving 
with excess alcohol is  by far the more commonly prosecuted offence;218 
evidential specimens are always used and no other evidence of the excess 
alcohol is  needed. Here the statutory assumption relieves  the prosecution of 
proving that the drinking preceded the driving; a defendant who invokes 
section 15(3),219  claiming that it was  alcohol drunk after driving which 
caused the unfitness  or excess alcohol, must accept the burden of proving 
the relative times of  drinking and driving. 
In either case, the prosecution need not deal with these questions of 
time in relation to specimen analyses, even though, given the words in the 
statutory definitions, they are elements  of the offences on both a procedural 
or a substantive approach. The presumption of innocence is  surely 
undermined by this.
The statutory assumption falls  within the definition of legal 
presumptions,220  requiring the court to draw a conclusion about the 
accused’s alcohol (or drug) level at a given time, upon proof of the results  of 
analysing a specimen given at a different time. Since it is possible for a 
specimen to show a concentration higher than at the time of the alleged 
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offence, there is a risk – albeit remote – that a person could be convicted 
even if he or she was below the limit at the time of being in charge, 
attempting to drive or driving, so breaching the presumption of innocence. 
As noted above, the circumstances in which this  could happen might not 
reflect well on the accused, but an injustice is  an injustice regardless  of how 
deserving or otherwise the victim may be.
Irrebuttable presumptions have been said to undermine the 
presumption of innocence in that they contribute to the definition of the 
offence.221  In the present context, the relevant element of the substantive 
offences 222  is  defined as “after consuming so much alcohol that the 
proportion of [alcohol] in [the] breath, blood or urine exceeds the 
prescribed limit”. The prescribed limit is in turn defined223 as a proportion 
of alcohol in a specimen of breath, blood or urine. The definition contains 
no reference to the assumption. Nonetheless, the effect of the statutory 
assumption is that the offence consists in having consumed so much alcohol 
that the proportion in the breath, blood or urine exceeds  the prescribed limit 
as indicated by the analysis of a specimen taken under section 7. This is  so despite the 
fact that the assumption appears  in a separate enactment altogether,224 and 
is headed “Use of specimens in proceedings  for an offence under any of 
sections 3A to 5A of the Road Traffic Act 1988”. This  is  a further argument 
that the assumption breaches  the presumption of innocence. The same 
point applies in relation to the new excess drug offences under section 5A.225
Section 15(2) fails  Duff ’s test226 for the compatibility of an irrebuttable 
legal presumption with the presumption of innocence – that there must be 
no scope to admit the fact proved yet deny the presumption which ensues. 
Clearly there is  scope to accept the accuracy of the analysis of the evidential 
specimen, yet argue that the alcohol (or drug) concentration was lower at the 
time of  the alleged offence.
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Stumer’s227 test for the reasonableness of a presumption is that if the 
prosecution proves  a basic fact which makes it very likely that a presumed 
fact is  also true, the presumption is reasonable, and the closer the connection 
between the basic and the presumed fact, the more likely it is  that the 
presumed fact is true. If the closeness of the connection in relation to the 
statutory assumption is measured by reference to the length of time between 
the alleged offence and the taking of the specimen, then the shorter that 
time, presumably, the less  objectionable the assumption – the shorter the 
time, the smaller the difference between the result of the analysis  and the 
alcohol concentration at the time of the alleged offence. But, in relation to 
alcohol at least,228 given the speed of absorption and elimination,229 to pass 
this  test, the time lapse would probably have to be a matter of minutes only 
– in practice, this  is unlikely until such time as  roadside evidential testing230 
comes into use.
Roberts  has argued231  that a reverse burden may be acceptable if 
necessary for enforceability,232  a view which is relevant to the statutory 
assumption. Without the assumption, prosecutions  would be vulnerable to 
challenge on the basis  that the alcohol level at the time of the alleged offence 
was  below the limit. That might not present too great a problem for the 
prosecution if the defence were to have a legal burden of proof (although 
that would of course raise further issues  relating to the presumption of 
innocence). If, however, any such burden of proof were to be evidential only, 
the prosecution would have to counter a defendant’s  argument. That would 
no doubt require expert evidence taking into account all the factors which 
contribute to a person’s  alcohol233 concentration.234 The effect would be to 
emasculate the statutory testing regime. The statutory assumption can 
therefore be viewed as  an important part of an evidential scheme designed 
to ensure the enforceability of the principal drink- and drug-driving 
provisions. 
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For these reasons I conclude that the statutory assumption breaches 
the presumption of  innocence. I discuss this further below. 235
THE “HIP FLASK DEFENCE”
The Statutory Provision
While the statutory assumption described above is  irrebuttable, there are 
certain circumstances  in which it is not to be made. Those circumstances, set 
out in section 15(3) of the Road Traffic Offenders  Act 1988, are, first, that 
the defendant proves having consumed alcohol after driving, attempting to 
drive or being in charge, but before providing a specimen. Secondly, the 
defendant must show that but for such consumption, the limit would not 
have been exceeded or he/she would not have been unfit to drive. There are 
to be similar provisions236 in relation to the new excess drug offences, and 
what is said below applies to them too. 
Section 15(3) regulates  the so-called “hip-flask defence”,237  named 
after the receptacle from which a driver might take a draught upon being 
stopped by police, then claim that it was  that alcohol, rather than alcohol 
drunk before driving, which caused the excess alcohol or unfitness to drive. 
Section 15(3) was enacted238  to bring to an end the possibility of defeating 
the purpose of the legislation by such a ploy.239 On the other hand, there 
may be quite legitimate cases in which these provisions come into play. 
Section 15(3) has been referred to as  a reversal of the burden of 
proof,240 a “defence241 and a “statutory escape clause”.242 Elsewhere,243 it is 
said to “operate by way of  an exception to the normal presumption”.
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The Case Law
A series of cases  illustrates how these provisions  operate. In the first place, 
the court must have before it evidence of drinking after the time of the 
alleged offence; it  is  not sufficient that the defendant asserts  having done so, 
or that a police officer accepted that assertion, or that the defendant had the 
time and opportunity to consume alcohol.244
The burden of proof is  on the accused, on the balance of 
probabilities,245  that is, the defendant has a legal burden of proof. The 
defendant must almost always  adduce medical or scientific evidence to show 
that it was  the alcohol consumed after the incident which caused the 
unfitness  or excess alcohol, “unless the case really is an obvious  one”.246 It is 
unclear what might amount to the “really obvious”, since there are no 
reported cases in which section 15(3) has been successfully invoked without 
medical or scientific evidence.
In R v Drummond,247 the Court of Appeal examined the compatibility 
of section 15(3) with the ECHR. The case was one of causing death by 
careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs,248 but the court 
made clear that what it had to say applies equally to all the drink- and drug-
driving offences. The court pointed out that conviction follows a scientific 
test which is  intended to be as  exact as possible. Drinking after the event 
defeats the aim of the legislature by making the scientific test potentially 
unreliable. There is a distinct danger that an accused may take alcohol after 
the event for the precise purpose of defeating the scientific test. The 
evidence to challenge the result of the test is  all within the means  of the 
accused, and includes: 
• the amount he had to drink after the incident; 
• what is  called his  ‘blood-breath’ ratio, important for calculating 
the rate at which his body absorbs alcohol; 
• the rate at which his body eliminates alcohol over time; 
• the accused’s body weight.
Section 15 imposes  a persuasive (or legal) burden. While that does 
interfere with the presumption of innocence, such interference was  not only 
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justified but was no greater than necessary. There was no reason to read 
down the reverse burden from a persuasive to an evidential burden. The 
court characterised driving while over the limit as  a social evil which 
Parliament had sought to minimise by the legislation. 
Discussion
In the sense that not having drunk between the time of the alleged offence 
and the time of providing an evidential specimen is  not a constituent of any 
of the drink-drive offences, the “elements  of the offence” approach249 is  not 
engaged in relation to section 15(3). But, as I have argued above,250  the 
statutory assumption passes  to the defendant the burden of proving the time 
aspect of the offences, in that section 15(3) requires a defendant to prove 
that he drank after driving, rather than before. 
In most cases there is  simply no opportunity for a suspect to drink 
between the time of an incident giving rise to an investigation and the time 
of providing a specimen, as where a person is stopped for, say, erratic 
driving, gives  a positive road side sample and is taken immediately to the 
police station. While it is  difficult to sympathise with those who take a drink 
after driving with the deliberate intention of frustrating an investigation,251 
there may nevertheless  be cases where a person has not drunk enough to be 
over the limit when driving, then drinks more which causes the person to 
exceed the limit, and is  only then required to provide a specimen. An 
example is  where a person had been involved in an accident, then went 
home and drank gin before the police arrived – one of the few factual 
situations in which a section 15(3) argument succeeded and was upheld 
(albeit somewhat reluctantly) on appeal.252  Circumstances of this kind 
indicate the possibility that a person who cannot prove the two elements in 
section 15(3) to the required standard could be convicted even if below the 
limit when driving. There is  no restriction on how long after an incident a 
specimen may be required; several hours  could pass, allowing ample 
opportunity for a person to consume alcohol perfectly innocently. In theory 
a specimen could be taken as long as twenty-four hours after driving. While 
it seems inconceivable that the analysis  of such a specimen could 
successfully ground a prosecution for driving with excess  alcohol a whole day 
before, the legislation does  not in fact prevent it. There is, therefore, an 
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argument that the legal burden of proving this  defence breaches  the 
presumption of  innocence.
CONCLUSIONS
It has  been observed that there has “been little appetite for findings of 
incompatibility [with article 6(2)] in road traffic provisions”.253  In the 
narrower context of the drink- and drug-driving cases this  is surely borne 
out. In short, the courts have upheld reverse legal burdens of proving no 
likelihood of driving,254 and of proving that excess alcohol or unfitness  was 
caused by alcohol consumed after the alleged incident but before providing a 
specimen.255 And the statutory assumption in section 15(2)256 has been found 
to be an irrebuttable presumption of  law.
On the other hand, to assert a reasonable excuse with a view to 
escaping conviction for failing to provide,257  a defendant has an evidential 
burden only, although it is  a relatively weighty burden. The weight of the 
evidential burden under the medical defence to an excess drug charge 258  
remains to be seen. These two questions are not discussed further in this 
chapter. 
The Presumption Undermined
It has been seen above259 that, to require a defendant to prove an element of 
an offence, whether that element derives  from the statutory definition or is 
part of the core or gravamen of the offence, may give rise to a breach of the 
presumption of  innocence. 
In relation to proving no likelihood of driving while remaining unfit or 
over the limit, I have argued260 that, despite the House of Lords’ ruling in 
Sheldrake, the “in charge” offences are without substance unless  construed so 
to include at least a risk of driving. On that interpretation, proving no 
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likelihood of driving would require an accused to disprove an element of the 
offence and so contravene the presumption of  innocence.
A prosecutor has  the benefit of the statutory assumption. There is  no 
scope (except by proving having taken alcohol after the offence but before 
providing the specimen) for a defendant to argue that his or her alcohol 
concentration was in fact below the limit at the time of the alleged offence. 
The consequence is that, in some rare cases, a person who was below the 
limit at the time of the alleged offence may be convicted. The same may 
also prove true in relation to the new excess drug offences.261
In relation to alcohol (or a drug262) consumed after an alleged offence 
but before providing a specimen, the effect of invoking section 15(3) is  to 
require a defendant to disprove the critical element of the offence – of being 
unfit or over the limit at the time of driving, attempting to drive or being in 
charge. 
The drink- and drug-driving offences  are serious in terms of the 
possible penalties  (up to a maximum of six months’ imprisonment) and the 
social consequences  of disqualification.263  Some commentators  are of the 
view that reverse burdens are never appropriate in relation to offences which 
carry the risk of imprisonment,264 but the seriousness of the outcome for the 
defendant has  had no discernible influence on the decisions of the courts in 
relation to the reverse burdens and the statutory assumption in the drink- 
and drug-driving legislation.
I contend that the provisions under discussion therefore offend the 
presumption of innocence, yet they have all been ruled compatible with 
article 6(2), ECHR. Arguments that the burdens  of proof should be read 
down to evidential burdens, and that the assumption should be rebuttable, 
have been roundly rejected. 
All this gives  rise to the question of how, if at all, these three sets of 
provisions can be reconciled with the theory. While the literature includes 
references to the drink-drive offences, often to illustrate a point or to 
highlight an exception, these are passing references only. The theory on 
reverse burdens  has  not been systematically analysed in relation to the road 
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traffic offences in general,265 or (apart from the present review) in relation to 
the drink-drive offences in particular.
Justifying the Derogations from Principle
The House of Lords in Sheldrake made it perfectly plain that it would 
consider each reverse burden case individually. Commentators have 
nevertheless  sought to elicit themes by reference to which encroachments on 
the presumption of innocence might be considered acceptable or 
unacceptable. Some of these themes  are relevant to the two reverse burdens 
and the statutory assumption in the drink- and drug-driving legislation. I 
next draw together the justifications upon which the courts have relied, then 
canvas  other grounds, drawn from the literature, which might justify the 
breaches of  principle.
Road safety
Reducing risk and enhancing safety on the roads  has  played a significant 
part in the development of  the case law, and was influential in upholding:
• the legal reverse burden on no likelihood of  driving:
Plainly the provision is  directed to a legitimate object: the 
prevention of death, injury and damage caused by unfit 
drivers.266
• the irrebuttable statutory assumption:
The offence is  concerned with preventing consumption of 
quantities  of alcohol which impair the ability of a driver 
to drive.267
• the exception in section 15(3):
It hardly needs  to be said that driving while over the limit 
and causing death by driving in such circumstances are 
both social evils  which Parliament sought to minimise by 
this legislation.268
While commentators have bemoaned the lack of principle running 
through the case law on reverse burdens in general,269  road safety is  a 
consistent theme in the cases on drink-driving. The public interest raises 
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compelling questions  about balancing the interests  of society against those of 
individual defendants,270  but in relation to drink-driving, the courts  have 
taken a clear view that road safety is to have priority. 
Proportionality
Similarly, in the drink-drive cases, reasonableness and proportionality have 
been used to support all three situations:
I do not regard the burden [of proving no likelihood of driving] 
placed on the defendant as  beyond reasonable limits  or in any 
way arbitrary … I do not think that imposition of a legal 
burden went beyond what was necessary.271
… having regard to the importance of what is  at stake, the 
[statutory] assumption is  a reasonable one and well within 
limits.272
… the legislative interference with the presumption of 
innocence in section 15 of the Road Traffic Offenders  Act 1988 
… is … no greater than necessary.273
There is  also the suggestion in the judgment in Griffiths that, as  some 
kind of quid pro quo for the fact that Parliament did not altogether outlaw 
drinking before driving, drivers must accept some diminution of the 
safeguards otherwise afforded by the presumption of  innocence: 
Parliament, while preserving the right of any person to take a 
drink before driving, expressed itself in such a way that if such a 
person is  then subjected to a breath, blood or urine test which 
shows an excess  proportion of alcohol the person who has 
provided that specimen is, by section 15(2), assumed to have had 
no less  a proportion of alcohol in his  breath at the time when he 
was driving.274
The drink-drive cases  also show that the perceived ease with which a 
defendant might discharge a reverse burden has been used to justify the 
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reverse burdens  and the statutory assumption,275  while the difficulties of 
proof  for a prosecutor without it have also been cited.276 
Finally, the defendant’s own knowledge of the circumstances  of the 
case, not known to the prosecutor, has been referred to, to justify reverse 
burdens.277
The special responsibilities of  drivers
Glover’s licensing approach, Dennis’s  voluntary acceptance of risk principle 
and Hamer’s regulatory regimes approach278 all might be invoked to justify 
the reverse burdens and the statutory assumption in the drink-drive offences. 
These have in common that participation in activities which are inherently 
dangerous  may justify deviation from, or the development of a variation of, 
the principles which comprise the usual paradigm. Although Duff considers 
that drivers should not be one of the groups who accept special 
responsibilities,279 the idea certainly finds support in the case law.280 
Enforceability
The other possible justification for the derogations from the presumption of 
innocence in relation to the drink- and drug-drive offences  is the need for 
the statutory regime to be enforceable, canvassed by Roberts.281 Certainly, 
the task for the prosecutor, to backtrack from the time the specimen was 
taken to the time of the alleged offence, would be time-consuming and 
expensive without the statutory assumption. On the other hand, a risk of 
driving while remaining unfit or over the limit would seem less difficult to 
prove, and would likely often be inferred from the factual situation. 
Overall, then, there are reasons to believe that the presumption of 
innocence is compromised in certain respects. Grounds on which these 
derogations  from principle might be justified have been identified. These 
derive, first, from the case law – the suppression of drink-driving and 
promotion of road safety, and reasonableness and proportionality; and from 
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the literature, notably the idea that those who drive must accept some kind 
of compromise of their rights, and the provisions  must be capable of being 
effectively enforced. These suggestions  are considered further in Chapter 
10.282 
Next, I turn to another important principle which, in the drink- and drug-
driving offences, seems to be more honoured in the breach than the 
observance – the privilege against self-incrimination.
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Chapter 4: Self-Incrimination
INTRODUCTION
This  chapter concerns  the privilege against self-incrimination and its  role, if 
any, in the investigation and prosecution of the drink- and drug-driving 
offences. I open with an overview of the background to the privilege. I next 
review the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
and the literature arising from that jurisprudence in so far as  relevant to the 
drink- and drug-driving offences. There follows a short account of the case 
law of the domestic courts. I examine the literature on self-incrimination in 
general, focusing on what has been said about its  scope, and the possible 
justifications for it. I then explain the statutory provisions  on requirements 
for specimens  of breath, blood or urine in suspected drink- and drug-driving 
offences. On the basis  of the principles  deriving from the case law and the 
literature, I find much to suggest that the privilege should apply to these 
requirements, but that it does  not. I contend that this departure from 
principle must be accepted, and suggest a basis for so doing.
THE BACKGROUND
The privilege against self-incrimination is  an elusive concept, in substance, 
scope and rationale. It is  said to derive from the Latin nemo tenetur se ipsum 
prodere (no one can be compelled to betray himself), and may have its origins 
in the right of an accused to remain silent, possibly as a reaction to the 
excesses of the Star Chamber, where defendants were first charged and then 
interrogated by compulsion under oath.1 
The privilege has been said to be “one of the peculiarities  of the 
common law systems”;2  controversial;3 “one of the more puzzling rules  of 
criminal procedure”;4  and more complex than other principled constraints 
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on the ability of the state to gather and use evidence against suspects.5 On 
the other hand, it has been described as  a cornerstone of any adversarial 
criminal justice system,6 and “deep rooted in English law”.7 
The privilege embraces the right of silence – the rule that a defendant 
cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself – but goes 
further. A defendant need not collaborate in his or her own conviction, or in 
any way assist the prosecution make its case.8 
The right to silence is  recognised in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,9 article 14.3 of  which provides:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, 
in full equality: … 
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to 
confess guilt.
While the general rule may be that suspects  should play no part in collecting 
evidence against themselves, drink- and drug- drive suspects, on the other 
hand, are required to provide evidence in the form of specimens  of breath, 
blood or urine. Failure to do so attracts  penalties broadly equivalent to those 
for the principal offences.10  On the face of it, these provisions  appear to 
breach the privilege against self-incrimination. To explore this  proposition, I 
first examine the case law.
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A number of cases  decided by the ECtHR concern self-incrimination. The 
ECtHR has often used the term “right” rather than “privilege”, which is  the 
traditional language of the domestic courts. This  difference is discussed 
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below.11 First, the decisions of the Strasbourg court are described, followed 
by a review of the criticism they have received. The cases can be divided 
broadly by subject matter as follows. 
Production of  Documents
Although protection from self-incrimination is  not specifically provided for 
in the European Convention on Human Rights,12  it has  been found to be 
implicit therein. In Funke v France,13  the applicant had been convicted and 
fined for failing to comply with a requirement by the customs authorities to 
provide certain bank statements. He argued that his  right not to give 
evidence against himself had been violated. The ECtHR ruled that the 
special features of customs laws could not justify such an infringement of the 
right of a person charged with a criminal offence to remain silent and not to 
incriminate himself. Article 6(1) of the ECHR (the right to a fair trial) had 
therefore been breached. 
In the high profile case of Saunders v United Kingdom,14 the documents in 
question were statements given by the applicant to inspectors  from the then 
Department of Trade and Industry,15  under statutory powers  which 
compelled him to make those statements on pain of penalty for failure. He 
argued that the use of those statements  in criminal proceedings against him 
breached his  right to a fair trial under article 6(1). The ECtHR found that 
the use made of the statements  amounted to an unjustifiable infringement of 
the right not to incriminate oneself. Although not specifically mentioned in 
article 6, the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself were 
generally recognised international standards lying at the heart of the notion 
of a fair procedure under article 6. These principles protected an accused 
against improper compulsion, thereby contributing to the avoidance of 
miscarriages  of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of article 6. The 
right not to incriminate oneself:
is  primarily concerned … with respecting the will of an accused 
person to remain silent. As commonly understood in the legal 
systems of the Contracting Parties to the Convention and 
elsewhere, it does  not extend to the use in criminal proceedings 
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of material which may be obtained from the accused through 
the use of compulsory powers  but which has  an existence 
independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, 
documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and 
urine samples  and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA 
testing.16
The ECtHR specifically rejected the UK government’s argument that 
the public interest in the investigation of corporate fraud should be allowed 
to take priority over the right against self-incrimination.
The court returned to the question of the production of documents in 
JB v Switzerland.17  Tax authorities had requested the applicant to submit 
documents relating to certain investments. The applicant admitted he had 
made such investments without fully declaring the income, but refused to 
submit the documents. The tax authorities eventually agreed not to pursue 
proceedings for tax evasion upon the applicant’s  paying a large fine.18 The 
ECtHR found that article 6(1) had been breached. Even though the 
applicant had admitted that he had not made full declarations to the tax 
authorities, the documents sought could have been used against him in a 
prosecution for tax evasion. The right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination had been violated. The situation in this case was not the 
same as  where there is  an obligation to produce material (such as a blood 
sample) which has an existence independent of  the person concerned.
The Right to Silence
The central point in Murray v UK19  was that adverse inferences had been 
drawn20  from the applicant’s  silence at his trial. He alleged breach of his 
right to silence, his right not to incriminate himself, and the principle that 
the prosecution must bear the burden of proving the case without assistance 
from the accused. The ECtHR acknowledged the importance of the rights 
to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself. Article 6 protected against 
improper compulsion and so contributed to avoiding miscarriages  of justice. 
A person should not be convicted on the sole basis  of silence, but in 
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situations which clearly call for an explanation, silence may be taken into 
account. The right to silence was not absolute, but the question was where 
the line should be drawn. This in turn depended on all the circumstances  of 
the case, including the situations in which inferences may be drawn, the 
weight attached to them, and the degree of compulsion inherent in the 
situation. On the particular facts of the case, there had been no breach of 
article 6. 
The right to silence was again invoked in Heaney and McGuinness v 
Ireland,21 where the applicants  had been suspected of terrorist activity. They 
were convicted of an offence of failing to comply with requests22 to account 
for their movements  over a certain period, and imprisoned. They claimed 
that the statutory provision requiring them to answer questions  violated their 
right to silence and their right not to incriminate themselves. The court 
reiterated the rationale for these rights, as in Saunders, adding that the right 
not to incriminate oneself presupposed that the prosecution would seek to 
prove its  case without resort to evidence obtained through methods of 
coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused, and was 
closely linked to the presumption of innocence. The rights  were not absolute 
rights, but, in the present case, the degree of compulsion to provide 
information “destroyed the very essence of their privilege against self-
incrimination and their right to remain silent”. Once again, an argument 
based on proportionality was unsuccessful, the court rejecting the 
proposition that the statutory provisions  in question were a proportionate 
response to the threat of terrorism and the need to maintain public order 
and peace.
Compulsion to Identify a Driver
Weh v Austria23 was  the first case to feature the compulsory disclosure of the 
identity of a driver. The registered owner of a car had been required to 
disclose the name and address of the person who had been driving on a 
particular occasion when the vehicle had been detected speeding. The 
owner supplied false information and was  convicted and fined for so doing, 
but was  not prosecuted for speeding. He complained that the requirement to 
disclose the driver’s identity breached his right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. The ECtHR found that all the owner 
had been asked was to say who had been driving, which was not in itself 
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incriminating. The link between the requirement to identify the driver and 
possible proceedings for speeding was  “remote and hypothetical”,24 and the 
right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination were not in 
issue. In reaching this  conclusion, the court seems to have relied heavily on 
the fact that the applicant was  not prosecuted for speeding, only for giving 
false information. The decision was, however, by a majority of four to three. 
In the dissenting judgment,25 it was said, more realistically in my view, that 
proceedings for speeding were probably in contemplation, and the request 
for information about the driver was no more than a preliminary to 
proceedings against the applicant if he had been the driver. The applicant 
was  compelled on pain of a fine to give what might prove to be 
incriminating evidence, or to be punished for remaining silent; article 6(1) 
was  therefore engaged and it was  irrelevant that he was not charged with 
speeding. 
O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom26 again concerned the disclosure 
of the identities of drivers. Vehicles  owned by the two applicants had been 
photographed by speed cameras, and the applicants were required27  to say 
who had been driving at the time. The first applicant complied, admitting 
he had been driving, and was  convicted of speeding. The second applicant 
refused to comply and was  fined £750 for refusing. Both complained that 
the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination had 
been breached. The court found that derogations from the right to remain 
silent and the right not to incriminate oneself were permissible without 
infringing article 6. Unlike in Saunders, no distinction was  to be drawn 
between cases where incriminating statements  were obtained by compulsion, 
and those in which “real” evidence, such as  breath, blood and urine samples, 
was  obtained by compulsion. Rather, to determine whether the essence of 
the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination had 
been infringed, it was necessary to focus  on the nature and degree of 
compulsion used, any relevant procedural safeguards, and the use made of 
any material obtained. The court also took into account that motor cars  are 
potentially dangerous and the state is justified in making laws to regulate 
their use:
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those who choose to keep and drive motor cars  can be taken to 
have accepted certain responsibilities and obligations as  part of 
the regulatory regime relating to motor vehicles, and … these 
responsibilities  include the obligation, in the event of suspected 
commission of road traffic offences, to inform the authorities  of 
the identity of  the driver on that occasion.28 
On the above basis, the right had not been violated. The second 
justification for the derogation was the limited nature of the inquiry – the 
registered keeper was being asked to provide a single, specific piece of 
information, which could be distinguished from requiring a person to 
engage in a compulsory interview. 
Administration of  Emetic
Jalloh v Germany29  concerned an entirely different method of seeking 
evidence. Here, an emetic was  forcibly administered to a suspect so that he 
regurgitated a bag of cocaine. The ECtHR ruled that to allow the use at 
trial of evidence thereby obtained would render unfair the trial as a whole; it 
also infringed the right against self-incrimination. The degree of force was 
great, and well beyond the compulsion typically used to obtain a blood or 
breath sample. There was insufficient public interest in such evidence to 
secure the conviction of a small-scale drug dealer. While the Convention did 
not specifically prohibit the use of medical procedures to obtain evidence, 
forcible medical intervention must be convincingly justified, especially where 
the procedure was intended to retrieve evidence from inside the body. The 
use of force was liable to arouse fear, anguish and inferiority amounting to 
inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to article 3.30 The proceedings 
also violated the presumption against self-incrimination in that the evidence 
was  obtained against the will of the applicant, the degree of force used was 
disproportionate, and the evidence had been obtained in violation of article 
3.
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Discussion
While the decision in Funke, in which the ECtHR first recognised the right 
against self-incrimination, was hailed as a bold and far-reaching decision,31 
the Strasbourg case law as  a whole has since been criticised for not providing 
consistent guidelines on the application of the privilege,32 leaving the precise 
state of the law far from clear.33 The court in Funke said nothing about the 
scope of the privilege, or about its origins  or rationale,34 and the words  in 
the judgment concerning the special features of customs laws have been 
described as “rather cryptic comments”.35 
Of the issues arising from the ECtHR cases, those of most relevance 
to the drink- and drug-driving offences are, first, the concept of “material 
which has an existence independent of the will of the subject”, and whether 
or not specimens of breath, blood or urine obtained in the course of a 
drink- or drug-driving investigation fall within this category; and, second, 
the extent to which the interests of the individual may be balanced or set off 
against wider community interests. 
Material which has an independent existence
The phrase “material … which has an existence independent of the will of 
the suspect” has “caused much bemusement.”36  The distinction between 
such material, which does not attract the privilege, and oral admissions, 
which do, has been said to be open to obvious criticism,37 and has never 
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properly been explained.38 The finding in Saunders that the privilege did not 
apply to such material seems in conflict with the decision in Funke, where the 
documents in question clearly did have independent existence, but were 
nevertheless  protected by the privilege. Yet the court in Saunders did not 
discuss  Funke or seek to distinguish it, and the decision in Funke was affirmed 
in Heaney.39 
Compulsion to co-operate
Ashworth40  questions  whether the distinction is a matter of substance or 
merely an attempt to limit the scope of the privilege. He suggests that Funke 
and Saunders can perhaps be reconciled on the basis  that in both cases what 
was  being required was the co-operation of the suspect, in Funke by handing 
over documents, and in Saunders, by answering questions. This would be 
consistent with Redmayne’s  proposal41 that the application of the privilege 
depends  not on the type of information sought, but on the means  by which 
it is  sought, the privilege being in play where the co-operation of the subject 
is  required. On this  view, since bodily samples can be obtained without the 
co-operation of the subject (that is, by force) they can be differentiated from 
attempts to force someone to speak or hand over documents. I return to this 
point below;42 for the moment it is  enough to note that specimens in drink-
and drug-driving cases may not be taken by physical force. The key 
question, Ashworth continues, should be, not whether documents  have an 
existence independent of the person concerned, but whether a requirement 
to produce evidence, whether oral or real, operates as coercion on the mind 
of  the subject. If  it does, the privilege should apply.43 
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Choo44 supports  this view, referring to one of the examples  the court 
gave of material not subject to the privilege – documents acquired pursuant 
to warrant – as  perhaps indicating that it is compulsion to co-operate which 
lies at the heart of the court’s  concern, and that it  is  freedom from such 
compulsion which forms the essence of  the privilege. 
Ashworth45  returns  to the distinction in evaluating Jalloh, where the 
court found that the drugs in the applicant’s  body could have had an 
existence independent of the applicant’s will. On the basis of Saunders, 
therefore, the privilege would not be in play, but the court cited several 
elements taking Jalloh out of the exception in Saunders – the high degree of 
force used, the fact that article 346  was violated, and the defiance of the 
applicant’s will in retrieving the evidence. The effect of Jalloh was, therefore, 
to create an exception to the exception in Saunders. 
The public interest
The ECtHR rejected arguments that the wider public interest might 
outweigh the right against self-incrimination in Funke, Saunders and Heaney. 
Yet in Jalloh, the public interest was  mentioned as one of the factors  going to 
whether or not the privilege is violated.47 
In relation to O’Halloran, Ashworth48  suggests, albeit tentatively, that 
there may be a consensus that the privilege against self-incrimination does 
not apply to the various regimes  in European countries for ascertaining who 
was  driving a vehicle on a particular occasion. Such an argument might be 
based on the fact that those who choose to own cars thereby take on certain 
obligations in order to preserve road safety, and identifying the driver is one 
such obligation. This  would suggest a limited exception to the privilege. But 
that was  not the approach the court took. Instead, it focused on the nature 
and degree of compulsion, the existence of any safeguards and the use 
made of any material obtained. The court quoted from the House of Lords 
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case, Brown v Stott,49  on balancing the community interest in road safety 
against the interests of the individual, an exercise which Ashworth describes 
as  the trumping of a basic right by the public interest – exactly what the 
ECtHR found impermissible in Saunders and Heaney. In both Weh and 
O’Halloran, it would have been more honest and more persuasive to describe 
these situations as  considered exceptions  to the privilege, founded mainly on 
the need to promote road safety and on the apparent European consensus, 
rather than deny the prima facie violation.50 Making an exception where there 
is a clear regulatory regime, involving licensing, registration, number plates 
and the like which vehicle owners voluntarily enter into has some pedigree 
in the literature on strict liability,51  and is  preferable to a plain balancing 
argument.52 
The use to which the material is put
Another question is whether or not the privilege applies if the material 
compulsorily obtained is not then used to support a prosecution.53  This 
point is  not pursued here in view of the near-certainty that prosecution 
follows from a positive analysis of a breath, blood or urine specimen in a 
drink- or drug-driving case. 
Material per se incriminating
In the dissenting judgment in Saunders,54 it  was said that fraud investigations, 
to which the privilege does not apply, are designed to ascertain whether or 
not a crime has been committed at all. In most other investigations, such as 
robbery or violence, it is  clear from the outset that a crime has taken place 
and the purpose of the investigation is  to identify the perpetrator. The right 
applies to the latter, but not necessarily to the former. A drink- or drug- drive 
investigation is  likewise to ascertain whether or not an offence has  been 
committed, and so may fall outside the privilege on the basis  of this 
distinction. 
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Choo55  takes up a similar theme, suggesting that the ECtHR 
distinguished Jalloh from Saunders on the basis  that the samples mentioned in 
Saunders would be obtained with a view to detecting whether or not a crime has 
been committed, as when analysing a specimen for the presence of alcohol 
or drugs. They would not become incriminating until analysed and shown to 
give rise to an offence. In Jalloh, by contrast, the regurgitated drugs were per 
se incriminating. This distinction between per se incriminating and neutral 
information also appears in R v S(F) and (S),56 where the court said, perhaps 
rather obviously, that the privilege would be engaged only if the data turned 
out to be incriminating. The inference appears to be that, when specimens 
are provided in a drink- or drug-driving investigation, the privilege is  not in 
play because of the possibility that analysis  may absolve rather than 
incriminate the suspect. 
I come back to the question of material which is  per se incriminating 
below.57
THE DOMESTIC COURTS
While the question of protection from self-incrimination is relatively recent 
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, it has  a longer pedigree in domestic law, 
although it is:
well understood that the principle is  subject to numerous 
statutory exceptions which limit, amend or abrogate the 
privilege in certain circumstances.58 
Parliament has recognised that the drink-driving provisions make significant 
inroads into the privilege against self-incrimination. Debating the bill which 
became the Transport Act 1981, it was said in the House of Commons that 
the Road Safety Act 1967,59 which first introduced the offence of being over 
the prescribed limit, had: 
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… made criminal a condition of which only the person accused 
could convict himself by giving evidence against himself and 
being obliged to do so.60
The cases  on drink- and drug-driving contain acknowledgements that 
suspects are required to provide evidence against themselves. In the House 
of Lords, it was said that section 8 of the Road Traffic Act 197261 
constitutes:
a substantial encroachment on the common law right of a 
citizen not to be compelled to incriminate himself. It was 
introduced for the beneficent purpose of protecting the public 
against drunken drivers … 62
More recently, the Divisional Court said:
… this  legislation, contrary to the general traditions of the 
criminal law but for good and pressing social reasons, compels  a 
suspected person to provide evidence against himself.63
A number of cases  have concerned self-incrimination in other contexts. In 
relation to the right to silence, the House of Lords64 has acknowledged a 
strong presumption against interpreting a statute so as to take away an 
accused’s right to silence, but recognised that statutory interference is almost 
as  old as the right itself. The various immunities  conferred by the right to 
silence are concerned with the protection of citizens against the abuse of 
powers by those investigating crimes. All civilised states  recognise the 
assertion of personal liberty and privacy, although it is  unclear where the 
line is to be drawn; some curtailment of these liberties is necessary to the 
stability of  society.65 
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There followed a series  of cases  concerning the compulsory disclosure 
of information. In R v Hertfordshire County Council,66 the House of Lords held 
that a power to require information under the Environmental Protection Act 
199067 was conferred not only for the purpose of obtaining evidence against 
offenders, but also to protect public health and the environment; that 
purpose would be frustrated if those who knew about a relevant hazard 
were entitled to refuse to provide urgently required information on the 
ground that they might incriminate themselves. The House of Lords 
distinguished Saunders on the basis  that Saunders was concerned only with the 
legality of using information obtained by compulsion as evidence at a 
criminal trial; in the present case none of the answers given was  ever used in 
evidence. 
In the Scottish case of Brown v Gallacher68 the appellant argued that the 
use at trial of evidence arising from the requirement in the Road Traffic Act 
1988 to provide breath specimens infringed his right not to incriminate 
himself. The High Court of Justiciary recited the ECtHR’s distinction 
between, on the one hand, material such as  breath or urine specimens, 
provided in accordance with statutory procedures, which had an existence 
independent of the person concerned and did not attract the privilege; and, 
on the other hand, answers obtained under compulsion, which did engage 
the privilege. The requirement for breath specimens had been lawfully made 
and did not interfere with the implied right not to incriminate oneself, even 
though accompanied by notice that failure to provide might give rise to 
liability to prosecution. The court also opined that if, on the other hand, the 
privilege was engaged, it could be justified on the grounds  that the degree of 
compulsion implied by liability to prosecution for failing to comply was  not 
disproportionate given the aim of the legislation, the requirement could be 
made only of people who had already failed a breath test and the level of 
penalty if  convicted of  failing to provide.
A year later, the Privy Council had before it a drink-drive case where 
the question of self-identification as the driver fell to be considered: Brown v 
Stott.69 A woman was arrested for theft at a supermarket. She appeared to 
have been drinking, and pointed out a car in the car park, saying it was hers. 
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The police required her70 to say who had been driving, and she admitted it 
was  her. She was convicted of driving with excess  alcohol. On appeal, she 
argued that it was incompatible with her human rights for the prosecutor to 
rely on her admission that she had driven. Having considered Saunders, the 
Privy Council ruled that while the right to a fair trial under article 6 is 
absolute, the privilege against self-incrimination – one of the constituent 
rights  under article 6 of the ECHR– was  not. Limited qualification was 
acceptable if reasonably directed towards a clear and proper public 
objective and if representing no greater qualification than the situation 
called for. The provision in question allowed for the putting of a single 
simple question; the answer did not in itself incriminate the person 
answering. It did not represent a disproportionate legislative response to the 
problem of maintaining road safety. The manner in which the balance 
between the interests  of the community at large and of the individual was 
struck was not unduly prejudicial to the latter and did not infringe a human 
right. 
The next judgment on self-incrimination was in a terrorism case: R v 
S(F) and A(S).71  Notices  served on the defendants72 required them, under 
threat of criminal proceedings for non-compliance, to provide sufficient 
information to facilitate access to the contents of their computers, which 
were already in the hands  of police. The Court of Appeal rejected an 
argument that the requirement infringed the privilege against self-
incrimination. Knowledge of the means of access to the data might engage 
the privilege, but only if the data itself contained incriminating material. If 
the data was neutral or innocent, the knowledge of the means of access  to it 
would likewise be neutral or innocent. The material was  lawfully in the 
hands  of the police, and the process  of making it readable would not alter it. 
The requirement for information was based on national security interests 
and the prevention and detection of crime, and was expressly subject to a 
proportionality test and judicial oversight. 
In the course of  the judgment, Lord Judge remarked that:
In much the same way that a blood or urine sample provided by 
a car driver is  a fact independent of the driver, which may or 
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may not reveal that his  alcohol level exceeds  the permitted 
maximum, whether the defendants’ computers contain 
incriminating material or not, the keys  to them are and remain 
an independent fact.73 
The court’s conclusion in R v S that the encryption key had an 
existence independent of the appellant’s  will has been questioned.74 Unless 
details  of such a key are documented somewhere, the key is an intangible 
“psychological fact” or information which exists  only in the suspect’s 
memory and that of any other person who may know it. As such, it 
presumably has no existence independent of the will of the accused and the 
demand for its  production seems prima facie to attract the privilege. On the 
other hand, by analogy with Brown v Stott, the demand for information was 
directed to national security and might be justifiable on that ground. 
Thus, while the early case of Morris v Beardmore seemed to recognise 
that the duty to provide evidential specimens in a drink-drive case was  an 
encroachment upon the right not to incriminate oneself, which could be 
justified by reference to the overall purpose of the legislation, the more 
recent Scottish case of Brown v Gallacher moved away from that stance, 
applying instead the approach of the ECtHR that the provision of breath 
specimens does  not even engage the privilege in the first place. In Brown v 
Stott the importance of proportionality in road traffic cases came to the fore. 
I return to these themes later.75
THE LITERATURE
The literature on the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
justifications for it and criticisms  of it, are reviewed next. As already noted, 
the privilege includes  the right to silence, but since the concern here is  the 
role of the privilege in relation to requirements  to provide specimens in 
drink- and drug-driving investigations, the right to silence is  mentioned only 
in so far as is useful for comparative or illustrative purposes.
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Scope
Easton76  discusses  the privilege in the context of intimate samples  taken 
under section 62, PACE.77 While section 62 does not apply to the drink- and 
drug-driving procedures,78  what she says  is nevertheless  of interest. She 
acknowledges that bodily samples are excluded from the scope of the 
privilege, but argues that there is  no fundamental difference between relying 
on a suspect’s  words  and relying of the composition of his blood, yet a 
suspect may decline to speak, but may not decline to provide a sample. She 
quotes from a US case79 in which, in a dissenting judgment, it was said, with 
some perspicacity, to be a strange hierarchy of values which allows the state 
to extract a human being’s blood to convict him of a crime because of the 
blood’s content, but proscribes compelled production of  his lifeless papers. 
Also in defence of the privilege, Sharpe80  argues that it should be 
refocused on the initial gathering of evidence rather than on the fairness of 
admitting the evidence in any proceedings  which follow. The state must 
prove a criminal case without assistance from the defendant, and this 
refocusing would ensure that defendants are not obliged to remedy 
deficiencies  in the evidence obtained by state investigators. The privilege 
thus goes to the burden of proof; without it, the state’s  task of proving a case 
may be lighter, and in the long term there would be nothing to prevent total 
subjugation of the private interest to the public need for information. The 
statutory safeguards in PACE81 do not justify abandoning the privilege.
Not all commentators are, however, entirely in favour of the privilege. 
Dennis82 points out that, on one view, it obstructs the efficient investigation 
of crimes; on another, it is simply one of a number of protective devices, 
and should have a distinct but limited place in criminal procedure. He 
distinguishes  what he calls  primary applications of the privilege from 
Chapter 4: Self-Incrimination
137
76 Susan M Easton, ‘Bodily Samples and the Privilege against Self-incrimination’ [1991] Crim LR 18.
77  Section 62 is headed “Intimate Samples” and falls within Part V of PACE: Questioning and 
Treatment of  Persons by Police.
78 PACE Act 1984, s 62(11).
79 Schmerber v California [1965] 384 US 757. 
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derivative applications. In primary applications, the privilege defines the 
scope of legal duties to co-operate in certain legal procedures  which call for 
a suspect’s  co-operation in evidence-gathering, whether by answering 
questions, handing over documents, or allowing searches  or the taking of 
samples. It has little or no role in evidence-gathering except through direct 
demands for information. Derivative applications  (for which there may well 
be other rationales, besides the privilege) might include the right to silence; 
the inadmissibility in evidence of involuntary confessions or of evidence 
obtained by police deception or entrapment; and the requirement that 
suspects be told of  their rights to legal advice and to remain silent. 
Redmayne83  suggests that the privilege is engaged when a suspect is 
under a legal duty to provide incriminating information, as where there is  a 
legal sanction for failure to do so. This also helps distinguish between the 
privilege and the right to silence. The latter is understood as forbidding 
inferences from failure to answer questions or other forms of non-
cooperation; provisions allowing courts  to draw inferences from silence do 
not infringe the privilege because they do not put the suspect under a duty 
to cooperate. 
Choo84 makes  the same point – that the privilege should mean that a 
person cannot be compelled, on pain of a criminal sanction, to provide 
information that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood of, that 
person’s  prosecution for a criminal offence. It could be argued that the 
privilege is counter to the idea that there are general moral duties on citizens 
to assist and co-operate with the authorities  in investigating crime, but 
concludes that, to the extent that dedicated pre-trial protections are in place 
and are routinely supervised and enforced, perhaps little would be lost if the 
privilege were abandoned altogether, or at least downplayed.
The tension between the state’s interest in collecting evidence and the 
individual’s  interest in avoiding self-incrimination is  discussed below85 in the 
context of  the presumption of  innocence as a rationale for the privilege.
The Rationale
A number of matters  have been proposed as the rationale for the privilege, 
although all have been criticised as unsatisfactory.
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Avoiding false self-incrimination 
First, the privilege is said to help avoid convicting the innocent by reducing 
the risk of false confessions. Since this  argument applies  to police 
questioning and the right to silence, it is  not pursued here, other than to note 
that immunity from being required to answer questions has been said to 
protect only the guilty, while the innocent are likely to want to explain 
themselves.86 On the other hand, the privilege against self-incrimination in 
relation to providing specimens  is less clear-cut. Here refusal may be for 
reasons  other than to hide guilt, but may instead arise out of fear, anxiety, 
embarrassment, anger, or scepticism about the accuracy of  the test.87 
Privacy, freedom and dignity
A number of commentators have defended the privilege on the basis  of 
arguments relating to individual privacy and integrity.
Sharpe88  argues that the privilege protects the right to a minimum 
level of human privacy; it should apply to any evidence which cannot be 
discovered without the free cooperation of the subject, although she 
recognises  that the privilege may have to be forfeit in certain circumstances 
where there is an objective need to do so, as where there is  a reasonable 
basis  for suspecting the individual is involved in offending and the 
investigation is necessary in the interests of public safety or the prevention of 
crime. 
Having to provide bodily samples, as  well as  being searched or having 
fingerprints  taken, invades  privacy, and may be even more intrusive than 
questioning.89 
Choo90 cites  as one of the justifications  for the privilege the idea that 
compelling suspects to provide information which is potentially 
incriminatory is an affront to dignity. Respect for personal autonomy 
demands that those at risk of prosecution must be given a fair opportunity to 
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formulate a response to allegations of wrongdoing, including having control 
over the time and circumstances for disclosing information.
Landau91 refers to the three tests in O’Halloran92  for deciding whether 
or not the privilege has been breached as consistent with the rationale 
deriving from the right to privacy.93  He suggests  three further criteria, all 
allied to the idea of protecting individual privacy. The first is  the nature of 
the requirement. The more personal, onerous and intrusive it is, the more 
difficult it should be to justify. The second consideration should be whether 
the information could be obtained by other means, and, if so, its reliability 
and the relative cost. Finally, there should be a presumption that a 
requirement to self-incriminate violates  article 6 where there is  no 
reasonable cause for making the enquiry; random requests  for information 
should be closely regulated. Landau does not give examples of such random 
requests, but an instance might be police officers asking cyclists  where they 
got their cycles from, without anything to suggest they came by them other 
than entirely legitimately. 
The relationship between state and citizen
At its  simplest, the argument in favour of the privilege based on the 
presumption of innocence and/or the relationship between state and citizen 
is that the state should prove the case against a presumptively innocent 
citizen without the compelled assistance of that citizen; the rationale is not 
only the placing of the burden of proof, but a political statement about the 
relationship between the state and the citizen.94 
Ashworth is  of much the same view,95  arguing that the effect of 
Saunders is that the defendant should be able to put the prosecution to proof 
without any obligation to assist in providing evidence. If the defendant were 
obliged to supply evidence, the duty of the prosecution to establish guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt would be watered down or even contradicted. 
While the presumption of innocence sets  out to ensure a proper relationship 
between the state and the citizen, the practical meaning of the privilege 
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should be that it is wrong to require an individual to supply evidence against 
himself  when the police are in the process of  building a case against him.
By protecting people from being obliged to co-operate with the 
prosecution, the privilege says something about the proper relationship 
between citizens  and the state, allowing citizens to keep some distance 
between themselves and the state and avoiding having to make what may 
often be significant personal sacrifices. Putting people under an obligation to 
co-operate, with criminal sanctions, would often be an excessive response to 
a suspect’s non-cooperation, when the state is  in one of its  most powerful 
guises. On this argument, the privilege applies  to blood specimens and 
documents as  much as  to answers to questions, so long as  they are obtained 
by obliging the suspect to co-operate.96
This  view is  taken further by Dennis.97 He agrees that the interest of 
all suspects, guilty or innocent, in not being obliged to incriminate 
themselves derives from the requirement that it is  for the prosecution to 
prove guilt, and not for the accused to prove innocence. The state, which has 
the greater resources, must prove its case without help from the suspect. If a 
suspect is presumed innocent, it is  wrong in principle to compel the suspect 
to be a source of incriminating evidence. Dennis goes  on, however, to point 
out that this  approach denies  the state access to much relevant material. Nor 
does  it explain why the privilege does not extend to the collection of real 
evidence by searches and the taking of fingerprints  and samples. Evidence of 
this  kind is so highly probative that there are compulsory powers to obtain it, 
the privilege being overridden by the public interest in truth-finding. He 
suggests that one way to reconcile these difficulties might be to interpret the 
privilege as applying only in relation to compulsion to disclose evidence 
which would otherwise be unobtainable, but accepts that this  might unduly 
restrict the privilege. 
Dennis98 concludes  that seeking to justify the privilege by reference to 
the presumption of innocence or protection against wrongful conviction is 
unsatisfactory, yet there remains a sense of unease about power and 
propriety in the criminal process, where agencies of the state both 
investigate and adjudicate. He proposes that the public interest in the 
enforcement of the criminal law may justify overriding the rule against self-
incrimination. The critical principle might then be that there should be no 
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compulsion to comply with procedures for the collection of evidence except 
where such procedures  can be justified by reference to the need to secure 
reliable evidence which is probative of guilt, and the collection of such 
evidence is governed by procedures based on natural justice to individuals, 
or there are other safeguards (such as  PACE) in place aimed at ensuring that 
state power is exercised in accordance with fundamental principles. 
Balancing social needs
Another theme in the literature on the privilege against self-incrimination is 
the matter of balancing the privilege against the demands of the community 
for protection against crime.99 This is  reminiscent of Dennis’s  argument100 
that the privilege may make valuable evidence unavailable and his  proposed 
solution. For Redmayne,101  the privilege is not so weighty that exceptions 
cannot be allowed, but he is  cautious about the reasons  for particular 
exceptions. In Brown v Stott, the goal of maintaining road safety justified a 
breach of the driver’s  rights, but Redmayne suggests  that this sort of 
reasoning should be avoided as it could be used to justify the erosion of all 
manner of rights. He prefers  the court’s  other reason – that those who own 
cars or wish to drive can be seen as accepting the duties that go with it, 
including the duty to account for the degree of sobriety in which they drive, 
and to explain who was driving at a particular time.
Ashworth102 is  not persuaded that cases such as  Brown v Stott, where the 
duty to “self-identify” is, in principle, inconsistent with the privilege when 
imposed in the context of an ongoing or probable criminal prosecution, can 
be justified by reference to the public interest in road safety. A pragmatic yet 
more rights-sensitive approach would be to suggest that an exception to the 
privilege may be justifiable on considerations similar to those in O’Halloran, 
that is, where the citizen:
• has relatively little at stake (and certainly does not risk 
imprisonment); this should be the dominant consideration; 
• has chosen to participate in a particular social enterprise, and 
• may be excused if  without fault. 
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Choo also urges caution in relation to balancing exercises. He argues 
that the right not to self-incriminate may lose its symbolic significance if it 
can simply be balanced away,103 and that, in conducting balancing exercises, 
greater weight should be given to the right than to the competing public 
interest.
Evidence not otherwise available
Finally, access to evidence which would otherwise be unobtainable has  been 
put forward as a reason for condoning breaches of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Lord Bingham commented104 that the purpose of requiring a 
suspect to provide breath specimens  was to obtain evidence not otherwise 
available. As already noted,105  Dennis  takes this  further in suggesting that 
the privilege might apply only in relation to compulsion to disclose evidence 
which otherwise would be unobtainable. Landau106  likewise proposes  that 
whether or not there are other means of obtaining the evidence is  a relevant 
consideration.
The literature briefly reviewed above suggests  various possible ways of 
delineating the privilege and reconciling the contradictions  arising from the 
cases, but proffers  little basis  for drawing any definitive conclusions in 
relation to specimens taken in drink- and drug- driving cases. Before 
attempting to do that, the statutory provisions on requiring specimens fall to 
be explained. 
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON PROVIDING SPECIMENS
The provisions of the Road Traffic Act (RTA) 1988 on police powers  to 
require specimens of breath, blood or urine are set out in sections 7, 7A, 8 
and 9,107 and described in Chapter 1.108 They are reviewed in rather more 
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detail here to illustrate the nature and extent of the procedure for requiring 
specimens. 
Preliminary Tests
Police officers  have powers 109 to administer preliminary tests, usually at the 
roadside, to provide an indication whether a person is  likely to have excess 
alcohol, or to be unfit to drive through drink or drugs. Preliminary testing is 
in the nature of screening, to eliminate those who are almost certainly not 
offending. There is  no requirement for preliminary testing before evidential 
testing by way of breath, blood or urine specimens. The circumstances in 
which they may do so, and the three types  of preliminary test, are set out in 
Chapter 1.110 It is an offence to fail without reasonable excuse to co-operate 
with a preliminary test.111 
Preliminary testing is  incriminatory to the extent that, if the result is 
positive, it usually leads  to further investigation. While the result of 
preliminary testing may not be used to establish whether or not an accused 
had committed an excess  alcohol offence,112 there are some circumstances  in 
which the outcome of a preliminary test may work against a defendant in 
other ways. For example, where an accused sought to challenge the 
reliability of the evidential breath analysis  device, the Divisional Court 
upheld the justices’ rejection of his assertion that he had not consumed 
enough to be over the limit. In doing so, the court relied on, among other 
matters, the result of  the roadside test.113 
Evidential Specimens
Powers  to require specimens of breath, blood or urine for use as evidence in 
prosecutions for drink- and drug-driving offences are contained in section 7 
RTA 1988. The only precondition for making the requirement is  that the 
officer is  in the course of an investigation into whether the person in 
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question has  committed an offence under section 3A,114 4115  or 5116 117  of 
the Road Traffic Act.118 
Breath specimens
Under section 7(2) to (2D), breath specimens are to be provided only at a 
police station, a hospital, or (when roadside evidential breath testing comes 
into force)119  at or near the place where a roadside specimen has been 
required. Breath is to be analysed using an approved device. For the purpose 
of proving the proportion of alcohol in a person’s breath, it is  presumed that 
an approved device operates  reliably,120  but evidence that the device has 
correctly self-checked its  calibration is  necessary.121  The presumption is 
rebuttable.122 
In a so-called “borderline” case where breath analysis  produces a 
reading of no more than 50123 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres  of 
breath, the person may claim that it be replaced by an alternative specimen 
of blood or urine. Although it now seems  probable that this option will be 
withdrawn in the near future,124  it was originally provided as a safeguard. 
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Debating what became the Transport Act 1981, introducing breath analysis 
for the first time, Lord Bellwin said in the House of  Lords: 
Because this  is  a new approach we have provided several 
safeguards for suspects. The most important of these will be the 
right to request a blood test to replace the result of a breath 
analysis if  this has not exceeded 50 microgrammes.125
The statute imposes  no express obligation to tell a suspect who 
qualifies of the right to provide an alternative specimen, but there is  an 
implied duty to do so.126 Where the option arises, the officer has no power to 
require a blood or urine specimen, and where, in error, the officer made such 
a requirement instead of offering the option, the result of the blood analysis 
was not admissible in evidence.127 
When offering the option, the officer need not ask the suspect whether 
he or she prefers  to give blood or urine. But the suspect must be told that the 
lower breath reading does not exceed 50 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 
millilitres of breath. The suspect must understand that a blood specimen 
would be taken by a doctor, not by a police officer, and the option must be 
put in such a way that the suspect is not deprived of the opportunity to 
exercise it, or caused to exercise in a way he or she would not otherwise have 
done.128 
Where breath specimens  are provided, the lower of the two analyses  (if 
they differ129) is  used in evidence and the other is disregarded.130  A person 
cannot be convicted on the basis of  a single specimen.131
Blood and urine specimens
Considerations of speed, simplicity and cost all favour ascertaining body 
alcohol by analysing breath specimens, but there are circumstances in which 
this  is not possible, and a specimen of blood or urine may be required 
instead. Those circumstances are:
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• the officer has reasonable cause to believe132  that there are 
medical reasons133 why breath cannot be provided or should 
not be required;134
• an approved device is not available or is not reliable,135 or for 
any other reason it is not practicable136 to use it;137
• breath specimens  have been analysed but the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that a reliable indication of the 
alcohol concentration has not been produced;138
• following a preliminary drug test, the officer has reasonable 
cause to believe that the person has a drug in his or her body.139
There is  no equivalent for drugs-testing of the evidential breath testing 
instruments, so that where drugs  are suspected, a blood or urine specimen 
may be required at a police station, but only if, as  a result of administering a 
preliminary drug test140 the officer has  reasonable cause to believe that the 
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person has a drug in his  or her body,141  or if a medical practitioner has 
advised that the person’s condition might be due to a drug.142 Thus, there 
has to be something to suggest the presence of drugs. This is  to protect a 
suspect from being required to provide a blood specimen where there is a 
medical explanation for the suspect’s condition which excludes  the influence 
of  drugs.143 
The officer making the requirement must tell the suspect the reason 
why breath specimens cannot be taken or cannot be used. As in the case of 
the statutory option, the suspect must understand that a blood specimen 
would be taken by a doctor,144 not by the officer. Failure to do so results  in 
acquittal.145 
The investigating officer decides  whether the alternative specimen is to 
be of blood or urine.146 In making the decision, the officer has the “broadest 
of discretions”147 and need not seek the view of the suspect.148 This applies 
both when blood or urine specimens are required, and when the “statutory 
option” is exercised. 
A blood specimen may not be required if the medical practitioner or 
health care professional who is asked to take it is of the opinion that, for 
medical reasons, it cannot or should not be taken, and, in the case of a 
registered health care professional, there is  no contrary opinion from a 
medical practitioner.149  In the case of suspected drug-driving, if there is 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
148
141  RTA 1988, s 7(3)(bc). On the interpretation of this requirement, see Cole v DPP [1988] RTR 224 
(DC); Bell v DPP, unreported, 30  July 1997 (DC); Angel v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2010] EWHC 
883 (Admin) (DC).
142  RTA 1988, s 7(3)(c). It has been proposed that registered healthcare professionals, as well as 
medical practitioners, should be empowered to provide such advice: Draft Deregulation Bill, Cm 
8642, 2013, s 24, sch 9, paras 5, 6.
143 Angel v Chief  Constable of  South Yorkshire [2010] EWHC 883 (Admin) (DC).
144 Or, now, by a health care professional.
145 DPP v Jackson; Stanley v DPP [1999] 1 AC 406 (HL).
146 RTA 1988, s 7(4).
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(QBD); Wade v DPP [1996] RTR 177 (DC); DPP v Joiner  [1997] RTR 387 (DC); Robinson (Dena) v DPP 
[1997] RTR 403 (DC); Gorman v DPP, DPP v Arnup  [1997] RTR 409 (DC); R v Epping Justices ex p Quy 
[1998] RTR 158 (QBD); DPP v Jackson, Stanley v DPP [1999] 1 AC 406 (HL); DPP v Gibbons [2001] 
EWHC 385 (Admin); Kinsella v DPP [2002] EWHC 545 (Admin) (QBD); Jubb v DPP [2002] EWHC 
2317 (Admin).
medical advice that a blood specimen cannot or should not be taken, it 
seems that a prosecution under the new s  5A would then be precluded since 
specified limits in urine are not in contemplation.150 The only course open to 
an investigating officer in these circumstance would, it seems, be to require a 
urine specimen with a view to charging the section 4 offence of unfitness 
through drugs. 
The suspect must consent151  to provide a specimen, or risk being 
prosecuted for failure to provide. In any proceedings, a blood specimen is to 
be disregarded unless taken with consent of the accused, and the specimen 
must be taken by a medical practitioner or a registered health care 
professional.152 
A urine specimen is to be provided within one hour of its being 
required and “after the provision of a previous specimen of urine”. Thus, it 
is  the second of two specimens, provided within an hour of the requirement, 
which forms the basis of any prosecution; the first is  discarded.153  These 
requirements are designed to ensure the specimen analysed is fresh, so best 
reflecting the alcohol concentration in the body. 
When requiring an evidential specimen, the officer must warn the 
suspect that failure to provide it will put the suspect at risk of prosecution.154 
If the officer does not administer the warning, any prosecution for failing to 
provide, as well as for a substantive drink- or drug-driving offence, is 
defeated.155
Where a blood or urine specimen is  provided, the suspect is  entitled to 
ask for part of the specimen, which the suspect may decide to have 
independently analysed.156  The suspect must ask for it; the officer is not 
obliged to offer it.157 There is  no requirement that the right to have part of 
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154 RTA 1988, s 7(7).
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156 RTOA 1988, s 15(5) and (5A).
157 Jones (Elaine) v CPS [2003] EWHC 1729 (Admin).
the specimen be explained to the suspect, although the pro formas158 used 
by police to guide them through the procedure in fact include the words, 
“you will be supplied with part of the specimen if you so require”. Under 
earlier versions  of the legislation, by contrast, the investigating officer was 
obliged to offer part of the specimen to the suspect. In practice, those who 
supply blood or urine are still offered part of  the specimen.
Persons Incapable of  Consenting
The provisions 159 which authorise taking a blood specimen from a person 
who is  incapable of consenting (usually because the person is  unconscious) 
are particularly interesting in the context of  self-incrimination.160 
The power arises  where the person has been involved in an accident 
and police are investigating a drink- or drug-driving offence. The person 
must be someone from whom an officer could otherwise require a specimen, 
and the incapacity must be one which appears to the officer to be 
attributable to medical reasons. The specimen is  not to be taken by a 
medical practitioner having responsibility for the clinical care of the person, 
and is, preferably, to be taken by a police medical practitioner.161 It is  lawful 
for a medical practitioner to take a specimen pursuant to the section, 
although there is  no obligation to do so. The medical practitioner may, 
presumably, decline to take the specimen if there are ethical objections.162 
The specimen may not be laboratory tested unless  the person from whom it 
was  taken regains capacity and consents. Failure without reasonable excuse 
to give such consent is an offence, and the officer making the requirement 
for consent must warn the suspect of  this.163 
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162  The British Medical Association has issued guidance for doctors on taking blood specimens from 
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Hospital Patients
There are also special provisions164 relating to patients  at hospital,165  the 
effect of which is to give priority to care and treatment rather than to the 
investigative procedure. A patient at hospital is  not to be required to undergo 
a preliminary test or provide a specimen unless the medical practitioner in 
immediate charge of the patient’s  case has been notified and does not 
object. The medical practitioner may object where the requirement, the 
provision of the specimen, or the giving of the warning of the consequences 
of failing to provide, would be prejudicial to the proper care and treatment 
of the patient. Where a blood specimen is  required at a hospital, the usual 
requirement that the officer say why a breath specimen is not being required 
does  not apply.166  Otherwise, the usual requirements concerning the 
procedure appear to apply.167
Failing without Reasonable Excuse 
As explained above,168 it is an offence if, without reasonable excuse, a person 
fails  to co-operate with a preliminary test,169  fails  to provide evidential 
specimens,170 or fails to give permission for the testing of a specimen taken 
while he or she was incapable of  consenting.171 
The definition of “reasonable excuse” has  been noted172  and the 
interpretation of this  expression173  is relevant to the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The following have been found not to amount to reasonable excuses:
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• trying hard but failing to produce breath specimens, unless 
there is a physical or mental disability;174 
• personal beliefs  and perceptions, even if genuine and/or 
mistaken, for example, a defendant’s belief that he had not 
drunk enough to take him over the limit;175 
• conditional agreement to provide.176 This  includes  agreeing to 
provide specimens after receiving legal advice,177  unless, 
possibly, the investigating officer consents to delay the 
procedure for the purpose178  or a solicitor is immediately 
available;179
• being advised by a solicitor not to provide a specimen;180 
• being too drunk to understand the requirement;181
• having been unlawfully arrested;182
• the three-minute time limit for providing each breath specimen 
not having been explained;183 
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178 Smith v Hand [1986] RTR 265 (DC).
179 Kennedy v DPP [2002] EWHC 2297 (Admin) (DC).
180 Dickinson v DPP [1989] Crim LR 741 (QBD). 
181 DPP v Beech [1992] RTR 239 (DC). It has, however, been suggested that the result might have been 
different had the suspect lapsed into a state of total unconsciousness: [1992] Crim LR 64, 
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• the subject’s awkward position in the back of a police car and 
his inability to see the lights on the screening device;184
• emotional distress, unless  severe enough to render the 
defendant mentally unable to provide a specimen or 
understand the requirement for it;185 
• fears  and embarrassment about the process  for providing 
specimens, unless amounting to a medically recognised 
phobia;186
• a fear of  contracting AIDS,187unless amounting to a phobia;188
• where a suspect makes  no effort to blow into the device, 
medical conditions of which he/she was  unaware at the 
time.189
By contrast, few cases result in a finding that there was a reasonable 
excuse for failing to provide. But the following have been accepted:
• fear of  a needle such that the subject was truly incapacitated;190
• failure to understand the procedure because of limited 
English;191 
• distress amounting to mental inability to provide a specimen;192 
• distress and intoxication such that the defendant was physically 
incapable of  providing;193 
• shortness of  breath resulting from a panic attack;194
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• a fear of  contracting AIDS which amounted to a phobia.195
If there is a genuine medical reason – bronchitis, asthma, a cold or flu, 
perhaps – it is  likely to emerge early in the procedure. Subjects who do not 
produce breath specimens are asked whether there are any medical reasons 
why not.196  If, from what the subject says, the investigating officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that there may be a medical reason why breath 
cannot be provided or should not be required, the officer may require a 
blood specimen instead.197 Officers  may also move on to blood if they have 
reasonable cause to believe there is  a medical reason as  a result of something 
other than what the subject says  – for example, where the suspect has 
medication with him or her. Whether or not there is  a medical reason is, at 
this  stage, a matter for the officer alone; there is  no need for medical 
advice.198  The test is  objective – it is enough that the subject proffers 
something, or the officer observes  something, which may be a medical 
reason; the officer need not necessarily believe what a subject says  to justify 
requiring a blood specimen instead of a breath specimen.199  Officers can 
therefore err on the side of caution and proceed to require blood instead of 
breath if there is  any suggestion of medical reasons which could amount to 
a reasonable excuse. The effect is  to reduce the scope for claiming 
reasonable excuse. 
Once a blood specimen is  required in place of a breath specimen, any 
question whether there is a medical reason why such a specimen cannot or 
should not be taken is a matter for a medical practitioner.200
The procedure for requiring evidential specimens  of breath, blood or 
urine is not an interview for the purposes of the Codes  of Practice under the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.201  The provisions of Code C 
concerning interviews  (on the procedure, records, and special provisions  in 
relation to juveniles, the mentally ill and vulnerable persons) do not 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
154
195 De Freitas v DPP [1993] RTR 98 (DC).
196 Pro forma MG DD/A, version 5.2.1 December 2012, para A11 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
publications/police/road-traffic-documents/drink-drug-driving-forms/form-a-mgdd?view=Binary> 
accessed 27 November 2013.
197 Under RTA 1988, s 7(3)(a) – constable having reasonable cause to believe that for medical reasons 
a specimen of  breath cannot be provided or should not be required; see p 147.
198 Dempsey v Catton [1986] RTR 194 (QBD).
199 White v Proudlock [1988] RTR 163 (DC).
200 RTA 1988, s 7(4A).
201  DPP v Rous and Davis [1992] RTR 246 (QBD), and PACE Code C 2013, para 11.1A, October 
2013. 
therefore apply. Because the procedure is  not an interview, the subject has 
no right to delay the procedure until legal advice has been given. All that is 
required is that the defendant is permitted to consult a solicitor as  soon as 
practicable. Nothing in the Act requires the police to delay taking a 
specimen in the meantime.202 
DISCUSSION
That there is a connection between the privilege against self-incrimination 
and the requirement to provide specimens in drink- and drug-driving cases 
has long been clear. It is  the exact nature of the connection, and its 
relevance for the theory of  criminal law, which is elusive. 
“Right” or “Privilege”
The use of the word “privilege” in relation to self-incrimination is 
distinctive, and does not appear to have been discussed in the literature. 
“Privilege” has  been the traditional terminology in the jurisprudence of 
England and Wales. The ECtHR, when first recognising protection against 
self-incrimination in the case of Funke,203 referred to a right, only adopting 
the word “privilege” in later cases, inconsistently and without acknowledging 
or explaining the shift. It may be that the change in terminology reflects  the 
court’s  developing attitude as  it has begun to delineate limitations on its 
initial formulation. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “privilege” as:  
a right, advantage, or immunity granted to or enjoyed … 
beyond the usual rights  or advantages  of others; specifically   (a) 
an exemption from a normal duty, liability, etc.;   (b) enjoyment 
of some benefit (as wealth, education, standard of living, etc.) 
above the average or that deemed usual or necessary for a 
particular group (in pl. sometimes contrasted with rights).204
Although the definition opens with a reference to “right”, it concludes 
by noting that privileges are often contrasted with rights. It also refers  to 
advantage and immunity, exemption and enjoyment of benefit – all of 
which suggest that what is being conferred by a privilege is  something over 
and above that to which a person is ordinarily entitled; that it is some 
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concession, something special, perhaps something that must be deserved, 
merited or earned, which can be conferred or withdrawn without, 
necessarily, applying consistent principles or, indeed, any principles at all.205 
Based on this  definition, the privilege against self-incrimination can perhaps 
be seen as something conferred on some suspects, but not on others, in some 
circumstances, but not all. 
Existence Independent of  the Will of  the Suspect
The critical question arising from Saunders206  is  whether breath, blood or 
urine specimens required in a drink- or drug-driving investigation engage 
the right against self-incrimination. The answer is by no means clear. 
A number of preliminary points  need to be made. First, Saunders 
concerned the use made, in a criminal trial, of statements  obtained by 
government inspectors  in exercise of statutory powers  of compulsion, so that 
what the court said about the privilege against self-incrimination in relation 
to other procedures is, strictly, obiter. Second, the differences  between the 
various  types of specimen may be relevant – breath specimens are given and 
analysed quite differently from blood or urine specimens, and exist only for a 
few moments in a breath analysis device before being purged away. Blood 
and urine specimens, on the other hand, are taken and stored in phials 
which are then sent for laboratory analysis, and suspects  have the 
opportunity to take away part of such a specimen207  for comparative 
analysis. Finally, none of these specimens has any kind of independent 
existence at all until a requirement to provide it is  made and it is  in fact 
provided. Until that point, the breath, blood or urine which may later 
constitute a specimen is an unidentified part of the air inhaled by the 
suspect, or of  the suspect’s body fluids. 
It may be possible to sustain an argument that specimens produced in 
the course of a drink- or drug-driving investigation, once provided into an 
evidential breath analysis  device or into phials  for laboratory analysis, then 
exist independently of the will of the suspect, in the sense that (excluding 
any part specimen supplied to the suspect) they are then beyond the suspect’s 
control. The critical question, however, may be whether or not they come into 
existence independently of the suspect’s will. The court in Saunders referred 
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to the right not to incriminate oneself as presupposing that the prosecution 
would seek to prove a case:
without resort to evidence obtained through methods  of 
coercion or oppression in defiance of  the will of  the accused.208 
While evidence of excess alcohol or of drugs  in the body cannot be 
obtained by physical force, it is obtained by compulsion. The consent of the 
suspect to the taking of a blood or urine specimen is required,209  yet a 
suspect has  virtually no scope to decline to provide specimens of any kind 
without risking prosecution. This  is  because of the restricted interpretation 
of the term “without reasonable excuse” for failing to produce specimens,210 
and the ease with which an investigating officer can move from requiring a 
breath specimen to requiring a blood specimen, and from blood to urine.211 
The pressure to co-operate is  immense. The suspect is  under threat of 
prosecution for failure to provide and must be told so. The suspect is in a 
police station undergoing an investigative procedure and must decide 
immediately whether or not to co-operate, without any right to delay 
matters  to take legal advice.212 Although the suspect may be unaware of it at 
the time, the penalties for failing to provide are the same as  for the principal 
offences, and include terms of  imprisonment. 
A specimen taken from a person incapable of consenting213 is taken 
without so much as  the person’s being aware of it, let alone consenting, and 
is surely taken against that person’s will, despite the fact that permission 
must be given before it is analysed.
It is  submitted that these procedures  amount at least to coercion, and 
the right against self-incrimination therefore seems to be breached in that 
the prosecution would be doing just what the court proscribed – seeking to 
prove the case by reference to evidence obtained by coercion. 
The second part of the court’s  formula for the prohibitions on what 
the prosecution may do to prove a case is that the evidence must not be 
obtained in defiance of the will of the accused. In a drink- or drug-driving 
case, this  may well depend on the attitude of the individual suspect. 
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Certainly some suspects  give specimens willingly, and would perhaps  do so 
even in the absence of the pressure described above. After all, they may be 
cleared of suspicion. But many are surely unwilling. The case law is 
testimony to the many (largely unsuccessful) attempts to avoid providing 
specimens.214 It seems unsatisfactory to conclude that the application of the 
privilege would depend on the will of the individual suspect, and that the 
unwilling should have the benefit, while the willing do not.
Having specified the manner in which the prosecution would seek to 
prove a case, the court in Saunders went on215  to narrow the focus of the 
right, saying it is  “primarily concerned” with the right to silence, before 
declaring that it does not extend to material which may be obtained through 
compulsory powers  but which has  an existence independent of the will of 
the suspect, giving the examples  of documents  acquired pursuant to a 
warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose 
of DNA testing. This  seems to raise a direct conflict with what the court said 
in the preceding paragraph of its  judgment. The latter refers to evidence 
obtained by coercion or oppression, paragraph 69 to compulsory powers. 
The language used may suggest that “compulsory powers” are less 
draconian than coercion or oppression, but if there is  a distinction, it would 
have been helpful if the court had said so and given a reason. Paragraph 69 
introduces the idea of existence independent of the will of the subject, but 
does  not specify the time at which the independent existence test is  to be 
applied – before the requirement for the evidence is made, at the time the 
requirement is  made, or after it has been made and complied with. Only in 
the last of these three situations would a drink-drive specimen meet the 
“independent existence” test so as to disapply the privilege. 
The use of the word “primarily” in the phrase confining the privilege 
primarily to the right to silence clearly does  not exclude other circumstances 
in which the right might apply, and in Jalloh, the ECtHR revisited the 
concept of material having an existence independent of the will of the 
suspect, finding that there could, after all, be circumstances where the 
privilege would apply to such material. Those circumstances, it will be 
recalled, were the high degree of force used, the violation of article 3 and 
the defiance of the applicant’s will in retrieving the evidence.216 The only 
element of these circumstances which might apply in a drink- or drug-
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driving investigation is  the defiance of the suspect’s will in obtaining a 
specimen. That would probably not be enough to engage the privilege on 
the basis of  Jalloh, but Jalloh does pave the way for further concessions.
Finally, it has  been noted217  that in R v S, Lord Judge referred to “a 
blood or urine sample provided by a car driver” as “a fact independent of 
the driver which may or may not reveal that his  alcohol level exceeds  the 
permitted maximum”. It really is  extremely difficult to make sense of this 
reference. In the first place, a specimen is  a specimen, not a fact. If it is the 
alcohol concentration – the result of analysis – which is  the fact under 
discussion, it is very difficult to see how that either can be independent of 
the driver, given that the presence of alcohol or a drug is a direct 
consequence of  what the driver has consumed. 
The Method of  Obtaining Evidence
The idea that it is the method by which evidence is obtained, not the nature 
of the evidence itself, which should be determinative of whether or not the 
privilege applies  has  been taken up in the literature.218 The argument is219 
that the privilege should engage where the suspect is  required to co-operate, 
and would not therefore apply if the evidence could be obtained by force, 
since that would not require co-operation. In a drink- or drug-driving 
investigation, co-operation is  required and, although there is much pressure 
to comply, there is no question of using physical force, so that, on this 
argument, the privilege applies. Ashworth refines the argument to the point 
that the privilege should apply where a requirement to produce evidence, 
whether oral or real, operates  as coercion on the mind of the subject.220 
Elsewhere221 it is  said that the privilege is engaged when a suspect is  under a 
legal duty to provide incriminating information, as where there is a legal 
sanction for failure to do so. Both these interpretations support a contention 
that breath, blood and urine specimens should be protected by the privilege. 
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The Criteria in O’Halloran 
In O’Halloran, it was said that three matters were relevant when determining 
whether the essence of the right to remain silent and the privilege against 
self-incrimination had been infringed:
• the nature and degree of  compulsion used, 
• any relevant procedural safeguards, and 
• the use made of  any material obtained. 
It is  worth examining these three criteria in some detail, to gauge the 
extent, if any, to which they suggest that the privilege should or should not 
apply in a drink- or drug-driving investigation. 
In O’Halloran, the nature of the compulsion to name the drivers  was 
that it was subject to the threat of a fine for failure to do so. The court 
justified this  on the basis of the responsibilities  accepted by those who drive, 
and in light of the limited nature of the information sought.222 The degree 
of compulsion in a drink- or drug- driving investigation has  been described 
above, and is clearly far greater than in the circumstances pertaining in 
O’Halloran, where a person receives a written request in the post, allowing 
time,223 should the recipient so wish, to take advice and reach a considered 
decision about how to react. Given the extent and immediacy of the 
pressure on a drink- or drug-drive suspect to provide a specimen, I contend 
that, on this  first criterion in O’Halloran, the nature and degree of 
compulsion is such that the privilege should be in play. 
Again in O’Halloran, the in-built safeguard was the provision that no 
offence would be committed if the person required to identify the driver 
could not with reasonable diligence have known who was driving. This  was 
one of the factors which influenced the court in favour of finding that the 
privilege did not apply.224  In a drink- or drug-drive investigation, it may 
seem that there is  a comparable safeguard in the reference to reasonable 
excuse in the offences  of “failing without reasonable excuse” to provide 
specimens. As has been seen, this  expression is narrowly construed, and in 
such a way that if a suspect actually has a reasonable excuse for not 
providing breath, then the investigating officer can usually require a blood or 
urine specimen instead. Once a blood specimen has been required, any 
proffered excuse may result in switching to a requirement for a urine 
specimen, or calling in a medical practitioner. If the medical practitioner is 
of the opinion that a blood specimen cannot or should not be taken for 
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medical reasons, again a urine specimen may be required instead.225 The 
circumstances in which it is not possible to require any form of specimen are 
very limited indeed. As has been seen, specimens can be obtained even from 
patients in hospital226 and from persons who are unable to give consent. The 
effect of all this is  not only to limit the availability of the safeguard of 
reasonable excuse, but to increase the degree of  coercion on the suspect.
There are other features of a drink- or drug-drive investigation aimed 
at protecting the interests  of suspects, but none alleviates the risk of self-
incrimination. Some concern the accuracy of the analysis of a specimen 
and can therefore be said to help prevent false self-incrimination, but they do 
not alleviate a suspect of having to incriminate himself or herself in the first 
place. Among these are:
• the statutory option;227
• the right of a suspect, upon request, to be given part of a blood 
or urine specimen;228
• the fact that it is  the lower of two breath readings which is used 
in evidence;229
• the provisions  requiring proof that the breath analysis device 
correctly self-checked its calibration;230 
• the rebuttable presumption that a breath analysis device is 
reliable.231
The right to be told that any blood specimen would be taken by a 
doctor,232  or, in a statutory option case, that the breath reading does not 
exceed 50,233 do not bear on self-incrimination. Nor does the explanation, 
when requiring blood, of why breath cannot be taken or used.234  The 
requirement to warn of the consequences of failing to provide surely acts as 
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pressure to provide evidence so, if anything, promoting self-incrimination 
rather than guarding against it. 
Not only do the safeguards built into the procedure not assist in 
avoiding self-incrimination, but the usual safeguards in PACE do not apply 
at the stage when specimens are taken.235 Most notably, a suspect may not 
delay the procedure to take legal advice and so must make the decision 
whether or not to accede to the requirement for a specimen unaided and 
immediately. The absence of real procedural safeguards  suggest that, on the 
basis of  the second criterion in O’Halloran, the privilege should be engaged. 
The third ground in O’Halloran upon which it was found that the 
privilege did not apply was the use to which the material was  put. 
O’Halloran’s statement that he had been driving was  admissible in evidence; 
the prosecution had to prove the offence in the usual way, and the 
defendants were free to invoke ss 76 and 78 of PACE236  if appropriate.237 
The identity of the driver was only one element in the offence of speeding, 
and there was no question of a conviction based solely on the information 
compulsorily obtained. The situation in a drink- or drug-drive case is  similar. 
The analysis of the specimen is to be taken into account in any proceedings, 
and the statutory assumption that the alcohol level at the time of the offence 
was  not less  than in the specimen238 applies. Section 76 is  not relevant, but 
section 78 can be called upon if appropriate. The results  of analysing a 
specimen are only one part of the case as  a whole; the prosecution must 
prove all the other elements of the offence – that the defendant was driving, 
attempting to drive or in charge of a motor vehicle or mechanically 
propelled vehicle on a road or other public place. 
So far, then, on the basis of the third element in O’Halloran, the 
privilege should not apply to a drink- or drug-driving investigation. But 
there is a difficulty with the proposition that the identity of the driver in the 
O’Halloran situation, and the results of analysing a specimen in a drink- or 
drug- driving case, are merely one part of the case as a whole. They may be 
only one part, but they are critical, and without them, a prosecution would 
not get off the ground. It has  been pointed out239 that, although the piece of 
information which the court in Brown v Stott said had a limited nature – the 
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identity of the driver only – in reality this  detail often leads directly to the 
conviction of the compelled person. The dissenting judgment in Weh, 
quoted above,240  is  to the same effect. So too in a drink- or drug-driving 
investigation, it is  the analysis which is critical. Lord Bingham,241 in Brown v 
Stott (when in the Court of Appeal), pointed out that the purpose of 
requiring the suspect to provide a breath specimen was to obtain evidence 
not otherwise available, and the reading could, in all but exceptional 
circumstances, be enough to convict a driver of an offence. All the 
remaining elements of the offence – driving, being in charge, and so on 
–  are in themselves perfectly innocent. I contend that too much has been 
made of the fact that a single piece of information is  in issue, and that its 
high evidential value should also be taken into account to bring these 
circumstances within the privilege.
Thus two of the considerations identified in O’Halloran would support 
an argument that the privilege should apply to the taking of specimens  of 
drink- and drug-driving investigations, while the third, on the face of it, does 
not, although there is a good argument that, in fact, it should. 
Other Criteria
A number of the formulations of the privilege also suggests  that it should 
apply to a drink or drug-driving investigation.
The requirement to provide specimens clearly runs counter to the 
basic idea that the prosecution should prove its  case without assistance from 
the defendant.242  It has been suggested that there is no fundamental 
difference between relying on a suspect’s  words, which attract the privilege, 
and relying on the composition of a suspect’s blood, which does not,243 or, 
likewise, between the drugs  in Jalloh and a blood specimen.244 In a dissenting 
opinion in Saunders,245  it  was  questioned why the right against self-
incrimination should protect a suspect from being coerced into making 
incriminating statements, but not from coercion to co-operate in providing 
Chapter 4: Self-Incrimination
163
240 See p 126.
241 Quoted at [2003] 1 AC 681, 705.
242 Above, pp 124, 137.
243  Susan M Easton, ‘Bodily Samples and the Privilege against Self-incrimination’ [1991] Crim LR 
18, 22.
244 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edn, OUP 2010) 152.
245 Judges Martens and Kuris [10]. 
other types of incriminating data (or specimens). In both instances the 
suspect is forced to bring about his own conviction.
The idea that the privilege protects suspects  from cruel choices  seems 
particularly apt in relation to drink- or drug-driving investigations. The 
suspect has the choice between providing a specimen which may result in 
exoneration or incrimination, and refusing to provide a specimen, so risking 
prosecution for failing to provide.
Based on Funke and Heaney, it has been said that where failure to 
provide information requested is a criminal offence in itself, liability for that 
offence violates the privilege.246 Choo247 likewise suggests that the privilege 
should mean that a person cannot be compelled, on pain of a criminal 
sanction, to provide information that could reasonably lead to, or increase 
the likelihood of, that person’s  prosecution for a criminal offence. While 
Funke and Heaney concerned documents, there seems no reason not to apply 
the same argument to a requirement to provide breath, blood or urine 
specimens, where again there are specific offences of failing without 
reasonable excuse to provide. The argument may be more compelling since 
the maximum penalties  for failing to provide are the same as for the 
substantive offences. 
The privilege has been said to protect individual privacy, freedom and 
dignity.248  Providing a sample of body fluid or even of breath seems to 
encroach on all three. Landau’s argument249  that the more personal, 
onerous and intrusive the requirement, the greater the importance of the 
purpose required to justify it, seems apt.
Dennis250 canvasses  the idea that there should be no compulsion to 
comply with procedures for the collection of evidence except where those 
procedures  can be justified by reference to the need to secure reliable 
evidence which is  probative of guilt, and the collection of such evidence is 
governed by procedures based on natural justice to individuals, or there are 
other safeguards  in place aimed at ensuring that state power is exercised in 
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accordance with fundamental principles. If these criteria are met in drink- 
and drug-driving investigations, then it can be said that the privilege need 
not apply. Clearly there is  a need to secure reliable evidence probative of 
guilt, but the whole burden of my thesis is that, in a drink- or drug-driving 
investigation, fundamental principles  of law are set aside, and the conclusion 
must be that Dennis’s  proposed preconditions  for dispensing with the 
privilege are not met. 
Applying Ashworth’s three tests251  for allowing exceptions to the 
privilege also leads  to the conclusion that the privilege should apply to drink- 
and drug-driving investigations. The first and most important test is that the 
suspect should have relatively little at stake, and certainly should not be at 
risk of imprisonment. Given the seriousness of conviction for a drink- or 
drug-driving offence, and the fact that imprisonment is available as  a 
penalty,252 this  test is not met. On the other hand, the second criterion, that 
the suspect has  chosen to participate in a particular social enterprise – 
driving – applies. On the face of it, the third test, that the suspect may be 
excused if without fault, may be met in that the legislation allows for 
reasonable excuse for failing to provide. It has been demonstrated, however, 
that in practice this excuse is difficult to make out, to the extent even that 
being advised by a solicitor not to provide specimens has been ruled not to 
be a reasonable excuse.253 
A final point in favour of applying the privilege to the drink- and 
drug-driving offences  may be the fact that evidence may not be available by 
any other means.254  Exceeding the prescribed limit can be proved only by 
analysing a specimen, and specimens are often critical to proving “in 
charge” offences. 
The weight of the arguments is  in favour of applying the privilege to drink- 
and drug-driving investigations. There is far less  by way of justification for 
disapplying it. But it may be possible to do so on the basis that the purpose 
of the privilege is  to avoid wrongful convictions. Analysing a specimen, 
assuming the analysis is  accurate, will not lead to the conviction of someone 
who is innocent, but will instead exonerate such a person. 
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The distinction between material per se incriminating, and material 
which may prove incriminating only after analysis, has  been noted above. 
Breath, blood and urine specimens  may of course exonerate as  well as 
inculpate a suspect, and this could be said to be a basis for upholding the 
non-application of the privilege. But the argument is unsatisfactorily 
circular: if the evidence exonerates  the suspect, there is  no question of 
incrimination in any event and so no reason why the privilege should be in 
play.
CONCLUSION
In the discussion above, I have sought to marshal the arguments for and 
against applying the privilege against self-incrimination to specimens  of 
breath, blood and urine collected in drink- and drug-driving investigations. 
There is much to suggest that, in principle, the privilege should apply. 
The difficulty with that conclusion is, of course, that it would defeat 
the very purpose of the legislation; an investigation would never get off the 
ground if a suspect could simply refuse to provide specimens because of the 
risk of self-incrimination. To avoid such a conclusion, it is necessary to 
recognise an exception to the privilege, and support it with convincing 
reasons. Such reasons are not difficult to find. 
In a dissenting opinion in Saunders,255  it was said that national 
legislatures are in principle free to compel suspects to co-operate in, among 
other matters, breath and blood-testing for alcohol, on the basis  that the 
general interest in bringing about the truth and in bringing culprits to justice 
is to take precedence over the privilege against self-incrimination. And in 
Brown v Stott, the Privy Council decided that the right against self-
incrimination can be qualified to a limited extent if the limitation is 
reasonably directed towards a clear and proper public objective and is no 
more restrictive than the situation calls  for.256  I contend that the general 
interest in detecting drug- and drink-driving and the road safety purposes 
underlying the legislation are clear and proper public objectives, and that the 
non-application of the privilege against self-incrimination is no more 
restrictive than the situation requires. 
In O’Halloran the ECtHR also accepted that there may be derogations 
from the right not to incriminate oneself, and said that people who choose to 
drive are taken to accept certain responsibilities  and obligations as part of 
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the regulatory regime. Although the court used these as reasons  for not 
applying the privilege, the better interpretation, in my view, is  that of 
Ashworth,257 that this is a situation which should be considered an exception 
to the privilege, given the clear regulatory regime of licensing, registration, 
number plates and the like, which vehicle owners voluntarily accept. 
In Brown v Gallacher,258  the High Court of Justiciary found that the 
taking of breath specimens was not protected by the privilege, but, obiter, 
offered grounds  for making an exception if it was. The court said that the 
degree of compulsion implied by liability to prosecution for failing to 
comply was not disproportionate, having regard to the aim of the legislation, 
the fact that the requirement could be made only of people who had already 
failed a breath test, and the level of penalty if convicted of failing to provide. 
The degree of compulsion is in fact high, as I have demonstrated, but that is 
not necessarily to say that it is  out of proportion to the aims of the 
legislation. The other two points are less convincing. Although most suspects 
have failed a roadside breath test, there is no statutory requirement that such 
a test should be administered and so it not correct to say that a requirement 
for evidential specimens may be made only of those who have already failed 
a breath test. The reference to the penalty for failing to provide seems to be 
a suggestion that it is  sufficiently low that an exception to the privilege could 
be made out, but in fact, as has been seen, the penalties  for failing to provide 
are as high as for the substantive offences, and include imprisonment. 
The case law and the literature concerning self-incrimination reveal a 
departure from principle which disadvantages  defendants. My position is 
that we must acknowledge that departure, justifying it by reference to the 
road safety purposes underlying the legislation, and by reasoning that drivers 
must accept the road traffic regulatory regime in its totality, including an 
obligation to co-operate in a drink- or drug-driving investigation by 
providing specimens. I take up these arguments  again in Chapter 10.259 I 
have also suggested that the use of the term “privilege” may be interpreted 
to mean that the prohibition on self-incrimination is not universal.260 
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I turn next to the difficult question of exactly what the prohibitions on 
drink- and drug-driving are, how they are understood by drivers, and the 
consequences for the principle of  certainty in the law. 
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Chapter 5: The Principle of  Certainty 
INTRODUCTION
I have argued that, in many respects, the manner in which the drink- and 
drug-driving offences have been framed and interpreted is such that they do 
not meet the principles of law relating to strict liability, the presumption of 
innocence and the privilege against self-incrimination. The focus  now moves 
to the idea of legal certainty in relation to these offences. Legal certainty has 
been interpreted and applied in many ways, and in a range of contexts, 
across  both the criminal and the civil law, but has not before been 
considered in detail in relation to the drink- and drug-driving offences. It 
raises a special challenge, in relation at least to the prescribed alcohol limit, 
and perhaps also in relation to unfitness  to drive and the proposed drug-
driving limits. Despite strong arguments that the law should be ascertainable 
by, and comprehensible to, those to whom it applies, there is much to suggest 
that many drivers are profoundly ignorant of  the details of  the prohibitions. 
In this  chapter, I examine the relevant literature and case law, before 
moving on to explain, in Chapter 6, the scientific background underlying the 
statutory provisions  on drink- and drug-driving. Chapter 7 is  devoted to 
drivers’ perspectives and raises the important question of the extent to 
which the drink-drive limit is misunderstood. I go on to describe, in Chapter 
8, my own study of this  question, before concluding (in Chapter 9) that this 
may be a case of  the wrong kind of  certainty. 
FORESEEABILITY 
The principle of certainty arises in all areas of law,1 but the focus here is  the 
criminal law. Probably the most important aspect of certainty in the context 
of driving when unfit or when over the limit is the question of the 
169
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Certainty’ (2007) 66 CLJ 500 (on company law); Gary Slapper, ‘Penalties in the Penumbra of the 
Criminal Law’ (2008) (72) JCL 467; Anton Ming-Zhi Gao, ‘Increasing Legal Certainty in the 
European Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive’ (2008) 97 Env LR 10; Marc Stauch, 
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Sovereignty’ (2011) 31 OJLS 61; Susan Bright, ‘The Uncertainty of Certainty in Leases’ (2012) 128 
LQR 337 and Kevin K F Low, ‘Certainty of Terms and Leases: Curiouser and Curiouser’ (2012) 75 
MLR 401.
foreseeability of breaking the law. What must an individual do, or not do, to 
avoid falling foul of  the prohibitions?
The Literature
The rule of  law
In an early defence of the principle of legal certainty, HWR Wade wrote 
that citizens  must know that certain acts will lead to certain legal 
consequences, so they know what to do and what not to do. They should not 
have to rely on their own judgments to know whether or not a court would 
approve their actions. Law exists for security, confidence and freedom and 
must be invested with as much certainty and uniformity as possible.2
More recent authoritative texts place the principle of certainty at the 
heart of the rule of law, requiring that those under the control of the state 
be dealt with by fixed and knowable law. Citizens  must be able to live within 
the law and one of the functions of the criminal law is  to provide them with 
advance guidance on what not to do; they must have an opportunity to 
know the law before they can be convicted of  breaking it.3 
A person’s ability to know of the existence and extent of a rule is 
fundamental. Rational citizens  with social and political duties are entitled to 
fair warning of the provisions of the criminal law and no undue difficulty in 
ascertaining them.4
The citizen is entitled to know what actions are permissible and which 
are not.5  The task of the legislature is to create laws  that are clear and 
accessible to those affected by them.6 In the context of a plea for clarity in 
the many laws controlling drugs, it is said that the criminal law should be 
consonant with common sense and perfectly clear to the public.7
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Those about to commit a criminal wrong should be on stark notice 
that that is what they are about to do. Criminal laws  should be clear, open, 
consistent, stable and prospective.8 
In what is called the descriptivist approach to defining crimes,9  it is 
said that, to achieve clarity and certainty, the rules should, as  far as possible, 
specify the proscribed conduct in purely descriptive terms, without reference 
to any underlying values or principles, to minimise the extent to which 
citizens have to call on their own normative standards to interpret and apply 
the law.
Raz summed it up in this way: 
The law must be open and adequately publicized. If it is  to 
guide people they must be able to find out what it is. For the 
same reason its  meaning must be clear. An ambiguous, vague, 
obscure or imprecise law is  likely to mislead or confuse at least 
some of  those who desire to be guided by it.10
The criminal law sets  standards  which must be communicated to the 
public and potential wrongdoers, in a language and form that is accessible 
and comprehensible to them.11 
Criminal convictions should not be surprises; people need reasonable 
opportunities  to avoid them; the law must give fair warning, by defining the 
prohibited activity with sufficient certainty.12
In the specific context of road traffic offences, it has  been said that if 
deterrence as  an objective of criminalising specified behaviour is  to be 
effective, a person must be able to identify the course of conduct the law 
seeks to prevent; in particular, drivers  should, if they choose to drink before 
driving, familiarise themselves  with the amount permitted under the current 
blood alcohol limit.13
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Jeffrey Barnes14 recognises  that certainty in legislation is problematic 
and contested. He examines  a number of sources  of doubt, but concludes  in 
favour of the orthodox legal view that certainty is achievable but not in all 
situations.
In practical terms, too, certainty is  desirable because it reduces 
recourse to the courts to interpret provisions. Uncertainty makes criminal 
trials unduly long and expensive, and unpredictable in outcome.15 
 In summary, certainty, uniformity, stability, clarity, accessibility and 
consistency are required. In Chapter 9, I argue that, while the prescribed 
limit for alcohol is expressed in precise scientific terms, it fails  in uniformity, 
stability and consistency of application, and in clarity and accessibility to 
those to whom it applies. Unfitness to drive is  also subject to the uncertainty 
that it is judged on the facts of each case, and so may not always  be clear in 
advance. 
Parliamentary draftsmanship
Underlying the need to know in advance that a certain action would or 
would not amount to a criminal offence is  the manner in which statutory 
provisions are drafted in the first place. It has been said that the task of those 
who draft legislation is  to give reliable expression to the will of Parliament in 
a manner that enables  the public to perceive the parliamentary will with 
clarity, and order its future behaviour accordingly. The challenge for the 
draftsman is  the tension between simplicity and clarity on the one hand, and 
certainty of  meaning on the other.16 
Another commentator asserts that:
a system of law is  just and effective only if people know at least 
in outline by what laws  they are bound, and are readily able to 
discover an authoritative text of those laws, and can properly 
understand the text once obtained (emphasis added).17 
The Scottish Office of Parliamentary Counsel acknowledged a 
consensus that, despite the many inherent constraints, the law should be 
expressed in the simplest terms  available and in a way which communicates 
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directly and effectively with as much of its  intended audience as possible.18 
In another context (the definition of forms of mens rea), referring to the 
communicative enterprise of the criminal law, it  has been said that citizens 
must be able to understand the nature of what the law declares to be a 
criminal offence, and “it is  obvious  that this will usually be conducted 
without the benefit of legal advice”.19  I argue in Chapter 9 that the 
prescribed limit is simple and clear only to those with special knowledge, and 
not to the general body of  motorists.
In contrast with this  body of opinion, it has been argued that a 
legislative text constitutes the law, and is  intended to be read by lawyers. It is 
not a function of such a text to explain the law. Explanations  should be 
sought elsewhere, and an individual may need legal advice to understand 
how a particular law applies to the individual. It is imperative that the law 
be clear to the lawyer.20  In Chapter 9, I argue that this stance is  not 
sustainable in relation to legislation applying to ordinary individuals.
The drift from principle
Many have rued the greater uncertainty accompanying the increasing 
volume of legislation in recent years.21  Examples include the difficulty of 
identifying whether or not property has  been derived from criminal conduct 
for the purposes of money laundering legislation;22  the meaning of 
possessing articles for terrorist purposes;23 and the question of who may be 
liable for the offence of  selling alcohol to an under-age person.24
In a sentencing case before the Court of Appeal, Lord Wall 
sympathised with the judge in the court below who had found it 
unacceptable in a society governed by the rule of law for it to be well nigh 
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19 Findlay Stark, ‘It’s Only Words: On Meaning and Mens Rea’ (2013) 72 CLJ 155, 163–164.
20  Francis Bennion, ‘Confusion over Plain Language Law’ <http://www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/
fb/2007/2007-018-plain-language-actual-article.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013. On the role of 
legal advice, see below, pp 187–188.
21  For example, JR Spencer, ‘The Drafting of Criminal Legislation: Need it be so 
Impenetrable?’ (2008) 67 CLJ 585.
22  Paul Marshall, ‘Part 7  of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Double Criminality, Legal Certainty, 
Proportionality and Trouble Ahead’ (2003) 10 J of Financial Crime 111; Paul Marshall, ‘Risk and 
Legal Uncertainty under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 - The Result of Legislative 
Oversight’ (2004) 25 Comp Law 354.
23  Graham Virgo, ‘Terrorism: Possession of Articles’ (2008) 67 CLJ 236, case comment on R v Zafar 
and Others [2008] EWCA Crim 184.
24 Colin Manchester, ‘Sale of  Alcohol to Children’ [2009] Crim LR 689.
impossible to discern from statutory provisions what a sentence meant in 
practice.25
Among suggested reasons  for increasing uncertainty are that too much 
law is made too quickly, with insufficient regard for the basic rules  of the 
substantive criminal law, and the adoption of language which is unjustifiably 
complicated.26  Haste in drafting provisions introduced as  a matter of 
political expedience has also been cited as producing unexpected results.27 
While these views on the decline in certainty are not directly relevant 
to motoring offences, they are indicative of a general drift away from 
principle, which is discussed further in Chapter 10.28
The Case Law
The principle of certainty has been acknowledged and developed in the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the domestic courts. 
The Court of  Justice of  the European Union
The jurisprudence of the European Union bearing on certainty arises 
mainly in the contexts of contractual, fiscal and commercial law,29 although 
a small number of  cases bear on the criminal law.
The Court of Justice has ruled that legal clarity is  imperative in any 
sector in which uncertainty may lead to particularly serious sanctions: Fishing 
Quotas (Commission v UK),30  where the sanctions  consisted of penalties  for 
fishing without a licence, and the uncertainty lay in the terms of such 
licences and the conditions under which they would be issued.
The same court reiterated the principle of certainty in its  preliminary 
ruling in R on the Application of International Association of Independent Tanker 
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28 See pp 307–308.
29  See, for example, Trevor C Hartley, ‘Five Forms of Uncertainty in European Community 
Law’ (1996) 55 CLJ 265; Gerrit Betlem, ‘The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation – Managing 
Legal Uncertainty’ (2002) 22  OJLS 397; Trevor Hartley The Foundations of European Community 
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Legal Uncertainty’ (2011) 70 CLJ 34.
30 Case 32/79 [1980] ECR 2403 [46].
Owners & Others v Secretary of State for Transport.31 The question was whether 
criminal liability based on serious negligence, arising from an EU 
Directive,32  was compatible with the principle of legal certainty. It was 
argued that the Member States would be unlikely to implement the concept 
into national laws and apply it uniformly. The court found that, since the 
directive did not contain directly effective penal provisions, the requirement 
for certainty did not apply to it. It nevertheless  acknowledged that rules 
(transposing community measures  into national laws where appropriate) 
must be clear and precise so that individuals  may ascertain unequivocally 
their rights and obligations. Legislation must clearly define offences and the 
penalties which they attract. The requirement of foreseeability may be 
satisfied, the court went on, even if the person concerned has to take expert 
advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences of a given activity. This was particularly true in relation to 
persons carrying on a professional activity, such as marine transport, who 
are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing 
their occupation.
The European Court of  Human Rights
While it was  once thought that the European Convention on Human 
Rights33  would not have much direct effect on the substantive domestic 
criminal law,34 the more recent case law suggests  otherwise. The ability of a 
citizen to know in advance what behaviour would amount to a criminal 
offence has arisen in relation to a number of provisions of the Convention. 
The ECtHR has considered penal provisions to determine whether or not 
they are sufficiently precise to fall within the terms “in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law”,35  “in accordance with the law”,36  or “as 
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33 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of 
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prescribed by law”.37  These terms appear in the Convention in provisions 
limiting the power of states  to interfere with the rights conferred. For 
example, a person may not be deprived of liberty except in defined cases 
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Other rights may not 
be interfered with except as prescribed by (or in accordance with) law, and 
then subject to further limitations.
The court considered the expression “prescribed by law” in Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom,38 in the context of article 10(2), which provides that 
the right of freedom of expression in article 10(1) may be subject to 
restrictions as  prescribed by law and as necessary in a democratic society. 
The ECtHR held that “prescribed by law” means  that the law must be 
adequately accessible, in that the citizen must be able to have an indication 
of it that is  adequate in the circumstances  of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case. A norm cannot be regarded as  “law” unless  formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. 
The court again reviewed the words  “prescribed by law” in Kokkinakis v 
Greece,39 this time in relation to article 9, on the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. The case concerned a Jehovah’s  Witness who had 
been arrested many times  for the offence of proselytism. The offence was 
defined as any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs  of 
a person of a different religious  persuasion with the aim of undermining 
those beliefs in certain defined ways. The court found that the offence fell 
within the term “prescribed by law” in article 9. There was a body of settled 
national case law, supplementing the statutory provisions, which was 
accessible and enabled the complainant to regulate his conduct. The 
ECtHR also noted that the wording of many statutes is not absolutely 
precise. To avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing 
circumstances, many laws are couched in terms which are vague to some 
degree.
In Steel v United Kingdom,40  demonstrators  had been arrested and 
detained for acting in a manner said to have caused, or to have been likely to 
cause, a breach of the peace. The ECtHR considered whether their arrests 
and detention were lawful for the purposes of article 5(1) of the Convention 
(on the right to liberty). The applicants  argued that the concept of breach of 
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39 (1994) 17 EHRR 397.
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the peace and the attendant powers  of arrest were insufficiently clear under 
English law. The court found, however, that the English courts  have made 
clear that a breach of the peace is committed only when a person causes 
harm, or appears  likely to cause harm, to persons  or property, in such a way 
that the natural consequence would be to provoke others  to violence. It was 
also clear that a person may be arrested for causing a breach of the peace, 
or where it is  reasonably apprehended that the person is likely to cause a 
breach of the peace. These rules  were sufficiently precise to meet the 
requirements of the Convention. They were also sufficiently clear to enable 
persons to foresee the circumstances  in which they might be bound over, and 
that if they refused to be bound over, they would be committed to prison. 
The court also ruled that the binding-over orders themselves were 
sufficiently precise in their terms; the applicants  were being asked to agree to 
refrain from causing further, similar, breaches of  the peace. 
The term “prescribed by law” was again before the ECtHR in 
Hashman v United Kingdom,41  when the court confirmed that the expression 
calls  for foreseeability. The applicants disturbed a fox hunt. Magistrates 
found that their behaviour was contra bonos mores, that is, “wrong rather than 
right in the judgment of the majority of contemporary citizens”,42  and 
bound them over to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The ECtHR 
accepted that their behaviour constituted an expression of opinion for the 
purposes  of article 10, and that the measures taken against them interfered 
with the exercise of their right of freedom of expression. The question was 
whether the finding that they had behaved contra bonos mores, and the 
binding-over order, were “prescribed by law” so as to justify the interference. 
The court found that a norm could not be regarded as a “law” unless it was 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their 
conduct. Conduct which was “wrong rather than right in the judgment of 
the majority of contemporary citizens” was not described at all, and failed 
the certainty test. The court distinguished Steel on the basis that in the 
present case the binding-over order had a purely prospective effect and was 
not (as in Steel) based on a finding that there had been a breach of  the peace.
More recently, other statutory provisions have been struck down by the 
ECtHR as too broadly drafted. Liberty v United Kingdom43  concerned the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985. Section 3(2) gave the British 
authorities  a virtually unlimited discretion to intercept communications 
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between the United Kingdom and overseas. Section 6 required the Home 
Secretary to make arrangements for safeguards against abuse of power in 
the operation of the section and in the dissemination and storage of 
intercepted material. Such arrangements had been made but had not been 
made public. The court found that the law did not indicate with sufficient 
clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the 
scope or manner of the exercise of the discretion. In particular, no 
indication of the procedure for examining, sharing, storing and destroying 
intercepted material had been made public. That was  not in accordance 
with the law and amounted to a breach of  article 8 (on the right to privacy).
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 was  another example of powers 
conferred in broad terms. It allowed senior police officers  to authorise the 
stopping and searching of people in designated areas, if expedient for the 
prevention of acts  of terrorism. There was no requirement for any kind of 
prior suspicion in individual cases; “hunch” or “professional intuition” was 
sufficient. The powers had been used extensively, sometimes with no obvious 
connection to terrorism. They eventually came before the ECtHR in Gillan v 
United Kingdom.44  The court found that the broad discretion conferred on 
individual officers (in respect of both authorisations and actual stops) was 
not moderated by adequate legal safeguards  to protect individuals against 
arbitrary interference; it was  not in accordance with law and breached 
article 8. The court reiterated that the law must indicate with sufficient 
clarity the scope of  a discretion and the manner of  its exercise.45
The domestic courts
Turning to the case law of the domestic courts, Lord Diplock said,46 
speaking of the construction of statutory provisions, that the acceptance of 
the rule of law requires that a citizen, before committing to a course of 
action, should be able to know the legal consequences which will flow from 
it. Where those consequences are regulated by statute, the source of that 
knowledge is  what the statute says. In construing a statute, the court must 
give effect to what the words of the statute would reasonably be understood 
to mean by those whose conduct it regulates. 
Certainty is  also required in relation to common law offences. In R v 
Misra, R v Srivastava,47  the question was whether the definition of 
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manslaughter by gross  negligence was sufficiently certain to comply with 
article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.48 The court found 
that it was; the gross nature of the negligence which had to be shown to 
establish the offence embraced the obviousness  of serious harm to the 
victim. The judgment highlights the long history of the link between justice 
and certainty, and provides a useful review of the case law,49  including 
decisions that:
• an individual must be able to foresee the consequences of his 
actions, in particular to avoid incurring the sanction of the 
criminal law;50
• rules  binding the citizen must be ascertainable (or more 
realistically, ascertainable by a competent lawyer advising the 
citizen);51 
• in criminal matters, clarity and certainty are important.52 
Following Misra, it was said that challenges  based on lack of certainty 
pursuant to article 7 were less and less  likely to succeed in the domestic 
courts in the light of a number of cases  in which the certainty test has been 
found to be met.53  The ECtHR’s position has been described as  leaving a 
“penumbra of uncertainty” surrounding its  own principle of certainty,54 and 
the case of Uttley55  – where the House of Lords upheld a provision on 
penalties which was in force at the time of sentencing but not when the 
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offence was  committed – has  been said severely to curtail the protection 
afforded by article 7.56  
These predictions appeared to be borne out by the House of Lords in 
R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein,57 another case concerning the definition of an 
offence, and whether or not it was  sufficiently clear. Lord Bingham 
reiterated58  that no one should be punished under a law unless the law is 
sufficiently clear and certain to enable the person to know what conduct is 
forbidden before doing it, and no one should be punished for any act which 
was  not clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act was done. But the 
House of Lords  rejected an argument that the common law offence of 
public nuisance did not meet the test of legal certainty because it was 
defined in terms which were too vague. The House reviewed the case law 
and concluded that the offence consists  in doing an act not warranted by 
law, or omitting to discharge a legal duty, the effect of which was to 
endanger the life, health, property or comfort of the public, or to obstruct 
the public in the exercise of rights  common to everyone. That definition was 
clear, precise, adequate and based on a rational discernible principle and so 
met the requirements for certainty and predictability.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeal was  prepared to find an 
offence too widely defined in R v Zafar and Others,59  which concerned the 
Terrorism Act 2000. Section 57 makes it an offence to possess an article in 
circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that possession is for 
a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an 
act of terrorism. The Court held that the phrase “for a purpose connected 
with” was  so imprecise as  to give rise to uncertainty. If it was to have the 
certainty of meaning which the law requires, it had to be interpreted so as  to 
require a direct connection between the object possessed and an act of 
terrorism. Section 57 was therefore to be read as making it an offence to 
possess  an article in circumstances  which give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that the person “intends it to be used for the purpose of ” the commission, 
preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. Since that had not been 
made plain to the jury which convicted the appellants, their convictions were 
overturned. 
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Finally, in relation to the offence of failing to provide specimens  for 
analysis,60 the Divisional Court said that: 
The provisions  of this  legislation must, as  has  been said on 
numerous  occasions, be interpreted so as  to be easily applied in 
a common sense way by police officers  and easily understood by 
defendants who may be subject to their requirements.61 
It is  not entirely clear whether these words refer to all the provisions  on 
drink- and drug-driving, but the context seems to suggest that they do.
OTHER ASPECTS OF CERTAINTY 
The cases described above give something of the flavour of the provisions 
which the courts  have scrutinised for certainty. A number of other aspects  of 
the principle of certainty emerge from the literature and the case law. They 
are mentioned here for the sake of completeness, but are not examined in 
detail unless pertinent to the drink- and drug-driving offences. 
Accessibility
At its simplest, perhaps, the principle of certainty requires  that the texts  of 
legislation should be readily accessible.62  The higher courts have had to 
grapple with this practical issue. 
In R (L and Another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,63  the 
Court of Appeal held that it is  an aspect of the rule of law that individuals 
and those advising them should have access to the law in authentic form, 
since they are presumed to know the law. The case concerned section 115 of 
the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The Act had received 
Royal Assent on 7 November 2002 and was  brought into immediate effect, 
but was not published by the Queen’s Printer until 28 November 2002. 
Asylum claims were dealt with between those two dates, and the question 
was  whether the Home Secretary was  entitled to invoke section 115 at a 
time when the Act could not be read or its  contents known with certainty. 
Chapter 5: The Principle of  Certainty
181
60 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 7(6); see also pp 102–105 and 151–155.
61 DPP v Darwen [2007] EWHC 337 (Admin) (DC) [19].
62  See, for example, Robert  A Duperron, ‘Interpretation Acts – Impediments to Legal Certainty and 
Access to the Law’ (2005) 26 Stat LR 26; Andrew Ashworth, ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law and 
Duties to Avoid it’ (2011) 74 MLR 1, 21.
63 [2003] EWCA Civ 25.
The court found that the applicants’ ignorance of the effects of section 115 
might have caused them injustice, but the availability to them of judicial 
review remedied any such injustice. While this conclusion may appear 
somewhat contrived, a different approach might have been taken if the 
problem of the non-availability of the provisions in question had not been 
remedied by publication.
In R v Chambers,64  a case concerning excise duty, the prosecutor was 
unaware that the relevant regulations  had been amended, because of a 
defect in the website of the Office of Public Sector Information. The 
prosecutor had in turn given erroneous information to the court. This came 
to light only at the last minute. The Divisional Court acknowledged the 
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse,65  but found it profoundly 
unsatisfactory that the law had not been accessible. It recognised progress in 
the development of the Statute Law Database,66  but considered the 
inaccessibility of the relevant legislation was  a problem of substantial 
constitutional importance.67 
In these two cases, the non-availability of the texts of legislation 
caused serious  problems, but in both the courts  found a way to rescue the 
elusive provisions. In R, the availability of judicial review was relied on, 
while in Chambers, an adjournment for further argument was granted. 
Although the drink- and drug- driving provisions  have a long statutory 
history, there have been many amendments  over the years,68  yet a 
comprehensive up-to-date text remains unavailable from official sources. 
Offences Framed in Vague Terms
Certainty is compromised in offences defined by reference to broad terms 
such as reasonableness, which are not capable of precise definition in 
advance. Simester and Sullivan69 give as  an example the offence of driving 
without due care and attention. A person drives  without due care and 
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69  AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (5th edn, Hart 2013) 
29.
attention if (and only if) the manner of driving falls  below what would be 
expected of a competent and careful driver.70 Drivers  must do their best to 
drive competently and carefully, but if something goes  wrong, a court will 
decide, after the event, whether the standard of driving fell below that 
required. Broad terms referring to the quality of behaviour may 
compromise certainty, but they do allow for flexibility. They may be 
acceptable in respect of driving where it would be virtually impossible to list 
in a statute every variety and nuance of incompetence and carelessness 
when driving.71
Ashworth and Horder likewise acknowledge that unless  the law 
occasionally adopts  terms such as “reasonable” and “dishonest”, which are 
open to differing interpretations, statutory provisions  would have to be 
longer and more detailed than is practicable.72
It has been argued that legislating by reference to legal standards, 
norms or principles,73 rather than by laying down detailed rules, may make 
for greater certainty in some circumstances. There is a considerable body of 
scholarship on the differences and relationships between principles and 
rules,74 and it is beyond the scope of this work to examine that literature in 
any detail. The offences  of unfitness  to drive, however, are (like driving 
without due care and attention, mentioned above) examples of laws 
incorporating a principle – the standard of (un)fitness  – and individual cases 
are then interpreted by applying that principle. The prescribed limit,75 on 
the other hand, is  a fixed rule. I argue in Chapter 976 that in these examples, 
at least, greater certainty attaches to unfitness  to drive than to the prescribed 
limit. The latter, I will suggest, embodies “the wrong kind of  certainty”.
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No Crime Without Law
The principle of legal certainty is closely linked to the concept of nullum 
crimen sine lege, or no crime without law, sometimes also called the principle of 
legality or of non-retroactivity. A person is not to be convicted of a criminal 
offence unless the person has done something which constitutes a crime. Nor 
should legal measures  be retroactive, in the sense that conduct which did not 
constitute an offence at the time should not attract censure even if it is later 
made an offence.77  While the question of non-retroactivity is  a significant 
aspect of the principle of certainty, it is  not relevant to the drug- and drink-
driving offences, and is not pursued further. 
The Thin Ice Principle
Allied to the concept of foreseeability is the “thin ice” principle.78  The 
proposition is  that those who know that what they do is on the borderline of 
illegality take the risk that their actions will later be held to be criminal. The 
origin of the principle is the case of Knuller v DPP,79 which concerned the 
offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals  and outrage public decency. 
Lord Morris  said that he knew of no procedure under which someone could 
be told with precision just how far he might go before incurring liability. 
Those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign denoting the 
precise spot where they may fall in.
Ashworth and Horder have little sympathy with the suggestion that the 
courts might rely on this principle to extend the criminal law,80 but recognise 
that the ECtHR has  left some scope for so doing by virtue of its  decision in 
SW v United Kingdom.81
Duff suggests  that the thin ice principle may extend beyond the 
question of the boundaries of offences, to acts constituting the commission 
of offences. He proposes  that the offence of driving with excess  alcohol 
promotes  certainty and consistency in that the limit is  defined. While it  may 
be difficult to know the point at which another drink would put a person 
over the limit, the thin ice principle is engaged – once a person starts  to 
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drink, the person is  on thin ice and takes the risk of exceeding the limit.82 In 
Chapter 9, I challenge the suggestion that the offence of driving with excess 
alcohol promotes certainty, but agree that the “thin ice” principle is  a useful 
tool in seeking to justify the deficit of  certainty. 
The Doctrine of  Precedent 
The principle of legal certainty also underlies the doctrine of precedent or 
stare decisis. Pursuant to the doctrine, courts follow the decisions  of higher 
courts, and the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
consider themselves bound, subject to certain exceptions, by their own 
decisions.83 In its  1966 Practice Statement on judicial precedent, the House 
of Lords recognised that the use of precedent provides a degree of certainty 
upon which individuals can rely in conducting their affairs. While the House 
would depart from one of its own previous  decisions if it appeared right to 
do so, the special need for certainty in the criminal law was acknowledged.84 
Certainty as a Procedural Notion
Bertea85 acknowledges the traditional theory of certainty as  described above, 
but suggests  that it applies  not only to the terms in which the law is 
expressed, but to the procedure for law-making, enforcement, interpretation, 
and decision-making. It is, on this argument, primarily a procedural notion 
and these procedures should be pre-determined. By way of example, he 
suggests that a process  leading to job allocation may be regarded as  certain if 
the steps involved and the criteria for selecting the successful candidate are 
known in advance; certainty is not about the contents  of the process or its 
outcomes but about the process itself. 
There is  some support for this approach in that the ECtHR has held 
that legal certainty is  an element of the right to a fair hearing. Where a 
judgment has become final, it should be accepted as  final and should not be 
susceptible to an application for a rehearing (as opposed to a process of 
appeal to correct a judicial error or miscarriage of justice). In Salov v 
Ukraine,86 the applicant had been charged with interfering with the exercise 
of citizens’ rights to vote. He was committed for trial, but some months later 
the district court adopted a resolution ordering an additional investigation as 
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83 See, for example, Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Cases & Materials (10th edn, OUP 2009) 1.
84 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (HL).
85 Stefano Bertea, ‘Towards a New Paradigm of  Legal Certainty’ (2008) 2 Leg 25.
86 (2007) 45 EHRR 51.
there was no evidence upon which to base a conviction. A month later, that 
resolution was  quashed by the regional court, and the district court went on 
to convict the applicant. The ECtHR held that the decision to set aside the 
resolution could be described as arbitrary and capable of undermining the 
fairness of the proceedings, and was  in breach of the principle of legal 
certainty. 
In Chapter 9,87  I demonstrate that the concept of certainty as a 
procedural norm is borne out in the strict procedures for investigating and 
prosecuting the drink- and drug-driving offences.
THE LIMITATIONS ON CERTAINTY
While fundamental to the rule of law, the principle of certainty is  complex, 
and its boundaries  not always  easy to identify. Some of the limitations to the 
principle have already been noted.88 The expression “maximum certainty” 
has been adopted to suggest the elusiveness of absolute certainty.89  The 
requirement is for sufficient, rather than absolute, certainty.90 
Impossibility of  Legislating for All Situations
Wade91  recognised that certainty in drafting legislation is  an ideal which is 
probably unattainable, because of the difficulty of legislating for every 
circumstance. Hart refers  to the “penumbra of uncertainty” and to the open 
texture of the language of the law. He points out the impossibility of rules 
sufficiently detailed to provide in advance for all cases which may arise, and 
the inevitability of having, at some point, to choose between alternative 
interpretations.92  Likewise, Twining and Miers  list, as one of several 
situations which gives  rise to doubt, the application of a rule to a given 
factual situation.93
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Popelier94  points  out that uncertainty is  inherent in the legal order 
because the words used in a statute may be ambiguous  and because, in 
drafting legislation, it is  impossible to provide for every situation. Judicial 
interpretation is necessary to clarify doubt or to adapt provisions to 
changing circumstances. As  society grows in complexity, more laws  are 
required, covering new areas of regulation, and these laws  are increasingly 
complex, make accessibility more difficult. Certainty may have to be 
balanced against other interests.
The ECtHR has recognised that the wording of many statutes  is  not 
absolutely precise. The need to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace 
with changing circumstances means that many laws are inevitably couched 
in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague.95  The level of 
precision required of domestic legislation cannot provide for every 
eventuality and depends on the content of the instrument in question, the 
field it is designed to cover and the number and status  of those to whom it is 
addressed.96
The ECtHR has also ruled that article 7 of the ECHR97  cannot be 
read as outlawing the gradual clarification of law on criminal liability and 
the development of the criminal law through judicial interpretation, 
providing the development is  consistent with the essence of the offence and 
sufficiently foreseeable.98 
The Role of  Advice
It has been recognised that advice and/or interpretation may sometimes be 
needed to understand statutory provisions. It has been acknowledged, in 
principle, that the test of certainty is satisfied if an individual can know from 
the wording of the provision, and if need be, with the court’s interpretation 
of  it, what will make the individual liable.99 
Chapter 5: The Principle of  Certainty
187
94 Patricia Popelier, ‘Five Paradoxes on Legal Certainty and the Lawmaker’ (2008) 2 Leg 47.
95 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 [40].
96 Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 241 [31].
97  No punishment without law <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> 
accessed 27 November 2013.
98 R on the Application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners & Others v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2009] Env LR 14 [AG148]. 
99  Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 63, quoting 
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The case law confirms the role of  legal advice:100
• the citizen must be able – with appropriate advice if necessary 
– to foresee, to a degree that is  reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may entail;101
• legal certainty demands that the rules  by which the citizen is to 
be bound should be ascertainable by him (or, more realistically, 
by a competent lawyer advising him);102 
• the test of foreseeability may be satisfied even where expert 
advice is needed, as by persons  carrying on a professional 
activity, such as marine transport, who are used to having to 
proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their 
occupation.103 
In Chapter 9,104 I question whether it is appropriate, in relation to an 
everyday activity such as  driving, that drivers  should need professional 
advice on the law. I also question, in relation to the prescribed limit, whether 
most lawyers would be able to provide competent advice. 
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
As will be seen in later chapters, drivers  are profoundly ignorant of the true 
nature of the offences  of unfitness to drive through drink and drugs and 
driving with excess  alcohol. The common law presumption is that ignorance 
of the law is  no excuse for breaching it. Although widely acknowledged,105 
the rule has  insecure foundations.106  It may simply be that there is  no 
generally accepted reason to suppose that knowledge is  necessary, or that 
ignorance should provide a defence. Or it may be that if ignorance were to 
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edn, Hart 2013) 103; Rahman and Bilal v R [2008] EWCA Crim 1465, “Ignorance of the law is no 
defence, but it can sometimes amount to mitigation” [43]; David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal 
Law (13th edn, OUP 2011) 141.
106 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Ignorance of  the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it’ (2011) 74 MLR 1, 24.
be a defence, it would be too easy to invoke and too difficult to disprove, and 
there would be an incentive not to know.107 The concept that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse has been called a “legal fiction”, most offenders having, 
at best, a limited knowledge of the law; its  legitimacy depends on the 
simplicity and clarity of  the law in question.108
	 The maxim has been said to be based on the duty of citizens  to 
inform themselves. Husak questions the existence of any such duty, saying 
that its nature and extent are obscure, and that it is not clear how a citizen 
would come to be aware of any such duty. Nor would breach of such a duty 
necessarily be blameworthy. He argues that ignorance of law should 
frequently be recognised as an excuse from criminal liability.109
Ashworth110  agrees that it is unjust to convict people of crimes of 
which they are unaware, but argues that citizens should make a reasonable 
effort to find out what the law is. The basis for the proposition is  a 
hypothetical contract arising out of the democratic process, under which the 
citizen agrees to the authority of the state in exchange for various  benefits, 
including the provision of security. The hypothetical contract provides  not 
only for the citizen’s  duty to make reasonable efforts  to ascertain the law, but 
a reciprocal duty on the state to provide information about the law. He cites 
the publicity given to the introduction of the offence of driving with excess 
alcohol as  having enhanced law abidance. He says that motorists  have a duty 
to familiarise themselves with obligations concerning offences of omission 
stated in the Highway Code. In formulating an argument in favour of a 
limited defence of ignorance of the law he highlights the difficulty that 
would arise where a person knows  that his  conduct is close to the borderline 
of crime but is  unsure which side of the line it falls. He does  not mention 
drivers  who have taken drink or drugs, but clearly many could fall into this 
group, and on Ashworth’s argument, they would have the defence of 
reasonable ignorance. Elsewhere,111  Ashworth and Horder suggest that 
ignorance and mistake of law might be less acceptable in a person engaging 
in an activity, such as driving a car, which is known to have changing rules. 
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The question of special responsibilities of those who drive, first raised 
in relation to reverse burdens of proof in Chapter 3,112 is  taken further in 
Chapter 10.113 
Having set out the contours of the idea of legal certainty as delineated in 
the literature and the case law, I postpone further discussion of its 
relationship to the drug- and drink-driving offences until Chapter 9. The 
next three chapters demonstrate the extraordinary extent to which drivers 
are ignorant of  the relevant law. 
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Chapter 6: The Scientific Background and the 
Law
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 5, I reviewed the principle of certainty in the law. Before moving 
on to relate that principle to the drug- and drink-driving offences, I further 
set the scene by explaining the scientific background to the offences which 
underpins the relevant law. This  chapter therefore concerns the scientific 
and legal aspects of  two concepts:
• unfitness  to drive through drink or drugs (also known as 
impairment), and 
• the prescribed alcohol limit.
These concepts are fundamental to the offences of driving, attempting 
to drive, or in charge when unfit through drink or drugs, or while over the 
prescribed limit.1 They are also constituents  of the offence of causing death 
by careless  driving when unfit or over the limit.2 The scientific basis for these 
two concepts, and the proposed specified limits  for certain drugs3 are briefly 
described. The statutory definitions of unfitness and the prescribed limit, 
and their interpretation in the case law, are then reviewed. How these 
matters are in practice understood by drivers is the subject of  later chapters.
THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
Unfitness to Drive 
To drive safely, a driver needs to have effective and reliable control of the 
vehicle, capacity to respond to many external factors, together with a 
knowledge of the rules  of the road and a willingness to follow them. Driving 
has been likened to a continuous loop in which information about the road, 
other drivers  and the vehicle is  processed by the brain, leading the driver to 
take action to adjust the speed and direction of the vehicle and to direct the 
eyes to likely danger areas. The results of these actions feed into a further 
round of adjustments. Timing is critical, as are visual and other perceptions 
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which convey information about matters  such as speed, the locations of 
vehicles and other obstacles, and the anticipated behaviour of others. Any 
condition that impairs perception, cognition (including alertness, attitude to 
risk, recall) or motor functions has the potential to interfere with the loop 
and thus  impair driving. A wide range of matters can influence the 
functioning of the loop.4  For present purposes, the most significant are 
alcohol and drugs.
Alcohol
Effects
The chemical name for the alcohol in social beverages is  ethyl alcohol or 
ethanol. It is a depressant drug, and its effects have been widely described.5 
It is undisputed that alcohol impairs  driving and may render a person 
unfit to drive. The pioneering Grand Rapids  Survey conducted in the 
United States  in the early 1960s was  the first large-scale, detailed 
investigation of the relationship between alcohol and driving. It reported 
that, once blood alcohol concentration reaches the equivalent of half the 
current UK drink-drive limit, the risk of causing an accident increases 
compared with that of a driver who has taken no alcohol, and rises sharply 
as  blood alcohol concentration rises.6 Later studies indicate that driving is 
impaired at well below the prescribed limit.7  There is  no clear threshold 
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Excellence NICE 2010) <http://www.nice.org.uk/media/3fe/1a/bloodalcoholcontenteffectiveness 
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below which alcohol does  not impair driving.8 There is  strong evidence to 
suggest that ability to drive is  affected by any amount of alcohol in the body, 
however small.9
Absorption and elimination
The rate at which alcohol is absorbed depends  on a number of factors. 
When drunk on an empty stomach, it is  usually absorbed more quickly than 
when accompanied by food. The alcohol concentration in the drink also 
affects the speed of absorption – the alcohol in drinks  with an alcohol 
concentration of twenty per cent is absorbed most quickly. Carbonated 
drinks are absorbed more quickly than still drinks. 
Alcohol is soluble in water but not in fat. Because women have a 
higher proportion of fatty tissue in their bodies  than men, women require 
less alcohol than men to reach a particular blood alcohol concentration. 
Women also eliminate alcohol more quickly than men. For both men and 
women, blood alcohol concentration depends on size and body build, and 
previous exposure to alcohol.
Peak alcohol concentration may be reached while drinking continues, 
or after it ends. Elimination starts as  soon as there is alcohol in the 
bloodstream, and a person may be absorbing and eliminating alcohol 
simultaneously. Alcohol is  eliminated far more slowly than it is absorbed. 
The average hourly elimination rate is  about fifteen mg in blood, but varies 
quite widely. Elimination is fairly constant until the concentration drops to 
about one quarter of the limit, but then slows, and alcohol may remain 
present in the blood the morning after a drinking session. Regular, heavier 
drinkers recover more quickly than others.10 
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The degree of impairment at a given blood alcohol concentration may 
be greater during the absorption phase than during elimination.11
A blood alcohol concentration of  400 or more is commonly fatal.12 
The length of time alcohol remains in the body is  also influenced by 
the period of time over which the alcohol was  consumed, the individual’s 
age and any medication being taken.13 
All these factors in turn affect the alcohol level found in a specimen of 
breath, blood or urine, and are well known to forensic scientists called upon 
to calculate blood alcohol concentration. Such calculations may include 
“back-calculating” to show that at the time of an offence the defendant’s 
blood-alcohol was higher than shown by the specimen.14 Statistics  on how 
frequently prosecutions are based on back-calculations are not available, but 
there are suggestions  that it is  rare. The pro formas used by investigating 
officers refer to back-calculation as  a process employed in “serious or 
unusual cases”,15 although these terms  are not defined. Such calculations are 
practicable only where there is  a substantial time interval between the end of 
pre-incident drinking and the incident itself; each case is to be treated on its 
own merits, based on the circumstances  of the case; and the uncertainties  of 
such calculations are emphasised.16 Prosecutors are advised to rely on such 
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16  Form MG DD/D, Alcohol Technical Defence Form, para D1 <https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117040/form-d-mgdd.pdf> accessed 15 April 2014.
calculations only if they are “easily understood and clearly persuasive of the 
presence of  excess alcohol at the time of  the alleged offence”.17
In Chapters  7 and 8, I demonstrate that some drivers are aware of 
some or all the factors  which bear on the absorption and elimination of 
alcohol, but that any such knowledge is too superficial to enable them to 
know whether, having consumed alcohol, they would be fit to drive or within 
the prescribed limit. In Chapter 9,18  I argue that the difficulty of 
understanding exactly how alcohol affects an individual is such that the 
prescribed limit fails the test for certainty in the law, described in Chapter 5. 
I also suggest that, since alcohol affects  different people (notably men and 
women) in different ways, the prescribed limit is variable in its  application, 
again offending the principle of  certainty. 
Drugs 
Driving skills  may be impaired not only by alcohol, but by drugs, by 
combinations  of alcohol and drugs, or by combinations  of different drugs. 
The Road Traffic Act defines a drug as including any intoxicant other than 
alcohol,19 while the dictionary definition is:
a. … a natural or synthetic substance used in the prevention or 
treatment of disease, a medicine; (also) a substance that has  a 
physiological effect on a living organism. b. A substance with 
intoxicating, stimulant, or narcotic effects  used for cultural, 
recreational, or other non-medicinal purposes.20
Drugs can be divided into medicinal drugs, which are either 
prescribed by a medical practitioner or available over the counter (“OTC”), 
and recreational drugs, used for their narcotic or stimulant effects. 
Recreational drugs include legitimate substances such as nicotine and 
caffeine. Illegal drugs include heroin, cocaine, amphetamines, ecstasy (or 
MDMA21), LSD22  and cannabis. There is  considerable overlap between 
them.23
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The effects on driving of drugs  other than alcohol have received much 
less attention than the effects of alcohol.24 These other drugs affect driving 
skills in different ways and pose varying challenges for road safety. The mere 
presence of a drug in the body does  not necessarily mean that the driver is 
impaired. Certain drugs may assist high risk drivers  to be safer. These 
include drugs  for those with epilepsy or diabetes.25 For most drugs, there is 
no critical level above which impairment is present or below which no 
impairment can be demonstrated.26  The House of Commons Transport 
Committee has  recognised the complexity of the problem of drug-driving, 
arising from the increasing number of substances which may impair driving 
ability and the difficulty of  detection and measurement.27
The effects  of drugs may include slower reaction times, erratic and 
aggressive behaviour, poor concentration, distorted perception, poor 
coordination, blurred visions, over-confidence leading to unnecessary risk-
taking, nausea, hallucinations, panic attacks, paranoia, tremors, dizziness 
and fatigue.28  The drugs (both legal and illegal) of greatest concern in 
relation to impairment of driving have been identified as  opiates, 
amphetamines, methamphetamine, ecstasy, cocaine, benzodiazepines, 
cannabinoids (including cannabis) and methadone.29 
Medication
A recent study concerning prescription medications recognised that such 
drugs  may both impair and improve driving, but acknowledged the lack of 
research in this  area. As  in the case of alcohol, the effects  of medication 
depend on many factors, including the way the drug works, the driver’s  age, 
sex, general health and driving ability, the dose, whether or not the 
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prescription instructions  are followed accurately, and the time between 
taking the drugs and driving.30
Products which affect the central nervous  system and which interfere 
with cognition and arousal are most associated with impairment from the 
use of medication, whether prescribed or over-the-counter. Such 
impairment usually takes  the form of drowsiness or detachment, sometimes 
with effects on coordination. A few agents impair visual performance, but 
interference with other aspects  of driving performance is  unusual.31  The 
medications  most commonly associated with affecting driving skills are 
certain anti-epileptics, narcotic analgesics (painkillers), anti-depressants, 
bupropion (used as an aid to smoking cessation), anti-emetics, 
anticholinergics,32 antihistamines, antihypertensives, some benzodiazepines, 
certain stimulants, insulin, and certain medications containing atropine or 
hyoscine.33
In the case of anti-depressants, there is  reliable evidence that older 
types  of drug impair driving performance, but there has been insufficient 
research into the effects on driving skills of  newer drugs.34
Benzodiazepines (most often in the form of temazepam) were the most 
frequently detected drugs in a survey of drivers suspected of driving when 
under the influence of  drink and/or drugs in Scotland.35 
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30 T Vandrevala and others, Medication and Road Safety: A Scoping Study (Department for Transport Road 
Safety Research Report no 116, 2010).
31 Tim Carter, Fitness to Drive: A Guide for  Health Professionals (Royal Society of Medicine Press 2006) 103 
et seq.
32  Drugs used to counter the side-effects (usually “the shakes”) of certain medications given to those 
with schizophrenia, psychosis and other conditions, and to treat the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease 
and movement disorders: <http://www.candi.nhs.uk/_uploads/documents/medicines/medicines-
ANTICHOLINERGICS.PDF> accessed 27 November 2013.
33  Tim Carter, Fitness to Drive: A Guide for Health Professionals (Royal Society of Medicine Press 2006) 
104–106. See also  J Michael Walsh and others, ‘Drugs and Driving’ (2004) 5 Traffic Injury Prevention 
241, 245–6, identifying six  groups of drugs which have so  far been the focus of research for their 
effects on driving skills – benzodiazepines and related drugs; opioids; amphetamines, cocaine and 
other stimulant drugs; cannabis; antihistamines; and antidepressants; T Vandrevala and others, 
Medication and Road Safety: A Scoping Study (Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 
116, 2010) 9, identifying the following as most likely to impair driving: tricyclic antidepressants, 
benzodiazepine anxiolytics, neuroleptics and compounds used to  treat Parkinson’s Disease. See also 
Sir Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) para 6.44.
34  JA Horne and PR Barrett, Anti-Depressants and Road Safety: A Literature Review and Commentary 
(Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 18, 2002).
35  Alison Seymour and John S Oliver, ‘Role of Drugs and Alcohol in Impaired Drivers and Fatally 
Injured Drivers in the Strathclyde Police Region of Scotland, 1995–1998’ (1999) 103 Forensic Science 
International 89.
Over-the-counter drugs
It has  been reported that over one hundred over-the-counter medicines 
contain ingredients (usually antihistamines) which may cause drowsiness. 
These include cough medicines and decongestants, anti-allergy medications, 
analgesics and anti-nausea preparations, and preparations  to treat 
gastrointestinal disturbances. The warnings  on the packaging, however, are 
inconsistent and often poorly presented. Further, the degree of impairment 
caused by the recommended doses of at least two over-the-counter drugs is 
greater than that caused by being over the prescribed alcohol limit for 
driving.36
Illicit drugs
The illegal nature of many non-therapeutic drugs  limits the scope for 
research. Cannabis  is the most common of the illicit drugs  found in drivers 
and victims of fatal road accidents.37 It has  been demonstrated that cannabis 
impairs driving skills.38 Unlike users of other drugs, however, cannabis-users 
seem aware of the impairment and may compensate for it.39  There is no 
way to measure the concentration of cannabis compounds to produce an 
estimate of  cannabis-induced impairment of  driving skills.40 
Different drugs have different impairing effects. Opiates give rise to a 
range of potential impairments. Stimulants sometimes appear to enhance 
certain skills, but it seems that the overall effect is detrimental. There is  little 
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36  JA Horne, PR Barrett, Over-the-counter Medicines and the Potential for Unwanted Sleepiness: Assessment of 
Package Warnings (Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 24, 2003).
37  NJ Dye, L Ward, Cannabis and Driving: A Review of the Literature and Commentary (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 12, 1999) Ch 1; RJ Tunbridge and others, The Incidence of 
Drugs and Alcohol in Road Accident Fatalities (Transport Research Laboratory Report 495, 2001) Table 2; 
PG Jackson and CJ Hilditch, A Review of Evidence Related to Drug Driving in the UK: A Report Submitted to the 
North Review Team (Department for Transport 2010) para 3.5. In relation to Scotland, see Alison 
Seymour and John S Oliver, ‘Role of Drugs and Alcohol in Impaired Drivers and Fatally Injured 
Drivers in the Strathclyde Police Region of Scotland, 1995–1998’ (1999) 103 Forensic Science 
International 89; Dave Ingram and others, Recreational Drugs and Driving (Scottish Executive, Research 
Findings no 102, 2001) Table 1.
38  NJ Dye, L Ward, Cannabis and Driving: A Review of the Literature and Commentary (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 12, 1999) Ch 11; JG Ramaekers and others, ‘Marijuana, 
Alcohol and Actual Driving Performance’ (2000) 15 Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and 
Experimental 15; BF Sexton and others, The Influence of Cannabis on Driving (Transport Research 
Laboratory Report 477, 2000) 1.
39  BF Sexton and others, The Influence of Cannabis on Driving (Transport Research Laboratory Report 
477, 2000) 2; Tim Carter, Fitness to Drive: A Guide for Health Professionals (Royal Society of Medicine 
Press 2006) 112.
40  EJD Ogden and HM Moskowitz, ‘Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs on Driver 
Performance’ (2004) 5 Traffic Injury Prevention 185, 193, quoting G Chesher and others, The 
Interaction Between Alcohol and Marijuana (Federal Office of  Road Safety, Canberra, Report CR40, 1986).
evidence on the effects  of hallucinogenic drugs, although the expectation is 
that they would seriously impair driving skills.41
Although the effects  of drugs on driving are less well researched than 
those of alcohol, government is proceeding to introduce offences  of driving, 
attempting to drive or in charge with an excess  over a specified limit of 
certain controlled drugs. These are discussed later in this chapter.
Recognising and Proving Unfitness
Police officers who suspect that a person is  unfit to drive – usually as  a result 
of having seen the person driving badly –  may carry out preliminary 
impairment testing.42 This  comprises physical tests, usually at the roadside, 
such as  asking the subject to stand on one leg, touch the tip of the nose, and 
walk in a straight line. These powers  are available whether the officer 
suspects either alcohol or drugs, although in practice, if alcohol is suspected, 
a roadside screening test is preferred for its  speed, simplicity and 
objectivity.43 Officers also look for other indicators of impairment – dilated 
pupils, poor coordination or slurred speech. 
There is  a statutory power to conduct a preliminary drug test, either at 
the roadside or at a police station, on a specimen of sweat or saliva, by 
means of  an approved device.44 
Proof of unfitness  usually consists  of evidence of the manner of 
driving and what took place at the roadside, the analysis  of a blood 
specimen45 to show that it contained alcohol or a drug, and, in the case of a 
drug, expert evidence that the drug was capable of affecting the ability to 
drive. 
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41  Tim Carter, Fitness to Drive: A Guide for Health Professionals (Royal Society of Medicine Press 2006) 
112.
42 Under RTA 1988, s 6B and Department for Transport Code of Practice  for Preliminary Impairment Tests 
2004 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080508201452/police.homeoffice.gov.uk/
publications/operational-policing/code_of_practice_order.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013. Officers 
must be trained and approved to conduct such tests. 
43 In due course, roadside screening for drugs may be preferred to unfitness testing, when RTA 1988, s 
5A (see below) comes into force, and subject to the development and approval of roadside drug 
screening devices. As at November 2013, no devices have been approved for roadside testing for drugs.
44  RTA 1988, s 6C. At the time of writing (December 2013), one device has been approved for 
preliminary testing for drugs: the Draeger Drug Test 5000, which tests for THC, the main ingredient 
of cannabis. It is non-portable and is for use at police stations only. See the Preliminary Drug Testing 
Device Approval 2012.
45 Provided pursuant to RTA 1988, s 7(3)(c). Before requiring a blood specimen for analysis, the officer 
must have been advised by a medical practitioner that the suspect’s condition may be due to a drug; 
see p 148.
The procedure for requiring specimens of blood or urine is  set out in 
the Road Traffic Act.46  Police forces have packs containing the necessary 
equipment for taking both types of specimen. The specimen phials contain 
preservative to prevent bacterial activity which could raise or lower the 
alcohol content, while packs for blood specimens also contain anti-
coagulant.47 
Blood specimens are analysed for the presence of alcohol or drugs  in 
approved laboratories. When testing for drugs, in the absence of any 
information supplied with the specimen which might point to a particular 
drug, specimens are subjected to a standard set of tests which detect the 
commoner drugs. If the results  are negative, it is  at the discretion of the 
laboratory whether or not to test for other drugs.48	
There are many fewer prosecutions  for unfitness  to drive than for 
excess alcohol offences; in 2012, there were just under 2,500 charges of 
unfitness, compared with 49,000 charges of  excess alcohol.49
The Prescribed Limit for Alcohol
While a person may be unfit to drive through drink regardless of the 
amount of alcohol actually in the system, the prescribed limit is  a fixed level. 
It is  an offence to drive, attempt to drive or be in charge of a vehicle while 
above that limit.50 Ability to drive properly is irrelevant. 
The limit is  set individually in respect of breath, blood or urine. In 
each case, the limit is expressed as a weight of alcohol in a 100 millilitre 
specimen – 35 microgrammes in breath, 80 milligrammes in blood and 107 
milligrammes  in urine.51  These three provisions are considered to be 
equivalent, although, at least in respect of equivalence between blood and 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
200
46 RTA 1988, s 7, discussed at pp 144–151.
47  See the notes to para B20 of standard form MG DD/B, ‘Drink/Drugs Station Procedure: 
Specimens/Impairment Supplement’, version 5.2.1, December 2012 <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229617/MGDD_B_Ver_5_2_1_Dec_ 
2012__2_.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
48 Sir Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) para 6.74.
49 Ministry of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Quarterly - December 2012, 30 May 2013, vol 6, Motoring, 
Table 6.1  <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-update-
to-december-2012> accessed 27 November 2013.
50 RTA 1988, s 5.
51 RTA 1988, s 11(2); see p 14.
breath, the matter is  not without controversy.52 Blood and breath specimens 
are considered to provide more satisfactory indications of alcohol 
concentration than urine specimens.53
Instruments of  measurement
Proof of exceeding the prescribed limit may be by the analysis of breath, 
blood or urine. Breath is  the most common, although blood or urine 
specimens are sometimes taken.54  Breath specimens  are taken using 
approved devices. Different devices  are used for preliminary screening 
(usually at the roadside, to ascertain whether or not a person is likely to be 
over the limit), and then (at a police station55) to obtain a reliable reading of 
the alcohol concentration in the breath for evidential purposes. Until 
recently, the devices used for preliminary screening were considered less 
accurate than the evidential breath testing devices used following arrest, 
although this may be less so in respect of those most recently developed. 
The Home Office’s Centre for Applied Science and Technology is 
responsible for testing and approving devices.
A number of devices  have been type approved for preliminary (or 
roadside) breath testing. These are hand-held devices designed to detect the 
presence and measure the concentration of alcohol. They provide an 
indication of the level of alcohol in the specimen by means of lights  or an 
alphanumeric display. The results  show in bands: zero, pass, air-fail,56 warn57 
or fail, sometimes accompanied by a digital reading of alcohol 
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52  See, for example, Alan Wayne Jones, The Relationship Between Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) and 
Breath Alcohol Concentration (BrAC): A Review of the Evidence (Department for Transport Road Safety Web 
Publication 15, 2010, para 2.2 <http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/research-and-statistical-reports/
report15.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013. See also Sir Peter North, Report of the Review of Drink and 
Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) 8–9 and Recommendation 12.
53  Because the urine in the bladder at the time it is passed reflects the average blood alcohol 
concentration over the period during which the urine was excreted by the kidneys into the bladder, 
rather than the blood alcohol concentration at the time of testing. See Vivian Emerson, ‘Alcohol 
Analysis’ in PC White (ed), Crime Scene to Court: Essentials of Forensic Science (2nd edn, Royal Society of 
Chemistry 2004) 356; Alan Wayne Jones, The Relationship Between Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) and 
Breath Alcohol Concentration (BrAC): A Review of the Evidence (Department for Transport Road Safety Web 
Publication 15, 2010, para 1  <http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/research-and-statistical-reports/
report15.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013).
54 See p 147 for the reasons.
55 Until portable devices come into  use, when evidential testing at the roadside or in a hospital will be 
possible; see p 12.
56  For purposes of the lower limit (9  µg) applying to pilots under Railways and Transport Safety Act 
2003, s 93.
57 This represents a breath alcohol concentration of  about 30µg.
concentration. Once ready for use, they allow between three and ten 
minutes for a satisfactory specimen to be provided.58
There are three approved devices  for evidential analysis of breath 
specimens: the Camic Datamaster, the Intoximeter EC/IR and the Lion 
Intoxilyzer 6000UK.59  They accurately measure the concentration of 
alcohol in breath, and provide a result which can be used as evidence in 
drink-driving cases. They are non-portable and installed at police stations.60 
Once ready for use, the devices  allow three minutes to perform the testing 
cycle in relation to each of two specimens. The cycle comprises  a number of 
stages. The device first automatically purges  the system and resets  to zero, 
performs a calibration check and purges  again, before taking and analysing 
a first specimen. A further purge takes place before the device receives and 
analyses a second specimen. There is  a final purge and second calibration 
check, and a printout is produced. The printout shows the instrument 
identification number and its  location, the date of the test, the name and 
date of birth of the subject, the detailed results  of the test (which includes a 
record of the purges  and calibration checks  and the times at which each 
stage of the procedure took place), and the name of the operator. It 
concludes with a certificate, by the operator, to the effect that reading 1 
relates  to the first specimen of breath provided by the subject, and reading 
2, to the second. There is  provision for both the subject and operator to sign 
the printout. The two readings  must be separated by no more than 15 per 
cent of the lower reading, or by 5µg in 100 ml breath, whichever is  the 
greater, up to 200 µg in 100 ml; any greater difference gives rise to the 
possibility of error (in which case an alternative specimen may be taken; see 
below). If a second breath specimen is  not performed, the instrument 
indicates that the cycle has not been completed. The instruments are 
designed to detect substances  (such as acetone, certain cleaning fluids and 
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58  Home Office and Forensic Science Service, Breath Alcohol Screening Devices: A Guide to Type-approval 
Procedures for Breath Alcohol Screening Devices Used for Law Enforcement in Great Britain, version 1, 30/6/2004, 
paras 5.1, 5.4.5 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/breath-alcohol-screening-devices-a-
guide-to-type-approval-procedures> accessed 27 November 2013.
59  Breath Analysis Devices Approval 2004, Home Office, 30 March 2004. The procedures for 
approval are set out in Home Office and Forensic Science Service, Breath Alcohol Screening Devices: 
A Guide to Type-approval Procedures for Breath Alcohol Screening Devices Used for Law Enforcement in Great Britain, 
version 1, 30/6/2004 (above) and Home Office and Forensic Science Service, A Guide to Type Approval 
Procedures for Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Instruments Used for Road Traffic Law Enforcement in Great Britain 
(HMSO 1994). On the workings of the Lion Intoxilyzer, see for example, Linda Dobbs, ‘Lion 
Intoxilyzer 6000UK’ (1998) Road Traffic Indicator 1.
60  Although RTA 1988, s 7 has been amended in anticipation of the type-approval of evidential 
breath testing devices for use at the roadside and in hospitals rather than at the police station (see p 
12). At the time of  writing (December 2013), no such device has been approved. 
fumes from paint or glue) which might be on the subject’s  breath and which 
could give a false result.61
Both types of device – those for preliminary screening and those for 
evidential testing – test “end expiratory air”, also known as  “deep lung air” 
or “alveolar air”, that is, air from the end of a forced expiration from the 
lungs.62 This air is closest to the point at which the exchange of gases and 
fluids  (including alcohol) between breath and blood takes place, and provides 
the most accurate indication of  the amount of  alcohol in the blood.63 
Both types must be capable of verifying their calibration when in use. 
The acceptable range is 32.00 to 37.9 µg alcohol in 100 ml breath.64 
In some cases, (including where the difference between two breath 
readings is unacceptably high65) a blood or urine specimen, rather than 
breath specimens, is taken for laboratory analysis, as described above.66
The Widmark formula
It is  possible to calculate blood alcohol concentration using what is  known as 
the “Widmark formula”, developed by a Swedish scientist of the same name 
in the 1920s. The basic formula has  been widely accepted and remains in 
use by forensic scientists worldwide. The formula may be applied to 
calculate the theoretical highest possible peak of blood alcohol 
concentration that could result from the consumption of a known amount of 
alcohol. The formula is:
c = a
        p x r
where:
- c is the peak concentration of  alcohol in the blood; 
- a is the amount of  alcohol taken in grammes;
- p is the subject’s body weight in kilogrammes;
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61  These characteristics of the devices are set out in Home Office and Forensic Science Service, A 
Guide to Type Approval Procedures for Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Instruments Used for Road Traffic Law 
Enforcement in Great Britain (HMSO 1994).
62 Ibid, paras 4.1, 4.2.
63 Vivian Emerson, ‘Alcohol Analysis’ in PC White (ed), Crime Scene to Court: Essentials of Forensic Science 
(2nd edn, Royal Society of  Chemistry 2004) 356–7.
64 Home Office and Forensic Science Service, Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Instruments: A Guide to Type 
Approval Procedures for Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Instruments Used for Road Traffic Law Enforcement in 
Great Britain (HMSO 1994) paras 5.8, 5.9. 
65 See above and p 147, fn 138.
66 See p 147.
- r is  the “Widmark factor”, derived from the proportion of the 
total body mass  over which the alcohol can be distributed. 
The mean values  adopted by Widmark were 0.68 for men and 
0.55 for women. 
For example, a basic calculation adopting the original formulation of r 
for a male weighing 80 kg who drank a single unit (8 grammes of alcohol) 
would be 8 ÷ (80 x 0.68) = 0.147%, or 14.7 milligrammes  of alcohol in 100 
millilitres of  blood.67 
The formula is  conservative in that it assumes that all alcohol is 
absorbed before any elimination takes place (in fact, as  noted above, 
elimination begins very soon after ingestion), and that the alcohol is  evenly 
distributed throughout all the water in the body.68 
The original Widmark values  have been greatly developed over the 
years  and would now be calculated individually for each subject, taking into 
account a range of individual characteristics, producing far more accurate 
results.69
Certain websites  provide on-line blood alcohol calculators, based on 
the Widmark formula or a variant of  it. These are discussed in Chapter 7.70 
Measures of  intake
While unfitness to drive is  defined by reference to the effects  of alcohol, and 
the prescribed limit by reference to the concentration of alcohol in the body, 
drivers  naturally think in terms of the drinks they consume. This  leads  to a 
consideration of  how amounts of  alcohol are measured. 
Pints, litres and centilitres are simple measures of volume without 
reference to their alcohol concentration. “A drink” or “a glass” likewise says 
little about the amount of alcohol it contains. Measures used in pubs were 
originally devised so that different drinks would contain the same amount of 
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67  For other examples, see Department of Forensic Medicine, University of Dundee, Lecture Notes 
‘Alcohol and Alcoholism’ (2011) <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/forensicmedicine/notes/alcohol.pdf> 
accessed 27 November 2013.
68  See Vivian Emerson, ‘Alcohol Analysis’ in PC White (ed), Crime Scene to Court: Essentials of Forensic 
Science (2nd edn, Royal Society of  Chemistry 2004) 353–354. 
69  See, for example, Patricia E Watson and others, ‘Prediction of Blood Alcohol Concentrations in 
Human Subjects: Updating the Widmark Equation’ (1981) 42 Jnl of Studies on Alcohol 547; ARW 
Forrest, ‘The Estimation of Widmark’s Factor’ (1986) 26 Jnl of the Forensic Science Society 249; Alan 
D Barbour, ‘Simplified Estimation of Widmark “r” Values by the Method of Forrest’ <http://
home.lightspeed.net/%7Eabarbour/jfss.htm> accessed 27 November 2013; US National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, Computing a BAC Estimate (2005), described in Robert Solomon and 
Erika Chamberlain, ‘Calculating BACs for Dummies: The Real-World Significance of Canada’s 
0.08% Criminal ABC Limit for Driving’ (2003) 8 Canadian Criminal Law Review 219, 230–233.
70 See p 227.
alcohol; half a pint of beer was  intended to be the equivalent of a single 
measure of  spirits, or a glass of  wine or sherry.71
The unit of alcohol is now a standard measure, although its origin and 
status  are unclear.72  It may be that, as originally formulated, a unit was 
intended to equate to a single drink –  a measure of spirit or a glass of 
wine.73 A unit of alcohol is defined as 10 millilitres, or 8 grammes, of pure 
alcohol. Over the years, both the alcohol concentration and the size of 
many drinks  have increased, so that most drinks now account for far more 
than a single unit of alcohol.74 One small study indicated that when people 
pour their own drinks, they contained, on average, 2.05 units.75 
The number of  units in a drink can be calculated using the formula: 
(alcohol by volume x size of  drink in millilitres)
1000
For example, a standard (750 millilitre) bottle of wine having 12 per 
cent alcohol by volume (“ABV”) contains 9 units.76 Again:
• 25 ml spirits, ABV 40 = 1 unit;
• 175 ml wine, ABV 13.5 = 2.4 units;
• a pint (568 ml) of  beer, ABV 4 = 2.3 units;
• a 330 ml bottle of  strong lager, ABV 5.2 = 1.7 units.
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71 Vivian Emerson, ‘Alcohol Analysis’ in PC White (ed), Crime Scene to Court: Essentials of Forensic Science 
(2nd edn, Royal Society of  Chemistry 2004) 351.
72  David Ball and others, ‘In Celebration of Sensible Drinking’ (2007) 14 Drugs: Education, 
prevention and policy, 97, 99.
73  Deborah Lader and Matthew Steel, Drinking: Adults’ Behaviour and Knowledge in 2009 (Office for 
National Statistics, Opinions Survey Report No. 42, 2010) 104.
74  See, for example, Caroline Ritchie and others, ‘How Can I Drink Safely? Perception Versus the 
Reality of  Alcohol Consumption’ (2009) 29 The Service Industries Jnl 1397, 1399.
75  Jan Gill and Fiona O’May, ‘Practical Demonstration of Personal Daily Consumption Limits: A 
Useful Intervention Tool to Promote Responsible Drinking Among UK Adults?’ (2007) 42 Alcohol 
and Alcoholism 436. 
76 (12 x 750) ÷ 1000 = 9.
This  definition of a unit has  been widely adopted by organisations 
including the Department of Health,77 the National Health Service78  and 
the charity Alcohol Concern.79
The Specified Limits for Specified Controlled Drugs
At the time of writing (December 2013), a new section 5A of the Road 
Traffic Act awaits  being brought into force. It will introduce offences of 
driving, attempting to drive or being in charge with a concentration of any 
one of certain controlled drugs above a specified limit. Government 
commissioned an expert panel to make recommendations  concerning limits 
for certain groups of drugs. The panel considered estimates  of accident risk 
associated with the drugs, and their known effects, and reported in March 
2013.80  Government is  now consulting on regulations to be made to give 
effect to section 5A. The draft regulations set out proposed specified limits,81 
as follows: 
Controlled drug Limit (µg per litre of  blood]
...............................................................................Amphetamine	 [TBC]
................................................................................Benzoylecgonine*	 50
........................................................................................Clonazepam	 50
..............................................................................................Cocaine*	 10
.............................................................Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol*	 2
..........................................................................................Diazepam	 550
...................................................................................Flunitrazepam	 300
...........................................................................................Ketamine*	 20
.........................................................................................Lorazepam	 100
..................................................................Lysergic acid diethylamide*	 1
........................................................................................Methadone	 500
............................................................................Methamphetamine* 	 10
...................Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA – Ecstasy)* 10
..................................6-Monoacetylmorphine (heroin and morphine)*	 5
............................................................................................Morphine	 80
.........................................................................................Oxazepam	 300
.....................................................................................Temazepam	 1000
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77  For example, Department of Health, Sensible Drinking, The Report of an Inter-Departmental Working 
Group, December 1995, 6 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://
www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/
dh_4084702.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
78 <http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/alcohol/Pages/alcohol-units.aspx> accessed 27 November 2013.
79  How Much is Too Much? <http://www.alcoholconcern.org.uk/concerned-about-alcohol/how-
much> accessed 27 November 2013.
80  K Wolff, Driving under the Influence of drugs. Report from the Expert Panel on Drug Driving (Department for 
Transport 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
167971/drug-driving-expert-panel-report.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
81  Department for Transport, Regulations to Specify the Drugs and Corresponding Limits for the New Offence of 
Driving with a Specified Controlled Drug in the Body Above a Specified Limit – A Consultation Document, July 2013, 
para 14.1 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
211220/consultation-document.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013. 
Government intends to consult further before proposing a limit for 
amphetamine. Otherwise, the limits  listed above reflect a “zero tolerance” 
approach to eight controlled drugs (marked with asterisks  in the list above) 
which are mostly associated with illegal use. To avoid catching those who 
have inadvertently consumed a very small amount of these drugs, the 
proposed limits  are set at the lowest concentration at which a valid and 
reliable analytical result can be obtained, yet above which issues such as 
passive consumption or inhalation can be ruled out – a “lowest accidental 
exposure limit”. In relation to the remaining drugs, which have medical uses, 
the proposed limits  are based on a “road safety risk” approach, in most cases 
being pitched at a level higher than would be expected of a person taking 
therapeutic dosages. The idea is to reduce the risk of catching drivers  who 
have taken medicine which has been properly prescribed or supplied, and 
who have taken it as directed or otherwise in accordance with the supplier’s 
instructions.82  Limits  for urine are not proposed; the Consultation 
Document recites that it is not possible to establish evidence-based 
concentrations  of drugs  in urine which would indicate an effect on the 
nervous  system, or which could be related to an increased risk of road traffic 
accident. Nor is  there any way of translating the concentration of a drug in 
blood to a concentration of  that drug in urine.83 
The scientific background to the prescribed and specified limits illustrates 
the complexity for the driver wishing to interpret those limits in particular 
circumstances. I demonstrate these difficulties, in relation to alcohol, in 
Chapters 7 and 8, and examine their significance for legal theory on 
certainty in Chapter 9. The way the scientific background underpins the 
statutory provisions is considered next. 
THE SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES IN THE LAW
It has  been seen that unfitness  to drive is  based on the effects on driving skills 
of drink or drugs, while the prescribed limit84 is a fixed concentration in the 
body regardless  of its  effects. The origins of the two concepts  in statute 
further illuminate the distinction between them. Early attempts  to deal with 
the dangers  posed by those who had consumed alcohol date back to the 
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82 Ibid, paras 1.9, 1.11, 14.1.
83 Ibid, para 10.6.
84 And, in due course, the specified limits for drugs in RTA 1988, s 5A; see above.
nineteenth century.85 The idea of unfitness  to drive, whether through either 
drink or drugs, was  introduced by the Road Traffic Act 1930, which made it 
an offence to drive, attempt to drive, or be in charge of a motor vehicle on a 
road or other public place when under the influence of drink or a drug to 
such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of the vehicle.86 
The word “unfit” was  first used to describe such a condition in the Road 
Traffic Act 1956.87 
Basing the prohibition on unfitness was problematic,88and remains 
so.89 Partly for that reason, but also in response to increasing concern about 
the danger of the drinking driver, and advancing scientific knowledge,90 a 
fixed limit of 80 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 milligrammes of blood was 
introduced by the Road Safety Act 1967, with an equivalent in urine of 
107.91 It became an offence to exceed this  prescribed limit, regardless  of any 
question of fitness or unfitness  to drive.92 With the introduction of evidential 
breath testing in 1981,93  the prescribed limit is  now expressed as 35 
microgrammes of alcohol in 100 milligrammes of breath, with the blood 
and urine levels  remaining as alternatives. As noted above,94  most 
prosecutions are based on exceeding the prescribed alcohol limit, although 
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85  Licensing Act 1872, s 12 made it an offence to  be drunk while in charge of any carriage, horse, 
cattle or steam engine on a highway or other public place.
86 RTA 1930, s 15(1).
87 RTA 1956, s 9.
88  See, for example, the speech of Lord Griffiths in Cracknell v Willis [1988] AC 450 (HL) 456–7, 
concerning the reluctance of juries to convict (the right to trial by jury for the drink-drive offences was 
removed by the Criminal Law Act 1977); and Roy Light, Criminalizing the Drink-Driver (Dartmouth 
1994) on the vagueness of the terminology (46–47) and on evidential problems (49). See also Peter 
Amey, ‘Drink/Drive – A New Initiative’ (1982) 146 JP 480, acknowledging that only those who were 
manifestly intoxicated were likely to be convicted. 
89 In 2012, of 2,464 proceedings for unfitness to drive, 1,017 (41%) were withdrawn or dismissed. This 
compares with 7% for the drink-drive offences as a whole: Ministry of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics 
Quarterly – December 2012, England and Wales, 30 May 2013, vol 6, Motoring, Table 6.1 <https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/criminal-justice-statistics-quarterly-update-to-
december-2012> accessed 27 November 2013.
90 See the American ‘Grand Rapids’ Study, above, p 192. 
91 Road Safety Act 1967, ss 1, 7(4).
92 See, for example, Delaroy-Hall v Tadman [1969] 2 QB 208 (QB) 214, also emphasising the element of 
certainty effected by introducing a fixed limit.
93 By the Transport Act 1981.
94 See p 9.
unfitness  to drive remains  a feature of the legislation,95 and is  the basis  for 
prosecutions based on unfitness through drugs. 
The current situation, therefore, is  that the original offences based on 
unfitness  to drive (whether through drink or drugs) remain, but have been 
supplemented by the offences  based on exceeding the prescribed limit for 
alcohol, and will be further supplemented, in due course, by offences based 
on exceeding specified limits for certain drugs. Unfitness  to drive concerns 
the effects  of alcohol or drugs on a person’s ability to drive properly; the 
degree of unfitness is not relevant. The offences  of unfitness are not defined 
by reference to any particular drug, or any amount, consumed. By contrast, 
the ability to drive properly is  irrelevant to an offence of being over the 
prescribed (or, in due course, specified96) limit, and again these offences are 
not defined by reference to an amount consumed.
Unfitness To Drive
It is  an offence, when driving or attempting to drive a mechanically 
propelled vehicle on a road or other public place, to be unfit to drive 
through drink or drugs.97 It is  likewise an offence to be in charge of such a 
vehicle on a road or other public place while in such a condition.98 Unfitness 
to drive is  also one of the constituents of the offence of causing death by 
careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs.99 Unfitness  to 
drive means that ability to drive properly is impaired,100 a concept which has 
been subject to much judicial interpretation.
The meaning of  unfitness
There is  no further statutory definition of “unfit to drive”. The terms 
“unfitness” and “impairment” appear to be interchangeable, but they are 
imprecise and each case turns on its  own facts. Fitness  to drive may depend 
on many circumstances, and the amount of alcohol which makes one person 
unfit to drive does  not necessarily make another person unfit.101 Facts which 
have been found to amount to unfitness to drive include:
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97 RTA 1988, s 4(1).
98 RTA 1988, s 4(2).
99 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 3A.
100 RTA 1988, ss 3A(2) and 4(5).
101 R v Richards [1975] 1 WLR 131 (CA (Crim)) 137.
• driving down a well-lit road on a fine night with a clear view of one 
hundred yards, and running into the back of a parked car. The 
defendant drove with the brake on and when he got out of his  car, he 
was swaying, his eyes were glazed and his speech was slurred;102 
• for no apparent reason, colliding with a stationary van which should 
have been plainly visible;103
• where, immediately after an accident, the defendant’s breath smelt 
reasonably strongly of alcohol, his  actions  and speech were slow and 
his speech was slurred;104
• a diabetic suffering a hypoglycaemic attack as  a direct result of an 
injection of  insulin;105 
• driving too fast and badly, admitting having smoked cannabis and 
being in possession of cannabis. The defendant’s  eyes were red and 
glazed, his speech slurred and his answers to questions slow;106
• driving erratically, going through two sets  of red traffic lights, the 
breath smelling of  alcohol, the speech slurred and the eyes glazed.107 
It is  the state of incapacity, whether caused by drink or drugs,108 which 
constitutes the impairment. 
Where the driver’s alcohol concentration was nearly two and a half 
times the prescribed limit, it could be inferred, without medical evidence, 
that the defendant was likely to be substantially intoxicated and that that was 
responsible for his impaired driving.109 
That a person may be unfit to drive while not above the limit was 
acknowledged by the Divisional Court when it upheld a finding that three 
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102 R v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77 (CA).
103 R v Hunt (Reginald) [1980] RTR 29 (CA (Crim)).
104  Hurst v DPP, unreported, 6 May 1998 (DC). There was expert evidence that slurred speech was 
consistent with intoxication, rather than with the injuries suffered in the accident.
105 R v Ealing Magistrates’ Court ex p Woodman [1994] RTR 189 (QBD), although, on the facts, there was 
no evidence that any insulin remained in the applicant’s body at the relevant time so as to lead to such 
an attack, or that any failure by the defendant to follow medical advice had caused the attack. In the 
earlier case of Watmore v Jenkins [1962] 2 QB 572, the Queen’s Bench Division had also found, on the 
facts, that it was open to justices to decide that injected insulin was no more than a predisposing or 
historical cause, and not the immediate cause, of  a hypoglycaemic episode.
106 Leetham v DPP [1999] RTR 29 (DC).
107 Willicott v DPP [2001] EWHC 415 (Admin) (DC), although the prosecution failed on another point.
108 Thomson v Knights [1947] KB 336 (DC).
109 R v Hunt (Reginald) [1980] RTR 29 (CA (Crim)).
large glasses  of wine would not have put the driver over the limit but would 
have impaired his ability to drive.110
The law does not recognise degrees of impairment – to constitute the 
offence, it is sufficient that the defendant was unfit to drive. 
A number of cases concerning European arrest warrants are of 
interest in this  context. For the UK courts to grant a request for extradition 
pursuant to such a warrant, the offence must be an “extradition offence” 
within the meaning of the Extradition Act 2003. To constitute an 
extradition offence, among other preconditions, the conduct complained of 
by the state seeking extradition of a person from the UK must constitute an 
offence under the law of the relevant part of the UK if it occurred there.111 
The Queen’s  Bench Division had no difficulty in finding that the words 
“driving a car … while being in the state of inebriation” in a Latvian arrest 
warrant would amount to the offence of  being unfit to drive.112
The meaning of  “drug”
 “Drug” includes any intoxicant other than alcohol.113 It has been further 
defined for present purposes  as “a medicament or medicine, something 
given to cure, alleviate or assist an ailing body”, including insulin.114
The Divisional Court has  found that, as  a general rule, a substance 
taken into the body by whatever means – for example by inhalation, 
injection or by mouth – which is  not a drink or food, but which does affect 
the control of the human body, is to be treated as  a drug. This includes 
substances having a narcotic effect, such as  toluene, found in glue which the 
defendant had been sniffing. The court dismissed schedule 2 to the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971 (list of controlled drugs) as a guide to the meaning of the 
word “drug” for road traffic purposes. Substances which are taken as 
medicines may be drugs, but equally substances  not taken as  medicines may 
be drugs.115  Thus, “drugs” include prescription and over-the-counter 
medicines, as well as illegal substances. 
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111 Extradition Act 2003, s 65(3)(b).
112 Wars v Lublin Provincial Court, Poland [2011] EWHC 1958 (Admin) (DC).
113 RTA 1988, s 11(2).
114 Armstrong v Clark [1957] 2 QB 391 (DC) 394.
115 Bradford v Wilson (1984) 78 Cr App R 77 (DC) 81. 
Proof  of  unfitness through drink or drugs
To secure a conviction, it must be proved not only that the defendant was 
unfit to drive, but that the unfitness  was caused by drink or drugs,116 rather 
than by, for example, illness. 
Unfitness  is  a matter of fact for the court and is usually proved by 
evidence of the manner of driving, the defendant’s appearance and 
demeanour at the roadside, and the outcome of any preliminary 
impairment test. Typically, a defendant said to be unfit through drink is 
described in terms  such as, “his  breath smelled of alcohol, his  eyes were 
glazed, his speech was slurred and he was unsteady on his feet”. 
Proof of the presence of alcohol or a drug is  by the analysis  of a 
specimen as explained above.117 That the unfitness was caused by the drink 
or drugs is  usually proved by medical or other expert evidence. On the facts 
in Leetham,118 however, the Divisional Court ruled that justices were entitled 
to find unfitness through drugs without evidence from the doctor who took 
the blood specimen, or other medical evidence. A blood sample confirmed 
the presence of cannabis. The scientist who analysed the blood gave 
evidence of the effects of cannabis and that it might adversely affect driving. 
The Divisional Court found that, in the circumstances of the case, that 
evidence was sufficient for a finding of  guilty.
The Prescribed Limit 
It is an offence to drive, attempt to drive, or be in charge of, a motor vehicle 
on a road or other public place after consuming so much alcohol that the 
proportion of it in the breath, blood or urine exceeds the prescribed limit.119 
As already noted, the prescribed limit is:
• 35 microgrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  breath, or
• 80 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  blood, or
• 107 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  urine.120
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117 See pp 199–203.
118 Leetham v DPP [1999] RTR 29 (DC), see p. 210.
119 RTA 1988, s 5(1).
120 RTA 1988, s 11(2); see p 14.
Breath specimens are preferred and are most commonly taken, 
because they can be taken quickly,121  at a police station, using a device 
approved for the purpose,122  and the results  of the analysis  are available 
immediately. Nevertheless, blood or urine specimens  for laboratory analysis 
may sometimes be taken instead.123 
While the prescribed limit is scientifically precise, its meaning in 
practice is  not straightforward. The Divisional Court has described the limit 
as  universal and pragmatic, recognising that different people are able to 
consume the same quantities  of alcohol with different physical and legal 
effects, the variables including age, size, gender and metabolic rate.124 They 
also include the time at which, or over which, alcohol is consumed.125 The 
courts have acknowledged the processes of absorption126 and elimination127 
of alcohol. Indeed, the principle that there is to be no delay in taking 
specimens from a suspect128 is based on the fact that in the period between 
the alleged offence and the taking of the specimen, the suspect’s alcohol 
concentration is  changing. In the context of a defendant who argued that he 
would not have driven until he was no longer over the limit, the Divisional 
Court remarked that a person who was well over the limit would have no 
way of knowing when he would be below that limit.129 The Divisional Court 
has also said that it would be difficult to say whether being told that the 
Chapter 6: The Scientific Background and the Law
213
121 By the time a suspect has been arrested and brought to the police station, the alcohol in the body 
has usually started to be eliminated, and it is therefore desirable to avoid delay so as to produce a 
result as close as possible to  the alcohol concentration at the time of the incident under investigation; 
see further, pp 105–106.
122 Pursuant to RTA 1988, s 7(1)(a). For the approved devices, see pp 201–203.
123 Where, for example, the officer believes there are medical reasons why breath specimens cannot be 
provided or should not be required, or the breath analysis device is not working: RTA 1988, s 7(3); see 
further, p 147.
124 Woolfe v DPP [2006] EWHC 1497 (Admin) (DC) [7]. On the courts’ recognition of such individual 
factors, see also DPP v Spurrier [2000] RTR 60 (QBD) 66. 
125 Williams (John Robert) v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 932 (DC) [13].
126 Griffiths v DPP [2002] EWHC 792 (Admin) [18].
127 See, for example, Smith (Dennis Edward) v DPP [1989] RTR 159 (DC) 164.
128 DPP v Billington [1988] 1 WLR 535 (QBD).
129 CPS v Thompson [2007] EWHC 1841 (Admin) (DC) [10].
breath alcohol did not exceed 50 would signify much to the average motorist 
arrested on suspicion of  driving with excess alcohol.130 
The Court of Appeal has  also acknowledged the factors  which affect 
alcohol concentration in the body, referring to the amount drunk, the rates 
of  absorption and elimination, and body weight.131 
The need for expert evidence
The prescribed limit is measured to a high degree of accuracy in each case 
investigated. Opportunities to challenge an analysis  are rare, largely because 
of the statutory assumption that the alcohol concentration at the time of the 
alleged offence was not less than in the specimen later analysed.132  There 
are, however, some circumstances  in which defendants may raise arguments 
concerning the effects of consuming particular amounts  of alcohol over 
certain periods, or about the rate of elimination of alcohol consumed. 
These cases are informative because they illustrate the situations  in which 
the courts have found that such matters may be decided only with the 
assistance of medical or scientific evidence. This raises the question of how 
an individual can be expected, before the event, to decide, for example, the 
effect of a certain amount of alcohol drunk over a certain period, if the 
courts need expert help to do so after the event. The cases in point concern 
the issues of:
• no likelihood of driving: a defendant can avoid conviction for 
being in charge when unfit, or in charge with excess  alcohol, by 
proving that, at the time in question, there was no likelihood of 
driving while remaining unfit or over the limit;133 
• the “hip flask” defence, or “post-incident consumption”: the 
statutory assumption that the proportion of alcohol in the body 
at the time of the alleged offence was not less  than in the 
specimen is not made if the defendant proves having consumed 
alcohol after ceasing to drive, and that otherwise the defendant 
would not have been over the limit. A defendant who can prove 
this again cannot be convicted;134 and 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
214
130 R v Bolton Justices ex p Zafer  Alli Khan, unreported, 4 November 1998 (QBD) concerning the statutory 
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131 R v Drummond [2002] EWCA Crim 527 [31].
132 RTOA 1988, s 15(2), discussed at pp 105–111.
133 RTA 1988, ss 4(3) and 5(2), discussed in detail in Chapter 3; see pp 90–94.
134 RTOA 1988, s 15(2) and (3), discussed in detail in Chapter 3; see pp 111–114.
• “laced drinks”: a person who has  been convicted of a drink-
drive offence may invoke the court’s  discretion not to disqualify 
from driving, or to disqualify for a shorter period than would 
otherwise be appropriate, upon proof of a “special reason”.135 
The addition of alcohol to the defendant’s drinks without the 
defendant’s  knowledge (“lacing” or “spiking”), where the added 
alcohol caused the defendant to be over the limit, is such a 
special reason. A special reason does  not amount to a defence, 
but may result in a lower penalty than would otherwise apply.
The case law is  to the effect that these matters  may sometimes be obvious 
and the court may reach its  own conclusion. But if the matter is  not obvious, 
medical or scientific evidence, of the effects  of the amount consumed in the 
circumstances of  the case, is needed. 
In an early laced drinks case,136 the Divisional Court ruled that there 
may be circumstances in which it obvious to a lay person that the alcohol 
added to a defendant’s  drink, once its nature and quality are known, caused 
the offence. The court gave as  an example the situation where the defendant 
is only marginally over the limit and the amount of drink added by lacing 
was  substantial. But unless the case was a really obvious one in which a lay 
person could reliably and confidently say that the added liquor must explain 
the excess alcohol, the only way to discharge the burden of proof was to call 
medical evidence. 
The Divisional Court has applied the same principle to the ousting of 
the statutory assumption, stressing the dangers of those who are not 
scientifically qualified, including those who sit on the bench, dabbling in 
science.137  It recognised the multiplicity of factors  which determine the 
effect of alcohol on a particular individual and concluded that, in most 
cases, expert assistance is needed before a conclusion is drawn. 
The requirement for expert evidence may differ according to whether 
the allegation is  of being in charge when unfit, or of being in charge when 
over the limit. A defendant who had been found asleep in his  car was 
accused of both, but argued that he would no longer have been in either 
condition by the time he intended next to drive. It was  accepted that he had 
not been going to drive for some five and a half hours after a breath alcohol 
reading just short of three times  the limit. The Queen’s Bench Division 
ruled that justices may be able, without expert evidence, to form an opinion 
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136 Pugsley v Hunter [1973] 1 WLR 578 (QBD).
137 Dawson v Lunn [1986] RTR 234 (QBD).
on when the defendant would have ceased to be unfit. But the question of 
exceeding the prescribed limit is not within their experience and medical or 
scientific evidence would be needed in support of this  aspect of the 
argument.138  If the driver had been only marginally over the limit when 
tested, and the court was satisfied that he would not have driven for a long 
time, it may be proper for a court to find there was no likelihood of driving 
while over the limit. Where, however, the defendant is well over the limit and 
the time lapse is  a few hours, the court cannot rely on general knowledge or 
personal experience, but must have clear, cogent and reliable evidence of the 
rate at which the individual would have eliminated the alcohol.139 
Other circumstances  in which the appellate courts  have said that the 
situation is not obvious, and/or that expert evidence is necessary include 
where:
• a defendant whose breath-alcohol was 50 argued that he would 
be below the limit by the time at which he next intended to 
drive, some four and a half  hours later;140 
• a defendant whose breath-alcohol was 127 said he had drunk 
one and a half pints  of beer before driving, and two cups of 
whisky after driving, and sought to argue that it was the whisky 
which had taken him over the limit;141
• a defendant argued that three half pints of beer and a large 
vodka, consumed between 8.30 p.m. and 11 p.m., were 
sufficient to explain a reading in breath of  58 at 12.30 a.m;142
• a defendant who had drunk three pints  of lager topped up with 
lemonade, over five hours and fifty minutes, argued that he 
would not be over the limit;143
• a defendant said he had had a shot of vodka after finishing 
work at 6 p.m. and a lager at 11.00 p.m. Police came upon him 
standing next to his car in a lay-by at 3.15 the next morning. 
The defendant said he had taken a mouthful of vodka as  police 
approached him. The Divisional Court held that expert 
evidence was needed, not only to test the argument that it was 
the mouthful of vodka which caused his  breath-alcohol reading 
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to be 51, but also to test the truth of his  version of events  as a 
whole.144
Taking perhaps a rather less robust stance, the Queen’s Bench Division has 
declined to interfere with decisions of  the courts below that:
• it was obvious  that one and three quarter pints  of lager would 
not have taken a motorist over the limit;145 
• by contrast, it was  not obvious that a person would remain 
below the limit having drunk one and a half  pints of  lager.146 
While these two cases at first sight appear irreconcilable, the first decision 
was  cited in the second, and both were based on the fact that there was 
nothing to suggest that the decisions of the courts  below were perverse. The 
High Court stressed that each case depends on its own facts, again 
illustrating the difficulty of  formulating any general rule of  interpretation.
Even where expert evidence is  adduced, it must be treated with 
appropriate caution. In a laced drinks  case, the expert evidence related to 
the principles only, and it was  the parties  who sought to apply the principles 
to the facts of the case. The Divisional Court held that courts  should not be 
drawn into detailed calculations  of such a nature. It is not practicable to 
work back to the alcohol level at the time of driving unless  the evidence is 
reasonably clear, straightforward and relatively simple.147  Again, where 
justices found that a hip flask argument failed because, if the defendant had 
been telling the truth about how much he had drunk after driving, the 
breath reading would have been even higher than it was, the Divisional 
Court held that assessments of this  sort were matters  of expert evidence 
depending on the facts and the defendant, and were not for the justices  to 
make themselves.148
The Queen’s  Bench Division has  also ruled that there is  no limit on 
the circumstances in which justices  may make a finding on the basis  that a 
situation is obvious to a lay person.149
In all these cases the courts  have recognised the complexity of interpreting 
the prescribed limit and applying it to particular sets of circumstances. In 
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Chapter 9, I cite them in support of my argument that the prescribed limit 
cannot be reconciled with the principle of legal certainty discussed in 
Chapter 5.150
The responsibility of  the driver
While the case law provides  many examples of circumstances in which 
expert assistance is  needed to assess  the effects  of alcohol, the courts  have 
nevertheless  emphasised the responsibilities of drivers. The Court of Appeal 
has stressed that drivers who decide to mix drink and driving do so at their 
peril, and have a heavy responsibility to watch with extreme care the 
amount they are drinking, and to see that they do not take more than is 
likely to keep them within the statutory limit.151
Even where the defendant could show that alcohol was added to his 
drinks  without his knowledge, but the alcohol level in his  body was high, or 
his driving was  erratic, he should have known he was  not fit to drive.152 
Where the blood alcohol content was  127, it was  highly unlikely that the 
driver was not aware that he had had too much to drink.153 Likewise where 
it was 180 in blood.154 
Where a driver was offered what he thought was a fruit drink but was 
in fact alcoholic punch, and he made no inquiry, he took the risk that he was 
drinking alcohol. A special reasons  argument failed. The driver had to show 
that he had done all that could reasonably be expected to avoid the risk of 
committing the offence. His alcohol level in breath was 83.155 
A motorist who had consumed some 800 millilitres  of mouthwash, 
which contained 26.9 per cent alcohol, said he was unaware that the 
mouthwash contained alcohol and argued that there was therefore a special 
reason for not disqualifying. While driving, he swerved, failed to take a bend 
correctly and crossed to the wrong side of the road. His breath-alcohol was 
94. The Divisional Court found that the defendant had long known that 
taking the mouthwash gave him “a lift”. On the day in question he had 
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taken a considerable amount of it and he drove erratically. He should have 
realised he was not fit to drive.156
Thus, despite the difficulty of knowing the precise effects  of alcohol 
consumed, drivers have not been absolved of responsibility. The alcohol 
levels in the cases mentioned above range from just over one and a half 
times the limit in blood, to nearly three times the limit in breath. The effect 
of this series of decisions is  that, certainly at these levels, it must be obvious 
to an individual that it would not be within the law to drive. In Chapter 
10,157 I argue that drivers  do have a special responsibility in relation to the 
law. 
This  brief review of the case law illustrates the difficulty of interpreting the 
prohibition on unfitness and the prescribed limit. Whether or not a person is 
unfit to drive through drink or drugs depends, as  has  been seen, on all the 
circumstances of each case. Although largely a matter of common sense in 
which expert evidence is  not usually necessary, nevertheless a definitive 
assessment in any particular instance is  not made until after the event, and 
then only if  there is a prosecution. 
The prescribed limit was introduced with the intention of promoting 
certainty. While there can be little doubt that the position after the event is 
now more certain, the position before the event may be less certain than 
when the only test was of  fitness to drive. I pursue this point in Chapter 9.158
The next chapter addresses  the question of how the restrictions are 
actually understood by drivers themselves. 
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Chapter 7: The Driver’s Perspective
INTRODUCTION
Having reviewed the concept of legal certainty in Chapter 5, the scientific 
facts  underlying the drug- and drink-driving legislation, and the legislation 
itself (Chapter 6), I now turn to drivers and how they interpret the statutory 
restrictions. This chapter contains a review of the literature on drivers’ 
understanding of the law, while Chapter 8 reports  on my own empirical 
work on the same theme. The literature shows, and the empirical study 
confirms, that there is widespread ignorance and confusion.
It is  clearly lawful to consume alcohol and/or certain drugs and then 
to drive, attempt to drive or be in charge, as long as the individual remains 
fit to drive and/or below the prescribed limit,1 or waits  until the effects  have 
sufficiently worn off. In the case of alcohol, the overlap between unfitness 
and exceeding the prescribed limit – the fact that a person may be unfit to 
drive but not over the limit2  – makes  for confusion. The confusion is 
exacerbated by the fact that there are relatively few prosecutions for driving 
when unfit through drink,3 with the result that it is  easy to overlook that it 
may be unlawful to drive even when far below the prescribed limit. The 
effects  of the many drugs  in use – both medicinal and illicit  – are widely 
diverse, some adversely affecting driving skill, some not. 
Importantly, all the offences  are couched in terms  of the result of the 
intake of alcohol or drugs, not in terms of what is consumed.4 Thus  a driver 
either abstains  entirely and takes no risk of breaking the law, or needs  an 
adequate understanding of the effects of consuming particular substances  in 
particular circumstances. This question of interpreting the legal restrictions 
is  of real practical significance – how is  a person who has  consumed alcohol 
or taken a drug to know whether or not it  is lawful to drive? One answer 
might be to introduce “zero tolerance”, such that the presence of any 
alcohol or impairing drug would be an offence, yet that would still leave the 
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1  Or, in due course, below a specified limit for a specified controlled drug; see pp 8–9 on the new 
offences under RTA 1988, s 5A.
2 See p 9.
3 See the figures quoted on p 200.
4  A point sometimes missed even in scholarly commentary. See, for example, Sally Cunningham, 
Driving Offences Law, Policy and Practice (Ashgate 2008) 59, “An upper legal limit for the amount of 
alcohol permitted to be consumed before driving was first introduced . . .”. 
problem of knowing when, after consuming alcohol or a drug, the body 
would be free of  its effects.
  ALCOHOL
Public ignorance of how much can lawfully be drunk before exceeding the 
prescribed limit has  been widely documented and is  considered in detail 
below. In the British Social Attitudes  Survey for 2012, seventy-five per cent 
of respondents  agreed or strongly agreed that most people do not know how 
much alcohol they can drink before being over the legal drink-drive limit.5 
Many of those who gave evidence to the North Review6  in 2010 thought 
that the success  of the drink drive legislation was at least in part attributable 
to the confusion about how much can be drunk before reaching the limit, 
which gives rise to a very cautious approach. The confusion may be the 
greater because official education campaigns often refer to units  of alcohol – 
a measure of the amount of alcohol before consumption – while the law is 
concerned with the effects, not the amount consumed. Not only that, but 
official advice about units of alcohol is given in two different contexts 
– general health7 and road safety.8 In addition, there is evidence that units  of 
alcohol are poorly understood.9 These difficulties  are widely recognised by 
the British Medical Association,10  as well as by academic commentators11 
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5 British Social Attitudes Survey 2012 (NatCen Social Research 2013) Self-Completion Questionnaire 
Vers ion B, Quest ion 6 <http://www.bsa-30.natcen.ac.uk/media/24859/bsa_30_ 
annotated_questionnaire_2012.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
6 Sir Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) para 3.111.
7  For example, NHS Advice on Drinking Limits <http://www.drinking.nhs.uk/questions/recommended-
levels/> accessed 27 November 2013.
8  For example, NHS, How Much Alcohol Can I  Drink Before Driving <http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/
2096.aspx?CategoryID=87&SubCategoryID=871> accessed 27 November 2013.
9 See, for example, Caroline Ritchie and others, ‘How Can I Drink Safely?  Perception Versus the 
Reality of Alcohol Consumption’ (2009) 29 The Service Industries Jnl 1397, 1402–4. The National 
Statistics Omnibus Survey in 2009 showed that 63 per cent of respondents said a half a pint of beer 
represented a single unit, and 27 per cent said that a small glass of wine represented a unit: Deborah 
Lader and Matthew Steel, Drinking: Adults’ Behaviour and Knowledge in 2009 (Office for National 
Statistics, Opinions Survey Report No. 42, 2010) 56–57, but see pp 231–232 below for reservations 
concerning the terminology used. 
10 See British Medical Association, Driving - Drinking and Driving, briefing paper, 19 February 2009. 
11  For example, David J Giacopassi and Preston M Stein, ‘To Err is Human: Estimating Alcohol 
Content and Its Effects’ (1989) 5 Jnl of  Contemporary Criminal Justice 102. 
and researchers.12 As a result, people may drink-drive without knowing it, or 
think they are committing the crime when they are not.13  Calculating 
alcohol concentration has been likened to a mystery to many policy makers, 
legal professionals and the general public.14 The courts  too have difficulty; 
the circumstances  in which they will not proceed without expert evidence of 
the effects of alcohol have been described in Chapter 6.15  Perhaps most 
telling is the fact that, in 2010, the House of Commons Transport 
Committee, in rejecting a recommendation to reduce the drink-drive limit 
from 80 mg to 50 mg in 100 ml blood, recognised the lack of public 
understanding about the present limit and what it means  in terms of drinks 
which may be consumed before driving. The introduction of a 50 limit 
would, the Committee decided, be likely to increase such confusion, given 
that the amounts and measurements in which drinks are served and 
consumed are not easily converted into units of alcohol, let alone into 
microgrammes of alcohol in the blood. The committee preferred a long 
term aim of a reduction to 20, but only after an extensive education 
campaign.16 
Official Guidance
It might be thought that official guidance would assist, but there are inherent 
difficulties  in formulating any such advice. The influential Blennerhasset 
Committee, reporting in 1976,17 considered that to give guidance on how 
much a person could drink before being over the prescribed limit might give 
rise to an erroneous  assumption that people can safely drink up to that 
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12 For example, Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and 
Attitudes (Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) 26. 
13 Donald S Kenkel and Steven F Kock, ‘Deterrence and Knowledge of the Law: the Case of Drunk 
Driving’ (2001) 33 Applied Economics 845, 847.
14  R Solomon, E Chamberlain, ‘Can Simplifying BAC Calculations Affect Public Attitudes and 
Awareness?’, paper presented to  the 17th International Conference on Alcohol Drugs and Traffic 
Safety, Glasgow, 2004. 
15 See pp 213–217.
16 Transport Committee, Drink and Drug Driving Law, 2010, paras 37–38 <http://www.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-committee/inquiries/
parliament-2010/drink-and-drug1/> accessed 27 November 2013.
17  Department of the Environment, Drinking and Driving: Report of the Departmental Committee (‘the 
Blennerhassett Report’) (HMSO 1976). The committee was appointed to review the law, in light of 
the fact that the reduction in road deaths through alcohol since the introduction of the fixed limit in 
1967  had not  been sustained, and in light of the case law which was allowing a small number of guilty 
drivers to escape conviction. Many of its recommendations were implemented in the Transport Act 
1981. 
level.18 Such an assumption would be misleading in the sense that a person 
who is  below the limit may nevertheless be unfit to drive. The Committee 
recognised the difficulties in formulating guidance on what the blood alcohol 
concentration might be following given numbers  of drinks, and concluded 
that the only general advice that could safely be given was that drink and 
driving do not mix. That has largely remained the official position, the 
guidance often advocating, in effect, a zero limit. Although appearing to 
relate to the prescribed limit, the advice not to drink at all before driving 
seems more appropriate to the offences of unfitness to drive, given that, as 
noted above,19 a person’s fitness  to drive is  impaired (to some extent at least) 
after any amount of alcohol. The Highway Code advises against drinking at 
all when planning to drive.20 The Department for Transport’s  road safety 
website likewise concludes that “it’s better to have none for the road”.21 The 
Department emphasised this approach in a consultation paper published in 
November 2008.22 The NHS and directgov websites,23 however, go as far as 
to say that men should drink no more than four units of alcohol before 
driving, and women, no more than three, but both emphasise that it is 
impossible to be sure. 
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18  See also Nason W Russ and others, ‘Estimating Alcohol Impairment in the Field: Implications for 
Drunken Driving’ (1986) 47 Jnl of Studies on Alcohol 237, 240, suggesting that those who feel 
impaired may choose to drink more upon learning that they have not reached the legal limit.
19 See pp 192–193.
20 Highway Code, 2007, para 95 <https://www.gov.uk/rules-drivers-motorcyclists-89-to-102/alcohol-
and-drugs-95-to-96> accessed 27  November 2013. For the legal status of the Highway Code, see 
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/TravelAndTransport/Highwaycode/DG_070236> accessed 27 
November 2013, reciting that many of the rules in the Code are legal requirements. Failure to comply 
with the other rules of  the Code does not, in itself, lead to prosecution.
21 <http://think.direct.gov.uk/drink-driving.html> accessed 27 November 2013.
22  Department for Transport, Road Safety Compliance Consultation, November 2008 <http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/closed/compliance/
roadsafetyconsultation.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
23  <http://www.nhs.uk/chq/pages/2096.aspx> <https://www.gov.uk/drink-drive-limit> both 
accessed 27 November 2013.
The difficulties are acknowledged in drink-drive rehabilitation 
courses,24 one course provider remarking, “you can make an educated guess, 
but you cannot know for sure until you blow into that tube”.25
The Driving Standards Agency’s  standard for safe and responsible 
driving26  advises  that drivers  should, before driving, assess  whether their 
ability to drive is  impaired by illegal or controlled substances, medicines  or 
alcohol. It goes  on to say that, to do this, drivers need to know and 
understand not only what the law says  about driving with such substances in 
the system, but also a number of scientific aspects  such as  how drugs and 
alcohol are metabolised and how they impair the ability to drive safely. In 
view of the widespread ignorance of such matters, revealed later in this 
chapter and in Chapter 8, it seems wholly unrealistic to expect drivers 
routinely to assess their fitness  to drive in the informed manner 
contemplated by the standard. 
Media Reporting 
The reliability of the media as  a source of information on interpreting the 
prescribed limit seems open to considerable doubt. For example, in 
December 2009, the then Secretary of State for Transport, Lord Adonis, 
commissioned advice on the legal framework for drink and drug driving.27 
The terms  of reference included investigating the possibility of reducing the 
prescribed limit from 80 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres  of blood 
to 50. In reporting the announcement, a number of newspapers  gave an 
interpretation of the present limit. The Times described it as  roughly two 
pints of normal strength beer for most men.28  The Guardian said it was 
equivalent to one and a half small glasses (175 ml) of wine or one and a half 
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24  Such courses are provided pursuant to  RTOA 1988, ss 34A, B and C, which contain provisions 
under which the period of disqualification may be reduced if the offender satisfactorily completes an 
approved course. 
25  Conversation between Judith Stamper of Drivewise and the author, 21 November 2011. The 
Driving Standards Agency’s syllabus for the courses does not address the question of how much a 
person may drink without breaching the limit: Driving Standards Agency, Drink Drive Rehabilitation 
Scheme Course Syllabus, version 1.1, June 2013 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/226646/dsa-drink-drive-rehabilitation-syllabus.pdf> accessed 27 
November 2013.
26  Driving Standards Agency, Safe and Responsible Driving (Category B), V 4.0, 2012, 4 <http://
assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/dsa-national-driving-riding-standards/dsa-driving-standard.pdf> 
accessed 27 November 2013.
27  The result of the advice was published as Sir Peter North, Report of the  Review of Drink and Drug 
Driving Law (HMSO 2010). 
28 The Times, 4 December 2009, ‘Drivers Face Lower Drink-Drive Limit’.
pints of normal strength beer,29 while The Telegraph reported that, for a man 
of average height and weight, the present limit is equivalent to three units, 
or a pint and a half of normal strength lager, or three small glasses of 
wine.30  While it might be expected that the serious press would provide 
reliable information, these three reports  were inconsistent among each other, 
only one mentioned height and weight, none mentioned the time over which 
the drinks are consumed (let alone the many other factors which influence 
the concentration of alcohol in the body31), and, as  will be seen below,32 
there is  evidence that all three estimates are highly conservative. The Daily 
Mail, meanwhile,33 suggested that lowering the limit to 50 would mean that 
drivers  could be over the limit after drinking less than a pint of beer or a 
glass of wine. The report which followed this  investigation itself criticised 
such press coverage as exaggerated.34 Even so, the front page headline of the 
London Evening Standard on the day that report was  published was, “Just One 
Pint or You’re Over Limit”.35 
Nor is the legal press immune to the difficulties of definition. In an 
article published as recently as 2007,36 the prescribed limit was said to be, 
for a healthy man of average weight, the approximate equivalent of 
consuming five units of alcohol, which were in turn equated to five glasses  of 
wine or two and a half pints of normal strength beer. While this statement is 
acknowledged to be a broad generalization, and that many factors  may be 
relevant, it is  yet another example where the use of terms such as  “glass” of 
wine, and “normal strength” beer may mislead rather than illuminate.
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29  The Guardian, 3 December 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/dec/03/drink-drive-
limit-lower> accessed 27 November 2013.
30  The Telegraph, 3 December 2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/6716849/Drink-
driving-law-change-would-ban-motorists-from-having-single-glass-of-wine.html> accessed 27 
November 2013.
31 See pp 193–194.
32 See pp 240–248.
33  Daily Mail, 3 December 2009 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1257871/Drink-drive-
limit-lowered-just-pint-cut-56-deaths-road-year.html#ixzz0snqYRhBS> accessed 27 November 2013. 
34 Sir Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) 7.
35 London Evening Standard, 16 June 2010, 1. 
36 Michael Watson, ‘Drinking and Driving’ (2007) 171 JPN 572.
Self-Testing and BAC Calculators
It might be thought that, at least in respect of the prescribed limit, drivers 
would be assisted if they could test themselves.37 Since speedometers  assist 
drivers  in avoiding speeding offences, there would seem no reason why they 
should not have an equivalent tool to measure alcohol concentration, but 
this  has not been encouraged. The Blennerhasset Committee38  considered 
that giving access to breath-testing equipment would not be helpful, because, 
for example, it would give misleading results if used too soon, while the 
person is still absorbing alcohol and may have alcohol in the mouth.39 The 
Committee also warned that self-testing might encourage drivers  to continue 
drinking until just below the limit. This  danger was  also recognised in recent 
American research concerning a personal saliva-based alcohol test.40 
A number of websites41  provide methods for estimating alcohol 
concentration in blood. The data to be inputted include age, gender, height 
and weight, the time over which alcohol has been drunk, and the amount 
and type of drinks  consumed. The resulting calculations are, quite rightly, 
subject to caveats about their accuracy. More recently, such calculators have 
become available as applications for smartphones and other devices.42 
Occasionally, tables and graphs  have been published showing 
estimated alcohol concentration after consuming certain amounts of 
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37  M Johnson and R Voas ‘Potential Risks of Providing Drinking Drivers with BAC 
Information’ (2004) 5 Traffic Injury Prevention 42.
38  Department of the Environment, Drinking and Driving: Report of the Departmental Committee (‘the 
Blennerhassett Report’) (HMSO 1976).
39  See p 193 for the reasons why a false reading could result in these circumstances. The dangers of 
self-testing before peak blood alcohol level is reached, and the temptation to continue drinking after a 
test  showing the limit has not been reached, was also recognised in David Riley, Drivers’ Beliefs About 
Alcohol and the Law (1984) Home Office Research & Planning Unit Bulletin No 17, 32.
40  Mark B Johnson and others, ‘The Consequences of Providing Drinkers with Blood Alcohol 
Concentration Information on Assessments of Alcohol Impairment and Drunk-Driving Risk’ (2008) 
69  Jnl of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 539. Although the saliva test was found not to  be particularly 
accurate, the results did enable users better to assess whether or not they were within the legal limit for 
driving, but was not particularly useful in assessing impairment.
41  See for example <www.rupis sed.com> and <http ://www.dr inkdr iv ing.org/
drink_driving_information_bloodalcoholcontentcalculator.php> accessed 27 November 2013. The 
following data were inputted: male aged 35 years, weighing 77 kg, 175 cm tall (for the rupissed 
calculator only), who had drunk three pints of beer of 3.5 per cent alcohol by volume over three 
hours. The two calculators both gave results of  0.049.
42  For example, JRB Computer Services, Drink Counter  <https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/drink-
counter/id291208184?mt=8> accessed 27 November 2013.
alcohol.43  Their value is, however, limited since such tables  are usually 
compiled making assumptions  about many of the factors  which have a 
bearing, with the result that it is  extremely complex to apply them accurately 
to an individual set of circumstances. Such a table44 was referred to in a case 
before the Queen’s Bench Division in 1986,45 when the court pointed out 
the danger of seeking to adapt such tables  to individual sets  of 
circumstances. 
How Much Drivers Think they Can Drink Before Driving 
Lawfully
The observations  above indicate the factors which may influence how 
people interpret the prohibitions on drinking and driving. A number of 
studies investigating drivers’ actual understanding of the law are described 
next. Most deal with how the prescribed limit is interpreted. (Un)fitness to 
drive is addressed in some of the studies, but has  received less  attention than 
the prescribed limit. 
The results show a wide variation in views. There are also reasons to 
treat the results with caution. Responses given in interviews give the flavour: 
• We don’t know what the limit is  … all the different strengths  out 
there … You can’t really specify for every single person.46
• It’s like we’re getting mixed messages  from the government in terms 
of the law because I’ve never gone into a pub and seen it on a sign 
saying you’re allowed to have this much alcohol. … I think two pints 
is about the limit … or is that four units? I’m not sure.47 
• I don’t know quite how much I can drink so it’s  not my fault if I 
creep over the limit.48
• It is confusing for people – is it ten units, is it five?49
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43 See, for example, (unattributed) ‘Recognition of Intoxication’ (1954) 1  BMJ 753; ‘Alcohol and Road 
Accidents: Report of Special BMA Committee’ (1960) 1 BMJ 269; ‘Table of metabolic losses for 
breath and blood analyses with time’ in PJ Halnan and PS Wallis (eds), Wilkinson’s Road Traffic Offences 
(13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1987) 1/869 (not reproduced in later editions); Global Road Safety 
Partnership, Drinking and Driving: A Road Safety Manual for Decision-makers and Practitioners (2007) 140.
44 Taken from JB Saunders, A Paton, ‘Alcohol in the Body’ (1981) 283 BMJ 1380.
45 Dawson v Lunn [1986] RTR 234 (QBD) 238.
46  Emma Collins and others, Drinking & Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish 
Government Social Research 2008) para 6.49.
47 Ibid, para 7.21.
48  Davies McKerr, Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 26 <http://www.docstoc.com/
docs/13834601/Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 November 2013.
49 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 29.
As noted earlier, assessing perceptions  of the legal provisions  in terms  of 
amounts consumed is  erroneous, since the restrictions  are expressed in terms 
of the effects of that consumption. Evaluating those effects involves  many 
considerations  in addition to the amount consumed. Nevertheless, the 
questions  and answers featuring in the research have often been expressed 
by reference to consumption. When individuals  were asked how much they 
could drink while remaining fit to drive, and/or within the legal limit, 
responses have been expressed:
• as units – from two or fewer, to as many as ten;50
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50   David Riley, Drivers’ Beliefs About Alcohol and the Law (1984) Home Office Research & Planning Unit 
Bulletin No 17, 35, in which it is reported that almost 40 per cent of 3,000+ male drivers in England 
and Wales believed they would remain within the limit after consuming five units of  alcohol.
	 R Lennox and A Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 1990) 24. Fifty-two per cent of 1,521 respondents 
in a postal questionnaire sent to UK driving licence holders believed they would remain within the 
prescribed limit after one to three units, consumed over two hours. A further 40 per cent gave limits of 
between four and six units consumed over two hours. The replies were broadly similar when 
respondents were asked how many units they could drink and still drive safely.
	 JT Everest and others, Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving: England and Wales 1990 (Transport 
and Road Research Laboratory Research Report 319, 1991) 16, reporting that, in a roadside survey of 
13,500 drivers in England and Wales in 1990, 88 per cent thought the legal limit would be reached, 
and 85 per cent thought they would be unfit to drive, after four or fewer units consumed over two 
hours. 
 Claire Corbett  and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, 
Viewed from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32 Brit J Criminology 537, 546. Seven per cent 
of 226 respondents in a survey of pub patrons who were drinking and intending to drive said they 
could drink ten or more units and remain within the limit. Fourteen per cent said they would be below 
the limit having drunk six or more units.
 Ian P Albery and Andrew Guppy, ‘Drivers’ Differential Perceptions of Legal and Safe Driving 
Consumption’ (1995) 90 Addiction 245, 248. Among more than 900 drivers who completed a 
questionnaire, 2.97 units was the mean perception of  the legal limit. 
 Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes 
(Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) 26, 27. The subjects of qualitative interviews were 
asked what they thought the legal limit is, and typically replied, “two units”, “two drinks, or “two 
pints”. Fifty-two per cent of a separate sample surveyed said they would not feel comfortable driving 
after having anything to drink; 34 per cent said they would not feel comfortable driving after having 
more than one beer or one glass of wine; and nine per cent said they would not feel comfortable 
driving after more than two beers or two glasses of  wine. 
	 Laura Brasnett, Drink-driving: Prevalence and Attitudes in England and Wales 2002 (Home Office 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Findings 258, 2004) 3. Among 1,648 interviewees, 
two units was most commonly thought (by 34 per cent) sufficient to be over the limit.
 Emma Collins and others, Drinking & Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish 
Government Social Research 2008) paras 7.6–7.7. Eleven per cent of 1,034 respondents thought a 
single unit was a safe amount to drink before driving, while 21 per cent said two units were safe, but 
63 per cent said they would not drink at all before driving.
• as pints – from half  a pint to four pints; 51, and
• as “drinks” – from no drinks to two drinks.52 
Perceptions not only vary widely, but appear to have become more 
conservative over the years. For example, in an early study (1984),53 almost 
forty per cent of more than 3,000 male drivers  in England and Wales 
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51  AB Clayton and others, Drinking and Driving Habits, Attitudes and Behaviour of Male Motorists (Transport 
and Road Research Laboratory Supplementary Report 826, 1984) para 3.8. Of 88 drivers 
interviewed, 58 per cent thought the maximum they could drink in two hours and remain within the 
limit was two pints of beer, 20 per cent said two and a half to  three pints, and 12 per cent said a single 
pint. 
	 R Lennox and A Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 1990) 35, in which 27 per cent of respondents 
agreed (either strongly or slightly) with the statement that some people can drive perfectly safely after 
drinking three or four pints of  beer.
	 Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished). When asked to define the legal drink drive limit in terms of drinks, two thirds of 
respondents from an initial sample of 1,062 eighteen- to thirty-year-olds, gave a number of pints, 
ranging from half  a pint to three pints. See p 239.
 MORI for the Portman Group: Alcohol and Society: A Report on what the British Public Thinks About 
Alcohol and the Part it Plays in their Lives (unpublished, research conducted in 2000). In face-to-face 
interviews with 1,511 members of the general public, when asked what the limit was in terms of beer, 
67  per cent answered two pints or less. When asked the same question in relation to glasses of wine, 
55 per cent thought the limit equated with one or two “pub glasses” of  wine. 
	 Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes 
(Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) 27.
	 RAC Report on Motoring 2003, Drink, Drugs and Driving (RAC Motoring Services 2003) 14. Eighty 
per cent of an unstated number of respondents thought an average man would be over the limit  after 
two pints of strong lager; 41 per cent thought the average man would be over the limit after two pints 
of ordinary lager, while 22 per cent thought the average man would be over the limit after one pint of 
strong lager.
52  Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes 
(Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) 27. 
 Churchill Insurance Press Release, Four Million Drivers Set to Hit the Road ‘Smashed’ this Christmas, 1  
December 2006, supplemented by data kindly supplied by RBS Insurance in August 2008. When 
asked how many drinks respondents would tend to have and still feel confident driving, 48 per cent (of 
about 2,000) said none, 32 per cent said one, and 13.33 per cent said two. A drink was defined as half 
a pint, a small glass of  wine, or one measure of  spirit. 
	 Davies McKerr, Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 23 <http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/13834601/Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 
November 2013. Most respondents (the sample size is not reported) believed they were to  safe to drive 
if  they observed their own personal limits, usually one to three drinks. 
	 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department 
for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 37, reporting that, among 50 drivers 
interviewed, two drinks was a rough rule of  thumb as a guide to the legal limit.
53  David Riley, Drivers’ Beliefs About Alcohol and the Law  (1984) Home Office Research & Planning Unit 
Bulletin No 17, 35. For an earlier survey of views on how much could be drunk before driving 
lawfully, conducted in anticipation of the coming into  force of the fixed alcohol limit in blood in 1967 
(see p 7), see D Sheppard, The 1967 Drink and Driving Campaign –  A Survey Among Drivers (Ministry of 
Transport Road Research Laboratory Report LR 230, 1968).
believed they would remain within the limit54 after consuming five units  of 
alcohol. The figure was two units  or fewer in 2002.55  A similar trend had 
been noted in a review covering the years  1976/77 to 1992/93: 4.6 units 
was  seen as equating with the legal limit in 1976/77, but by 1992/93 this 
had gone down to 3.52 units.56 
The accuracy of these estimates, and therefore the accuracy of 
respondents’ understanding of the legal prohibitions, depend on a number 
of factors. These include understanding the measures used and the factors 
which influence how alcohol affects the body and the speed at which it is 
absorbed and eliminated, the accuracy of the assumptions made by 
researchers and the objectivity of  respondents’ replies to questions. 
Terminology
Because simple measures of volume do not provide any information about 
the amount of alcohol they contain, the unit of alcohol was adopted as a 
standard measure.57 The accepted definition is  given above.58 While public 
awareness of measuring alcohol in units  is  increasing,59  there is  much to 
suggest that the unit is still not well understood.60 This  has been referred to 
as  an area of confusion and uncertainty.61  One interviewee, when asked 
about the legal limit, said:
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54 Expressed in the report as ‘would not fail a breathalyser’, ibid, 33.
55  ONS Omnibus Survey, March 2002, module 303 <http://nesstar.esds.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?
v=2&mode=documentation&submode=abstract&study=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk
%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2F4701&top=yes> accessed 27 November 2013. Seventy-two per cent of 
1,283 respondents said they could drink two or fewer units and remain within the limit.
56  COI Research Unit and Research International for the Department of Transport, An Overview of 
Trends in Drinking and Driving Behaviour and Attitudes 1979 –1993 (undated) para 3.15. Approximately 450 
men, who drove and drank away from home, were interviewed in each of  the years reviewed.
57 See p 205.
58 At p 205.
59  Deborah Lader and Matthew Steel, Drinking: Adults’ Behaviour and Knowledge in 2009 (Office for 
National Statistics, Opinions Survey Report No. 42, 2010) 56, reporting that 90 per cent of 
respondents had heard of  measuring alcohol in units. 
60  See, for example, Jan Gill and Fiona O’May, ‘Practical Demonstration of Personal Daily 
Consumption Limits: A Useful Intervention Tool to Promote Responsible Drinking Among UK 
Adults?’ (2007) 42 Alcohol and Alcoholism 436; Deborah Lader and Matthew Steel, Drinking: Adults’ 
Behaviour and Knowledge in 2009 (Office for National Statistics, Opinions Survey Report No. 42, 2010) 
Chapter 4.
61 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 23. See also  Laura Brasnett, Drink-driving: 
Prevalence and Attitudes in England and Wales 2002 (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate, Findings 258, 2004) 2, acknowledging the difficulty of  measuring units.
It doesn’t say on your glass  this  is  one unit, it says 175 ml, but 
what is a unit? What does it measure?62 
As already noted, the distinction between the numbers of units 
recommended as maxima from the points of view of general health and the 
drink drive limit seems blurred.63  Nor are units well understood for the 
purposes of  safe drinking in general.64
Despite the confusion, researchers have posed questions  referring to 
units of alcohol without defining the unit. For example, in a roadside survey 
in England and Wales in 1990,65 drivers were asked to estimate the number 
of units they could drink in two hours and remain (a) within the limit and (b) 
safe to drive, but no explanation of a unit of alcohol was given. Other 
studies which refer to units  of alcohol sometimes  included a definition,66 
sometimes not.67 In one, examples  of drinks  converted into units were given 
to assist respondents. A pint of “normal strength beer, cider, lager, etc.” was 
referred to as two units, and a pint of “strong/continental beer, cider, lager 
etc.” as  three units.68 While this approach is  at least an attempt to deal with 
the difficult question of definition, the examples  cannot be more than 
approximations unless alcohol strength is also taken into account.
It may be that researchers have avoided defining the unit of alcohol 
because its complexity might confuse participants. In a report based on 
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62  Emma Collins and others, Drinking and Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish 
Government Social Research 2008) para 7.21.
63 See, for example, Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings 
(Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 23–24.
64  Caroline Ritchie and others, ‘How Can I Drink Safely? Perception Versus the Reality of Alcohol 
Consumption’ (2009) 29 The Service Industries Jnl 1397, 1399, 1402–1403. 
65 JT Everest and others, Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving: England and Wales 1990 (Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory Research Report 319, 1991) 16.
66  As in Laura Brasnett, Drink-driving: Prevalence and Attitudes in England and Wales 2002 (Home Office 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Findings 258, 2004), reporting on ONS Omnibus 
Survey, March 2002, Module M303 4: <http://nesstar.esds.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?
v=2&mode=documentation&submode=abstract&study=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk
%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2F4701&top=yes> accessed 27 November 2013, which refers to a show 
card giving definitions of  units of  alcohol, but does not reproduce the definitions.
67 Claire Corbett and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, Viewed 
from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32 Brit J Criminology 537; R Lennox and A Quimby, A 
Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
Contractor Report 147, 1990).
68  Emma Collins and others, Drinking and Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish 
Government Social Research 2008) Annex A, Q60. 
annual research by the Office for National Statistics,69 it is  estimated that the 
average ABV of beer, lager and cider of “normal strength” is 4 per cent, 
and, in strong beer, lager and cider, 6.5 per cent. Nevertheless, respondents 
were asked about their understanding of units  in “beer/lager/cider” 
without reference to strength. Sixty-three per cent of 1,210 respondents 
thought half a pint of beer/lager/cider represented a single unit, and this  is 
reported as a “correct answer”. Using the accepted formula,70 half a pint 
would equate to a single unit only if the alcohol content is 3.5 per cent. 
Many popular beers 71 are in fact much higher in alcohol. Again, the report 
acknowledges that the smallest (125 millilitres) glass of wine sold on licensed 
premises  probably now contains more than 1.5 units  (assuming an ABV of 
12.5 per cent) and may contain over three units,72 leading to the awkward 
situation that the correct answer to a question about what constitutes  a 
single unit in wine had to be “less than” a small glass. In fact, only 27 per 
cent of  respondents selected this answer. 
There are other instances  of imprecise terminology, which must cast 
doubt on the accuracy of participants’ responses. Reporting on a recent 
survey,73  it was said that most respondents had a rule of thumb that they 
could have “two drinks” without exceeding the limit, but the term “two 
drinks” was not explored. 
Influencing factors
Unfitness  to drive and reaching the prescribed drink-drive limit are 
influenced not only by the volume and strength of alcohol consumed, but by 
the many other factors mentioned in Chapter 6.74  Some of the studies 
illustrate that drivers are conscious  of the importance of individual 
characteristics, and the factors which affect the rate of metabolism of 
alcohol: 
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69  Deborah Lader and Matthew Steel, Drinking: Adults’ Behaviour and Knowledge in 2009 (Office for 
National Statistics, Opinions Survey Report No. 42, 2010) Chapter 4 and Appendix A. 
70 See p 205.
71  See, for example, the list on the website of the pub chain J D Wetherspoon: <http://
www.jdwetherspoon.co.uk/home/drink/beers-and-ciders> accessed 27 November 2013, listing eight 
of the “world’s top brands of lager” as having ABVs of 5.0, 5.0, 4.8, 4.6, 4.1, 4.0, 4.0 and 3.8  per 
cent. Appendix A to the ONS Report estimates an average ABV in “normal strength beer, lager or 
cider” as 4 per cent. 
72  Deborah Lader and Matthew Steel, Drinking: Adults’ Behaviour and Knowledge in 2009 (Office for 
National Statistics, Opinions Survey Report No. 42, 2010) 56–57.
73 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 37.
74 See pp 193–194.
Meals, size, speed of drinking and time between drinking and 
driving were all seen as  playing a part in what is  seen as  an 
impossible calculation.75 
While many drivers seem aware that alcohol affects different people 
differently, they may be less  sure of quite how. The published research 
suggests that their understanding of these issues  is shallow and tentative.76 
While it is  possible that respondents may, without prompting, have taken 
into account these factors when estimating how much they can drink 
without breaking the law, the research does  not address whether or not they 
did so, let alone the accuracy of any such mental exercise. Issues  such as  the 
rates  of absorption and elimination and the consumption of food with 
alcohol are largely ignored in the studies.
In some surveys, time has been taken into account. In one, 
respondents  were asked how much they could drink over two hours  and 
remain within the limit or safe to drive, although the reports contain no 
explanation of  why this period was selected.77
Research assumptions
In framing their research, some investigators have adopted assumptions 
about how much alcohol would take a driver over the limit. In studies 
designed to gauge the frequency of drink-driving, one early researcher, on 
the basis of information then published,78 thought it reasonable to assume 
that five units  would bring most people to the legal limit if drunk quickly 
and the person tested a short time later, although it was acknowledged that 
this  would not apply to all drivers. The same assumption was  made in a 
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75 Davies McKerr, Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 25 <http://www.docstoc.com/
docs/13834601/Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 November 2013. See also 
Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes (Central 
Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) 26–27, 28, 29–30, 33–34; Emma Collins and others, Drinking 
and Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish Government Social Research 2008) 
para 7.18; Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings 
(Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 37–38, 60, 61.
76 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 37–38.
77 AB Clayton and others, Drinking and Driving Habits, Attitudes and Behaviour of Male Motorists (Transport 
and Road Research Laboratory Supplementary Report 826, 1984) para 3.8; R Lennox  and A 
Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 1990) 24.
78 David Riley, Drivers’ Beliefs About Alcohol and the Law (1984) Home Office Research and Planning Unit 
Bulletin No 17, 32, giving as an example of published information Health Education Council Leaflet AL5 
(not traced by the present author). 
roadside survey conducted in 1990.79  More recent work has  moved away 
from making such assumptions,80 because of the clear difficulty of doing so 
accurately. Nevertheless, in a survey conducted in Scotland, reported in 
2001,81  it is  said that interviewees “operate with a relatively clear 
understanding of current limits, though this  is  typically expressed in terms of 
units or numbers  of drinks, rather than blood alcohol measures”. The report 
goes on to quote two units, two drinks or two pints  as typical of respondents’ 
perception of the current limit. The implication is that these estimates  are 
accurate, but the question is simply not explored, leaving no basis for 
concluding that respondents  had anything like a clear understanding of the 
legal limit. At the other end of the scale, where respondents in a pub said 
they could drink ten or more, or six or more, units without exceeding the 
limit, it was remarked that their assessments  were “based more on hope than 
on a realistic assessment”.82  Again the accuracy of these estimates is not 
addressed. It seems simply to be assumed that they must be wrong. Yet, as 
will be seen below,83 other studies suggest that two units, two drinks or two 
pints would leave many people well below the limit, while some may indeed 
be able to consume ten units and remain within it. 
In relation to research conducted in 2002,84 it was acknowledged that 
the same amount of alcohol can have a different effect on different 
individuals, but the prescribed limit was nevertheless equated to four units  of 
alcohol, two pints of regular strength beer, four very small glasses  of wine (7 
per cent ABV) or four single measures of spirit. The complexity of the issue 
is such that assumptions must be made if research is to be feasible, yet some 
such assumptions seem to beg the question: how small is  a “very small” glass 
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79 JT Everest and others, Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving: England and Wales 1990 (Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory Research Report 319, 1991) para 3.6, where it is said that this level was 
chosen because a man of average build would be unlikely to exceed the legal limit by drinking less 
than five units.
80  See, for example, Laura Brasnett, Drink-driving: Prevalence and Attitudes in England and Wales 2002 
(Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Findings 258, 2004) 3, 
acknowledging the difficulty of  gauging the level required to be over the limit. 
81  Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes 
(Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) 26.
82 Claire Corbett and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, Viewed 
from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32 Brit J Criminology 537, 546.
83 See p 240–248.
84 RAC Report on Motoring 2003, Drink, Drugs and Driving (RAC Motoring Services 2003) 14.
of wine. Others  appear naïve, in that wine having an ABV as low as 7 per 
cent is unlikely to be available.85
Personal interpretations
A further problem of interpreting the research findings is  that of identifying 
subjective views. Respondents  who are asked how much they can drink 
before driving and remain fit to drive or within the limit may, unless the 
question is framed so as to exclude the possibility, answer subjectively, 
bringing in personal considerations. Such answers  may be influenced by the 
“don’t drink and drive” campaigns, by inaccurate media reporting, by the 
complexity of the calculation, and/or by individual caution, resulting in an 
under-estimate. On the other hand, although probably less  likely, there may 
be over-estimates, possibly as a result of  bravado. 
Subjects  asked about how much they would in fact drink before 
driving may give low estimations  to appear in a positive light to researchers, 
to hide from the truth, because they are simply not aware of how much they 
drink,86 or to appear more law-abiding than they in fact are. Although some 
studies refer to “personal limits”,87  suggesting that these are individual 
interpretations rather than interpretations of the prescribed limit, many do 
not investigate whether responses have been influenced in ways such as 
these. Respondents  adopting the “don’t drink and drive” mantra88  are 
almost certainly erring on the side of caution as far as  the prescribed limit is 
concerned. 
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85  For example, the website of Majestic Wine <http://www.majestic.co.uk/find/category-is-Wine/>, 
when accessed on 18 August 2011, showed one wine having an ABV of up to 4.5  per cent; five wines 
having an ABV between 5 and 9.5 per cent, 54 with an ABV between 10 and 12 per cent; 531 in the 
range 12.5 to 14.5 per cent; and 13 having 15 per cent or more. 
86 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) 23. See also David Riley, Drivers’ Beliefs About 
Alcohol and the Law (1984) Home Office Research and Planning Unit Bulletin No 17, 32; Emma Collins 
and others, Drinking and Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish Government 
Social Research 2008) paras 2.6–2.8; R Lennox and A Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, 
Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and Road Research Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 1990) 24, 
45.
87  COI Research Unit and Research International for the Department of Transport, An Overview of 
Trends in Drinking and Driving Behaviour and Attitudes 1979 – 1993 (undated) para 3.16; Davies McKerr, 
Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 25 <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/13834601/
Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 November 2013.
88  In the British Social Attitudes Survey for 2012, two thirds of respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement that “If someone has drunk any alcohol they should not drive”: British Social Attitudes 
Survey 2012 (NatCen Social Research 2013) Self-Completion Questionnaire Version B, Question 6 
<http://www.bsa-30.natcen.ac.uk/media/24859/bsa_30_ annotated_questionnaire_2012.pdf> 
accessed 27 November 2013.
(Un)fitness to drive
Some of the studies which address drivers’ attitudes to drinking and driving 
omit the question of unfitness to drive altogether, concentrating only on the 
prescribed limit.89  In others, researchers  have used terms such as  “fit to 
drive”,90  “able to drive safely”91 and fitness to drive92  without expressly 
relating these expressions to either the statutory test of unfitness and its 
interpretation in the case law93  or to the prescribed limit. In one survey, 
respondents  were asked how much they would “tend to have and still feel 
confident then driving”,94 without reference to whether still feeling confident 
to drive meant fit to drive, or within the legal limit, or neither. The result is 
that while people may have described the circumstances in which they 
thought they would be safe to drive, or fit to drive, it is  difficult to know 
whether that means they believed they would be fit for legal purposes, below 
the legal limit, or neither. It may mean simply that they believed they could 
drive safely according to their own personal standards. If so, this leads to the 
unasked question of whether personal standards match the legal 
requirements.
While the scientific position is  that a person may be unfit to drive on 
far less  alcohol than would put the person over the limit,95 some research 
suggests that this is  not understood, and that respondents’ ideas of ability to 
drive safely fall below the legal standard of fitness to drive. In one survey, 
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89  For example, the two Scottish reports: Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: 
Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes (Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001); Emma Collins 
and others, Drinking and Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish Government 
Social Research 2008).
90 AB Clayton and others, Drinking and Driving Habits, Attitudes and Behaviour of Male Motorists (Transport 
and Road Research Laboratory Supplementary Report 826, 1984), para 3.8.
91  BE Sabey and others, Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving 1988  (Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory Report No. 175, 1988); JT Everest and others, Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving: 
Wiltshire (Transport and Road Research Laboratory Research Report RR 285, 1991); JT Everest and 
others, Roadside Surveys of Drinking and Driving: England and Wales 1990 (Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory Research Report 319, 1991) para 3.6; R Lennox  and A Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving 
Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and Road Research Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 
1990); Ian P Albery and Andrew Guppy, ‘Drivers’ Differential Perceptions of Legal and Safe Driving 
Consumption’ (1995) 90 Addiction 245.
92 Claire Corbett and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, Viewed 
from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32 Brit  J Criminology 537, 545, 546, referring to 
respondents in a pub study who believed they would be fit to drive even when over the limit. 
93 Explained in Chapter 6; see pp 209–211.
94  Churchill Insurance Press Release, Four Million Drivers Set to Hit the  Road ‘Smashed’ this Christmas, 1 
December 2006, supplemented by data kindly supplied by RBS Insurance in August 2008.
95 See pp 9, 192–193, 224.
there was little difference between the amounts respondents thought they 
could drink and remain within the limit and the amounts they thought they 
could drink and still drive safely,96 while others suggests the opposite.97 In a 
recent qualitative survey of fifty drivers,98  many respondents thought 
impaired ability to drive would be evident to them, and that if they felt 
“alright”, they were probably not impaired. They could apparently “feel 
alright”, and so presumably consider themselves  fit to drive, even if over the 
limit. 
In a study among men under the age of forty, there was general 
surprise that drinking to a level which leaves  the drinker below the limit 
could have any effect at all on driving ability. There seemed to be an 
assumption that the legal limit is set where it is because it is  safe to drink to 
that level and that driving is not impaired when below the limit.99 This bears 
out the fears of the Blennerhasset Committee decades  earlier.100  And 
respondents  were sceptical that driving ability could be impaired following 
as  little as  half a pint.101 This compares  with a survey in 1984 which showed 
that forty-seven per cent of respondents agreed with the statement than even 
one drink makes a person drive less safely.102  It seems that awareness  of 
unfitness  to drive may have receded since the introduction of the prescribed 
limit. 
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96  R Lennox  and A Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 1990) 6.
97 Claire Corbett and Frances Simon, ‘Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the Road, Viewed 
from the Rational Choice Perspective’ (1992) 32  Brit J Criminology 537, 545, 546, where more than 
three quarters of respondents in a survey of pub patrons who were planning to drive even though they 
expected to be over the limit believed they would nevertheless be fit to drive, although there is no 
definition of fitness to drive; Laura Brasnett, Drink-driving: Prevalence and Attitudes in England and Wales 
2002  (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Findings 258, 2004) 4, where 
almost half of drivers who drove when they thought they were over the limit said they did so because 
they felt safe to drive. 
98 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) para 5.2.
99  Davies McKerr, Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 41–42, 75 <http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/13834601/Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 
November 2013, where the sample consisted of men up to the age of thirty-nine; the number in the 
sample is not quoted.
100 In 1976; see pp 223–224. 
101  Davies McKerr, Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 63–64 <http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/13834601/Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 
November 2013.
102  R Lennox and A Quimby, A Survey of Drink Driving Behaviour, Knowledge and Attitudes (Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory Contractor Report 147, 1990) 36, 43.
Knowledge of  the Statutory Definition 
Only rarely have research subjects  been directly asked to define the 
prescribed limit itself. An early study103 indicated that forty-two per cent of 
respondents  knew that the limit was  80 milligrammes in 100 millilitres of 
blood; forty-five per cent did not know. But from the report, it is  unclear how 
the question was put; it is possible that the proportion 80 in 100 was quoted 
in the question.104 A later study reports that no respondent could quote the 
limit in terms of blood alcohol concentration, most thinking of it in terms of 
units, but again it is not clear what question was actually asked.105
More recent work indicates widespread ignorance of the prescribed 
limit as  a concentration of alcohol in the body. In an unpublished study 
conducted in Great Britain in 1993,106 1,062 respondents aged eighteen to 
thirty were asked what they understood by the term the “drink drive limit”. 
Although the question did not mention units  of alcohol or particular drinks, 
most respondents nevertheless interpreted the limit in those terms. Only 
fifteen per cent recognised it as  relating to the concentration of alcohol in 
the body, and even fewer knew the actual limit: 
• sixty-nine per cent answered by reference to an amount which may 
be drunk. Two thirds of these gave a number of units  of alcohol, 
pints, measures of spirits or glasses  of wine, ranging up to four units, 
three pints, three measures of spirits  and three glasses of wine. The 
remaining third referred, more conceptually, to “the amount you can 
drink before driving”, “the amount you have to drink”, “the limit 
you can drink at which it is safe to drive” without specifying a 
particular amount;
• nine per cent said the limit refers  to the amount or percentage of 
alcohol in the blood, without specifying an amount or percentage;
• six per cent quoted a limit in breath, blood or urine, two thirds of 
them getting it right and one third getting it wrong; 
• six per cent referred to the variables, saying that the answer depends 
on size, weight, gender or that different people are affected 
differently;
• five per cent replied, “you shouldn’t drink and drive”.
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103 AB Clayton and others, Drinking and Driving Habits, Attitudes and Behaviour of Male Motorists (Transport 
and Road Research Laboratory Supplementary Report 826, 1984) para 3.8.
104 Ibid, table 7, first entry.
105 Davies McKerr, Anti-Drink Drive Adcept Research Debrief, March 2007, 25 <http://www.docstoc.com/
docs/13834601/Drink-Drive-Adcept-Debrief-March-2007> accessed 27 November 2013.
106 Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished).
In another unpublished study107 conducted in 2000, 1,511 respondents 
were asked to give the legal drink-drive limit in terms  of milligrammes per 
100 millilitres  of blood. Only thirteen per cent gave the correct answer of 
80. And in a recent poll conducted throughout the European Union, 
respondents  were asked the legal blood alcohol level for drivers in their own 
countries. Seventy per cent of UK respondents simply did not know, while 
twenty-one per cent gave wrong answers. Only nine per cent put it within 
the band 60 to 100.108
When told the definition of the prescribed limit, it meant little to 
interviewees, one saying that “it might as well be Swahili”, another saying 
that the limits  “sound like medical terms”. Numbers  of drinks which could 
be consumed before reaching the limit were of  much greater interest.109 
It is  not only the statutory limit which is  ill-understood. An 
unpublished study in 1995 revealed widespread ignorance of the 
consequences of drink-driving, many respondents understating the penalties 
and failing to appreciate the additional cost of  insurance after conviction.110
In Chapter 8, I describe my own study, which confirms  the general 
lack of  understanding of  the drink-drive limit. 
Drivers’ Estimates Enhanced by Calculations
The research projects  described above give some indication of individuals’ 
perceptions of the prescribed limit and, to a lesser extent, of unfitness  to 
drive. They do not, however, address  the accuracy or otherwise of those 
perceptions. This is  not necessarily to criticise the studies, rather to illustrate 
the complexity of  the issue. 
Studies  conducted outside the UK have featured calculations to test 
the accuracy of respondents’ estimates, or to illustrate the relationship 
between amounts drunk and the resulting alcohol concentration in breath or 
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107  MORI for the Portman Group: A Report on what the British Public Thinks About Alcohol and the Part it 
Plays in their Lives (unpublished, research conducted in 2000).
108  European Commission, Attitudes Towards Alcohol (Special Eurobarometer 272, 2007) 26. It seems 
that the survey was not, however, confined to drivers. 
109 Wendy Sykes and others, A Qualitative Study of Drinking and Driving: Report of Findings (Department for 
Transport Road Safety Research Report no 114, 2010) para 5.3.
110 Audience Selection for the Portman Group, Crime and Punishment: A Report on the Nation’s Understanding 
of the Drink-driving Laws (unpublished report of research conducted in 2005). Police officers distributed 
a leaflet summarising the results of the study at Charing Cross Station over Christmas 1996. The 
study showed, for example, that three in five drivers did not realise that a drink driver not involved in 
an accident can be sent to  prison; 70 per cent thought the maximum fine is less than £2,000 (in fact it 
is £5,000); only 6  per cent realised that an endorsement for drink-driving stays on the licence for 
eleven years (see RTOA 1988, sch 2). Only 7 per cent knew that insurance premiums were likely to 
increase five-fold following a conviction. 
blood. Overall, these tend to confirm that it is extremely difficult for 
individuals accurately to estimate the effects  of alcohol. An American 
study111 concerned the role of alcohol in crime generally, and perceptions  of 
how much alcohol it takes to become intoxicated. Intoxication was  defined 
as  having 100112  milligrammes  of alcohol in 100 millilitres  of blood. 459 
students were asked to assume that, after working all day, they ate a light 
meal at 6 p.m. and went to a party at 9 p.m. They estimated how many of 
various  drinks, which were described, they would need to consume in an 
hour to become intoxicated. Widmark’s formula113 was applied to calculate 
the amount it  would actually take for each individual to become intoxicated 
to the defined level in one hour. Comparing the calculations with the 
students’ responses showed that fewer than half of respondents said, to 
within 25 per cent, the number of drinks  they could consume before 
reaching intoxication. Coining the expression “alcohol illiteracy”, the 
authors concluded that the average citizen lacks accurate knowledge and 
explicit guidance as  to the amount of alcohol he or she may drink without 
becoming functionally or legally impaired.
In a study in New Zealand in 2005,114 1,564 students said how many 
“standard drinks” they could consume in one hour and remain within the 
legal limit.115 Standard drinks were defined as containing 10116 grammes of 
alcohol, and illustrations were given. The responses  were then converted 
into blood alcohol concentration, taking into account sex and weight.117 The 
calculations showed that most respondents118 dramatically under-estimated 
how much they could drink and remain within the limit. Only 5.8 per cent 
of  respondents over-estimated it. 
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111  David J Giacopassi and Preston M Stein, ‘To Err is Human: Estimating Alcohol Content and Its 
Effects’ (1989) 5 Jnl of  Contemporary Criminal Justice 102.
112 The UK prescribed limit is 80; see p 14.
113 See p 203.
114  Kypros Kypri and Shaun Stephenson, ‘Drink-Driving and Perceptions of Legally Permissible 
Alcohol Use’ (2005) 6 Traffic Injury Prevention 219.
115 The limit in New Zealand is the same as in the UK.
116 A UK unit of  alcohol is 8 grammes; see p 205.
117  Using the formula developed by the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; see p 
204, fn 69.
118  The results are shown as graphs which are not entirely straightforward to interpret, but it seems 
that about 80 per cent of respondents gave estimates which would put their blood alcohol 
concentration at below 30 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 milligrammes of  blood. 
Calculating the Blood Alcohol Concentrations (BACs) of  
Hypothetical Subjects
Calculations  published in 2003 in Canada119  are perhaps even more 
revealing. Researchers had been surprised when police officers told them 
how much a person had to consume before being charged with the offence 
of being over the limit. They decided to calculate the blood alcohol levels  of 
hypothetical men and women, using the formula adopted by the American 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The results were published 
as  tables showing blood alcohol concentrations of both males and females 
assuming certain numbers of drinks  consumed over two, three or four hours, 
and assuming certain body weights. An extract is quoted below.120 
The Blood Alcohol Concentrations of  Males in Relation to Weight and Drinks 
Consumed in Three Hours
No. of  
“standard 
drinks”
consumed 
over 3 hours
Equivalent 
in UK 
units
Resulting 
BAC in male 
weighing
170 lbs 
(= 77.1 kg or 
12 st 2 lb)
Resulting 
BAC in male 
weighing
185 lbs 
(= 83.9 kg or 
13 st 3 lb)
Resulting 
BAC in male 
weighing 
200 lbs 
(= 90.7 kg or 
14 st 4 lb)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
3.36 3.5 0 0
5.05 27.8 21.9 16.9
6.73 52.1 44.2 37.5
8.41 76.3 66.5 58.1
10.09 100.6 88.8 78.7
11.77 124.8 111.1 99.4
13.46 149.1 133.4 120.0
These calculations are conservative in that they assume that the person is 
drinking on an empty stomach, and make no allowance for the elimination 
of any alcohol by metabolism.121  The figures  highlighted in bold indicate 
results over the UK limit. It appears that people may remain within the limit 
even after consuming a great deal more than they think they can according 
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119  Robert Solomon and Erika Chamberlain, ‘Calculating BACs for Dummies: The Real-World 
Significance of Canada’s 0.08% Criminal ABC Limit for Driving’ (2003) 8 Canadian Criminal Law 
Review 219.
120  The tables published at (2003) 8 Can CLR 219 refer to weights in pounds only, and to “standard 
drinks”. Pounds are here converted to stones and kg using Apple Macintosh Calculator version 4.2. 
The Canadian “standard drink” referred to by the authors contains 13.46 grammes of pure alcohol, 
while a standard UK unit  contains only 8  grammes; standard drinks have here been converted to units 
on this basis. For example, 2 standard drinks contain (2 x 13.46 =) 26.92 grammes of alcohol, ÷ 8, 
gives 3.365 units.
121 Food would slow the absorption of alcohol and lower the peak alcohol concentration, as explained 
on p 193.
to the UK surveys. For example, men of all three weights could drink as 
much as eight units over three hours without exceeding the limit. Women 
weighing 120, 130 and 140 pounds  (8 st 8 lb; 9 st 4 lb, 10 st; 54.4 kg, 58.97 
kg, 63.5 kg) could, it was  calculated, all drink the equivalent of 3.36 units 
and remain within the limit, whether they consumed the drinks over two, 
three or four hours. Women in the two heavier ranges could drink 5.05 units 
over two, three or four hours without exceeding the limit.
The calculations above may be compared with a table given by 
Denney.122  His table gives the approximate blood and breath alcohol levels 
resulting from drinking various amounts of beer having 3.6 per cent alcohol 
by volume, and from drinking various measures  of whisky containing 40 per 
cent alcohol by volume. The following extract shows the resulting123 blood 
alcohol concentration for men weighing 154 pounds  (70 kg or 11 st). Again, 
the figures in bold indicate a BAC which exceeds the prescribed limit:
Beer – pints Equivalent in 
units
Resulting BAC
1
2
2.5
3
4
5
2.04 34
4.08 67
5.1 84
6.12 101
8.16 134
10.2 168
On the face of it, it may seem that Denney’s  hypothetical subjects reach the 
limit on less  alcohol than Solomon and Chamberlain’s. But the tables can be 
reconciled by the fact that Denney’s hypothetical subject is lighter than 
Solomon and Chamberlain’s, and if it is  assumed that Denney makes  no 
allowance for the time over which the alcohol is  taken (in fact he does not 
say whether or not he makes any allowance for time).124  But Denney’s 
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122 Ronald C Denney, None for the Road: Understanding Drink-Driving (Shaw 1997) 40.
123 The author does not specify how the calculation is made.
124 Applying the calculations set out in detail on pp 231  to 233 of Solomon and Chamberlain’s article 
to Denney’s hypothetical 70 kilo man drinking the amounts of alcohol Denney assumes, produces 
results which agree with those given by Denney. For example, a 70 kg man would have (70 x 58% =) 
40.6 litres of water in his body. If he has consumed 4.08 units of alcohol, that is the equivalent of 
(40.8 x 8 =) 32.64 grammes of alcohol. This produces a water-alcohol concentration in the body of 
(32.64 divided by 40.6 =) .804. Converting the alcohol concentration in water to the alcohol 
concentration in blood gives (.804 x  80.6% =) .647. The figure given by Denney is in fact 67. The 
difference may be accounted for by the fact that Solomon and Chamberlain used the US NHTSA 
formula (see fn 66 above); Denney does not say how he made the calculations.
calculations are conservative in the same way as Solomon and 
Chamberlain’s in making no allowance for the elimination of  alcohol. 
It seems  surprising that calculations  of the kind described above have 
not received greater attention, or that the simple method of applying a 
standard formula has  not been used more widely in research into how the 
drink-drive limit works in practice. The technique gives a realistic estimate of 
the amounts of alcohol which would bring people to the limit, and suggests 
that drivers’ own estimates may be extremely conservative. I discuss  this 
further in Chapter 9.125
Studies of  the Effects of  Specific Amounts of  Alcohol
A small number of studies provide real-life examples of much alcohol would 
bring a person to the legal limit. 
In an early Australian study,126  experiments  were carried out to 
investigate the relationship between the amount of alcohol consumed and 
the maximum blood alcohol concentration reached, and the time it took 
after the last drink to reach that maximum concentration. While these small-
scale experiments  were not in the context of driving offences, and did not 
take into account subjects’ own views  of the effects of what they drank, they 
are nevertheless revealing. Seventeen subjects drank the equivalent of 
thirteen units  of alcohol within an hour. They reached their maximum 
blood alcohol concentration an average sixty minutes later. Blood specimens 
were taken and analysed. The levels  ranged from 75 to 185 milligrammes 
per 100 millilitres.127 While it is  hardly surprising that most were over the 
limit having drunk so much so quickly, what may be surprising is that one 
person was not. He drank the equivalent of ten units, weighed 84 
kilogrammes, and was aged thirty-nine. 
In a second experiment, thirty-six subjects  had a light breakfast128 and 
drank at their own pace, over a period of three hours. On average they 
consumed the equivalent of a massive twenty units  of alcohol and took 43 
minutes to reach maximum blood alcohol concentration. Blood alcohol 
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125 See pp 292–293.
126 IEC Cameron and PA Donkin, ‘Interpretation of Breathalyser Results for Medico-legal Purposes: 
An Investigation of the Blood Alcohol Concentration of Subjects Monitored in a Series of Controlled 
Drinking Experiments’ in Ian R Johnston (ed), Proceedings, Seventh International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs 
and Traffic, 1979, 206.
127 Blood alcohol concentration is expressed in the report as a percentage, but is here expressed in the 
same way as in RTA 1988. 
128  The report does not describe the food eaten in any further detail; nor does it state the time lapse 
between eating and starting to drink.
concentration ranged from 70 to 245. Only two were below the limit; both 
had had the equivalent of 13 units of alcohol. One was aged twenty-eight, 
the other thirty-five, and they weighed, respectively, 105 and 86 
kilogrammes.
A small study into the meaning of “binge drinking”129 was undertaken 
in the UK in 2003 at a cricket match. Twelve men, aged thirty-four to fifty-
nine, who all said they were social drinkers, participated. The number of 
units of alcohol each drank before lunch (1 p.m.), from lunch to tea-time 
(3.30 p.m.), and from tea-time to end of play (6.00 p.m.) was  recorded. All 
began drinking at 11.15 a.m., except one who began at 12.15. Breath 
alcohol was  measured at lunch time, tea-time and end of play. All had had 
breakfast. One had a hot lunch; the others  had a picnic. At the end of play, 
four were over the limit, with breath alcohol concentrations of 36, 54, 57 
and 61 microgrammes. They had drunk, respectively, 16, 16.7, 19.5 and 
21.7 units  of alcohol over the course of the day. The number of units 
consumed by those who were below the limit at the end of the day ranged 
from 8.5 units  to 18.9 units, suggesting that, at least when consumed over a 
relatively long period and with a meal, fairly substantial amounts may be 
drunk without reaching the drink-drive limit. 
The issue has also been covered in the popular media, although in the 
absence of detailed published reports, the results are probably to be treated 
with some caution. They nevertheless support the view that it is  extremely 
difficult to predict the effects  of given amounts of alcohol. In a small 
experiment designed to illustrate the difference that age, sex, height and 
weight can make to alcohol concentration,130  eight volunteers each drank 
either three or four measured units of alcohol and ate a sandwich. Blood 
specimens were taken when they finished the drinks, and a breath test was 
administered twenty minutes later. Further blood specimens were taken an 
hour and a half after they had finished drinking. The resulting alcohol 
concentrations  were widely different. Among the five people who had 
consumed three units of alcohol, alcohol concentration in blood ranged 
from 16.6 to 74.9 milligrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood when 
drinking stopped, and from 26.2 to 58.1 an hour and a half later. Only one 
of the tests  showed a participant over the limit – a nineteen-year-old woman 
weighing nine and a half  stones, height 5 ft 4 in, who drank three units. 
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129  Neil R Wright, ‘A Day at the Cricket: The Breath Alcohol Consequences of a Type of Very 
English Binge Drinking’ (2006) 14 Addiction Research and Theory 133.
130  Sarah Edghill, ‘Why Alcohol Testing Doesn’t Tell You Whether You’re Fit to Drive’ (1998) Good 
Food 102.
Another rare example of a popular review of the position was a 
television broadcast131 which followed five people in a bar. One drank five 
pints, but was  just under the limit at the end of the evening. Another drank 
six pints  and his  breath alcohol at the end of the evening was 44 
microgrammes. 
Estimated vs Actual Alcohol Concentration
Other experimental studies, all conducted outside the UK, have 
concentrated not on how much people think they can drink and still legally 
drive, but on comparing their own estimates of their alcohol concentrations 
with actual measured levels. Although the studies  were conducted for a 
variety of purposes, and although the results are reported in different ways, 
what emerges  is  that most people are unable accurately to estimate their 
breath- or blood- alcohol concentration. At lower levels of consumption, 
people tend to over-estimate alcohol concentration, thinking that they will 
reach the limit on less  alcohol than is  the case. At higher levels, they are 
more likely to under-estimate alcohol concentration, believing they can stay 
within the limit on more alcohol than is the case.
In New Zealand in 1977,132  passers-by in a city centre late in the 
evening were asked to estimate their blood alcohol concentrations, and 
blood samples were taken and analysed for comparison. Only thirty-one per 
cent were right to within twenty per cent either way. Those with low blood 
alcohol tended to over-estimate it. Those with the highest concentrations 
were most accurate, but there was an increasing tendency to under-estimate 
at higher levels. A study conducted in Virginia in 1985, among students  at a 
party,133 also showed that subjects  underestimated the amount of alcohol it 
took to reach their actual blood alcohol levels.
As part of a study conducted in Canada, reported in 1986,134 seventy-
two participants  attended events  designed to be as  close as possible to 
ordinary social evenings. They were given a variety of alcoholic drinks and, 
at intervals, asked to estimate their blood alcohol concentrations. Their 
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131 ITV, Police, Camera Action: Drink-Drive Special, broadcast 17 December 2008.
132 JR Sharman and others ‘Blood Alcohol Levels. How Accurately Can They be Guessed?’ (1978) 87 
New Zealand Med Jnl 438. This was an exercise by members of the bio-chemistry department of 
Christchurch University, New Zealand, to raise funds for charity. They offered to measure blood 
alcohol concentrations in return for a donation.
133 Nason W Russ and others, ‘Estimating Alcohol Impairment in the Field: Implications for Drunken 
Driving’ (1986) 47 Jnl of  Studies on Alcohol 237.
134  Douglas J Beirness, ‘Self-estimates of Blood Alcohol Concentration in Drinking-driving 
Context’ (1987) 19 Drug and Alcohol Dependence 79.
actual blood alcohol concentrations were then measured and compared with 
the estimates. Just under forty-nine per cent of participants  over-estimated 
their alcohol concentrations; 31.9 per cent under-estimated them; and 19.4 
per cent revealed a mixed pattern of underestimating during the alcohol 
absorption phase and overestimating during the elimination phase. 
In September 1990, a voluntary roadside survey of night-time drivers 
was  carried out in Minnesota.135  483 drivers who said they had drunk 
alcohol within the preceding twelve hours, and whose measured blood 
alcohol levels were not less  than the equivalent of 20 milligrammes in 100 
millilitres of blood, were asked to estimate their blood alcohol 
concentrations, which were then compared with the results  of analysing 
breath specimens. Only eighteen per cent were right to within 10 
milligrammes. Thirty-two per cent over-estimated it, and fifty per cent 
under-estimated it. As in other studies,136 those with lower concentrations 
(below 50 milligrammes) were more likely to over-estimate their alcohol 
concentration, while those with higher alcohol concentrations  tended to 
under-estimate it. Of those who were actually over the limit, 94 per cent 
under-estimated their alcohol concentration.
More recent work in the United States137  indicated that people 
drinking in bars were poor at estimating their blood alcohol concentrations. 
Of subjects  who had been drinking before arriving at the bar, only 28.9 per 
cent could estimate their blood alcohol accurately.138  The figure for those 
who had not been drinking before was higher, at 42.5 per cent.
Other studies, not all of them in the context of driving, and none of 
them particularly recent, have borne out the tendency to over-estimate the 
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135  DJ Beirness and others, ‘Drinking Drivers’ Estimates of Their Own Blood Alcohol 
Concentration’ (1993) 21 Jnl of  Traffic Medicine 73. 
136  For example, Christopher S Martin and others, ‘Estimation of Blood Alcohol Concentrations in 
Young Male Drinkers’ (1991) 15 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 494.
137  John D Clapp and others, ‘Predictors of Error in Estimates of Blood Alcohol Concentration: A 
Replication’ (2009) 70 Jnl of  Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 683.
138 To within 2 grammes per 100 milligrammes.
effect on blood alcohol concentration of alcohol at lower levels of 
consumption and under-estimate it at higher levels.139 
All the studies  referred to above illustrate the difficulty for drivers  to estimate 
their own blood alcohol concentration, and the widely varying effects of 
personal characteristics and circumstances. I refer to these studies  again in 
Chapter 9, in support of my argument that the prescribed limit cannot be 
reconciled with the principle of  legal certainty discussed in Chapter 5.
DRUGS
By comparison with alcohol, there has been little research into the driving 
public’s understanding of how drugs affect driving skills, or on the relevant 
law.140 As noted in Chapter 6, driving can be impaired by a wide range of 
drugs, both legal (whether or not prescribed) and illegal. In due course there 
will also be offences of driving, attempting to drive or in charge with an 
excess of  a specified controlled drug.141 
Applicants for provisional driving licences, and those who hold driving 
licences, have legal duties142  to declare whether they suffer from certain 
disabilities  which might affect their fitness to drive. The disabilities  to be 
declared include the persistent misuse of drugs  or alcohol, whether or not 
such misuse amounts to dependency. The DVLA investigates such 
declarations and as a consequence, a licence may be refused, revoked or 
restricted. While this  may mean that regular or heavy users of drugs or 
alcohol may not be licensed to drive at all, and indeed may flag up, at an 
early stage, the connection between drugs  or alcohol and fitness to drive, it 
does  not assist drivers  in knowing about the effects  of drugs  or the law on 
fitness to drive. 
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139 Robert Turrisi and James Jaccard, ‘Judgment Processes Relevant to Drunk Driving’ (1991) 21 Jnl of 
Applied Social Psychology 89; Dennis L Thombs and others, ‘Field Assessment of BAC Data to Study 
Late-Night College Drinking’ (2003) 64 Jnl of Studies on Alcohol 322; Jacques Wicki and others, 
‘Self-Estimates of Blood-Alcohol Concentration and Ability to Drive in a Population of 
Soldiers’ (2000) 35  Alcohol and Alcoholism 104; Courtney L Kraus and others, ‘Inconsistencies 
Between Actual and Estimated Blood Alcohol Concentrations in a Field Study of College Students: 
Do Students Really Know How Much They Drink?’ (2005) 29 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental 
Research 1672; Jean-Pascal Assailly, ‘Self-Estimates and Objective Measurement of BRAC in Young 
French Drivers: A Field Study and its Preventive Aspects’ (1995) Thirteenth International Conference 
on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety.
140  Acknowledged in Sir Peter North, Report of the Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) 
para 6.8.
141 When RTA 1988, s 5A comes into force; see pp 8–9.
142 Under RTA 1988, ss 92 and 94.
Medication: Over-the-Counter and Prescription Drugs
Sources of information about the effects of medication are the label or other 
printed information provided with the medication, the pharmacist, the 
doctor or other health professional. While advice on fitness  to drive should 
be integral to many consultations between drivers and health professionals, 
very little research has been done in the UK on the extent to which such 
advice is given, understood, or put into practice.143
There are statutory requirements concerning the labelling of 
medicines.144  Medicines  must also be accompanied by a product 
information leaflet, which must include a statement of any effects the 
medicine may have on the patient’s ability to drive.145 As noted elsewhere,146 
over one hundred over-the-counter medicines  contain ingredients which 
may cause drowsiness, but the warnings  on the packaging are inconsistent 
and often poorly presented. The Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency is working with European regulators  to strengthen 
information given with prescription and over-the-counter medicines.147
The British National Formulary has promulgated recommended 
wordings  for prescription medicines, which include warnings such as  “This 
medicine may make you sleepy. If this  happens, do not drive or use tools or 
machines.”148 
The provision of advice is  only one aspect of the complex matter of 
understanding the law on fitness to drive. It raises the further questions 
whether general advice applies  in particular cases; whether the advice is 
assimilated and understood; and whether or not the driver acts on it. It 
seems that remarkably little is  known about these issues. One piece of 
research showed that a large proportion of patients  do read the product 
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143 Tim Carter, Fitness to Drive: A Guide for Health Professionals (Royal Society of Medicine Press 2006) Ch 
4.
144  See the schedules to the Medicines (Labelling) Regulations 1976 SI 1976/1726 as amended, 
requiring that medicines be labelled with information on matters such as the name of the product  and 
its active ingredients.
145  The Medicines (Leaflets) Regulations 1977 SI 1977/1055 as amended, sch 2. See also Medicines 
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, Committee on Safety of Medicines, Always Read The 
Leaflet, Getting the best information with every medicine (Stationery Office 2005) 14.
146 See p 198.
147  The Government’s Response to the Reports by Sir Peter North CBE QC and the Transport Select Committee on 
Drink and Drug Driving (Cm 8050, 2011) paras 13.10–13.15
148  <http://www.medicinescomplete.com/mc/bnf/current/PHP9294-recommended-label-
wordings.htm> accessed 27 November 2013.
information leaflet accompanying prescription medicines.149 But whether or 
not patients act on advice not to drive is unclear. A wide-ranging review150 of 
research into the role and effectiveness  of written information about 
medicines, reported in 2007, concluded that most patients  read the leaflets, 
and were most interested in any possible adverse effects. Since the focus  of 
the review was patients’ knowledge and understanding of treatment and 
health outcomes, the report does  not cover how patients  reacted to warnings 
not to drive.
Only a single study extending to drivers’ knowledge about medicinal 
drugs  has been traced. It indicated that 75 per cent of over 2,000 drivers 
surveyed in 2002/03 knew it was illegal to drive when under the influence of 
medication which could impair driving ability, but fewer than 40 per cent 
knew that over-the-counter products  such as  hay fever remedies and cough 
medicines can impair.151
One of the few items of public information on driving after taking 
medication152  perhaps only illustrates the complexity of the problem, 
pointing out the absence of hard and fast rules and the need for advice from 
a doctor or pharmacist in individual cases.
Illicit Drugs
A little more is known about drivers’ understanding of the effects of illicit 
drugs  and fitness  to drive. The RAC reported that 82 per cent of over 2,000 
drivers  surveyed in 2002/3 said it was extremely dangerous  to drive while 
under the influence of “hard” drugs such as  ecstasy, cocaine or heroin, while 
65 per cent said it was  extremely dangerous to drive while under the 
influence of  cannabis or marijuana.153 
A small number of studies among drug-users themselves, however, 
reveals a more complex picture. As already noted,154  cannabis has  been 
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
250
149 DK Raynor and others, ‘How Do Patients Use Medicine Information Leaflets in the UK?’ (2007) 
15 International Jnl of  Pharmacy Practice 209. 
150  DK Raynor and others, ‘A Systematic Review of Quantitative and Qualitative Research on the 
Role and Effectiveness of Written Information Available to Patients about Individual 
Medicines’ (2007) 11 Health Technology Assessment i.
151 RAC Report on Motoring 2003, Drink, Drugs and Driving (RAC Motoring Services 2003) 30–31.
152  London Accident Prevention Council, Don’t Motor on Meds: It’s Illegal <http://
www.motoringassist.com/Assets/Documents/Leaflets/Web-Road-Safety-leaflets/GEM-Meds-
leaflet> accessed 27 November 2013.
153 RAC Report on Motoring 2003, Drink, Drugs and Driving (RAC Motoring Services 2003) 25.
154 See p 198.
shown to impair driving skills. In a qualitative study in Scotland,155  44 
people who had driven within a few hours  of taking cannabis gave mixed 
comments  about its  effects, both positive and negative, and individuals  were 
sometimes inconsistent in what they said. Perceived positive effects included 
heightened perceptions, greater focus and less propensity to speed, take risks, 
or be impatient. The main negative effects  were seen as reduced 
concentration and feeling out of control. Some said cannabis had no effect 
on driving. Among the smaller numbers who had driven after using ecstasy, 
amphetamines, cocaine or LSD, the proportions who thought their driving 
skills were thereby enhanced were far lower. Subjects who had taken drugs 
but not then driven had more negative views. There was a widespread 
perception that the effects of drugs  depend on a range of factors, such as the 
type and amount of drug, its strength or purity, and interactions with other 
substances. Most thought drink-driving more dangerous than drug-
driving.156 Knowledge of  roadside drug-testing was limited. 
In an associated Scottish study on the prevalence of driving after using 
recreational drugs,157  among 61 club-goers  who were all users of illicit 
drugs, many thought cannabis  had little or no impact on driving skills  and 
performance; again, some thought it would enhance driving. Those who had 
driven after taking ecstasy reported effects  such as blurred vision, impaired 
concentration, propensity to speed and slower reaction times. Some who 
had taken amphetamine felt their driving was little affected, while some were 
sure it had been impaired. The effects of driving after cocaine were 
described as mixed, but all thought that driving after LSD was extremely 
dangerous. Knowledge of the legal position was  said to be very poor, 
although the report does not elaborate on this.
In a later survey, again in Scotland,158  it emerged that, of 36 
interviewees  who admitted having driven while under the influence of drugs 
in the past, almost half believed the drugs had no effect on their driving, 
while nine per cent thought the drugs  improved their driving. Ninety-two 
per cent knew they could be prosecuted for drug-driving.
Other studies confirm the perception, at least among young people, 
that, while alcohol reduces mental alertness  and may increase aggression, 
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155  Joanne Neale and others, Recreational Drug Use and Driving: A Qualitative Study (Scottish Executive 
Central Research Unit, 2000) paras 5.5–5.8, 15.19.
156 Ibid, para 7.8.
157  Dave Ingram and others, Recreational Drugs and Driving (Scottish Executive Central Research Unit, 
Research Findings no 102, 2001).
158  Katherine Myant and others, Illicit Drugs and Driving (Scottish Executive Social Research 2006) fig 
5.2.
cannabis has  the opposite effect and improves  driving.159  In a study in the 
UK,160  among 50 regular cannabis  users who reported driving after 
consuming cannabis, 24 per cent thought their driving was  improved by 
cannabis. Only 12 per cent believed their driving was  very much impaired; 
58 per cent believed it was only slightly impaired; and 6 per cent believed it 
was  not impaired at all. On the other hand, all believed that alcohol 
impaired their driving. An earlier study of 58 UK drug-users  who had 
driven after taking drugs  had shown that those who sometimes or frequently 
did so thought that an accident would be more likely when driving after 
taking alcohol alone, rather than cannabis, methadone, stimulants or 
heroin.161
Research carried out for the Department for Transport,162 to inform 
its first major anti drug-driving campaign in the summer of 2009, revealed 
that young drug users163  rarely acknowledge drug-driving as a problem. 
There was little concern about detection and little awareness of the legal 
penalties. It was generally accepted that driving after taking drugs is illegal, 
but usually on the basis  that possessing the drugs  is  illegal. The effects of 
drugs  on driving ability were only rarely acknowledged, and certain drugs 
were seen to have positive effects on driving. There was much greater 
awareness that drink-driving is  an offence, and drink-driving was considered 
far worse than drug driving.164 Most thought it far easier to measure whether 
or not they would be over the alcohol limit. 
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Learning to Drive (Department for Transport Road Safety Research Report No 74, 2007) 19.
160  P Terry, KA Wright, ‘Self-reported Driving Behaviour and Attitudes Towards Driving under the 
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161 Ian P Albery and others, ‘Illicit Drugs and Driving: Prevalence, Beliefs and Accident Involvement 
Among a Cohort of Current Out-of-treatment Drug Users’ (2000) 58 Drugs and Alcohol 
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162  Firefish Qualitative Research for the Department for Transport, Drug Driving Campaign – Creative 
Development, April 2009 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120606112243/http://
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For the final report, see Department for Transport, Drug Drive – August 2009 Post Campaign Report 
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163 The sample size is not given in the report. 
164  In contrast, in a Scottish survey of young male drivers only three years earlier, 46 per cent of 
respondents agreed that  taking drugs and driving was more dangerous than drunk driving; only 11 
per cent disagreed: Katherine Myant and others, Illicit Drugs and Driving (Scottish Executive Social 
Research 2006) 34. 
DISCUSSION
The studies described in this chapter illustrate little connection between, on 
the one hand, drivers’ perceptions of the prohibitions on drink- and drug-
driving and, on the other hand, the statutory provisions and the scientific 
realities. 
The legal definition of the prescribed limit as the concentration of 
alcohol in the breath, blood or urine seems to be unknown to many drivers 
and poorly understood by most of the remainder. It is  perfectly natural to 
seek to understand the limit by reference to what is  consumed, especially in 
the absence of tools to measure it in any other way. It is  not clear how 
drivers  settle on their own versions of safe amounts to drink, but it seems 
likely that they do so without reference to the statutory prohibitions, instead 
taking into account various public health messages, road safety messages, 
and media reports. These are often, as has been seen, contradictory and in 
some cases  misleading. Nevertheless, translating the prescribed limit into an 
amount which may be drunk is fraught with difficulty – it requires a proper 
consideration of the amount consumed, its strength, the time over which it 
was  drunk, the time since it was drunk, and anything consumed with it, as 
well as many characteristics of  the individual concerned. 
Many drivers  seem to adopt conservative interpretations, perhaps as  a 
matter of caution in response to the inherent difficulties; perhaps, in the 
interview situation, from a desire to appear in a good light. Nor is  it always 
clear whether the estimates are of what the individual believes  he or she 
could drink and still drive within the law, or of what the individual would 
drink before driving. 
As a result, surprising as it may seem, most drivers  appear to think the 
drink-drive limit is a great deal more restrictive than it in fact is. No work 
has been done in the UK to assess  the accuracy of drivers’ estimates of how 
much they can drink before driving and remain within the law, but 
comparing such estimates  with the calculated blood alcohol concentrations 
arrived at in studies such as  that of Solomon and Chamberlain165  suggests 
that drivers greatly under-estimate how much they may drink before 
reaching the prescribed limit. Experimental work in other jurisdictions, with 
people who had been drinking at the time of interview, also shows that at 
lower levels, people think they will reach the limit on far less  alcohol than is 
in fact the case, although at higher levels, they think the opposite, over-
estimating how much they can drink before reaching the limit. 
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165 See p 242.
Ironically, of course, an over-estimate in relation to the prescribed 
limit is unlikely to be an over-estimate in relation to (un)fitness to drive.166 
In Chapter 9,167  I argue that all these considerations make the 
prescribed limit so uncertain of interpretation that the principle of legal 
certainty is not met.
The studies  which have been conducted concentrate on the prescribed 
limit with little reference to the offence of driving when unfit. Some refer to 
“safety to drive” without relating this  expression to unfitness  to drive. There 
seems to be little understanding that driving skill can be impaired after a 
very small amount of alcohol. In view of that, the “don’t drink and drive” 
message appears far more appropriate to the offence of driving when unfit 
than to driving while over the limit, yet there is greater awareness of the 
latter offence and it is  far more commonly prosecuted. Despite this, in 
Chapter 9,168 I defend the legal concept of (un)fitness  to drive through drink 
as reconcilable with the principle of  legal certainty.
Far less  is known about drivers’ knowledge of the drug-driving 
prohibitions. It is  unclear how widely the prohibition on driving when unfit 
through drugs, particularly prescription drugs, is  understood. Among users 
of illegal drugs, there may be confusion between the offences of possession 
of illegal drugs and driving when unfit. There may be differences between 
the views of  those who do, and those who do not, use various drugs. 
While the exact effects  of different drugs on driving skills  are a 
complex issue, I argue in Chapter 9169 that the relative simplicity of the term 
unfitness  is  such that most drivers  should know whether or not, having 
consumed drugs, they are unfit to drive through drugs. Whether or not they 
will know if they are over the forthcoming specified limits170 is, however, 
another matter.
 Against this background, I conducted a piece of empirical work to 
explore drivers’ perceptions further. This  were confined to alcohol and the 
prescribed limit, and is described in Chapter 8.
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166  Given that a person may be unfit to drive at a far lower blood alcohol concentration than the 
prescribed limit; see pp 9, 192–193.
167 See pp 292–294.
168 See pp 290–292.
169 Ibid.
170 Under RTA 1988, s 5A; see pp 8–9, 206.
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 INTRODUCTION
It has been seen in Chapter 7 that most drivers  think of the prescribed 
drink-drive limit in terms of how much they can drink without falling foul of 
the law, rather than in the terms  of the statute, which refers to the 
concentration of alcohol in the body. There is also much to suggest that 
drivers’ ideas  about how much they can drink before reaching the limit are 
inaccurate. These findings in turn have implications  for the principle of legal 
certainty, described in Chapter 5, and discussed further in Chapter 9.
In many of the studies  described in Chapter 7, drivers  had simply 
been asked how much they could drink and remain within the limit.1 
Phrasing the question in this  way would focus respondents’ minds  on how 
much may be drunk, to the exclusion of other possible ways  of 
understanding the drink-drive limit. I decided to look for other 
interpretations by putting a more broadly-based question in a survey.
The Survey Question
To obtain a large number of answers in a fairly short time, I decided to take 
advantage of the established sampling, interviewing and data-collection 
techniques offered by the Opinions Survey2  conducted by the Office for 
National Statistics  (“ONS”). My question, together with a preliminary 
screening question (see below), was  incorporated in the Opinions Survey in 
July 2009.
My survey question was:
Most drivers  know something about the drink-drive law, but I 
am interested to know what drivers  understand about the drink-
drive limit itself. Please tell me, in a sentence or two, what the 
expression ‘the drink-drive limit’ means to you.
It was to be expected that the results would reflect the findings  described in 
Chapter 7, but I hoped that the open-ended nature of the question would 
generate responses encompassing a wider range of issues, yielding greater 
insight into what the drink-drive limit means to drivers, and how their 
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1 See pp 228–238.
2  Now called Opinions and Lifestyle Survey, which “provides a fast, cost effective and reliable way of 
collecting data”: ONS, About the survey <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/products-and-
services/opn/about-the-survey/index.html> accessed 27 November 2013.
understanding of it compares with the legal definition. Drafting the question 
in open terms would also allow respondents freedom to answer in their own 
words, and would avoid suggesting answers to them. An open question of 
this  nature had previously been put in only one, unpublished, survey, sixteen 
years before.3
My question referred explicitly to the drink-drive limit, excluding from 
consideration the offence of unfitness  to drive,4  or, since they were not in 
contemplation at the time, the new proposed offences  of excess  of a 
specified drug.5 Since resources were limited, it seemed expedient to confine 
the question to the better-known offence and avoid the risk of generating 
confusion between the two sets of  offences.
The question was tested by ONS before being included in the 
Opinions Survey, and I piloted it informally using a small sample of friends 
and family (ten) to ensure it did not give rise to ambiguities  or 
misunderstandings. 
I expected the question to do no more than elicit respondents’ 
perceptions, leaving open whether or not those perceptions were accurate.
Ethical Issues
The survey question received approval from the Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of Sheffield School of Law in May 2009. The resulting 
data is subject to a data access agreement in the ONS’s  standard form, 
restricting use of the data to statistical, research and analysis  purposes, and 
providing for the confidentiality and security of  the data.
	 The principles applied by ONS in conducting surveys  are set out in its  
Survey Charter.6 The handling of data, and in particular the confidentiality 
of  data, are subject to the ONS Code of  Practice.7
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3  Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239. 
4  As noted on p 8, RTA 1988, s 4 creates the offences of driving, attempting to drive or being in 
charge when unfit through drink or drugs, while s 5 creates the offences of driving, attempting to drive 
or in charge after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion in the breath, blood or urine 
exceeds the prescribed limit. The s 5 offence of driving with excess alcohol is the most commonly 
prosecuted (see p 200).
5 Under RTA 1988, s 5A; see pp 8–9.
6  <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/search/index.html?newquery=Opinions+Survey> accessed 27 
November 2013.
7  UK Statistics Authority, Code of Practice for  Official Statistics, edn 1.0 January 2009 <http://
www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/assessment/code-of-practice/index.html> accessed 27 November 
2013. See Principle 5: Confidentiality.
Method
The sample comprised 1,200 adult individuals in private households  in 
Great Britain. It was drawn from the Royal Mail’s  postcode address file of 
private households which receive fewer than fifty items of mail per day. 
From this population, a sample was  drawn using statistical techniques which 
would ensure, as far as  reasonably possible, that the sample was 
representative of the population as a whole. Sixty-seven postal sectors were 
selected, with the probability of selection being proportionate to the sizes of 
the sectors. Addresses within these sectors were stratified8 by region, by the 
proportion of households where the household reference person9 is in socio-
economic categories 1 to 3,10 and by the proportion of people aged sixty-five 
or over. Thirty addresses in each postal sector were selected randomly, and 
one person per household was randomly selected to answer the survey.11 
	 The sample was drawn from Great Britain as a whole, reflecting the 
geographic application of the prohibition on driving while over the 
prescribed limit.	  
	 ONS wrote to each of the selected addresses in advance, describing 
the survey and explaining that an interviewer would be calling. Interviews 
were conducted face-to-face by trained interviewers.
The July 2009 Opinions  Survey also included questions  concerning 
tobacco consumption, the support available to help people to live 
independently in later life, and individual autonomy.12 The two questions  on 
drink-driving were introduced with the words, “The next questions  are 
about drinking and driving, and are being asked on behalf of the University 
of  Sheffield”.
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8  That is, the population was divided into  groups (or strata) by region etc., to ensure that the sample 
was distributed among the groups in the same way as the population. On this technique, see, for 
example, Iain Crow and Natasha Semmens, Researching Criminology (Open University Press 2008) 47.
9  The “household reference person” is the member of the household in whose name the 
accommodation is owned or rented, or who is otherwise responsible for the accommodation. Where 
there are joint householders, the household reference person is the person with the higher or highest 
income, or, in the case of equal incomes, the elder or eldest: National Statistics, Living in Britain 2001, 
171 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100520011438/statistics.gov.uk/lib2001/
index.html> accessed 27 November 2013. 
10  Managerial and professional occupations, intermediate occupations, and routine and manual 
occupations: National Statistics, Living in Britain 2001, 205, Table E.1 <http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100520011438/statistics.gov.uk/lib2001/index.html> accessed 
27 November 2013.
11  For the sampling techniques referred to in this paragraph, see, for example, Alan Bryman, Social 
Research Methods (4th edn, OUP 2012) Ch 8; Iain Crow and Natasha Semmens, Researching Criminology 
(Open University Press 2008) 43–50. 
12 <http://www.esds.ac.uk/findingData/snDescription.asp?sn=6826> accessed 27 November 2013.
	 The survey question was restricted to persons holding valid driving 
licences and to those who answered yes to a screening question asking 
whether they drank alcohol at least once a month. This was to ensure that 
the question was  put only to those to whom the drink-drive limit would be 
most relevant and who could most be expected to understand it.
	 The response rate was 57.8 per cent,13  resulting in 1,051 interviews. 
Of these, about a quarter (277) did not hold a valid licence to drive a car in 
Great Britain, while 185 said they did not drink alcohol at least once a 
month. This left 589 participants to whom the survey question was  put and 
who answered it. 
THE DATA
The data were received from ONS as a PASW14  Statistics  File, which 
included not only the replies  to my question, but data on a number of 
variables relating to the respondents. These covered demographic matters 
such as  age and gender, marital status, ethnicity, level of education, income, 
health and employment status.15
Coding the Data
To facilitate analysis  and comment, I coded the responses received from 
ONS as described below and throughout this  chapter. A list of all codings  is 
given in Appendix 2. 
The replies were analysed on the basis of the answers as recorded by 
the interviewers, although they may not always have been recorded fully or 
wholly accurately,16 and on unweighted data. Where responses  are quoted in 
this chapter, they are quoted verbatim.
In the tables  appearing in this chapter, all percentages are rounded to 
the nearest whole number.
Nine key themes emerged from the analysis and the responses were 
coded accordingly:
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13 In the remaining 42.2 per cent of cases, the person selected for interview declined to  be interviewed 
or could not be contacted.
14 An IBM research software product. See <http://www.spss.com/uk/> accessed 27 November 2013. 
15 Listed in full in Appendix 2.
16  For example, “hch alcohol, you have in your blood per millilitre it doesn't  matter how much you 
think you have had to  drink” (Appendix 3, response 482), where the opening word “hch” should 
probably have been “how much”.
1. quantified amount: replies giving a specified amount of alcoholic 
drink which may be consumed before driving;17
2. unquantified amount: replies  defining the limit as an amount of 
alcoholic drink which may be consumed before driving, but 
without quantifying the amount;18 
3. “don’t drink and drive”: replies stating “don’t drink and drive”;19 
4. concentration of alcohol: replies  referring to the concentration of 
alcohol in the body; 
5. consequences: replies referring to the consequences  of driving 
after drinking;20 
6. variables: replies mentioning, albeit sometimes obliquely, the 
variables which affect alcohol concentration;21
7. “don’t know”;22
8. refusals: those who declined to answer;
9. non-classifiable/circular: responses which could not be classified or 
which simply repeated the question.23
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17 These included a small number of replies where the amount specified was vague, as in “a miniscule 
amount”, and “very little” (Appendix 2, responses 188, 195).
18  Replies were allocated to this category only if they referred to amounts consumed, for example, 
“the amount of alcohol you can drink and still drive safely” (Appendix 2, response 432). If drinking or 
consumption was not mentioned, as in “legal limit of alcohol before you break the law” (Appendix  2, 
response 571), replies were categorised as non-classifiable, in the sense that they were circular or 
simply repeated the question. The inclusion of the word “unit”, as in “allowed number of 
units” (Appendix 2, response 381), was, however, taken to imply consumption. 
19 Included in this category were replies including the expression “don’t drink and drive” or words to 
that  effect, even if the respondent then went on to suggest some other interpretation – often an 
amount which could be drunk before driving; see p 276. 
20 Deciding whether or not to allocate a reply to this category was not always straightforward. Broadly, 
responses were placed in this category only if they referred to some specific serious outcome of drink 
driving. Included, for example, were replies containing the words, “loss of license” (Appendix 2, 
response 528), and “you can kill somebody”(Appendix 2, response 531).
21 Including, for example, “2 units for a woman” (Appendix 2, response 33), suggesting the respondent 
is aware of  the relevance of  gender.
22  The “don’t  knows” were confined to replies which offered no suggested interpretation at all. For 
example, “it means one glass of wine - know it means also a certain no. of milligrams allowed but not 
sure how many” (Appendix 2, response 101) was categorised as a quantified amount rather than as a 
“don’t know”. 
23  For example, “limit is too high should be brought down, it's a level in law that is too 
high” (Appendix 2, response 576), “You are not allowed to drive over the limit” (Appendix 2, response 
589).
Where more than one of the above categories featured in a single response, 
each category was coded individually, according to its position in the reply.24 
	 A number of other themes also emerged, cutting across  the nine 
main categories. Many respondents referred to units of alcohol, while some 
replies included words  suggesting an individual interpretation which might 
not necessarily align with the formal definition. The difficulty of 
understanding the limit was mentioned, while others  emphasised that it is 
low. Although the question explicitly concerned the prescribed limit, some 
respondents  talked of unfitness to drive or impairment. I created further 
variables and values to facilitate analysis of  these responses. 
In analysing the data, I systematically cross-tabulated the data in the 
variables I created against the variables provided by ONS (these related to 
the demographic characteristics of the respondents, as mentioned above). In 
some cases, notably variables relating to age and sex, I created additional 
variables for different age groups, or different age/sex groups, in order to 
find statistically significant associations. The statistically significant 
relationships revealed are reported below. 
The Nine Main Categories
The numbers of people who gave answers  falling into each of the main 
categories were:
Table 1: The Main Categories of  Response25
Category First 
answer
Second 
answer
Third 
answer
Totals %age of 
total 
589
Quantified amount
“Don’t drink and drive”
Unquantified amount
Concentration of  alcohol
Variables
Non-classifiable/circular answers
“Don’t know”
Consequences
Refusals
Totals
199 21 2 222 38%
181 23 4 208 35%
79 1 1 81 14%
61 3 1 65 11%
7 41 5 53 9%
32 32 5%
13 9 3 25 4%
11 10 21 4%
6 6 1%
589 108 16 713
All the responses  are listed in full in Appendix 3. Each of the categories is 
considered in more detail below. 
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24 For example, “no drinking at all with driving. I dont know where they are with the present limits e.g. 
no. of units supposedly allowed” (Appendix  2, response 333) was coded as “don’t drink and drive” as 
the first answer, “don’t know” as the second, and “unquantified amount” as the third. 
25 Frequencies: Ans01, Ans02, Ans03.
QUANTIFIED AMOUNTS
A total of 222 (thirty-eight per cent) of the 589 respondents quoted an 
amount of alcohol or number of drinks  in their replies, 199 as a first answer 
and twenty-three as a second or third answer. The 222 responses were 
further analysed to provide more details  about the amounts  and types  of 
alcohol mentioned.	
The Amounts
The 222 were broken down according to the amounts stated. At the lower 
end of the range, answers included “a miniscule amount”, half a pint of 
beer, a small glass of wine and a single unit of alcohol. At the upper end, 
three pints  of beer and four units  were mentioned. A number of responses 
included alternatives, but all were classified according to the first reply given:
Table 2: The Quantified Amounts Broken Down 26
One pint of  beer, lager or of  unspecified content. Some respondents gave as 
alternatives to one pint, a glass of  wine, a small glass of  wine, a couple of  shorts, and 
two small whiskies.
Minimal: one drink or glass (of unspecified content), “a bottle”, “one or two 
drinks”, “a small drink”, “just one”, half a pint, a bottle, a bottle of beer, a small 
bottle of beer, one beer, a can of Stella, half a pint of beer, one glass of lager, “one 
or two” drinks, a “small amount”, “very little”, “a miniscule amount”.
Two units including “a couple of  units, one or two units”. The alternatives were a 
pint of  beer, two small wineglasses/1 small spirits/1 pint, 4 units for men, and 2 
small glasses of  wine or a small beer, two halves.
Two pints of  beer, lager or of  unspecified content. Some respondents gave as 
alternatives two glasses of  wine, four units, 80 milligrammes in blood, and 80 
millilitres in blood. 
One (glass of) wine. The alternatives were half  of  lager, one drink, a glass of  beer, 
half  a pint, and a pint for a man.
One and a half  pints of  beer, lager or of  unspecified content. Some respondents 
gave as alternatives three shorts, three units, and a glass of  wine.
One unit, including “one unit of  wine and two unit of  beer”, see below.
Two (glasses of) wine, including the alternative of  a pint of  beer.
One and a half  units, including “1 or 2 units” and “1 - 2 units”).
Two drinks or glasses (of  unspecified content), including “a couple of  drinks”, 
“about two drinks”, and two small drinks or two glasses of  wine. 
Two and a half  pints of  beer, lager or of  unspecified content. Alternatives were 
three glasses of  wine, and 80 millilitres.
Three pints of  beer, lager or of  unspecified content.
Three units
Four units
Total
41 (19%)
40 (18%)
39 (18%)
32 (14%)
31 (14%)
9 (4%)
7 (3%)
6 (3%)
5 (2%)
5 (2%)
2 (1%)
2 (1%)
2 (1%)
1 (0%)
222 (100%)
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26  Frequencies: QAmtBdown. The words shown in bold in the table are the values coded within the 
variable QAmtBdown.
As expected, a large proportion of respondents gave amounts  at the lower 
end of the scale in Table 2. To illustrate this further, I consolidated the 
categories  of reply into two – those who said two drinks  or less, and those 
who said more than two drinks. For this  purpose, a unit was taken as 
equivalent to a single drink, and two units, to two drinks. While this is 
unsatisfactory in the sense that drinks  and units can rarely be considered 
equivalent nowadays,27  it may nevertheless  reflect how respondents  think, 
and facilitates comparison with earlier studies: 
Table 3: The Quantified Amounts Reclassified into Two Groups 28
Number
Less than two drinks
Two drinks or more
Total
133 (60%)
89 (40%)
222 (100%)
Six respondents  in this  group (together with three others who fell 
outside this  group) specifically mentioned that the limit equates with a small 
amount of  alcohol, for example:29
- it doesn't take much to exceed limit… 
- you are allowed a certain amount but it's a miniscule amount.
As noted elsewhere,30 this  is  in keeping with the trend towards perceiving the 
drink-drive limit in terms of smaller and smaller amounts, in effect, moving 
further and further from the truth. 
Men more often quoted higher amounts, although those who said less 
than two drinks were divided almost equally between men and women:
Table 4: Amount of  Drink by Gender31
Men Women Total
Less than two drinks
Two drinks or more
Totals
64 (48%) 69 (52%) 133 (100%)
57 (64%) 32 (36%) 89 (100%)
121 (54.5%) 101 (44.5%) 222 (100%)
The largest amount mentioned was three pints, by two respondents 
only. 
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27 See p 205.
28 Frequencies: QAmtSimp.
29 Appendix 2, responses 98 and 188. See also responses 102, 115, 181, 195, 241, 481 and 533.
30 See pp 230–231.
31 Cross tabulation QAmtSimp x RSEX; p = .020.
Types of  Drink
Nearly two thirds of the 222 mentioned a type of drink in their replies, most 
commonly beer, followed by wine. Some gave alternatives  (“a pint of beer or 
a glass of  wine”, for example):
Table 5: Types of  Drink32
Number (%age of  the 222)
Beer
Wine
Alternatives
Totals
79 (36%)
32 (14%)
26 (12%)
137 (62%)
Spirits  were mentioned by only three of these respondents, as  an alternative 
to beer or wine, as in “no more than a pint or a couple of shorts or a glass  of 
wine”.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, among this  137, men mentioned beer more 
often than wine, and women mentioned wine more often than beer. Men 
more often expressed themselves in terms of  alternatives:
Table 6: Types of  Drink by Gender33
Men Women Total
Beer
Wine
Alternatives
Totals
67 (85%) 12 (15%) 79
2 (6%) 30 (94%) 32
17 (65%) 9 (39%) 26
86 (63%) 51 (37%) 137
Again within these 137 respondents, among the men, older respondents 
were significantly more likely to mention beer than the younger men. 
Among the women, the older respondents more often mentioned wine than 
did the younger women. Older men seemed to be rather more descriptive, 
giving alternatives  such as  “one and a half pints  of reasonable strength not 
strong beer, or a glass of wine” and “probably one pint of beer or two small 
whiskies”,34 rather than a simple “two units” or “two glasses of  wine”: 
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32 Frequencies: QAmtTypDrink.
33 Cross-tabulation QAmtTypDrink x RSEX; p = .000.
34 Appendix 2, responses 148, 170.
Table 7: Types of  Drink by Age/Gender35
Men up to 
age 44
Men aged 
45+
Women up 
to age 44
Women 
aged 45+
Total
Beer/lager/pints
Wine
Combinations/
alternatives
Totals
18 (23%) 49 (62%) 6 (7.5%) 6 (7.5%) 79
0 (0%) 2 (6%) 11 (34%) 19 (60%) 32
5 (19%) 12 (46%) 5 (19%) 4 (15%) 26
23 (17%) 63 (46%) 22 (17%) 29 (21%) 137
Respondents who owned their own homes (whether outright or subject 
to mortgage) gave a quantified amount in reply to the question significantly 
more often than did those who rented their homes.36
Finally, the higher the level of education, the more likely it was that 
respondents would give a quantified amount as their answer.37
Discussion
In keeping with expectation, a common response to the survey question was 
to give an amount which the respondents believed they could drink before 
reaching the drink-drive limit. As  noted elsewhere,38 it seems natural that 
drivers  should think of the limit in terms of what may be consumed, rather 
than the resulting concentration of alcohol in the body. They can, after all, 
keep track of what they drink, but have no means of measuring alcohol in 
the body. This approach is, however, at variance with the statutory 
definition, and raises the question whether drivers are aware of that 
variance, and of the scope for error. Alcohol concentration in the body 
depends  on many factors  over and above the amount consumed.39  Some 
respondents  in the survey did mention some of these factors,40 but it is not 
possible to deduce how, if at all, they took them into account when 
providing a quantified amount of alcohol in reply to the survey question. 
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35 Cross tabulation QAmtTypeDrink x Agesexgrp2.44; p = .000.
36  Cross-tabulation TENgrp x QAmtPeople; p = .035, showing that 41% of those who owned their 
homes outright, and 40% of those who owned their homes subject to a mortgage, gave a quantified 
amount, compared with 28% of those renting privately, and 25% of those renting from a local 
authority or housing association.
37  Cross-tabulation highed4 x QAmtPeople; p = .049, showing that 42% of those with higher 
educational qualifications below degree level gave a quantified amount, as did 40% of those with 
degrees; 33% of respondents with lower educational qualifications (such as GCSEs), and 27.5% of 
those without formal qualification, also gave this answer.
38 See p 221.
39 See pp 193–194.
40 Discussed below, pp 282–283.
Indeed, the studies described in Chapter 7,41 comparing individuals’ own 
estimates  of their alcohol concentrations with actual measured levels, 
suggest that individuals cannot accurately allow for these matters.
Perhaps even more compelling is the question whether respondents 
were right in their statements  of how much they could drink before reaching 
the limit. There is much to suggest that they may in fact have given serious 
under-estimates. Calculations have shown, for example, that a man weighing 
seventy-seven kilos could drink over eight units  of alcohol over three hours 
and remain within the limit,42 and that a man weighing seventy kilos  could 
drink four units  and remain within the limit.43 It is  not, of course, possible to 
make individual calculations in relation to the respondents  in the present 
survey, but it is  telling that the highest number of units  mentioned was four, 
and that by one person only, while only two people said three units; most 
thought the limit was  below two drinks. The cricket match survey44 showed 
that men could drink between eight and eighteen units  over the course of a 
day yet remain below the limit. While the respondents in the present survey 
were perhaps unlikely to have contemplated drinking over a whole day, there 
is nevertheless reason to question the accuracy of  their estimates.  
As already noted, in only one earlier study45 has  a question been put in 
the same terms  as in the present survey. There, some sixty-nine per cent of 
respondents  answered by stating an amount which may be consumed before 
driving, two thirds of them quantifying the amount, the remaining third 
leaving it unquantified. Thus about forty-six per cent of all respondents  in 
that study compares with thirty-eight per cent in the present study. The 
difference is  possibly accounted for by the fact that in the present survey the 
proportion answering “don’t drink and drive” increased substantially,46 
people perhaps moving away from thinking in terms  of amounts  towards 
espousing “don’t drink and drive”. Further, the 1993 survey was confined to 
persons aged eighteen to thirty. 
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41 See pp 240–241.
42  Robert Solomon and Erika Chamberlain, ‘Calculating BACs for Dummies: The Real-World 
Significance of Canada’s 0.08% Criminal ABC Limit for Driving’ (2003) 8 Canadian Criminal Law 
Review 219; see p 242.
43 Ronald C Denney, None for the Road: Understanding Drink-Driving (Shaw 1997) 40.
44 Neil R Wright, ‘A Day at the Cricket: The Breath Alcohol Consequences of a Type of Very English 
Binge Drinking’ (2006) 14 Addiction Research and Theory 133; see p 245.
45  Audience Selection for the Portman Group, Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239.
46 Discussed below, pp 274–275.
It is difficult to make direct comparisons with other studies, because of 
the different ways in which questions were phrased and the different 
assumptions  implicit in those questions. There does, though, seem to be a 
distinct trend towards lower amounts. The present survey showed a clear 
majority (sixty per cent) of those who interpreted the limit as a quantified 
amount giving the amount as  below two drinks. In a 1984 survey,47 forty per 
cent of respondents thought they would be within the limit after five units.48 
In the present study, the maximum number of units  mentioned by anyone 
was  four; no-one mentioned as  many as five, although in fact that may be 
nearer the truth. Other early interpretations in terms of higher amounts  are 
noted elsewhere.49 The 1993 study referred to above50 showed that the vast 
majority of people who gave an amount quoted two or more drinks. 
Although that study was confined to eighteen to thirty-year olds, even in the 
present study, people in that age bracket favoured less than two drinks by 
fourteen to nine. The results of the present study are more in keeping with 
recent work. For example, in 2004, most respondents, when asked how 
many units  of alcohol they could personally drink before exceeding the 
limit, said less than two units; thirty-four per cent said two units would take 
them over the limit.51
The wording of twenty-nine of the 222 responses (thirteen per cent) 
suggests that these respondents  had adopted a subjective interpretation 
which did not necessarily reflect the drink-drive limit, perhaps instead 
indicating the amounts they would drink before driving, rather than how 
much they could drink and remain within the limit. For example, “I limit 
myself to one pint when driving”, “I wouldn’t have more than two glasses  of 
wine and the drive”, “no more than 1 pint if driving myself ”.52  These 
responses of course leave open the significant question of how long before 
driving these drinks might be consumed.
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47  David Riley, Drivers’ Beliefs About Alcohol and the Law  (1984) Home Office Research & Planning Unit 
Bulletin No 17, 35.
48  A threshold adopted by the researcher: drivers were asked if they thought they would pass a 
breathalyser test after drinking five units of  alcohol; ibid, 32.
49 See p 229, fn 50.
50  Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239. 
51  Laura Brasnett, Drink-driving: Prevalence and Attitudes in England and Wales 2002  (Home Office 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Findings 258, 2004) 3.
52 Appendix 2, responses 84, 91, 131.
Two respondents seemed to think the limit has changed. Perhaps  they 
had heard about proposals to lower the limit53 and thought, in error, that 
there has been some change: 
- no drinking at all. 2 pints limit years  ago, but there's  never 
been a limit (this  respondent may of course have meant that 
the limit was once understood as two pints);
- I know it's changed hasn't it … 54 
The associations between this  response and social characteristics such 
as housing status and levels of  education are discussed below.55
Beer and wine were the drinks most often mentioned. Spirits did not 
feature greatly, and cocktails  and alcopops did not feature at all. This may be 
because the respondents in the sample were unfamiliar with these drinks, 
because most public education campaigns refer to wine and beer, or because 
it is even more difficult to know the alcohol content of  these drinks.
UNQUANTIFIED AMOUNTS
The Results
In addition to the 222 who replied to the survey question by giving a specific 
amount of alcohol, eighty-one respondents 56  (fourteen per cent of the 
sample) referred to amounts  which could be drunk, but in a more 
conceptual way, without quantifying the amounts. Most used words such 
as:57
- how much you can drink and still drive legally;
- maximum amount that you can drink before driving a car.
	 Others were less clear, for example:58
- it is  a formal limit of alcohol you can drink before exceeding 
limit to drive;
- limit the amount of alcohol that you are allowed before 
exceeding the limit to drive.
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53 See pp 14 (fn 69) and 225 for more recent proposals to lower the limit.
54 Appendix 2, responses 334, 449.
55 See p 287.
56 79 as a first answer, one as a second answer and one as a third answer; see Table 1.
57 Appendix 2, responses 394, 415. 
58 Appendix 2, responses 399, 411.
Despite occasional difficulties of classification, I included responses  in 
this category if  they clearly contemplated the consumption of  alcohol.59 
One third of  the eighty-one referred to units of  alcohol, for example:
- amount of  units that can be consumed before driving;
- it’s so many units.
Two expressly said they did not know how much they could drink:60 
- … I don’t know where they are with the present limits …;
- so many units to consume before it's  over the limit. I don't 
know the quantities.
Thirteen of these respondents  referred to standards  of driving – safety, 
fitness to drive, and ability to drive, some giving their definitions  in terms of 
such standards. For example:61
- amount of alcohol you can drink without causing any serious 
disability on your driving;
- how much you are allowed before you can not drive safely.
Significantly more women than men gave this answer –17.5 per cent of the 
women in the sample, compared with ten per cent of the men.62 It was also 
favoured by younger respondents  – eighteen per cent of all respondents 
aged up to forty-four gave this  answer, compared with eleven per cent of 
those aged forty-five or over.63 
Discussion
In view of the confusion about measures of alcohol and its  effects, and the 
variety of strengths and sizes of drinks, it is  hardly surprising that some 
people, while interpreting the limit as an amount which may be consumed, 
did not go on to specify the amount. Indeed, apart from indicating their 
perception of the drink-drive limit as an amount which may be consumed, 
the responses in this group do little more than restate the question. 
Again, there is  only one other study with which to make a direct 
comparison.64  There, the proportion giving an unquantified amount was 
twenty-three per cent, compared with fourteen per cent in the present study. 
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59 See, for example, Appendix 2, responses 385, 402.
60 Appendix 2, responses 333, 423.
61 Appendix 2, responses 383, 393.
62 Cross-tabulation RSEX x UnqAmtPeople; p = .012.
63 Cross-tabulation Age2.44.45 x UnqAmtPeople; p =. 010
64  Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239.
As mentioned above,65  it is possible that people who might then have 
thought in terms of amounts which may be drunk now respond in terms of 
“don’t drink and drive”.66
It seems unlikely that any firm conclusion can be drawn from the fact 
that this response was favoured by younger people. It may simply be that 
interpretations become more detailed as  people mature, although this would 
not explain why women favoured this answer more than men. 
The difficulty of interpreting the limit and the propensity to think of it 
in terms of  units of  alcohol are discussed next.
UNITS OF ALCOHOL
Among those who gave both quantified and unquantified amounts  in their 
replies, many referred to units of alcohol. A total of ninety-seven of all 589 
respondents  (sixteen per cent of the whole sample) mentioned units  of 
alcohol.67 Fifty-three of the ninety-seven (fifty-six per cent) gave a quantified 
amount as  their first answer; indeed an answer couched in terms of units 
was  the second most frequent among those who gave a quantified amount. 
Twenty-nine of the ninety-seven (thirty per cent) gave an unquantified 
amount as their first answer.68 
The extent to which respondents understood the alcohol content of a 
unit is unclear. Eight responses included something to suggest a conversion 
of units into drinks. As  explained elsewhere,69 a unit was originally intended 
to equate to a single small drink, but this equivalence no longer applies as 
drinks  have become larger and stronger. Some survey respondents  who 
attempted to convert units into drinks seemed to be working on the outdated 
formula:70
- … no more than 2 units  of alcohol which equates to one pint 
of  beer;
- maximum two units (two halves).
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65 See p 265.
66 See p 271.
67  Frequencies: Other, yielding 95 from value 1 (unit of alcohol mentioned) and 2 from value 2 
(difficulty of  interpretation mentioned). 
68 Cross-tabulation: Other x Ans01; p = .000.
69 See p 205.
70 Appendix 2, responses 76, 118.
Others came closer to an accurate conversion:71
- 2 units of  alcohol=2small wineglasses/1 small spirits/1pint;
- probably 2 units  of drink =2 small glasses  of wine or a small 
beer … 
Some thought the limit is defined in units but could not quote a number, for 
example:72
- the units  you are allowed to consume. … I wouldnt know how 
many …
One respondent demonstrated stark misunderstanding:73
- one unit of  wine and two unit of  beer.
Another referred directly to the difficulty of  understanding:74
- … people don't know what a unit is  - it's  not marketed very 
well.
Some respondents  seemed not to appreciate that units  of alcohol are 
measures of drinks before consumption, not of the resulting alcohol in the 
blood:75
- if you are breathalised it's  the number of units  in your blood - 
and there is a cut off  point - DK what it is;
- Number of  units of  alcohol in bloodstream.
Discussion
As noted elsewhere,76  a unit of alcohol is 10 millilitres, or 8 grammes, of 
pure alcohol. A considerable proportion of respondents were clearly aware 
of the system of measuring alcohol in units, but it is  not possible to draw any 
conclusions about the extent to which they understood it. The replies of a 
small number suggest they did not, but there are no grounds  for drawing the 
same conclusion in respect of the majority of these ninety-seven. The 
limitations of  the survey were such that the question was not investigated.
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71 Appendix 2, responses 37, 168. 
72 Appendix 2, response 449.
73 Appendix 2, response 161.
74 Appendix 2, response 346.
75 Appendix 2, responses 484, 508.
76 See p 205.
“DON’T DRINK AND DRIVE”
“Don’t drink and drive” was a common response, given by 181 as their first 
answer, by twenty-three as  a second answer, and by four as a third answer – 
a total of  208, or thirty-five per cent of  the 589 respondents.77 
The Results
The replies in this  group were further broken down, illustrating that this 
response may sometimes have embraced more subtle approaches:
Table 8: Breakdown of  the “Don’t Drink and Drive” Responses78
Simple “don’t drink and drive”
Personal rule 
Emphasis added 
Advocating a general zero limit
Other observations
Totals
71 (34%)
51 (24%)
41 (20%)
25 (12%)
20 (10%)
208 (100%)
• the simple “don’t drink and drive”: the seventy-one in this category 
simply repeated the mantra, “don’t drink and drive”, or words 
to similar effect (such as “either drink or drive”, “leave the car 
at home if you’ve had a drink” and “none for the road”79), 
without adding anything further;
• personal rule: fifty-one gave answers suggesting that not drinking 
and driving was a personal code of behaviour, and did not 
necessarily match the legal position. These responses 
included:80
- for me personally it would be never to drink and drive;
- do not know but never drink and drive;
• emphasis added: forty-one added some words  of emphasis  to the 
“don’t drink and drive” response, perhaps indicating a strongly 
held view. Typical of  these replies were:81
-  don’t drink and drive at all;
- … better to be safe than sorry;
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77 See Table 1.
78 Frequencies: DDDBdown.
79 Appendix 2, responses 258, 306, 336.
80 Appendix 2, responses 260, 539.
81 Appendix 2, responses 239, 280, 303.
- … if you drive you do not drink alcohol, none at all 
that’s it.
One respondent went further, remarking:
- very important-not to drink and drive as it casues  (sic) 
havoc on the roads-teenagers especially using roads  like 
a race track-should be stamped down on;82 
• advocating a zero limit: twenty-five respondents said words 
indicating that they were aware that it  is  permissible to drink 
something before driving but effectively advocated a zero limit, 
for example:83
- … they should change it to no drinking whilst driving;
- … there should be a total ban nil alcohol;
• the remaining twenty responses  comprised a variety of 
observations  in addition to the “don’t drink and drive” 
message:
‣ two respondents  mentioned designated drivers, in the sense 
of  one person agreeing to drive but not to drink:84 
- if  we go out one of  us will stay alcohol free;
- in essence if driving never drink, use a designated 
driver;                                                                              
‣ two acknowledged the significance of  time:85
- if you are going to drive do not drink including 
from night before;  
- no drinking alcohol twelve hours before driving;          
‣ three expressed their disapproval of drinking and driving, 
mentioning safety, seriousness and danger;86
‣ six specifically conceded that a certain amount of alcohol is 
permitted, for example:87
- don't drink and drive or just have one & it depends 
on what drink; 
- shouldn't drink and drive at all-shouldn't overdrink 
and drive - but shouldn't do it at all;                            
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82 Appendix 2, response 366.
83 Appendix 2, responses 203, 257.
84 Appendix 2, responses 283, 298.
85 Appendix 2, responses 286, 328.
86 Appendix 2, responses 275, 348, 361.
87 Appendix 2, responses 361, 240.
‣ two advocated no drinking while driving,88  although this 
may have been a simple error of  language;
‣ three mentioned the difficulty of understanding the limit, as 
in:89
- no drinking at all. 2 pints  limit years  ago, but 
there's never been a limit;
- … it’s very vague;
‣ two mentioned the varying effects of alcohol on different 
individuals:90
- … it is what the body can take;
- … you don’t know the effect of alcholol on 
individuals.
Women were significantly more likely to give this answer than men. Forty-
two per cent of the women in the sample of 589 said “don’t drink and 
drive”, compared with only twenty-nine per cent of  the men.91
While there were no significant differences by age alone, the data were 
further classified into four groups, identifying younger men and younger 
women (up to and including age thirty-four92), and older men and older 
women. This revealed that those in the higher age groups more often said 
“don’t drink and drive”, while younger men least often said so: 
Table 9: “Don’t Drink and Drive” by Age/Gender Group93
Men Women Total
Aged up to 34
Aged 35+
Totals
13 (6.5%) 29 (14%) 42 (20%)
76 (36.5%) 90 (43%) 166 (80%)
89 (43%) 119 (57%) 208 (100%)
There appeared to be certain differences  by region.94 Fifty-six per cent 
of respondents  in Wales gave a “don’t drink and drive” response, as did fifty-
four per cent in the South West, compared with the thirty-five per cent 
overall. 
Other significant associations were:
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88 Appendix 2, responses 200, 203.
89 Appendix 2, responses 334, 535.
90 Appendix 2, responses 307, 376.
91 Cross-tabulation RSEX x DDDPeople; p = .001.
92 This age was chosen because it gave statistically significant differences.
93 Cross-tabulation x Agesexgrp1.34 x DDDPeople; p = .004.
94 Cross-tabulation GorA x DDDPeople; p = .008.
• by housing status: those who rented their homes  from a local 
authority or housing association more often said “don’t drink 
and drive” than did those who rented privately or owned their 
homes;95 
• by whether or not respondents were parents of children under 
sixteen. Those who were (forty-two per cent of the 208) more 
often said “don’t drink and drive” than those who were not 
(thirty-three per cent of  the 208);96
• level of education: the higher the level of education, the less 
likely it was that a respondent would say “don’t drink and 
drive”;97
• socio-economic group: those in higher socio-economic groups 
were less likely to give the “don’t drink and drive” response 
than were people in lower groups.98
Discussion
It was  expected that, because of the difficulties of translating the drink-drive 
limit into how much may be consumed while remaining within it, people 
would err on the side of caution and adopt the “don’t drink and drive” 
approach. This expectation was  borne out. Indeed, the proportion of people 
answering “don’t drink and drive” is far higher than in the only other study 
where respondents  were asked for their own interpretations  of the drink-
drive limit.99 There, only five per cent answered “you shouldn’t drink and 
drive”. The earlier study was conducted in 1993 and it may simply be that 
views have changed, possibly in response to official campaigns. Further, in 
the 1993 study, the question, “What do you understand by the term the 
‘drink drive limit’?” was  the ninth of eighteen questions  on drink-driving, so 
it is  possible that the preceding questions may have concentrated 
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95 Cross-tabulation TENgrp x DDDPeople; p = .001, showing that 59% of the 208 who rented from a 
local authority or housing association said “don’t drink and drive” – almost twice as many as among 
those who owned their homes or rented privately.
96 Cross-tabulation Parent x DDDPeople; p = .033, showing that 42% of the 208 who were parents of 
under-16s said “don’t drink and drive”, compared with 33% of those who were not parents of 
under-16s.
97  Cross-tabulation highed4 x  DDDPeople; p = 0.000, showing 54% of those without formal 
qualification saying “don’t drink and drive”, dropping to 21% of  those with a degree or equivalent.
98  Cross-tabulation DDDPeople x  NSECAC3; p = 0.000, showing that 25% of those in managerial 
and professional occupations fell into the “don’t drink and drive” group, compared with 43% of those 
in routine and manual occupations. 
99 Audience Selection for the Portman Group, Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Survey, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239.
respondents’ minds on drinking and driving to the exclusion of “don’t drink 
and drive”. While the earlier study was  confined to eighteen- to thirty-year 
olds, that does not explain the difference, because, in the present survey, 
thirty-five per cent of respondents within that age bracket – the same as  in 
the sample as a whole – gave the “don’t drink and drive” answer. 
Other studies, however, show large proportions of respondents 
adopting the “don’t drink and drive” stance. In a study in Scotland,100 fifty-
five per cent of a sample of 1,004 said their own safe limit of drink before 
driving was nothing, although the high proportion may be attributable to the 
fact that “nothing” was the first of  seven options offered to interviewees. 
In a survey of approximately 2000 drivers in 2006,101  an insurance 
company asked, “how many drinks  would you tend to have and still feel 
confident then driving your car?” Forty-eight per cent replied none. Again, 
“none” was the first answer in the list of  alternatives given.
In Scotland in 2007, sixty-three per cent of 1,034 respondents said 
they would not drink anything before driving.102  This was in response to 
being offered a guide to calculating units, and asked how many units they 
would consider safe for them to drink before driving. No reason for so high a 
proportion is  suggested. It is not entirely clear from the report whether not 
drinking at all was offered as an option in response to the question, but it 
seems unlikely that it was. It may be that the complexity of calculating the 
number of units  encouraged the “no drinking” answer, or that the series of 
questions  which preceded this one predisposed respondents to say they 
would not drink before driving. 
The mantra “don’t drink and drive” does not reflect the statutory 
definition, in that most people would not exceed the limit by consuming 
some alcohol within a few hours before driving. There are, however, 
suggestions  that respondents  may have been aware that they were giving a 
stricter interpretation than the law requires. Seventeen per cent of 
respondents  in this group103 used words such as, “if I go out for a drink I 
never take the car”. The implication is  that they were adopting a personal 
code, possibly out of caution, or because of the difficulty of interpreting the 
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100  Simon Anderson and Dave Ingram, Drinking and Driving: Prevalence, Decision-Making and Attitudes 
(Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive 2001) Table 3.1.
101  Churchill Insurance Press Release, Four Million Drivers Set to Hit the Road ‘Smashed’ this Christmas, 1 
December 2006, supplemented by data kindly supplied by RBS Insurance in August 2008.
102  Emma Collins and others, Drinking & Driving 2007: Prevalence, Decision Making and Attitudes (Scottish 
Government Social Research 2008) para 7.7.
103  Appendix 2, responses 203, 260–275 inc, 277–283 inc, 301, 302, 304, 311, 313, 318, 346, 365, 
367–370 inc.
limit, or because they personally believed that any amount of alcohol is 
dangerous. Other responses  may likewise have been personal interpretations 
even in the absence of words to suggest that; for example, the response 
recorded as  “don’t drink at all” might have meant that that particular 
respondent chooses not to drink and drive.
There is  further support for the view that these respondents realise 
that the limit does  not equate with drinking nothing before driving, in that 
twenty-three of the 208 respondents 104 went on to add that a driver may in 
fact drink something before driving.
Where the response was  a simple “don’t drink and drive” without 
further elaboration, it is not clear whether this is  an admonition, or a 
statement of a personal policy, or a simple repetition of the public education 
campaigns. 
Other possible reasons  for saying “don’t drink and drive” may be that 
the official campaigns have convinced drivers that the limit in fact is  zero, or 
that it is  an ideal to be aspired to. Or the response may have been given to 
appear in a good light to the interviewer. The ONS’s Survey Charter,105 
supplied to all participants, includes the words  “Participation in our surveys 
of people and households  is  not required by law, so we seek to give you a 
good understanding of why taking part is  worthwhile and an act of good 
citizenship”. These words  may suggest an element of obligation short of a 
legal requirement, which in turn may suggest to participants that they 
should appear to behave responsibly and within the law. 
A further difficulty with the “don’t drink and drive” answers is that 
they beg the question of the period of time during which a person should 
refrain from drinking before driving. Only two respondents mentioned time.
I have suggested106 that the “don’t drink and drive” campaigns are far 
more appropriate to the offences  of unfitness through drink than to the 
offences  of exceeding the prescribed limit, yet there are far more 
prosecutions for the latter than the former. While small amounts  of alcohol 
adversely affect fitness  to drive, most people remain within the limit after 
consuming greater amounts  than would make them unfit through drink. 
This major difficulty is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
The fact that older people more often espoused the “don’t drink and 
drive” approach may simply reflect greater caution with age. 
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104 Appendix 2, responses 203, 238, 240, 241, 257, 259, 262, 266, 269, 271, 273, 278, 307, 313, 317, 
319, 333, 334, 341, 346, 360, 365, 375.
105  Office for National Statistics, Survey Charter, 3  <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/search/index.html?
newquery=%22Survey+Charter%22> accessed 27 November 2013.
106 See p 224.
In relation to regional differences, the higher percentage of people in 
Wales (and possibly also the South West of England) saying “don’t drink and 
drive” may be because breath-testing in Wales in 2009 was far more 
extensive than elsewhere.107 At the other end of the scale, only thirteen per 
cent of respondents in the North East gave this reply. Responses in the 
remaining regions108 ranged from twenty-six per cent to thirty-seven per 
cent.  
Those living in the private sector, those who were educated to higher 
levels, and those in higher socio-economic groups were all less  likely than 
others  to say “don’t drink and drive”. Again, there is  no obvious 
explanation, but it may be that people at higher levels of achievement in 
these areas are more likely to perceive the limit in scientific or statutory 
terms, and less likely to resort to the simpler “don’t drink and drive” option.  
SUBJECTIVE REPLIES
Eighty-five respondents (ten per cent of the sample) gave replies  which 
suggested that they were personal to them rather than an accurate 
understanding of the prescribed limit. Half of these eighty-five came from 
those who said “don’t drink and drive” (above), while thirty-four per cent 
came from respondents  who gave a quantified amount as  their main answer. 
I coded answers  as  “subjective” if they included words  such as  “personally”, 
“as far as  I’m concerned”, or comprised sentences such as “I don't drink if I 
am driving”. This classification was not always straightforward, but the 
principle adopted was to treat a reply as  subjective if there was  a suggestion 
that it  applied only to the particular respondent, rather than to drivers in 
general. So, for example, I took “It's fair but I drink at home but if I drink 
out 2 pints is enough”109 to be a subjective answer. 
As the survey question was about what the limit means  “to you”, it was 
to be expected that responses  would be subjective. Nevertheless, there are 
suggestions  that respondents resorted to personal interpretations because of 
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107  Home Office Breath Test Statistics 2010, Table BT.02 <https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/breath-tests> accessed 27 November 2013, showing that in Wales, in 2009, 41 in 1,000 
were breath-tested, compared with 13 per 1,000 in England. The figures for the English regions range 
from 8 per 1,000 (West Midlands) to 20 per 1,000 (Yorkshire and the Humber). 
108 North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East  Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, 
South East, and Scotland.
109 Appendix 2, response 108.
the elusiveness of the statutory limit, perhaps  indicating hesitation or 
uncertainty about the real meaning of  the drink-drive limit:110
- for me it means  only drinking one glass of wine when you go 
out;
- I’m never sure so I don’t do both.                                                
Almost twenty per cent of the women in the sample gave a subjective reply, 
compared with only ten per cent of the men.111 Nearly three quarters  of the 
women who gave personal answers  were over the age of thirty-five.112 There 
is no obvious reason why personal replies should have been favoured by 
women, or by older women.
CONCENTRATION OF ALCOHOL
The Results
Sixty-five participants (eleven per cent of the total sample of 589) gave 
answers  referring not to the amount consumed, but to the resulting 
concentration of alcohol in the body, sixty-one as a first answer, three as a 
second answer, and one as  a third answer.113  These responses  were further 
broken down to show more details about how respondents were thinking: 
Table 10: Breakdown of  “Alcohol Concentration” Responses 114
Answer included the word “blood”
Answer included a number only, or a partial formula 
Answer included the word “breath” 
Answer included the word “system”
Total
44 (68%)
10 (15%)
6 (9%)
5 (8%)
65 (100%)
Almost half the respondents in this group did not elaborate their responses 
beyond a basic conceptual level, typically saying:115
- amount of  alcohol as a percentage of  blood;
- the legal maximun (sic) blood alcohol level that is  acceptable 
to drive;
- statutory breath test limit.
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110 Appendix 2, responses 70, 546. 
111 Cross-tabulation RSEX x Subjective; p = .001.
112 Cross-tabulation Subjective x AgeSexgrp1.34; p= .001.
113 See Table 1.
114 Frequencies: AlcConBdown.
115 Appendix 2, responses 473, 488, 510. 
Eleven116  of those who did go further gave only partial formulae – 
answers  that were correct as  far as they went but were not complete, for 
example, quoting 80 milligrammes in blood, without giving the volume of 
blood (100 millilitres), or giving the wrong volume, as in “80 milligrams  of 
alcohol to 50 millilitres of  blood”.117
The limit in breath is  thirty-five microgrammes of alcohol in 100 
millilitres of breath. Four respondents mentioned thirty-five, but again gave 
incomplete formulae, or thought the limit was expressed in milligrams rather 
than microgrammes:118
- about 35 per cent I think . . . 
- cannot exceed 35ml in breath;
- it’s 35 milligrammes in your breath;
- it’s 35 . . .
Others confused the limit of thirty-five in breath with the limit of 
eighty in blood and vice versa:119
- 35mg of  alcohol per 100ml of  blood;
- 35mils of  alcohol in 100 mills of  blood;
- driving whilst having 70 or 80 on breathaliser scale;
- it means you can’t have more than 35mg of alcohol per 100 
mg of  blood.                                                                                 
A single person mentioned a limit of fifty – which applies throughout 
most of  Europe:
- 50 mg of  alcohol per, about a glass of  wine or beer.120
The respondent who came nearest the full legal definition said:
- 35 in breath, 80 in blood, possibly 107 in urine.121
Even this  was incomplete, in failing to state the measures of alcohol 
(microgrammes or milligrammes) or the relevant volumes of breath, blood 
or urine. 
Some of the answers again illustrated confusion about units  of 
alcohol, three respondents answering in terms of the number of units  of 
alcohol in the blood.122 
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116 Appendix 2, responses 124, 147, 465–468 inc, 472, 487, 489, 504, 507.
117 Appendix 2, response 467.
118 Appendix 2, responses 471, 477, 494, 495.
119 Appendix 2, responses 461, 463, 479, 493.
120 Appendix 2, response 464.
121 Appendix 2, response 460.
122 Appendix 2, responses 484, 508, 518.
One respondent, although apparently confused about how it is 
measured, was  clear that what matters is  the alcohol concentration, not how 
much has been consumed:
- hch (sic) alcohol, you have in your blood per millilitre it 
doesn't matter how much you think you have had to drink.123    
Men were more likely to refer to alcohol in the body than were women 
– fifteen per cent of the men in the sample of 589, compared with six per 
cent of  the women.124 
By age alone, there was  no significant difference between those who 
gave this answer and those who gave other answers. But there was a 
significant difference when age and gender were both taken into account, 
the data suggesting that among both men and women, this response was 
favoured by older people:
Table 11: Alcohol Concentration Responses by Age/Gender Group125
Men Women Total
Aged up to 44
Aged 45+
Totals
13 (20%) 7 (11%) 20 (31%)
34 (52%) 11 (17%) 45 (69%)
47 (72%) 18 (28%) 65 (100%)
Again, there was a significant relationship between this  answer and 
respondents’ level of education, those having been educated to higher levels 
more often referring to alcohol concentration.126
Discussion
Since roadside breath-testing is  often depicted in road safety campaigns, and 
in view of public debate concerning the lowering of the limit from eighty to 
fifty in blood,127  drivers  should be aware that the drink-drive limit is 
measured by reference to breath or blood. At the same time, earlier 
studies128 have shown an extraordinary degree of ignorance of the limit in 
breath, blood or urine, so it was expected that few would be able to quote 
accurate figures. The results confirmed this.
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123 Appendix 2, response 482.
124 Cross-tabulation AlcConPeople x RSEX; p = .001.
125 Cross-tabulation AlcConPeople x AgeSexgrp2.44; p = .004.
126  Cross-tabulation AlcConPeople x highed4; p = .000, showing that 20% of those with degrees or 
the equivalent answered in terms of alcohol concentration, tapering down to 4.5% of those having no 
formal qualifications. 
127 See pp 225–226.
128 See p 239.
The responses falling within this group are closer to the statutory 
definition of the prescribed limit than any others elicited in the survey. 
Nevertheless, at eleven per cent, the proportion of people who recognised 
the drink-drive limit as  a level of alcohol concentration in the body was  low 
– even lower than in the 1993 study129  asking respondents what they 
understood by the drink-drive limit, when fifteen per cent referred to alcohol 
in the blood, breath or urine. The low proportion may be a consequence of 
the predisposition to think in terms  of what is  consumed, and/or the 
increasing influence of  the “don’t drink and drive” campaigns.
The degree of confusion about the formula itself, and the fact that no 
single person gave it fully and correctly, is not surprising in light of the 
earlier studies.130 It might be thought that the recurring public debate about 
whether or not the limit should be lowered from eighty to fifty131 might have 
increased awareness of the limit as a concentration of alcohol in blood, but 
there seems to be no evidence to support such a view. On the other hand, 
more respondents  in this  group referred to blood rather than to breath, even 
though breath testing rather than blood testing has been the usual method of 
investigating drink-driving for many years, and even though road safety 
campaigns often depict roadside breath-testing.
Perhaps less  surprising is  the fact that older respondents  and those 
educated to higher levels more often gave this  response, although there is no 
obvious reason why proportionately more men than women should have 
done so. 
Knowing the limit in terms  of breath or blood alcohol concentration 
of course begs the question of interpreting it into the practical matter of 
how much (and of what, and when) a person can drink before driving 
without reaching the limit. This in turn highlights the circularity of the 
problem of knowing what behaviour will lead to a breach of the prohibition 
on driving when over the prescribed limit, and bears on the difficult question 
of  legal certainty in this context. I discuss this further in Chapter 9.132 
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129 Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239.
130  MORI for the Portman Group: A Report on what the British Public Thinks About Alcohol and the Part it 
Plays in their Lives (unpublished, research conducted in 2000), showing that only 13 per cent of 
respondents who were asked to give the drink-drive limit in milligrammes per 100 millilitres of blood, 
said 80; European Commission, Attitudes Towards Alcohol (Special Eurobarometer 272, 2007) 26, 
reporting that only 9 per cent of UK respondents who were asked the legal blood alcohol level put it 
within the band sixty to 100, although it seems that the survey was not confined to drivers. See p 240.
131 For example, Sir Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) 6.
132 See pp 292–295.
VARIABLES
The Results
While only seven respondents gave a first answer in terms of the variables 
which affect alcohol concentration, a further forty-six acknowledged such 
aspects  as  second or third answers  – a total of fifty-three, or nine per cent of 
all 589 respondents.133 The factors  mentioned, and the numbers  who did so, 
were: 
Table 12: Breakdown of  Factors Mentioned134
Personal differences in general, for example, “amount varies from person 
to person”, “there’s no set limit, differs from person to person”.
Gender, for example, “2 units for a woman”, “varies for women and men”.
Strength/amount of  drink. These replies included references to “normal 
strength beer”, and “beer no more than 3.8% alcohol”.
The complexity of  the issue, for example, “more complicated 
dependending on the person”, “you never know how it [alcohol] might affect 
you.”
Time, for example, “no drinking alcohol twelve hours before driving”, “if  you 
are going to drive do not drink including from night before”.
Multiple factors, mentioning two or more of  the other factors listed. One also 
referred to the effect of  fatigue.
Whether food taken with alcohol, such as “two glasses of  wine over the 
meal”. 
Weight/mass, for example, “depends on body type and mass”.
Total
14 (26%)
12 (23%)
7 (13%)
7 (13%)
6 (11%)
4 (8%)
2 (4%)
1 (2%)
53 (100%)
There were no statistically significant associations between these 
responses and any of the demographic data deriving from the ONS 
variables. 
Discussion
In line with earlier studies, it was expected that some respondents would 
refer to some, although probably not all, of the many factors which 
influence the concentration of alcohol in the body. These are described in 
Chapter 6,135 and include not only the amount of alcohol consumed, but its 
strength, the time over which it is  drunk and whether or not it is 
accompanied by food. Individual differences, such as  gender, build and age, 
and the degree of  habituation to alcohol, are also influential.
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134 Frequencies: VarBdown.
135 See pp 193–194.
Respondents who acknowledged the significance of factors  of this  kind 
all implicitly recognised that the drink-drive limit is  a measure of the effects 
of alcohol rather than the amounts consumed. It might be expected that 
knowledge of how these factors interact would be fairly superficial, but as 
respondents  were asked only a single question, their depth of understanding 
was not investigated.
Those who pointed out the difference by gender may have been 
influenced by general health messages advocating different maximum 
numbers of units for men and women, but again this was  not investigated. 
There is  other evidence,136 however, to suggest the difficulty of taking proper 
account of  these matters.
More respondents in the present survey mentioned the variables which 
influence alcohol concentration in the body than in the comparable 1993 
survey in which respondents were asked for their interpretations of the 
drink-drive limit.137 There, only six per cent mentioned the variables. It is, of 
course, possible that awareness has increased over time, or is higher among 
the general population than among the younger respondents (eighteen- to 
thirty-year-olds) in the 1993 survey. 
THE CONSEQUENCES
Twenty-one respondents  (3.5 per cent of the sample) talked about 
consequences,138  covering both the legal penalties  and the social 
consequences. Some referred to the consequences  of the act of drink-
driving, others  to the consequences of conviction. Eleven were first answers, 
and ten were second answers. Although these are not strictly answers to the 
question put, they are not without interest. The matters  mentioned, and the 
numbers who mentioned them were: 
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136 See pp 228, 234. 
137 Audience Selection for the Portman Group: Drinking and Driving: Consumer Attitudes Study, November 
1993 (unpublished); see p 239.
138 See Table 1.
Table 13: Breakdown of  Consequences 139
Danger, as in “it puts other lives in danger”, “it’s dangerous”, “a car is a lethal 
weapon…” 
Effects on the quality of  driving, for example, “any alcohol affects your brain 
and your reactions”, “being incapable of  controlling a vehicle properly through 
alcohol”
The consequences of  conviction, including loss of  liberty, loss of  job, loss of  
licence, and “it curbs your social activities”.
Other consequences, such as “diverts police activity from more serious crime”, 
“people very aware of  consequences but still do it”.
Multiples of  the above: “you can kill somebody plus you lose your license plus 
you could get jailed”.
Total
7 (33.5%)
7 (33.5%)
3 (14%)
3 (14%)
1 (5%)
21 (100%)
The references to danger of course bring to mind the underlying 
purpose of the legislation – road safety. Drivers  who mentioned the effects  of 
alcohol on the quality of driving may likewise have had in mind the road 
safety considerations. But they may have been thinking about unfitness  to 
drive rather than exceeding the prescribed limit, perhaps confusing the two 
offences. It is not possible to draw any firm conclusion. 
Five respondents 140 from the full sample mentioned unfitness to drive 
and impairment, for example:
- the amount of alcohol above which your abilities  to drive 
would be significantly impared (sic). 
References to the penalties in terms of loss  of licence, the possibility of 
imprisonment and loss  of employment all indicate the seriousness attached 
to conviction, perhaps arising out of the anti-drink-drive campaigns. It may 
be that increasing awareness of the consequences  explains the increasing 
number of drivers who say “don’t drink and drive”, discussed above. On the 
other hand, the idea that, in dealing with drink-driving, police are being 
diverted from more serious matters141 suggests that drink-driving is seen as 
less serious, although this was the only response of  this kind. 
One other consequence mentioned was that “it curbs  your social 
activities”. This may be a reference to the consequences of disqualification 
from driving following conviction, or to the restrictions arising from the 
statutory provisions themselves.
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140 Appendix 2, responses 426, 448, 500, 560, 570.
141 Appendix 2, response 159.
THE “DON’T KNOWS”, THE REFUSALS AND THE NON-
CLASSIFIABLE
The first answer of thirteen respondents was that they did not know, and 
another twelve added a “don’t know” element as a second answer.142 Most of 
the thirteen were simple “don’t knows” or variations of that. They may have 
some importance for the principle of legal certainty and merit 
consideration. Some clearly reflect the complexity of the question, 
suggesting that the respondent has  resorted to the “don’t know” response for 
lack of  anything better:143
- I don't know what the exact limits are;
- I’m never sure so I don’t do both.                                                
Eleven of the total 589 respondents explicitly pointed out the difficulty 
of  interpretation, for example:144                                                                              
- I dont think they have yet found a satisf. way that the ord. 
man in the street can understand how that figure relates to his 
own consumption;
- nobody knows what the drink drive ruling is. 
Responses of this  kind, in which respondents  articulate the gulf between the 
statutory provisions and their own understanding, encapsulate the problem 
of reconciling the drink-drive offences  with the principle of legal certainty. I 
come back to this in Chapter 9.145    
Thirty-two responses  did little more than repeat the question, or were 
otherwise unclassifiable.146  These answers demonstrated that the 
respondents  were aware of the existence of a prohibition, but provided little 
further insight. For example:147
- don’t drive if  you are over the limit;
- legal limit of  alcohol before you break the law.
 	 Some of these responses  may have been incorrectly or incompletely 
recorded, as in:148
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142 See Table 1.
143 Appendix 2, responses 266, 546, 549.
144 Frequencies: Other. See Appendix 2, responses 519, 549. See also responses 8, 486, 487, 532, 534, 
535, 536, 538, 546.
145 See pp 292–293.
146 See Appendix 2 for the list.
147 Appendix 2, responses 561, 571.
148 Appendix 2, responses 559, 573.
- amount of  alcohol per unit;
- level of  responsible driving. 
	 One person clearly appreciated that it is  permissible to drink before 
driving, saying:
- I dont think that if  you are driving you couldn’t drink.149   
Six respondents  refused to answer the survey question. Again, it is  possible 
that some of the refusals  were consequences  of the difficulty of answering, 
but this cannot be verified.                                                                                       
CONCLUSION
I had expected that many respondents, as  in earlier studies, would interpret 
the drink-drive limit in terms  of what may be consumed before driving, and 
that “don’t drink and drive” would feature in the replies. Matters such as  the 
strength of drink consumed and the time over which it is  consumed would 
possibly be mentioned, although not by many. In view of the widespread 
ignorance of how the prescribed limit is formulated, few respondents were 
expected to mention alcohol concentration in the body. Even fewer were 
expected to describe the limit accurately. All these expectations  were borne 
out.
As planned, the survey revealed a wider range of interpretations  of 
the drink-drive limit than had been elicited in many of the earlier studies, 
providing a more comprehensive overview than had been available before. 
In some respects, the results  bear out the findings from earlier research. The 
trend towards  greater caution seems to be confirmed, in that the amounts 
which people think they can drink before driving continues to fall, and the 
proportion of  people saying “don’t drink and drive” was surprisingly high.
The findings are to be interpreted against the background of the 
widespread confusion about the limit, the difficulties of providing reliable 
advice to drivers, the variations  in official advice and inaccurate media 
reporting.150 They may well have had a bearing on respondents’ answers in 
the present survey, although there is no way of estimating the extent of any 
such influence. The fact that two people in the present survey apparently 
thought the limit has  been changed151  is  just one small indicator of the 
confusion.  
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150 See pp 223–225.
151 Appendix 2, responses 334, 449.
The study revealed certain characteristics of those adopting various 
views, although none of the relationships  causes any great surprises. For 
example, men rather than women, older respondents  and those educated to 
higher levels were more likely to reply referring to alcohol concentration in 
the body, so coming close to the statutory definition, rather than giving an 
amount or simply saying “don’t drink and drive”. While more detailed 
knowledge is understandable in those of greater age or education, there is 
no obvious explanation for the fact that men came closer to the statutory 
definition than did women, or for the fact that women more often seemed to 
give subjective interpretations. 
As in earlier studies, there is much here to indicate uncertainty about 
the law. A large proportion of respondents answered the survey question by 
stating an amount of alcohol, whether quantified or unquantified, which 
could be consumed before reaching the drink-drive limit. This is  an 
erroneous, although understandable, interpretation of the limit, as  discussed 
above. Likewise, the large group whose answers amounted to “don’t drink 
and drive” were adrift of  the legal definition. 
Respondents who answered the survey question by quantifying the 
amount they believed they could drink before reaching the limit may have 
been greatly understating how much they can drink before reaching the 
limit.152 But if the question had been about respondents’ understanding of 
unfitness  to drive through drink, there would have been a high degree of 
accuracy in the replies  – those quoting low amounts and the “don’t drink 
and drive” responses would have been very close to accurate, given that 
people become unfit to drive on far less  alcohol than would put them over 
the limit.153 The further twist is  that drivers are nowadays far less  likely to be 
prosecuted for driving when unfit than for driving when over the limit.154 
Only a very small proportion of respondents  answered in terms of the 
concentration of alcohol in the body – an answer coming close to the 
statutory definition, but raising the question whether these individuals  would 
know how to interpret the limit into what they can drink before driving. 
A further indication of confusion is the fact that sixteen per cent of 
respondents  referred to units of alcohol. Units  of alcohol are not well 
understood,155 and indeed have little to do with the formal definition of the 
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153 See pp 192–193.
154 See p 200.
155 See pp 231–232.
limit. It may be that general public health messages are being confused with 
public education initiatives concerning road safety. 
While the survey was useful, it  had limitations. Only a single question 
was  put, without the opportunity to explore respondents’ views  further or to 
seek elucidation of answers which were not entirely clear or which otherwise 
gave rise to further questions. Nevertheless, it  did call on respondents to 
think about the drink-drive more broadly than in earlier studies, and there is 
reason to believe that their responses  provide a more accurate picture of 
their overall views than had previously been available. 
In Chapter 9 I draw conclusions  for the concept of legal certainty from my 
own small study, and on my research project as a whole.
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Chapter 9: The Wrong Kind of  Certainty
INTRODUCTION
The principle of legal certainty, described in Chapter 5, requires that 
citizens must be able to know what they are to do, or not to do, to avoid 
breaking a criminal law. In this  chapter, I examine whether or not the two 
concepts  fundamental to the drug- and drink-driving offences  – unfitness to 
drive through drink or drugs, and exceeding the prescribed limit1 – comply 
with the principle of certainty. The same question will arise in relation to the 
specified limits  for specified controlled drugs, when the new offences  are 
introduced.2 While drivers demonstrably have a poor understanding of both 
unfitness  to drive and the prescribed alcohol limit,3 that does  not of itself 
lead to the conclusion that the principle of certainty is breached. The 
question is  not whether drivers in fact understand the provisions, but 
whether the provisions are of sufficient clarity that drivers  could understand 
them well enough to know what they must do to avoid committing offences.4 
I contend that unfitness to drive is within this principle, but that the 
prescribed limit is  not. Nor can uncertainty about the prescribed limit be 
remedied by advice. As noted elsewhere,5 there are many more prosecutions 
for exceeding the prescribed limit than for unfitness to drive through drink 
or drugs, with the result that the serious  question of uncertainty affects the 
majority of the drink- and drug-driving cases brought before the courts. 
Certainty in relation to the new offences of exceeding specified limits  for 
certain drugs may well be greater in some respects than in relation to the 
prescribed alcohol limit, but there is scope for new uncertainties in other 
ways.
On the other hand, the procedure for investigating the offences  is, I 
say, sufficiently certain to meet the principle, despite one important difficulty. 
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1  The statutory definitions and their interpretation in the case law are described in Chapter 6, pp 
209–217. 
2 Under RTA 1988, s 5A; see pp 8–9.
3 As demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8.
4  Daniel Greenberg, ‘The Volume and Complexity of United Kingdom Legislation Today’ in 
Halsbury’s Laws of  England Centenary Essays 2007 (LexisNexis 2007) 55; see p 172.
5 See p 200.
UNFITNESS TO DRIVE
As already noted,6 it is  an offence to drive, attempt to drive, or be in charge 
of a vehicle when unfit to drive through drink or drugs.7 A person is  unfit to 
drive if the person’s ability to drive properly is  impaired.8 The interpretation 
of the term “unfitness” is  discussed above,9 and gives rise to the question 
whether this concept of  unfitness passes the test of  certainty.
Whether or not a particular set of circumstances  amounts  in law to 
unfitness  is  a matter which does  not arise for formal decision until after the 
event, and then only if a prosecution is brought and the issue raised. The 
question is  decided by the court on the facts  of each case. To assess the 
certainty of the concept, however, the position of the driver before the event 
must be considered. 
Drivers  who were swaying,10 whose speech was slow or slurred,11 who 
had glazed eyes,12 who smelt of alcohol,13 who drove with the brake on14 or 
who drove badly when under the influence of cannabis15 have all been held 
to be unfit to drive. A driver in any of these circumstances  would surely 
realise that he or she would be unfit to drive. The fact that any degree of 
impairment is  sufficient to make out the offence should make matters 
simpler to predict. A driver need not consider how much he is  swaying, or 
how heavily she is slurring her words; it is  enough that this  is happening. 
While the very fact of having taken drink or drugs might reduce the 
individual’s  capacity to recognise the indications, the point, for the purposes 
of the clarity of the concept of unfitness, is  that they are capable of 
recognition as signs of  unfitness to drive.
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6 See p 8.
7 RTA 1988, s 4(1).
8 RTA 1988, s 4(5).
9 See pp 209–211.
10 R v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77 (CA).
11  Hurst v DPP, unreported, 6 May 1998 (DC); Leetham v DPP [1999] RTR 29 (DC); Willicott v DPP 
[2001] EWHC 415 (DC).
12 R v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77 (CA); Leetham v DPP [1999] RTR 29 (DC); Willicott v DPP [2001] EWHC 
415 (DC).
13 Hurst v DPP unreported, 6 May 1998 (DC); Willicott v DPP [2001] EWHC 415 (DC).
14 R v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77 (CA).
15 Leetham v DPP [1999] RTR 29 (DC).
The circumstances amounting to unfitness  to drive have also included 
running into parked vehicles for no apparent reason.16  It may be more 
difficult to predict such a matter, since it is  a consequence of the unfitness 
rather than a symptom of it, but it seems  plausible to suggest that if such an 
event were to occur a driver who has  taken drink or drugs should not be 
surprised by a suggestion that he or she was not fit to drive.
The unfitness may be caused not by alcohol but by a drug, whether 
legal or illegal. It was  seen in Chapter 7 that drivers’ understanding of the 
effects  of various  drugs is  limited, and that even the word “drug” is not 
uniformly understood. Nevertheless, in most cases, it seems reasonable to 
assume that a driver who has knowingly taken a drug, whether medicinal or 
otherwise, and is in one of the conditions  described above, would be on 
notice that the drug may have caused the unfitness. There may be 
exceptions which require the clarification of the court after the event, as 
where, say, a prescribed drug has an unusual and unexpected effect, or 
where a diabetic suffers a hypoglycaemic attack.17 
Like driving without due care and attention,18  the term “unfit” 
denotes  a standard by reference to which behaviour is evaluated after the 
event. While it has been said that crimes  should not be defined by reference 
to underlying values  or principles, because citizens  should not have to apply 
their own standards to gauge the legality of their behaviour,19 provisions of 
this  nature are sometimes necessary because it is impossible to legislate for 
all circumstances.20  The range of circumstances which have given rise to 
appeals on the meaning of  unfitness21 is enough to demonstrate this point. 
On the other hand, unfitness  has a meaning in ordinary language 
which largely aligns  with the legal interpretation, but which requires 
clarification in marginal, perhaps  exceptional, circumstances. The same is 
true of many other terms in sections 4 and 5 – “drive”, “attempt to drive”, 
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16 R v Lanfear [1968] 2 QB 77 (CA); R v Hunt (Reginald) [1980] RTR 29 (CA).
17  R v Ealing Magistrates’ Court ex p Woodman [1994] RTR 189 (QBD), where the court found that the 
offence of unfitness to  drive may be made out where a diabetic suffers a hypoglycaemic attack as a 
direct result of an injection of insulin, but that such an attack may be triggered by something else – 
skipping a meal, for example –  which would not fall within the offence. See also the earlier case of 
Watmore v Jenkins [1962] 2 QB 572 (QBD), another case of a hypoglycaemic episode, where the QBD 
found that the court below was entitled to  find that the injected insulin was not the immediate cause of 
the attack.
18 Contrary to RTA 1988, s 3.
19 See p 171.
20 See pp 186–187.
21 See pp 209–210.
“mechanically propelled vehicle”, “road or other public place”– which have 
been subject to extensive interpretation. In relation to unfitness, while there 
may be difficulties in borderline cases, it is  submitted that these fall within 
the normal process  by which the guidance of the higher courts  is sought to 
clarify the law through judicial interpretation, a process  endorsed by the 
ECtHR.22  For these reasons, I conclude that the concept of unfitness  to 
drive is sufficiently comprehensible to drivers to meet the test of  certainty.
THE PRESCRIBED LIMIT
Introduction
It is an offence to drive, attempt to drive, or be in charge of a vehicle when 
the proportion of alcohol in the breath, blood or urine exceeds  the 
prescribed limit.23 The prescribed limit is  defined24 by reference to weights 
of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  breath, blood or urine. 
How is this  provision to be tested for legal certainty? Is  it enough that 
a driver knows not to exceed the “prescribed limit”? Must the driver know 
how the prescribed limit is  defined in the legislation? To what degree of 
accuracy must the driver be able to interpret the statutory definition? Must 
the driver be able to calculate the effects  of drinks of different strengths 
consumed in different quantities over different times, given the individual 
driver’s own physiological characteristics? Is it enough to adopt the “don’t 
drink and drive” approach, or a rule of thumb featuring just one or two 
small drinks? 
One of the advantages of the prescribed limit is that it facilitates 
conviction on the basis of the measured amount of alcohol in the system, 
avoiding the more complex and difficult task of proving unfitness. While 
there can be little doubt that the position after the event is  now a great deal 
simpler than it was, the position before the event is less certain than ever. 
The definition of the prescribed limit is  at once scientifically precise, 
but wholly incomprehensible to most people. I contend that this is  “the 
wrong kind of certainty”. Drinkers can monitor their own sensations, 
behaviour and speech for signs of impairment, but cannot measure their 
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23 RTA 1988, s 5(1).
24 In RTA 1988, s 11(2); see p 14.
blood-alcohol concentration. The limit has  been described as  “meaningless 
to lay people”.25 
In Chapters 7 and 8 I demonstrated the extraordinary lack of 
understanding about what the drink-drive limit means in practice, most 
drivers  believing it is  far more restrictive than it in fact is.26  This  very 
confusion may have contributed to the view that drink-driving is not 
acceptable. The North Review27  records  views  that confusion about how 
much can be drunk before reaching the limit has  led to a very cautious 
approach, and has  unexpected beneficial effects. The drink-drive law may 
be an instance where misperception of a public health message serves  the 
public good.28 All this  suggests a degree of approval of the lack of certainty. 
The Scottish Government, on the other hand, has adopted a realistic 
approach, saying that its  “don’t drink and drive” message is based on the 
fact that people cannot accurately estimate a safe level of alcohol 
consumption and it is better not to drink at all.29 Rather less transparently, 
the Department of Transport declared that its advice is  not to drink and 
drive, but that changing the prescribed limit would raise questions and 
concerns about how many drinks could be consumed prior to driving.30 The 
lack of clarity may indeed have beneficial effects, but the principle of law – 
certainty – is nevertheless breached, and it is deeply troubling that a criminal 
law should be effective because it is confusing. 
I contend that the prescribed limit for alcohol defies the language of 
certainty used in the scholarship – uniformity, clarity, foreseeability, stability, 
consistency of application, advance guidance on what not to do, the ability 
to know the extent of the rule. It is clear only to those with special 
knowledge, and not to the general body of  motorists. 
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25 Roy Light, Criminalizing the Drink-Driver (Dartmouth, 1994) 72.
26 See pp 240–248, 265.
27 Sir Peter North, Report of  the Review of  Drink and Drug Driving Law (HMSO 2010) para 3.111.
28  Kypros Kypri and Shaun Stephenson, ‘Drink-Driving and Perceptions of Legally Permissible 
Alcohol Use’ (2005) 6 Traffic Injury Prevention 219, 223.
29  Scottish Government, Reducing the Drink Driving Limit in Scotland, A Scottish Government Consultation, 
September 2012, para 3.04 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0040/00401340.pdf> accessed 
27 November 2013. 
30 Department for Transport, Enforcement Procedures against Drink Drivers and Other Offenders – A Consultation 
Document, Proposed Changes in Legislation for Testing Procedures for Drink and Drug Driving and in Other Transport 
Sectors and for Remedial Training for Road Traffic Offenders, November 2012, para 3.14 <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/14959/drink-driving-
consultation.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
Expert Evidence
If an individual who has consumed alcohol is  to know with certainty 
whether or not, in given circumstances, he or she is  within the prescribed 
limit and therefore within the law, then understanding the effects  of all the 
variables which influence alcohol concentration in the body31 is  crucial. Yet, 
as  the cases referred to in Chapter 632 bear out, the courts themselves have 
recognised the difficulty of so doing, often insisting on expert evidence to 
assist them. It is  only in the most obvious  of cases  – where a defendant is 
only just over the limit and his  drink was heavily laced,33 for example – that 
the courts have been prepared to make decisions without expert assistance. 
If the courts  cannot assess  these matters  for themselves, except in the most 
obvious of  cases, it seems extraordinary to expect that drivers can do so.
Uniformity of  Application
The principle of certainty calls for uniformity in the application of the law. 
Since alcohol affects  different people in different ways, the prescribed limit is 
variable in its  application, in that different people may consume different 
amounts of alcohol before reaching the prescribed limit.34 Not only does this 
further illustrate the complexity of interpreting the limit, but, since many of 
the differences in the effects  of alcohol depend on whether the drinker is 
male or female, the limit is discriminatory. It has been put this way:
Given differences  in individual size, shape, age, maturity, 
experience with alcohol, and drinking contexts, how can this 
legal prohibition be formulated as  a neutral, objective standard 
amenable to routine, predictable, uniform enforcement?35
Technical Language
The language in which the prescribed limit is  couched itself militates against 
certainty for drivers. The results  of my survey make a nonsense of the ruling 
that a court must give effect to the words  of a statute as the statute would 
reasonably be understood by those whose conduct it regulates.36  The 
prescribed limit is barely understood at all. It is technical and its 
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35 James B Jacobs, Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma (University of  Chicago Press 1989) 66.
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interpretation is  a matter for specialists. It is  not amenable to explanation in 
ordinary language except, possibly, at such length as would be unsuitable for 
inclusion in the statute. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union37 ruled some time ago 
that legal certainty could be prejudiced if a decision is  notified to a person in 
a language that person cannot understand.38  Although the case concerned 
the use of the appropriate official Community language to notify a decision 
on social security, the prescribed limit may as well be in an unknown foreign 
language for all it means to most drivers. As a survey respondent once said, 
the drink-drive limit “might as well be Swahili”.39 
The prescribed alcohol limit, both as  defined in the RTA 1988 and as  it 
applies in practice to individual drivers in individual circumstances, is 
probably unique in road traffic law in the challenge it presents to drivers. 
While we have speed limits, we are obliged to have working speedometers  in 
our vehicles. We are obliged to have a minimum amount of tread on our 
tyres, again something fairly easy to measure. It has been said that the law 
assumes  people can monitor their blood alcohol levels  in order to conform,40 
but this  is far from so, as I have demonstrated, and as  the higher courts  have 
recognised. I find no way of reconciling the prescribed limit for the drink-
drive offences with the principle of  legal certainty. 
THE SPECIFIED DRUG OFFENCES
Throughout this  work I have referred to the new offences of driving, 
attempting to drive, or in charge with a concentration of a specified 
controlled drug above a specified limit.41 They are expected to be brought 
into force in 2014 and, at the time of writing,42 government is consulting43 
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Driving with a Specified Controlled Drug in the Body Above a Specified Limit – A Consultation Document, July 2013 
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consultation-document.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
on specifying the drugs  and the limits for the purposes of the new offences. 
As noted in Chapter 6,44 the draft regulations propose limits for eight illegal 
controlled drugs, setting limits  at the lowest level at which a reliable 
analytical result can be obtained, but above which accidental exposure can 
be ruled out.45 In relation to these drugs, this  “virtual zero” limit may well 
be easier to interpret than the prescribed limit for alcohol. It should be fairly 
clear that it will be illegal to drive with any amount of these drugs  in the 
body, just as it is  illegal to possess  them. The consultation document recites 
that this “zero tolerance” approach has been adopted in part to avoid the 
view that “it’s  ok to drive on illegal drugs  as long as you don’t have too much 
of it”46 – exactly the problem in relation to alcohol. Of course, even on the 
zero tolerance basis, there is the question of how long after consumption it is 
once again legal to drive. 
The proposal also includes limits  for eight further controlled drugs 
which have therapeutic, as  well as  illegal, uses. The limits  for most of these 
drugs  are set at a level higher than would result from a normal therapeutic 
dose.47 The idea is to avoid bringing into the net people who are using drugs 
legitimately. Such people should be fairly confident that if they take their 
medication as instructed they have nothing to fear, although it is not 
impossible that someone taking a prescribed drug as directed may 
nevertheless be unfit to drive under the existing section 4. 
While the relatively low limits may make for greater certainty than is 
the case in relation to alcohol, other aspects  of the new offences may 
increase the potential for confusion. These include the fact that there are to 
be two sets  of limits48 – one set at virtually zero and the other somewhat 
higher. Likewise, the very fact that the new offences embrace drugs which 
have both legal and illegal uses  may confuse the boundaries between licit 
and illicit drugs, and between drugs covered by the new offences and those 
which are not. The proposed regulations anticipate setting limits  for 
seventeen drugs in total (the eight illegal substances, the eight having 
therapeutic uses, and amphetamine, on which consultation about the limit 
continues). They will all be specified by their scientific names. It is  not clear 
how drivers  will know which drugs are on the list, given that many of them 
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have alternative names, including street names  for illegal drugs and brand 
names for therapeutic drugs. Not only that, but, according to the draft 
regulations, the specified limits will vary from drug to drug, from 1 µg in one 
litre of blood (for LSD) to 1,000 (for temazepam). As in the case of alcohol, 
it seems unlikely that the numerical limits will have any meaning at all for 
most drivers, and the distinction between the “zero tolerance” drugs and the 
rest may likewise be elusive. The consultation document anticipates a public 
education campaign. While such campaigns have been highly successful in 
relation to drink-driving,49  the message in relation to the new drug-driving 
offences seems considerably more complex. 
Overall, it seems that the challenges to understanding the new 
offences, assuming the regulations are made in the same terms  as in the 
consultation document, given their range and complexity, will be great.
CERTAINTY OF PROCEDURE
In Chapter 5, the idea of certainty as  relating to the procedure for law-
making, enforcement, interpretation, and decision-making,50 rather than to 
legislative provisions  themselves, was mentioned. Most of these elements 
engage topics  which are far beyond the scope of the present work, but the 
idea of the certainty of the procedure for enforcing the drink- and drug-
driving legislation does  strike a chord. Lord Hutton said that it is  clearly 
desirable that, as  far as possible, the law governing the procedure for taking 
specimens of blood or urine should be simple and free from complexity,51 
while the Divisional Court has found that the provisions of the legislation 
must be interpreted “so as to be easily applied in a common sense way by 
police officers and easily understood by defendants who may be subject to 
their requirements”.52
It has  been shown throughout this  work that the investigatory process 
is  closely regulated,53 but that there has  been a high number of appeals,54 
many of them quite possibly arising out of the reluctance of drivers to 
accept the consequences of conviction and/or their readiness  to fund weak 
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cases,55  In recent years, many of these appeals have been condemned as 
unmeritorious. There have, nevertheless, been some issues of real difficulty 
relating to procedure, calling for clarification of  the statutory provisions.56
Nor has  the courts’ insistence on the statutory procedure been without 
controversy. Michael Hirst57 asserts that the courts have put themselves  into 
a straightjacket by insisting on full compliance with the statutory procedure, 
and that drivers who have clearly committed drink-driving offences  often 
escape conviction or have their convictions overturned on appeal as a result 
of inconsequential procedural errors  by the police. In fact, as has  been seen, 
the conviction rate is high, and the majority of appeals  on points of law 
fail.58 Despite that apparent error of perspective, there is  some attraction in 
his argument that the better approach to insisting on the statutory procedure 
would be to follow the general rule that evidence is  admissible despite any 
illegality in obtaining it, subject only to the courts’ discretion to exclude it 
under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.59  This 
approach might reduce certainty, in that the court’s discretion would have 
priority over the rules which have been developed over the years, but, ten 
years  later, the case of Carless60 provided support for the view that excess 
alcohol may be proved by means  other than the statutory procedure. The 
case also provides  a vivid illustration of the fact that the provisions  are still 
subject to significant points  of interpretation. The case is worth reviewing in 
some detail here. It turned on section 15(2) of the Road Traffic Offenders 
Act 1988:
Evidence of the proportion of alcohol or any drug in a 
specimen of breath, blood or urine provided by or taken from 
the accused shall, in all cases  (including cases  where the 
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specimen was  not provided or taken in connection with the 
alleged offence), be taken into account … 
The words  in brackets  were introduced by the Road Traffic Act 1991, and 
had, it seems, gone unnoticed since. In Carless, police took samples  of blood 
from inside a car which had been involved in a traffic accident. They 
analysed it for DNA and alcohol, matching the specimen to the defendant 
and showing excess  alcohol. The Divisional Court ruled that the words 
“(including cases where the specimen was not provided or taken in 
connection with the alleged offence)” created a new set of circumstances in 
which specimens may be admitted in prosecutions  for excess  alcohol 
offences. This seems to be exactly the development which Hirst wished for. 
It gives rise, however, to the question whether Parliament intended, by the 
addition of these words, to provide an alternative to the statutory regime for 
taking specimens. The words  were added to section 15(2) by provisions61 
headed “Minor and Consequential Amendments”. But the effect of the 
words  was far from minor in the case of Carless. Further, there seems to be 
nothing in the 1991 Act upon which the addition of these words  to section 
15(2) is  consequent. The 1991 Act modified the substantive drink-drive 
provisions only by inserting section 3A,62 and by substituting, in section 4, 
the words  “mechanically propelled vehicle” for “motor vehicle”.63 Stranger 
still, a year later, the Transport and Works Act 1992 introduced a set of 
provisions on drink-driving in respect of railways, tramways and other 
guided transport systems, which mirrors the provisions  of the Road Traffic 
Act, but omits the words which gave rise to the decision in Carless. The 
approach adopted in Carless was endorsed, albeit obiter, in R v Coe,64 where 
the Court of Appeal said that, by virtue of the bracketed words in section 
15(2), section 15 is capable of applying not only to a specimen taken 
pursuant to the procedure laid down in the Act, but to a specimen of blood 
taken as a matter of  routine by a member of  the hospital staff.
The point in Carless is  one of genuine concern about the procedure 
and is a vivid example of serious  uncertainty, suggesting that there may be 
circumstances in which the investigation can be conducted entirely outside 
the regime in the Road Traffic Act. For example, if there were reliable 
evidence of what a person had eaten and drunk before driving, at what 
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times, and of the person’s personal characteristics such as  height and weight, 
it would be possible to calculate fairly accurately the person’s blood alcohol 
concentration when driving, and a prosecution could, conceivably, succeed 
even though no specimen at all was  taken. In Barclay v Richardson,65 however, 
the Scottish High Court of Justiciary, without reference to Carless or Coe, 
ruled, by a majority of three to two, that any conviction under section 5 
requires  to be founded on an analysis  of a specimen of breath, blood or 
urine provided in accordance with the statutory procedures.66  In the two 
dissenting judgments, on the other hand, it was  opined that the legislation 
did not limit the manner of proof; all that was required was that any such 
proof demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had a breath 
alcohol level in excess of the limit.67 It is  worrying that there seems to be a 
difference of some significance between the jurisprudence of England and 
Wales and of  Scotland on this point. 
While it  is  difficult to reach an overall conclusion on the question 
whether or not the drink- and drug-driving investigation procedure is 
sufficiently certain, I conclude that, overall, it probably is. Where alcohol is 
suspected, the investigation is often quick and simple. The kind of situation 
which arose in Carless is  rare, and, to avoid challenge, investigators would 
doubtless opt for the conventional procedure if at all possible. The new 
offences  under section 5A68 will be subject to investigative procedures  in the 
same terms as for the excess alcohol offences and, no doubt, new challenges 
will arise. A drink-drive investigation may be lengthy if the full process of 
moving from requiring breath to blood, to urine, has to be invoked. 
Unfitness  investigations  are more complicated, often requiring a medical 
opinion.69 But length or complexity should not be confused with uncertainty. 
The procedure for all the drink- and drug-driving investigations is  set out in 
detail70 in the legislation and has  been greatly elaborated by the decisions  of 
the higher courts  over the years, and is  further explained in the pro formas 
used by investigating officers.71 While it is sometimes  difficult, I contend that 
it is sufficiently clear to meet the test of  legal certainty.
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THE ROLE OF ADVICE
As noted elsewhere, it has been said that the law should be expressed so as to 
communicate directly and effectively with as  much of its intended audience 
as  possible.72  While it might be assumed that the audience for road traffic 
legislation is  those who use the roads, another view is  that the law is  written 
for lawyers  and that the only audience is lawyers; others need advice on the 
law.73  In Chapter 5,74  I mentioned the role of advice as an aid to 
understanding legal provisions and enhancing their certainty. I cited a 
number of propositions to the effect that the requirement for certainty is 
met even if advice on the interpretation of a prohibition is needed in order 
to understand it.
It has been seen75  that an investigation into a drink- or drug-driving 
offence may not be delayed for the suspect to take legal advice, so that if 
advice is  to have any role in relation to the certainty or otherwise of the 
provisions, advice on certain important matters – significantly, on whether or 
not to provide a specimen if so required – would need to be taken at some 
point before the investigation starts. The prospect of someone who has 
consumed alcohol or a drug and then seeks legal advice about whether or 
not he or she could then lawfully drive is  at best far-fetched.76 In any event, 
given the ways in which alcohol and other drugs behave in the body,77 
scientific or medical advice, and even then of a specialised nature, would 
probably be far more useful than advice from a lawyer. 
It might be said that those who drive should inform themselves in 
advance of the practical interpretation of the prohibitions. In Chapter 10, I 
argue that drivers  do have certain special duties, but I do not think they 
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77 See Chapter 6.
extend to a detailed understanding of how alcohol affects the individual; it is 
too complicated. The advice which is readily available is  that given in public 
education campaigns. Sadly, this  may only confuse matters. In Chapter 7, I 
described the limitations  of official guidance,78 and argued that the “don’t 
drink and drive” campaign is more appropriate to unfitness  than to 
exceeding the prescribed limit.79  The campaigns, however, make no clear 
distinction between the two offences, while the driving public seems more 
aware of the excess  alcohol offences  than of the unfitness  offences, with the 
result that the campaigns seem far more likely to be understood, erroneously, 
as relating to the excess alcohol offences.
The role of advice about the effects of drugs  is  rather different. In 
relation to prescription and over-the-counter drugs, specific advice relating 
to the drug in question, and perhaps  to the individual in question, is  often 
given, but not consistently. As noted in Chapter 7,80  however, very little is 
known about what, if anything, prescribers tell patients about the effects  of a 
drug on driving. Likewise, little is  known about whether people taking either 
prescription or over-the-counter drugs  read and understand any warnings 
about driving given in the product information leaflet. Many warnings  are 
generalised and may not apply to particular individuals  in particular 
circumstances. Nevertheless, if a person really wanted to know if it would be 
unsafe to drive after a particular drug, there are plenty of sources of advice 
– the person who prescribed it, the pharmacist who dispensed or sold it, not 
to mention the vast resources of the internet – and it seems  reasonable to 
assume that a fairly sound indication would be fairly easy to find in many 
cases. It would be enough for the purposes of unfitness to drive to know that 
a particular drug impairs  driving skills, but possibly not enough if the advice 
is that a drug could impair, since that gives rise to questions of the 
circumstances in which it would have that effect.
In the case of illicit drugs, it is difficult to imagine where advice about 
the effects  of particular drugs on driving might be found, except perhaps 
from specialist organisations  who offer assistance to drug-users. While the 
internet does assist,81 the advice is necessarily generalised. 
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In relation to the drugs  – both legal and illegal – which will be 
specified for the purposes  of the new section 5A,82 advice may be needed 
not only concerning the effects of specific drugs, but also on whether or not 
a drug appears  on the list, such that having an excess would be an offence 
regardless  of fitness to drive. It is  unclear how this will work. In the case of a 
specified prescription or over-the-counter drug, the pharmacy label or 
packaging may include a statement to that effect, or the prescriber may 
advise.
On balance, my conclusion is that the lack of certainty in the 
definition of the drink-drive limit cannot be off-set by taking advice except 
of a detailed, scientific kind which it is inappropriate to expect drivers to 
seek out. The opposite is, however, probably true of prescription and over-
the-counter drugs where information about the effects of specific doses is 
available. It seems not unreasonable that those who drive should make 
inquiries  if they are taking such medication. Advice is less readily available 
in relation to illegal drugs, yet here the very fact that possession is  forbidden 
might be taken to suggest that having the drug in the body while driving 
constitutes  an offence in itself. Of course, that may give rise to the question 
of how people know which drugs  are illegal – a point far beyond the scope 
of  this work.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties of understanding the drink-drive limit seriously compromise 
legal certainty in relation to the offence which is, in terms  of the number of 
cases brought to justice, the most important of the drink- and drug-driving 
offences  by a long way. Since the concept of the prescribed limit goes  to the 
definition of the offence itself, this seems  to me a far more fundamental 
breach of principle than those discussed in Chapters 2 to 4. Strict liability, 
reverse burdens and the presumption of innocence all go to matters of proof 
and the rights  of individual defendants, but the prescribed limit determines 
whether or not an offence has been committed at all. In Chapter 10, I argue 
that we must find a way of  accommodating this major breach of  principle.  
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Chapter 10: Breaking the Rules or an Alternative 
Paradigm?
INTRODUCTION
In this  closing chapter, I first recall my research questions, before drawing 
together conclusions from my project as a whole. My challenge was  to 
elucidate:1
• the nature of  the drink- and drug-driving offences;
• the extent to which they comply with or breach the principles 
said to underlie the criminal law;
• whether any such breaches can be justified; and  
• the consequences (if  any) for legal theory of  any such breaches. 
My expectation was  that the law would be complex and difficult, and that it 
would offend many of the traditional principles. Both these expectations 
were borne out.
On the nature and difficulty of the offences, I have, throughout this 
work, demonstrated the complexity of the provisions, describing them as 
technology-led, non-paradigmatic offences of endangerment.2  I have 
examined the blameworthiness  attaching to them.3  I have described the 
scientific background on which the offences  are founded,4 and the closely 
regulated procedure for conducting investigations.5 I have delineated parts  of 
the vast body of  case law which has arisen.6 
In this  chapter, I draw together conclusions relating to the principles. I 
first recall my findings concerning derogations from the traditional criminal 
law paradigm. I place the derogations into the context of a more general 
move away from principle in the development of the criminal law. I argue 
that, at least in relation to the excess  alcohol offences, the contribution to 
road safety has been so great that it is  a compelling reason for accepting the 
derogations  and finding justifications for them. This is not necessarily so in 
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respect of the drug-driving offences, and it has been much more difficult to 
reach firm conclusions in relation to those. Finally, I look forward, suggesting 
that the time may have come to recognise, and to begin to map out, an 
alternative paradigm. 
I concluded in Chapter 2 that, although the drink- and drug-driving 
offences  are offences  of strict liability, strict liability is not appropriate to 
them. I next found, in Chapter 3, that the presumption of innocence is 
compromised in relation to the offences. In Chapter 4, I identified much to 
suggest that the privilege against self-incrimination should, although it does 
not, apply to requirements  to provide specimens  in drink- and drug-driving 
investigations. 
In relation to all three principles  I cited arguments that the 
derogations  could nevertheless be accepted. These were, first, that road 
safety considerations might be given priority over the matters of principle, 
and, second, that driving is a special activity in which people engage 
voluntarily with the quid pro quo that drivers  must accept some special 
responsibilities and forego certain legal protections which would otherwise 
be available. In relation to strict liability, I also argued that those who drive 
after drinking or taking drugs must realise they are at risk of breaking the 
law, and highlighted the difficulty of proving mens rea if it were to be a 
constituent of the offences. Ease of proof was relevant in relation to the 
presumption of innocence, while the need for enforceability called for an 
exception to the privilege against self-incrimination.  
The principle of legal certainty, particularly in relation to the 
prescribed limit for alcohol, was  a major focus  of my research and I 
discussed it at length, exploring the theory in Chapter 5, the scientific 
background (Chapter 6) and drivers’ confused perceptions of the law 
(Chapter 7). In Chapter 8 I described my own study, confirming that, in 
relation to the prescribed alcohol limit, drivers are greatly confused. I 
concluded, in Chapter 9, that the prescribed limit for alcohol (and possibly 
also, in due course, the specified limits  for certain drugs7) is couched in terms 
which defy the principle of legal certainty, but that the same cannot be said 
of  the unfitness offences.  
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THE EROSION OF PRINCIPLE
I have highlighted a number of examples of the erosion of principle in the 
context of the drink- and drug-driving offences. James Jacobs, the American 
commentator, asserts that: 
Jurisprudential and constitutional values, which have figured 
prominently in the evolution of criminal law and procedure, 
have been ignored or slighted in the case of  drunk driving. 8
In the UK, the departures  from principle are such that the procedure 
in drink-driving cases clearly favours the prosecutor at the expense of the 
defendant, and the same will likely be true in relation to the excess drugs 
offences, when in force,9  since the statutory provisions are couched in the 
same terms. A suspect may not delay giving a specimen to take advice about 
whether or not to comply.10 If the suspect refuses  to supply a specimen, a 
charge of failing without reasonable excuse to provide the specimen almost 
certainly ensues and the suspect is in much the same position as someone 
who supplies a specimen which shows an excess over the relevant limit.11 
The limited circumstances in which defendants have been found to have 
reasonable excuses for failing to provide specimens, and the broad powers to 
require specimens, are such that it is  virtually impossible to avoid providing a 
specimen of some sort.12  The prosecutor has  the benefit of the statutory 
assumption that the alcohol or drug level at the time of an alleged offence 
was  no lower than in the specimen taken later, and may even “backtrack” to 
show that it was in fact higher.13  The defendant may not make a similar 
calculation to show being below the limit at the critical time. I have argued 
that the supposed safeguards  against self-incrimination are in reality no 
safeguards at all.14
The only concessions in a suspect’s  favour are that it is  the policy of 
the Crown Prosecution Service not to prosecute for drink-driving if the 
breath alcohol is below 40 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres  of 
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breath, even though the prescribed limit is 35.15 Secondly, a margin of error 
is allowed in favour of suspects when blood specimens are analysed.16 The 
legislation contains some procedural safeguards for suspects. For example, 
suspects must be warned that failure without reasonable excuse to provide 
specimens is an offence, and a prosecution must fail if this  requirement is 
not met.17 
The fact that the drink-drive offences  do not have their roots in the 
common law may be a reason for their non-compliance with the traditional 
principles. This may be true of many offences  created by statute. Ashworth18 
noted that, of thirty-nine new offences  created by statute in 1997, most were 
regulatory in that they applied to spheres of social or commercial activity 
and were generally enforced by a regulatory authority rather than the 
police.19 Most were characterised by strict liability, liability for omissions  and 
reverse onus defences. All these features were inconsistent with the rhetoric 
of the criminal law – the presumption of mens rea, that liability for omissions 
is exceptional, and that the prosecution bears  the burden of proving guilt.20 
Ashworth highlights  the proliferation of offences  for purposes of political 
expedience, without reference to principle.21 I would not go as far as that in 
relation to the drink- and drug-driving offences, for they are inspired by 
principle, but the principle, as I explain further,22 is road safety rather than 
the traditional criminal law. I come back to the burgeoning of regulatory 
offences 23 in the context of a suggestion that the time may have come to 
recognise an alternative paradigm. For the moment, it is sufficient to note 
that the drink- and drug-driving offences are far from alone in departing 
from traditional principles.
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16  It is a standard practice of analysts to allow a margin in favour of the suspect, of 6%, or 6 mg, 
whichever is lower, a practice recognised in Walker v Hodgins [1984] RTR 34 (DC).
17 DPP v Jackson, Stanley v DPP [1999] 1 AC 406 (HL); see p 56.
18 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 LQR 225. See also p 326.
19 This latter point does not of  course apply to the drink- and drug-driving offences.
20 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 LQR 225, 228.
21 Ibid, 253. 
22 See pp 309–312.
23 See pp 324–325.
JUSTIFYING THE BREACHES OF PRINCIPLE
I turn now to considering what we are to make of the departures  from 
principle. My contention is  that the remarkable contribution to road safety 
made by the drink-driving provisions is  so compelling that it warrants 
accepting deviations  from the normal paradigm. The literature and the case 
law provide much support for this proposition. My conclusions  in relation to 
the drug-driving offences are necessarily more tentative. Nevertheless, I 
argue that, in relation to both drink- and drug-driving, drivers are in a 
position of special responsibility, and, as a quid pro quo for the freedom of the 
road, they must accept a regulatory regime which is  more restrictive of their 
individual liberties  than that envisaged by the traditional criminal law 
paradigm. I believe these to be strong and sufficient arguments for accepting 
the imperfections, from the point of view of legal theory, of the drink- and 
drug-driving offences. I find further support for my argument that the 
derogations  from principle are to be accepted by invoking the “thin ice” 
principle and the need for enforceability.
Road Safety
The statistics
I have already noted24 that road traffic fatalities  in Great Britain attributed 
to drink-driving fell from 1,640 in 1979 to an estimated 290 in 2012. Serious 
injuries attributed to drink-driving fell from 8,300 to 1,210, and slight 
injuries from 21,490 to 8,500 over the same period. While fatalities have 
fallen to below one fifth of their level a third of a century ago, the total 
number of fatalities and injuries  taken together has fallen to only one third 
of the 1979 level. Improvements in vehicle design, emergency service 
responses  and life-saving techniques have surely contributed to the 
proportionately greater reductions in the numbers of fatalities. In 1979, 
drink-drive incidents  accounted for about a quarter of all those killed on the 
roads; over the five years to 2012, the proportion has dropped to fifteen per 
cent.25 Although the estimated figure for fatalities  in 2012 shows a slight rise 
on the final figure for 2011, the general trend over the years  is  relentlessly 
downward. Thousands of  lives have been saved and much suffering averted. 
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uploads/attachment_data/file/226068/accidents-involving-illegal-alcohol-levels-2011-2012.pdf> 
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The statistics  themselves do not, of course, prove any direct 
connection between the statutory provisions and the reductions in fatalities 
and injuries, but it seems unrealistic to think that the improvements  can 
result from anything other than a combination of the statutory provisions, 
the public education campaigns and police enforcement. Because of this 
significant contribution to improving road safety, I contend that we must find 
a way of  accommodating the offences in the framework of  the criminal law. 
There are no equivalent statistics  on drug-driving, the extent of which 
is unknown,26 although statistics  on the new drug offences27 will probably be 
kept once the provisions  are in force. The consultation document contains 
an estimate of the likely reduction in casualties, but acknowledges  the 
complexity of forecasting.28  Unfitness to drive (whether through drink or 
drugs) is  rarely before the courts.29 It is not therefore possible to invoke with 
any certainty the road safety considerations  to justify derogations  from legal 
principle in relation to the law on drug-driving. Nevertheless, when the 
drink-driving offences were first introduced, the extraordinary success  of the 
measures was not foreseen. History has  proved their effectiveness. The same 
may well prove true of  the new excess drug offences. 
Balancing interests
I have alluded many times  to the question of balancing society’s interests in 
road safety against individual rights deriving from the traditional criminal 
law paradigm. I have outlined how road safety considerations underlie the 
drink- and drug-driving offences,30 and noted that the public has come to 
view drink-driving as a serious  offence.31 Except for the offence of causing 
death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, all the 
offences  can be committed without any harm resulting.32 They are offences 
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53, para 52 et seq <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
211220/consultation-document.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013. 
29 See p 200.
30 See pp 62–63.
31 See pp 22–23.
32 See pp 26–27.
of endangering the safety of others,33  bringing additional risk to the 
inherently dangerous process of  driving. 
It has been said that the justice of creating such offences may be 
evaluated by balancing the seriousness of the possible harm and the 
likelihood of its occurrence, against the social value of the conduct in 
question (driving) and the degree of intrusion on the individual’s life which 
would be caused by criminalising that conduct.34  The drink and drug-
driving offences  surely pass this  test. The increased likelihood of accident 
when driving with alcohol is well documented.35 In 2012, there were 55,300 
convictions  for drink-driving in England and Wales36 and, in 2011/12, 7,445 
in Scotland.37  In 2012 there were 10,000 casualties (fatalities and persons 
injured seriously or slightly) in Great Britain arising out of drink-drive 
incidents.38  This  approximates  to one casualty for every 6.2 convictions. 
Although Clarkson says 39 that the potential harm of drink-driving is  so great 
that, to justify criminalising it, the risk of its materialising need not be 
particularly high, these figures seem to suggest that the risk is indeed high.
On the other hand, the social value of freedom to drive is immense, in 
terms of individuals  going about their daily activities, of transport 
infrastructure and of commerce in general. The degree of intrusion on the 
individual, in avoiding the drink- and drug-driving offences, is, I contend, 
slight. Given what is at stake, it  can rarely be much of an inconvenience to 
refrain from alcohol or (most40) drugs before driving, or to avoid driving 
after consuming such substances. The period of time for which one must do 
so is  a matter of difficulty, as I have shown in Chapter 7,41  but it is not 
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39 CMV Clarkson, Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 262, see pp 30–31.
40 The position in relation to prescription drugs under the new specified drug offences is not, however, 
quite so clear; see pp 296–297.
41 See pp 221–222.
beyond drivers  to adopt a safe margin of error – twenty-four hours, if 
necessary. This  would be in line with the “don’t drink and drive” approach 
of so many respondents  in my survey.42 It seems not unreasonable to expect 
drivers  to exercise appropriate caution, as in many other driving situations, 
for example, waiting until sure that the way ahead is  clear, or taking extra 
precautions  in bad weather. Indeed, if the proposal to reduce the drink-drive 
limit in Scotland43  comes to fruition, drivers in the North of England who 
think they may be below the English limit but possibly over the Scottish limit 
will need to take extreme care not to cross the border. 
The case law
The suggestion that departures from principle may be acceptable in the 
broader public interest is  supported by the case law of both the domestic 
courts and the ECtHR.
The Privy Council said that strict liability may be acceptable where it 
will advance the objects  of a statute by encouraging greater vigilance to 
avoid committing an offence.44 In the leading case of Sheldrake, the House of 
Lords  ruled that, while the reverse burden of proving no likelihood of 
driving while remaining unfit through drink or drugs  breached the 
presumption of innocence, the breach was  justified because (among other 
reasons) it was aimed at the legitimate objectives of preventing death, injury 
and damage.45 I have argued46 that the real danger at which the “in charge” 
offences  are aimed is  the risk of driving, a road safety consideration. In 
upholding the statutory assumption that the alcohol level at the time of an 
alleged offence would have been no lower than in the specimen taken later, 
the Divisional Court emphasised that the legislation was aimed at preventing 
the consumption of large quantities of alcohol before taking control of a 
vehicle.47 So too, the purpose of the legislation was invoked in relation to 
drinking after the event but before providing a specimen,48  the Court of 
Appeal also referring to Parliament’s intention to minimise the social evil of 
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44 Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of  Hong Kong [1985] AC 1 (PC) 14; see p 40. 
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47 Parker v DPP [2001] RTR 16 (QBD); Griffiths v DPP [2002] EWHC 792 (Admin); see p 117.
48 R v Drummond [2002] EWCA Crim 527; see p 116. 
drink-driving. Road safety has been a consistent theme in the case law on 
reverse burdens, as  described in Chapter 3.49  Encroachments on the 
presumption of innocence have been found to be reasonable and 
proportionate.50  The right against self-incrimination may be sacrificed in 
favour of protection against drunken drivers, for “good and pressing social 
reasons”.51 Foregoing the privilege may be proportionate and reasonable in 
relation to drink-driving offences.52
The House of Lords has  ruled that the nature of the threat to society 
addressed by a reverse burden of  proof  is relevant to deciding its legality.53 
Although the ECtHR court at first rejected arguments that the wider 
public interest might outweigh the right against self-incrimination, an 
important dissenting opinion in Saunders54 is  to the opposite effect, and the 
public interest question took on greater significance in the more recent case 
of  Jalloh.55 
While it may be more difficult to justify breaches  of principle if the offence 
is serious,56 and I noted in Chapter 1 that drink-driving (if not drug-driving) 
is  considered serious, I nevertheless  conclude that the huge benefits  to road 
safety brought about since the excess  alcohol offences  were introduced can 
be balanced against the convenience of freedom to drive and the relative 
inconvenience of avoiding committing the offences, such that, to the extent 
that drink-drive offences  breach the principles of law described in this work, 
it is in the interests of  road safety to accept those breaches. 
Drawing the line
Arguing that the road safety considerations should take priority over 
established principles  of law gives rise to problems of where to draw the line, 
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a matter which is not without controversy.57 I discuss  this  question below,58 
in relation to both the road safety considerations  and the idea of a special 
duty on drivers.
A Special Duty
I next turn to the proposition that drivers  are under a special duty in relation 
to each other and to others, such that they must accept departures from a 
number of the principles often featuring in the criminal law. I put forward 
this  argument in relation to all the drink- and drug-driving offences, 
including the new excess drugs offences. 
Co-operation between drivers
It is  clear that many rules of the road – driving on the left, stopping at red 
signals, giving way to vehicles  in accordance with the system of priorities – 
are based on the need for cooperation between drivers so that traffic can 
move in an orderly and safe fashion. It would be unrealistic to suggest that 
rules of  this basic kind breach rights such as individual liberty. 
That drivers  have specific duties to others  is reflected in the definitions 
of some road traffic offences. Examples  are driving without reasonable 
consideration for others,59 and using a vehicle in such a condition that there 
is a danger of  injury to another.60 
This  idea that drivers  are in a special position vis-à-vis each other 
recurs throughout the literature. James Jacobs61 talks  of the extraordinary 
interpersonal trust on which the highway transportation system depends, 
urging that responsible participation should be considered a major 
obligation of  citizenship. 
Duff62 points  out that the reason we obey rules such as the prohibition 
on driving the wrong way down a one-way street is that doing so serves the 
convenience (and, to a degree, the safety) of drivers generally. He argues that 
drivers  have a general responsibility to consider the convenience and safety 
of other road users. They owe it to each other not only to ensure they act 
safely, but to assure each other that they do so, by following rules  such as 
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61 James B Jacobs, Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma (University of  Chicago Press 1989) 16.
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speed limits,63 and by proving competence to engage in the activity by taking 
the driving test.64 
Simester and von Hirsch65  canvass the idea of obligations of co-
operation among participants in common activity. The proscription of 
drink-driving (and speeding) falls within a group of rules designed to protect 
members  of the group whose conduct is  regulated – here, drivers. No man is 
an island, and the rules are for mutual protection. 
Some further confirmation of the idea of drivers  as a special 
community may perhaps be found in the penalty of disqualification – a 
period of forced withdrawal from the community of drivers, with all the 
consequent inconvenience and expense. 
Special responsibilities
Taking the idea of the community of drivers a step further, drivers can be 
said to incur special responsibilities  by virtue of membership of that 
community. In relation to a proposal that repeat convictions for drink-
driving might lead to permanent disqualification from driving, the 2010 
North Report referred to driving as a considerable responsibility, not an 
inalienable right.66 These responsibilities, I argue, include not only the rules 
relating to how they drive, but extend to relinquishing some of the rights 
ordinarily afforded to those who come up against the criminal law. 
Throughout this work I have noted instances in which commentators  have 
drawn on the idea of the special position of drivers  to justify departures 
from principle.
Ashworth and Horder67 acknowledge that higher standards in relation 
to the criminal law apply to drivers  (as they do to certain corporations) since 
safety is a central issue and a licence is  required. In Chapter 5,68  in the 
context of ignorance of the law, I mentioned the suggestion that it is  a duty 
of citizenship to know the law. While the existence of any such duty in 
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general is  controversial,69 it has been argued 70 that it is  fair to expect people 
to make a reasonable effort to find out what the law is, and, in the specific 
context of motoring offences of omission, such as failing to comply with a 
traffic signal,71  drivers have a responsibility to familiarise themselves with 
duties such as these, which are set out in the Highway Code.
In relation to strict liability, Ormerod72 suggests  that since driving is  an 
activity of choice involving danger to others, strict liability is  acceptable in 
relation to some road traffic offences, but does not specify which road traffic 
offences he would put within this bracket.  
Again in support of the proposition that drivers incur special duties, 
Dennis,73  writing about reverse burdens  of proof, suggests a principle he 
calls  the voluntary acceptance of risk, to the effect that people who benefit 
from taking part in a regulated activity accept responsibility for disproving 
assumptions  of blame. Glover’s licensing approach,74 also argued in relation 
to reverse burdens of  proof, is to the same effect.
Ashworth and Redmayne75  also recognise, albeit with a degree of 
reservation, that vehicle owners do voluntarily enter into a clear regulatory 
regime.  
In arguing that the outcome in O’Halloran would have been better 
reasoned by finding a limited exception to the privilege against self-
incrimination, rather than by deciding it did not apply at all, Ashworth76 
suggests that one of the criteria for making an exception to the privilege 
might be that the social enterprise in question is, like driving, heavily 
regulated, to the extent of requiring a test to be passed and a licence 
obtained. While the drink- and drug-driving offences  might fail on his other 
preconditions for an exception (relatively little at stake; provisions to be 
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76  Andrew Ashworth, ‘Self-incrimination in European Human Rights Law –  a Pregnant 
Pragmatism?’ (2008) 30 Cardozo LR 751, 770; see pp 142, 165.
excused if without fault), he nevertheless  contemplates singling out driving 
by virtue of  the degree of  regulation. 
On the basis  that car ownership and driving are heavily regulated, 
requiring licences  and the registration of vehicles, the Road Traffic Act 1988 
can be seen as part of that regulatory structure, and those who own or drive 
cars can be said to accept the duties imposed by the structure, including the 
duty to account for their sobriety when they drive.77
Not all commentators  are, however, of one accord. Duff78 specifically 
exempts drivers from special responsibility because he considers  driving an 
ordinary rather than a special activity, although he agrees  in principle that 
those who create risk of harms over and above those which are acceptable as 
features of normal life should bear some measure of special responsibility. 
Hamer79 embraces  exemptions from principle for regulatory regimes, but is 
unsure how to categorise driving, although he emphatically rejects any idea 
that it should go as  far as a presumption of dangerous  driving. These are, 
however, minority views, both writers’ reservations being based, at least in 
part, on wishing to avoid making any presumptions  of dangerous  (Hamer) 
or careless (Duff) driving. 
The case law
The case law also contains  many references  to special responsibilities on 
people who engage in certain activities, and, more recently, on drivers  in 
particular. 
The House of Lords has referred to a higher duty of care to avoid 
prohibited acts on those who choose to participate in certain activities. The 
context was, however, activities involving particular danger to public health, 
safety or morals.80 Making the same point again in a later case,81 the House 
suggested that a requirement to have a licence to take part in an activity 
would indicate that strict liability might attach. The examples  of such 
activities  were those concerned with the promotion of health and safety and 
the avoidance of pollution, and other cases  which might properly be seen as 
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“not truly criminal”. This might encompass many road traffic offences, but 
not necessarily the drink- and drug-driving offences.  
A more robust stance has been taken in cases  concerning road traffic 
legislation. In Brown v Stott,82 the House of Lords articulated in the clearest of 
terms the fact that drivers and vehicle owners must accept a special 
regulatory regime because of the risk of grave injury from their activities. 
Brown v Stott concerned a statutory obligation to identify the person who had 
been driving on a particular occasion, but the language of the judgment – 
“all who own or drive motor cars  know that by doing so they subject 
themselves to a regulatory regime” – suggests  that the point applies  in 
relation to all driving offences. The ECtHR case of O’Halloran83 arose out of 
the same requirement to identify who had been driving. The court ruled that 
those who choose to keep and drive vehicles can be taken to have accepted 
certain responsibilities and obligations  as part of the regulatory regime. Such 
responsibilities include the obligation to identify a driver if a road traffic 
offence is suspected. Again the language suggests that these special 
obligations apply to motoring offences  in general and are not confined to the 
narrower point of  identifying the driver.
There can be little doubt that drivers single themselves out for voluntary 
participation in an activity which is inherently dangerous and heavily 
regulated. They must learn to drive, often taking expensive lessons, and pass 
both a theory test and a practical test. A number of commentators have 
referred to the requirement for a licence as one of the indicators of special 
responsibility. The Highway Code features  in the driving test, and while it is 
by no means  a comprehensive guide to road traffic law, it nevertheless puts 
learner drivers  on notice of the many rules  and regulations applying to 
them. These concern not only the manner of driving, but also safety 
measures such as wearing a seat belt or safety helmet, and specific duties 
such as  the requirement to stop after and report an accident, to have 
insurance and to pay vehicle excise duty. Drivers thereby put themselves into 
a special category of citizen, with all the responsibility for what they do and 
how they do it, as the price of the freedom of the roads. Included in this 
range of responsibilities is, I argue, the relinquishment of a number of 
safeguards which have traditionally characterised the criminal law and 
which I have discussed at length. In relation to the drink-drive limit in 
particular, drivers are responsible not only for the state of the vehicles  they 
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drive,84  but, as a consequence of accepting the breach of legal certainty 
inherent in the prescribed limit, they are also responsible for the condition in 
which they themselves drive. 
Once it is agreed that drivers have a range of special duties, the question of 
the extent of those duties arises. I discuss  this  below.85 But first, I revert to 
the “thin ice” principle and the question of enforceability, as  further 
justifying, in more specific ways, derogations from the traditional criminal 
law paradigm in the drink- and drug-driving offences.
Thin Ice
The “thin ice” principle may come into play in relation to the drink- and 
drug-driving offences. As  explained elsewhere,86  the idea is that to do 
something, knowing it is on the borderline of illegality, gives  rise to the risk 
that the action in question will later be held to be criminal. While the 
principle has been referred to in relation to the creation of new offences, 
and the extension of existing offences,87 it may apply also to acts  constituting 
the commission of offences. Duff88 argues that, once a person starts to drink, 
the drinker is  on thin ice and takes  the risk of exceeding the limit. James 
Jacobs89 cites a comment in an American case to the effect that anyone with 
common sense will know when consumption is approaching a meaningful 
amount; at that point he proceeds at his own risk.90 
The domestic courts, likewise, have placed the risk on the driver, who 
must:
observe the quantity and quality of what he drinks  and if he 
makes  a mistake and in fact takes  more alcohol than is  justified 
by the statutory limit, then he is guilty of  the offence.91 
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Other cases  in which the higher courts  have confirmed the risk on the 
driver are mentioned in Chapter 6.92 In Chapter 2,93 I argued that taking 
this  risk amounts  to culpability such as  to justify strict liability. Given 
widespread awareness of the dangers  of driving after drinking, even though 
their exact nature is  so elusive, there is a strong argument that those who 
take the risk must accept the consequences if  the risk materialises. 
It may be possible to say the same of drug-driving, although I do so 
only tentatively since so much less is  known about drugs  and driving than 
about alcohol and driving. Those who use illegal drugs must usually be 
aware, by virtue of how they came by them, that they should not be using 
them at all. If they then drive after consuming them, they take the risk of 
doubly falling foul of the law in the sense of both illegal possession and 
drug-driving. While it is  easier to have sympathy for those who use 
prescribed or over-the-counter drugs, the very fact of having come into 
possession of such a drug surely puts a person, especially a driver, on notice 
to inquire about its  effects  beyond the immediate intended therapeutic 
purpose. This might be considered one of the constituents of the special 
duties of  drivers, discussed above.  
The thin ice principle may therefore be seen as  offsetting the absence 
of legal certainty about the interpretation the prescribed limit (and, in due 
course, perhaps also about the specified drug limits  also), by placing the risk 
on the individual. 
Enforceability
The need for legislation to be enforceable has  been put forward as  a reason 
for accepting derogations  from the principles of the criminal law. Roberts 
proposed94 that reverse burdens of proof may be justified if the legislation in 
question would otherwise be unenforceable. I discussed reverse burdens of 
proof in Chapter 3, identifying three situations in which burdens allocated 
to defendants rather than to the prosecution appear to breach the 
presumption of  innocence. The three situations were:
• proof, by a person in charge of a vehicle, that there was no 
likelihood of driving while remaining unfit through drink or 
drugs or over the limit;95 
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94 Paul Roberts ‘The Presumption of Innocence Brought Home? Kebilene Deconstructed’ (2002) 118 
LQR 41, 63; see p 87. 
95 See pp 90–99.
• the irrebuttable statutory assumption that the concentration of 
alcohol or a drug at the time of an alleged offence was  no 
lower than in the specimen taken at a later time;96 and 
• proof of “post-incident consumption” or the “hip flask 
defence’ – that it was alcohol97  consumed after the incident 
which caused the defendant to be over the limit.98
The other two burdens of proof on defendants  – to raise the question 
of reasonable excuse in response to an allegation of failing to provide a 
specimen99 and the medical defence in relation to drugs100 – are evidential 
burdens only and do not offend the presumption of  innocence. 
Of the three reverse burdens listed above, the first raises no issues of 
the enforceability of the legislation. It is exculpatory, referred to in the 
legislation as resulting in a deeming of having not been in charge,101 and as 
a defence.102
The statutory assumption, on the other hand, plays  a significant role in 
the enforcement of the legislation. Without it, it would be open to a 
defendant to claim that the analysis of the specimen does not accurately 
reflect the alcohol or drug concentration at the time of the alleged 
offence.103  It would then be a complex and costly task, based on matters 
such as the personal characteristics  of the defendant, detailed timings, and 
what is said to have been consumed (both food and drink)104 for a prosecutor 
to undermine such a claim. As  the law is framed, such exercises are 
unnecessary other than in the exceptional case where the analysis  shows  the 
person to be below the limit, but there is a compelling reason to back-
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97 Or, in due course, a specified drug; see pp 8–9.
98 See pp 111–114.
99 See pp 102–105.
100 See pp 99–102.
101 RTA 1988, s 4(3); see pp 90–91.
102 RTA 1988, s 5(2); see p 91.
103 See pp 105–106 on the significance of  time in relation to offences and the taking of  specimens. 
104  For the full details which, ideally, the prosecution would need, see Form MG DD/D: Alcohol 
Technical Defence Form <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/117040/form-d-mgdd.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013.
calculate to show that at time the time of the offence the limit was  in fact 
exceeded.105 
The reverse burden in the third of the situations listed above – where 
a person claims to have drunk after driving but before providing the 
specimen, and that the specimen would not otherwise have shown an excess, 
– engages an issue of enforceability. Without the reverse burden, it would be 
open to anyone who has the opportunity to take a drink between the time of 
an alleged offence and the time police make contact, to claim to have 
consumed alcohol106 during that time which caused the excess over the limit. 
Indeed, it was to avoid exactly that problem that the burden of proof was 
first placed on the defendant,107 so going some considerable way to resolving 
this difficulty of  enforceability.
While Roberts suggested the enforceability test in relation to reverse 
burdens only, it may be illuminating to speculate on how it might apply to 
the other breaches of principle in the drink- and drug-driving offences. I 
have demonstrated in Chapter 2 that the offences  do not meet the criteria 
for dispensing with mens rea and are instead offences  of strict liability. 
Whether strict liability is necessary for the enforceability of the offences 
would probably depend on how mens rea were defined. If defined as 
intention, it would doubtless  make the offences extremely difficult to prove, 
and, given the problems of interpreting the drink-drive limit, illustrated at 
length in Chapters 7 and 8, extremely easy to deny. Recklessness or even 
perhaps negligence (although negligence as mens rea is controversial)108 might 
well be easier to prove. It might be enough to have consumed alcohol or a 
drug within a certain time before driving to give rise to the suggestion of 
recklessness  or negligence, especially in view of what is said above109 about 
risk-taking. I do no more here than raise the possibility that mens rea in the 
form of intention would likely impede enforcement, while other forms of 
mens rea might not be too great a challenge for a prosecutor. 
I have already noted Dennis’s  proposition110  that the compulsory 
provision of information in defiance of the privilege against self-
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106 Or, in due course, a drug; see s 8–9.
107 See p 111.
108 See pp 38–39.
109 See pp 319–320.
110  Ian Dennis, ‘Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the 
Privilege Against Self-incrimination’ (1995) 54 CLJ 342, 375, discussed at pp 141–142.
incrimination might be permissible where there is a need to secure reliable 
evidence probative of guilt, and there are suitable procedures in place. This 
argument goes  to the question of enforceability of the legislation, and might 
be invoked to justify the requirement to provide specimens, either in breach 
of the privilege or on the basis  that the privilege is not engaged.111 For the 
excess alcohol offences, there is  certainly a need for evidence which cannot 
be obtained without the breaches of the privilege set out in Chapter 4, the 
whole purpose of requiring specimens  being to obtain evidence not 
otherwise available.112 To allow suspects  to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination to decline to provide specimens  would defeat the statutory 
regime for the excess  alcohol offences  (and in due course, the excess drugs 
offences), making proof virtually impossible. While it is theoretically possible 
to prove a drink-drive offence outside the investigative regime set out in the 
Road Traffic Act,113 the likelihood of  so doing is remote. 
 The very practical problems which would ensue if the offences were 
framed within the traditional paradigm (with the tentative, possible 
exception of certain forms of mens rea), confirms, I suggest, that the breaches 
make a substantial contribution to the workability of  the statutory regime. 
While the thin ice principle and the question of enforceability offer some 
justification for the derogations from principle inherent in the drink- and 
drug-driving offences, the undeniable success  of the road safety objectives 
and the concept of special duties  on drivers  seem to me overwhelming 
reasons  for accepting the departures  from the traditional paradigm exhibited 
by this  special group of offences. Now that I have arrived at that conclusion, 
it remains to anticipate what questions may ensue. 
A SECOND PARADIGM?
As noted above,114  the drink- and drug-driving offences are not alone in 
defying many supposedly established principles  of the criminal law. There 
are suggestions in the literature that the traditional paradigm of the criminal 
law may not be quite as  secure as  the textbooks  might lead us  to think. I 
have had reason to quote Blake and Ashworth’s  survey of indictable offences 
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113 See pp 298–300 and the case of  DPP v Carless [2005] EWHC 3234 (Admin) (DC).
114 See p 308.
listed in Archbold115  elsewhere.116  The authors  noted that developments in 
recent years  had cast doubt on the fundamental principles of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the requirement for mens rea. The study 
showed that only four per cent of the 540 offences in question were 
common law offences, the remainder having been created by statute. No 
fewer than forty per cent of the 540 appeared to violate the presumption of 
innocence, while half included at least one element which did not require 
mens rea to be shown to establish guilt. Comparable figures  relating to the less 
serious either-way and summary-only offences117 are not available, but Blake 
and Ashworth refer to a finding reported in 1980 that, of all offences  in the 
1975 edition of Stone’s Justices’ Manual, just over half could be regarded as 
offences  of strict liability. Today, the proportion of offences which are 
regulatory in nature and which defy the traditional paradigm must surely be 
even greater, given the continuing stream of legislation creating new 
offences.118
Not only that, but Blake and Ashworth categorised the offences by 
reference to how they are defined, either by the statutory words, or by 
judicial interpretation, or both. The proportions might well be different if 
calculated on the basis  of the numbers of charges, or convictions, for the 
various  offences. Given that less serious offences are more likely to breach 
the principles,119  and given that the courts deal with relatively few serious 
offences  and many more less serious  ones, it may be that the offences which 
depart from the traditional principles are now in the majority, at least in 
terms of the numbers of proceedings  and of persons charged. While it is 
well beyond the scope of this  work to attempt any detailed calculation to 
support this idea, it may be significant that in 2012, 1.48 million defendants 
were proceeded against in the magistrates’ courts, compared with fewer than 
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115 Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 1995 (Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
116  Meredith Blake and Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal 
Law’ [1996] Crim LR 306.; see pp 41 and 72.
117  “Either-way” offences are tried either in the Crown Court or the magistrates’ court; “summary-
only” offences are tried in the magistrates’ courts. Both are less serious that indictable-only offences, 
which are tried in the Crown Court only; see p 41, fn 55.
118  See, for example, Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 LQR 225; 
James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick, ‘Tracking the Creation of Criminal Offences’ [2013] Crim LR 543. 
See also pp 174, 308.
119 See pp 42, 59–61 and 81–82.
100,000 in the Crown Courts. About one third of the defendants before the 
magistrates’ courts were charged with summary motoring offences.120 
The tenuous  nature of the traditional paradigm is  perhaps suggested 
by this comment:
the fact that we know so little about how many criminal offences 
exist might suggest that those of us  who teach criminal law do 
so with a rather sketchy knowledge of what the criminal law 
actually is.121 
The authors point to ignorance about the content of the multiplicity of 
statutory offences and the reasons for their creation. They found that most 
offences  recently created are not of general application, but are targeted at 
people acting in some form of special capacity – a kind of regulatory 
criminal law which, they say, is  all but ignored by most criminal law texts 
and journals, despite that fact that, in the two tranches  of new enactments 
examined in the study, it dominated the criminal law.122  Other 
commentators have acknowledged the paucity of attention given to these 
lesser offences. Husak notes that legal theorists have paid little attention to 
mala prohibita offences,123  instead concentrating on the central core of 
offences originating in the common law.124 
All these observations are leading to the possibility that there may be 
another paradigm altogether for certain offences. Simester and von 
Hirsch125  refer to a paradigm of the criminal law as  an archetype in the 
context of offences such as  murder, rape and theft, and suggest there may be 
a separate paradigm for regulatory and administrative offences, although 
they recognise the difficulty of distinguishing which offences should fall into 
which group – the problem of deciding which offences are “truly criminal” 
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124  Douglas Husak, ‘Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism’, in RA Duff and Stuart P Green (eds), 
Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of  the Criminal Law (OUP 2005) 66.
125  A P Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(2011, Hart) 7.
and which are not, or of the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita, 
discussed elsewhere.126 
Ormerod127 points  out that when motor vehicles  first came onto the 
roads, there were no driving tests, no requirement to register the ownership 
of vehicles and no requirement to insure; the only offences relating to 
driving were those which, by chance, happened to apply to motorists.128 The 
common law could not deal with matters like this. Rules and regulations 
would prove necessary to control motor traffic in the interests of safety, and 
those rules, starting with the Criminal Justice Act 1925,129 may well be an 
example of an early regulatory regime developing in parallel with the 
traditional criminal law. 
There is  much to suggest that road traffic offences  are perceived as 
somehow “different” from other offences. This view may support the idea 
that they fall into a separate paradigm, whether a paradigm all their own, or 
one which they might share with other offences created by statute. The first 
North Report130  remarked that road traffic law “appears to be widely 
perceived as different from the general criminal law”. In Chapter 1, I noted 
suggestions  that road traffic offences  fall outside the usual criminal law 
paradigm.131 I also noted that, in general, they are not regarded as  serious, 
and many of the proffered reasons  for this  perception132  also help explain 
why they might be distinguished from the body of criminal offences as  a 
whole. While the drink-driving offences are a notable exception to the view 
that road traffic offences  are not serious, there is  nevertheless  a perception 
that road traffic offences are in a class of their own, distinct from the rest of 
the criminal law. 
I leave it to others, if they think it worth their while, to take on the 
challenge of further investigating a possible alternative paradigm to the 
traditional view of mens rea, the presumption of innocence, the privilege 
against self-incrimination and legal certainty. I can do no more than 
highlight that the drink-and drug-driving offences is an important group of 
offences which would certainly be candidates for any such re-categorisation.  
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128 For example, driving a carriage on a pavement, contrary to Highways Act 1935, s 72.
129 See p 7, fn 26.
130 Department of  Transport and Home Office, Road Traffic Law Review Report (HMSO 1988) [2.15].
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132 Described on pp 20–22.
DRAWING LINES
Everything I have said above – about balancing the road safety 
considerations  against traditional criminal law rights, about the special 
duties of drivers, about thin ice and enforceability, and about a possible 
alternative paradigm – begs the question of how far we might go. Are there 
any rights  which must never be compromised? Are there certain offences in 
relation to which the traditional paradigm must never be modified? Is  there 
a limit to how far the road safety considerations should be taken? Exactly 
how extensive are the special duties on drivers? What behaviour do they 
cover, and to whom are they owed? Which offences  might fall within an 
alternative paradigm, and what rules might be drawn up to govern their 
admissibility to that paradigm? What would be the characteristics  of the 
alternative paradigm? In what way would the general principles  be modified 
for the alternative paradigm?
It is beyond the current research project to go any further than to 
argue, as I have done, that the lines must be drawn so as  to forgive the drink- 
and drug-driving offences their transgressions  of the traditional principles. 
Beyond that, I go no further than to list a number of possibilities. Thus, 
dividing lines might be by reference to:
• whether or not the offence in question existed at common law, 
or was created by statute, perhaps reflecting the divide between 
mala in se and mala prohibita;
• the seriousness  of the offence as  indicated by mode of trial. 
Offences triable summarily only might fall within the 
alternative paradigm, leaving the more serious either-way or 
indictable-only offences within the traditional paradigm. Thus, 
offences  carrying a maximum penalty of six months’ 
imprisonment133  would come within the alternative. This 
would include the drink- and drug-driving offences in ss 4, 5 
and 5A, but exclude the controversial134  offences of causing 
serious injury by dangerous driving,135  causing death by 
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careless or inconsiderate driving136  and causing death while 
driving without a licence, while uninsured or without 
insurance;137 
• by reference to those whom the legislation in question seeks to 
regulate. Provisions addressed to particular groups of people 
would be prime candidates for allocation to the new paradigm.
Each of these possibilities  would raise many further questions  which I 
cannot pursue here. 
OTHER IMPLICATIONS
My findings have a number of other implications, notably for self-reported 
drink-driving. In Chapter 7, I observed some limitations  of the research 
projects I described there. It is  clear that the drink-drive limit is  so ill-
understood that most drivers have no way of recognising the point at which 
they would reach it. One obvious  consequence is that propositions based on 
self-assessments  of having been under or over the limit should be treated 
with great caution. In one piece of research, the occurrence of drink-driving 
was  counted by reference to answers to the question, “in the last twelve 
months have you driven a car when you had drunk enough to be in trouble 
if the police had stopped you?”138 And in a large study into drinking and 
driving by university students in twenty-three countries, the incidence of 
drink-driving was  measured from responses  to the question, “over the last 
year, how many times did you drive when you felt that you had perhaps  had 
too much to drink?” The shortcomings of relying on self-reporting have also 
been recognised in research conducted in Canada139 and elsewhere.140 On 
the other hand, the Department for Transport produces statistics on 
percentages of people who report having driven while they thought they 
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were over the limit.141  The words “thought they were” give the correct 
perspective; these figures are unlikely to indicate with any reliability that 
those reporting having driven when they thought they were over the limit 
were in fact over the limit.
I had hoped that my research might produce findings of relevance to 
other debates  concerning drink- and drug-driving – such as whether the 
alcohol limit should be lowered, whether self-testing should be encouraged, 
and whether or not greater understanding of the drink-drive limit would 
encourage greater compliance. In the end, I think all I can contribute to 
such arguments is to emphasise how poorly the drink-drive limit is 
understood. If the limit were to be lowered to zero, that might make it more 
comprehensible to drivers. Experience with the new “zero tolerance” 
specified limits for illegal drugs 142 may provide useful points of  comparison.
There may be some benefit in permitting, and even encouraging, self-
testing, perhaps  by making breath-testing devices  available in public houses, 
restaurants  and clubs, or for private purchase. The fear has  been that people 
testing themselves  might not realise that their breath-alcohol could be on the 
rise, so that, while a self-test might show them to be within the limit, they 
may be over it (and driving) not long afterwards. It does not seem beyond 
the bounds of possibility that self-testing devices  could be designed so as  to 
give ample warning of such risks. While it may well be that the success  of 
the drink-drive limit has resulted in part from confusion about the limit,143 it 
seems to me profoundly unsettling that compliance should be based in 
ignorance or confusion; it would be preferable for it to be based on at least 
some element of understanding of a complex process. Self-testing might 
lead to better understanding the relationship between what is eaten and 
drunk, over how long, and the breath-alcohol measurement. In time, the 
effect could be to reduce the numbers of people who drive over the limit – 
quite the opposite of what has been feared. In turn, greater understanding 
of how much can be drunk before reaching the limit might make a 
reduction of  the limit more acceptable, or at least inform the debate. 
Beyond these brief remarks, resolving these issues may well depend on 
aspects  of the offences which I specifically excluded from my research, such 
as  the reasons  people risk driving with excess  alcohol in the first place, the 
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142 See p 206.
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kinds of people who do it, and what can be done to influence their 
behaviour. 
CONCLUSION
The drink- and drug-driving offences are challenging in their complexity 
and technicality. The drink-driving offences and the associated public 
education and enforcement regimes have made a substantial contribution to 
the saving of life and limb. Yet this  group of offences has been addressed in 
the legal literature only in the most cursory manner. I hope I have 
demonstrated that there is  much to learn from them, and they could 
certainly contribute to defining an alternative paradigm of the criminal law. 
The advent of a new series  of offences, based on an excess  of specified 
controlled drugs, might provide just the opportunity. 
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Appendix 1: The Legislation
THE ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1988, SS 3A–11
13A.—Causing death by careless driving when under influence of  drink or 
drugs
(1)  If  a person causes the death of  another person by driving a mechanically 
propelled vehicle on a road or other public place without due care and 
attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the 
road or place, and—
(a) 	 he is, at the time when he is driving, unfit to drive through drink or 
drugs, or
(b)	 he has consumed so much alcohol that the proportion of  it in his 
breath, blood or urine at that time exceeds the prescribed limit, or
2(ba)	 he has in his body a specified controlled drug and the proportion of  it 
in his blood or urine at that time exceeds the specified limit for that 
drug, or
(c)	 he is, within 18 hours after that time, required to provide a specimen 
in pursuance of  section 7 of  this Act, but without reasonable excuse 
fails to provide it, [or
(d) 	 he is required by a constable to give his permission for a laboratory 
test of  a specimen of  blood taken from him under section 7A of  this 
Act, but without reasonable excuse fails to do so,3]
he is guilty of  an offence.
(2) 	 For the purposes of  this section a person shall be taken to be unfit to drive at 
any time when his ability to drive properly is impaired.
(3) 	 Subsection (1)(b) [,(ba)4] [, (c) and (d)5] above shall not apply in relation to a 
person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle other than a motor vehicle.
4.— Driving, or being in charge, when under influence of  drink or drugs
(1) 	 A person who, when driving or attempting to drive a [mechanically propelled 
vehicle6] on a road or other public place, is unfit to drive through drink or 
drugs is guilty of  an offence.
(2) 	 Without prejudice to subsection (1) above, a person who, when in charge of  a 
[mechanically propelled vehicle7] which is on a road or other public place, is 
unfit to drive through drink or drugs is guilty of  an offence.
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1 Section 3A inserted by Road Traffic Act (“RTA”) 1991, s 3, in force 1 July 1992.
2 Paragraph (ba) inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 2(2), to come into force from a 
date to be appointed.
3 Words in square brackets inserted by Road Safety Act 2006, s 31(2), in force 24 September 2007.
4 Paragraph number in square brackets inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 2(3), to 
come into force from a date to be appointed.
5 Words in square brackets substituted by Road Safety Act 2006, s 31(3), in force 24 September 2007.
6 Words in square brackets substituted by RTA 1991, s 4, in force 1 July 1992.
7 Ibid.
(3) 	 For the purposes of  subsection (2) above, a person shall be deemed not to 
have been in charge of  a [mechanically propelled vehicle8] if  he proves that 
at the material time the circumstances were such that there was no likelihood 
of  his driving it so long as he remained unfit to drive through drink or drugs.
(4) 	 The court may, in determining whether there was such a likelihood as is 
mentioned in subsection (3) above, disregard any injury to him and any 
damage to the vehicle.
(5)	 For the purposes of  this section, a person shall be taken to be unfit to drive if  
his ability to drive properly is for the time being impaired.
9
5.—  Driving or being in charge of  a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration 
above prescribed limit
(1)  If  a person—
(a)	 drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public 
place, or
(b)	 is in charge of  a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, 
after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of  it in his breath, blood 
or urine exceeds the prescribed limit he is guilty of  an offence.
(2) 	 It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(b) 
above to prove that at the time he is alleged to have committed the offence 
the circumstances were such that there was no likelihood of  his driving the 
vehicle whilst the proportion of  alcohol in his breath, blood or urine 
remained likely to exceed the prescribed limit.
(3) 	 The court may, in determining whether there was such a likelihood as is 
mentioned in subsection (2) above, disregard any injury to him and any 
damage to the vehicle.
105A.—Driving or being in charge of  a motor vehicle with concentration of  
specified controlled drug above specified limit
(1)  This section applies where a person (“D”)—
(a) 	 drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public 
place, or
(b) 	 is in charge of  a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, 
and there is in D’s body a specified controlled drug.
(2) D is guilty of  an offence if  the proportion of  the drug in D’s blood or urine 
exceeds the specified limit for that drug.
(3) It is a defence for a person (“D”) charged with an offence under this section to 
show that—
(a)	 the specified controlled drug had been prescribed or supplied to D for 
medical or dental purposes,
(b)	 D took the drug in accordance with any directions given by the person 
by whom the drug was prescribed or supplied, and with any 
accompanying instructions (so far as consistent with any such 
directions) given by the manufacturer or distributor of  the drug, and
(c) D’s possession of  the drug immediately before taking it was not 
unlawful under section 5(1) of  the Misuse of  Drugs Act 1971 
(restriction of  possession of  controlled drugs) because of  an exemption 
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in regulations made under section 7 of  that Act (authorisation of  
activities otherwise unlawful under foregoing provisions).
(4) The defence in subsection (3) is not available if  D’s actions were—
(a)	 contrary to any advice, given by the person by whom the drug was 
prescribed or supplied, about the amount of  time that should elapse 
between taking the drug and driving a motor vehicle, or
(b)	 contrary to any accompanying instructions about that matter (so far as 
consistent with any such advice) given by the manufacturer or 
distributor of  the drug.
(5)	 If  evidence is adduced that is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the 
defence in subsection (3), the court must assume that the defence is satisfied 
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not.
(6) It is a defence for a person (“D”) charged with an offence by virtue of  
subsection (1)(b) to prove that at the time D is alleged to have committed the 
offence the circumstances were such that there was no likelihood of  D driving 
the vehicle whilst the proportion of  the specified controlled drug in D’s blood 
or urine remained likely to exceed the specified limit for that drug.
(7)	 The court may, in determining whether there was such a likelihood, disregard 
any injury to D and any damage to the vehicle.
(8) In this section, and in sections 3A, 6C(1), 6D and 10, “specified” means 
specified in regulations made—
(a)	 by the Secretary of  State, in relation to driving or attempting to drive, 
or being in charge of  a vehicle, in England and Wales;
(b)	 by the Scottish Ministers, in relation to driving or attempting to drive, 
or being in charge of  a vehicle, in Scotland.
(9)	 A limit specified under subsection (2) may be zero.
116.—  Power to administer preliminary tests
(1) 	 If  any of  subsections (2) to (5) applies a constable may require a person to co-
operate with any one or more preliminary tests administered to the person by 
that constable or another constable.
(2)  This subsection applies if  a constable reasonably suspects that the person–
(a) 	 is driving, is attempting to drive or is in charge of  a motor vehicle on a 
road or other public place, and
(b) 	 has alcohol or a drug in his body or is under the influence of  a drug.
(3)  This subsection applies if  a constable reasonably suspects that the person–
(a)	 has been driving, attempting to drive or in charge of  a motor vehicle 
on a road or other public place while having alcohol or a drug in his 
body or while unfit to drive because of  a drug, and
(b)	 still has alcohol or a drug in his body or is still under the influence of  a 
drug.
(4)  This subsection applies if  a constable reasonably suspects that the person–
(a) 	 is or has been driving, attempting to drive or in charge of  a motor 
vehicle on a road or other public place, and
(b) 	 has committed a traffic offence while the vehicle was in motion.
(5)  This subsection applies if–
(a) 	 an accident occurs owing to the presence of  a motor vehicle on a road 
or other public place, and
(b) 	 a constable reasonably believes that the person was driving, attempting 
to drive or in charge of  the vehicle at the time of  the accident.
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(6) 	 A person commits an offence if  without reasonable excuse he fails to co-
operate with a preliminary test in pursuance of  a requirement imposed under 
this section.
(7) 	 A constable may administer a preliminary test by virtue of  any of  subsections 
(2) to (4) only if  he is in uniform.
(8)  In this section–
(a) 	 a reference to a preliminary test is to any of  the tests described in 
sections 6A to 6C, and
(b)  “traffic offence” means an offence under–
(i) 	 a provision of  Part II of  the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 
(c. 14),
(ii) 	 a provision of  the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (c. 27),
(iii) 	 a provision of  the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (c. 53) 
other than a provision of  Part III, or
(iv) 	 a provision of  this Act other than a provision of  Part V.
6A.—Preliminary breath test
(1)  A preliminary breath test is a procedure whereby the person to whom the test 
is administered provides a specimen of  breath to be used for the purpose of  
obtaining, by means of  a device of  a type approved by the Secretary of  State, 
an indication whether the proportion of  alcohol in the person’s breath or 
blood is likely to exceed the prescribed limit.
12(2) 	 A preliminary breath test administered in reliance on section 6(2) to (4) may 
be administered only at or near the place where the requirement to co-
operate with the test is imposed.
(3)  A preliminary breath test administered in reliance on section 6(5) may be 
administered–
(a) 	 at or near the place where the requirement to co-operate with the test 
is imposed, or
(b) 	 if  the constable who imposes the requirement thinks it expedient, at a 
police station specified by him.
6B.—Preliminary impairment test
(1)  A preliminary impairment test is a procedure whereby the constable 
administering the test–
(a) 	 observes the person to whom the test is administered in his 
performance of  tasks specified by the constable, and
(b)  makes such other observations of  the person’s physical state as the 
constable thinks expedient.
(2)  The Secretary of  State shall issue (and may from time to time revise) a code 
of  practice about–
(a) 	 the kind of  task that may be specified for the purpose of  a preliminary 
impairment test,
(b) 	 the kind of  observation of  physical state that may be made in the 
course of  a preliminary impairment test,
(c) 	 the manner in which a preliminary impairment test should be 
administered, and
(d) 	 the inferences that may be drawn from observations made in the 
course of  a preliminary impairment test.
(3)  In issuing or revising the code of  practice the Secretary of  State shall aim to 
ensure that a preliminary impairment test is designed to indicate–
(a) 	 whether a person is unfit to drive, and
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(b) 	 if  he is, whether or not his unfitness is likely to be due to drink or 
drugs.
(4)  A preliminary impairment test may be administered–
(a) 	 at or near the place where the requirement to co-operate with the test 
is imposed, or
(b) 	 if  the constable who imposes the requirement thinks it expedient, at a 
police station specified by him.
(5) 	 A constable administering a preliminary impairment test shall have regard to 
the code of  practice under this section.
(6) 	 A constable may administer a preliminary impairment test only if  he is 
approved for that purpose by the chief  officer of  the police force to which he 
belongs.
(7)  A code of  practice under this section may include provision about–
(a) 	 the giving of  approval under subsection (6), and
(b) 	 in particular, the kind of  training that a constable should have 
undergone, or the kind of  qualification that a constable should possess, 
before being approved under that subsection.
6C.—Preliminary drug test
(1) A preliminary drug test is a procedure by which a specimen of  sweat or saliva 
is–
(a) 	 obtained, and
(b) used for the purpose of  obtaining, by means of  a device of  a type 
approved by the Secretary of  State, an indication whether the person 
to whom the test is administered has a drug [in his body and if  so–
(i)	 whether it is a specified controlled drug; 
(ii) if  it is, whether the proportion of  it in the person’s blood or 
urine is likely to exceed the specified limit for that drug.13]
(2)  A preliminary drug test may be administered–
(a) 	 at or near the place where the requirement to co-operate with the test 
is imposed, or
(b)	 if  the constable who imposes the requirement thinks it expedient, at a 
police station specified by him.
14(3)	 Up to three preliminary drug tests may be administered.
6D.— Arrest
(1) A constable may arrest a person without warrant if  as a result of  a 
preliminary breath test [or preliminary drug test the constable reasonably 
suspects that–
(a) the proportion of  alcohol in the person’s breath or blood exceeds the 
prescribed limit, or
(b) the person has a specified controlled drug in his body and the 
proportion of  it in the person’s blood or urine exceeds the specified 
limit for that drug.15]
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(1A)16 	The fact that specimens of  breath have been provided under section 7 of  this 
Act by the person concerned does not prevent subsection (1) above having 
effect if  the constable who imposed on him the requirement to provide the 
specimens has reasonable cause to believe that the device used to analyse the 
specimens has not produced a reliable indication of  the proportion of  alcohol 
in the breath of  the person.
(2)  A constable may arrest a person without warrant if–
(a)	 the person fails to co-operate with a preliminary test in pursuance of  a 
requirement imposed under section 6, and 
(b)	 the constable reasonably suspects that the person has alcohol or a drug 
in his body or is under the influence of  a drug.
(2A)17 	A person arrested under this section may, instead of  being taken to a police 
station, be detained at or near the place where the preliminary test was, or 
would have been, administered, with a view to imposing on him there a 
requirement under section 7 of  this Act.
(3) 	 A person may not be arrested under this section while at a hospital as a 
patient.
6E. Power of  entry
(1)  A constable may enter any place (using reasonable force if  necessary) for the 
purpose of–
(a) 	 imposing a requirement by virtue of  section 6(5) following an accident 
in a case where the constable reasonably suspects that the accident 
involved injury of  any person, or
(b) 	 arresting a person under section 6D following an accident in a case 
where the constable reasonably suspects that the accident involved 
injury of  any person.
(2)  This section–
(a) 	 does not extend to Scotland, and
(b) 	 is without prejudice to any rule of  law or enactment about the right of  
a constable in Scotland to enter any place.
7.— Provision of  specimens for analysis
(1)  In the course of  an investigation into whether a person has committed an 
offence under [section 3A, 4 or18] 5 of  this Act a constable may, subject to the 
following provisions of  this section and section 9 of  this Act, require him—
(a) 	 to provide two specimens of  breath for analysis by means of  a device 
of  a type approved by the Secretary of  State, or
(b) 	 to provide a specimen of  blood or urine for a laboratory test.
19(1A)	 In the course of  an investigation into whether a person has committed an 
offence under section 5A of  this Act a constable may, subject to subsections 
(3) to (7) of  this section and section 9 of  this Act, require the person to 
provide a specimen of  blood or urine for a laboratory test.
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17  Subsection 2A inserted by Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 154(3), in force 1 July 
2005.
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19 Subsection (1A) inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 5(2), to come into force from 
a date to be appointed.
20(2)  A requirement under this section to provide specimens of  breath can only be 
made—
(a) 	 at a police station,
(b) 	 at a hospital, or
(c) 	 at or near a place where a relevant breath test has been administered 
to the person concerned or would have been so administered but for 
his failure to co-operate with it.
(2A)  For the purposes of  this section “a relevant breath test” is a procedure 
involving the provision by the person concerned of  a specimen of  breath to 
be used for the purpose of  obtaining an indication whether the proportion of  
alcohol in his breath or blood is likely to exceed the prescribed limit.
(2B)  A requirement under this section to provide specimens of  breath may not be 
made at or near a place mentioned in subsection (2)(c) above unless the 
constable making it—
(a) 	 is in uniform, or
(b) 	 has imposed a requirement on the person concerned to co-operate 
with a relevant breath test in circumstances in which section 6(5) of  
this Act applies.
(2C) 	 Where a constable has imposed a requirement on the person concerned to 
co-operate with a relevant breath test at any place, he is entitled to remain at 
or near that place in order to impose on him there a requirement under this 
section.
(2D)  If  a requirement under subsection (1)(a) above has been made at a place other 
than at a police station, such a requirement may subsequently be made at a 
police station if  (but only if)—
(a) 	 a device or a reliable device of  the type mentioned in subsection (1)(a) 
above was not available at that place or it was for any other reason not 
practicable to use such a device there, or
(b) 	 the constable who made the previous requirement has reasonable 
cause to believe that the device used there has not produced a reliable 
indication of  the proportion of  alcohol in the breath of  the person 
concerned.
(3)  A requirement under this section to provide a specimen of  blood or urine can 
only be made at a police station or at a hospital; and it cannot be made at a 
police station unless—
(a) 	 the constable making the requirement has reasonable cause to believe 
that for medical reasons a specimen of  breath cannot be provided or 
should not be required, or
(b) 	 [specimens of  breath have not been provided elsewhere and21] at the 
time the requirement is made a device or a reliable device of  the type 
mentioned in subsection (1)(a) above is not available at the police 
station or it is then for any other reason not practicable to use such a 
device there, or
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22(bb) 	a device of  the type mentioned in subsection (1)(a) above has been 
used [(at the police station or elsewhere)23] but the constable who 
required the specimens of  breath has reasonable cause to believe that 
the device has not produced a reliable indication of  the proportion of  
alcohol in the breath of  the person concerned, or 
24(bc) 	 as a result of  the administration of  a preliminary drug test, the 
constable making the requirement has reasonable cause to believe that 
the person required to provide a specimen of  blood or urine has a 
drug in his body, or 
(c) 	 the suspected offence is one under [section 3A [, 4 or 5A25]of  this Act 
and the constable making the requirement has been advised by a 
medical practitioner that the condition of  the person required to 
provide the specimen might be due to some drug;
	 but may then be made notwithstanding that the person required to provide 
the specimen has already provided or been required to provide two specimens 
of  breath.
(4) 	 If  the provision of  a specimen other than a specimen of  breath may be 
required in pursuance of  this section the question whether it is to be a 
specimen of  blood or a specimen of  urine [and, in the case of  a specimen of  
blood, the question who is to be asked to take it shall be decided (subject to 
subsection (4A)) by the constable making the requirement26].
27(4A) Where a constable decides for the purposes of  subsection (4) to require the 
provision of  a specimen of  blood, there shall be no requirement to provide 
such a specimen if—
(a) 	 the medical practitioner who is asked to take the specimen is of  the 
opinion that, for medical reasons, it cannot or should not be taken; or
(b)	 the registered health care professional who is asked to take it is of  that 
opinion and there is no contrary opinion from a medical practitioner;
	 and, where by virtue of  this subsection there can be no requirement to 
provide a specimen of  blood, the constable may require a specimen of  urine 
instead.
(5) 	 A specimen of  urine shall be provided within one hour of  the requirement for 
its provision being made and after the provision of  a previous specimen of  
urine.
(6) 	 A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to provide a specimen when 
required to do so in pursuance of  this section is guilty of  an offence.
(7) 	 A constable must, on requiring any person to provide a specimen in 
pursuance of  this section, warn him that a failure to provide it may render 
him liable to prosecution.
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287A. 	Specimens of  blood taken from persons incapable of  consenting
(1)  A constable may make a request to a medical practitioner for him to take a 
specimen of  blood from a person (‘the person concerned’) irrespective of  
whether that person consents if—
(a) 	 that person is a person from whom the constable would (in the 
absence of  any incapacity of  that person and of  any objection under 
section 9) be entitled under section 7 to require the provision of  a 
specimen of  blood for a laboratory test;
(b) 	 it appears to that constable that that person has been involved in an 
accident that constitutes or is comprised in the matter that is under 
investigation or the circumstances of  that matter;
(c) 	 it appears to that constable that that person is or may be incapable 
(whether or not he has purported to do so) of  giving a valid consent to 
the taking of  a specimen of  blood; and
(d) 	 it appears to that constable that that person's incapacity is attributable 
to medical reasons.
(2)  A request under this section—
(a) 	 shall not be made to a medical practitioner who for the time being has 
any responsibility (apart from the request) for the clinical care of  the 
person concerned; and
(b)  shall not be made to a medical practitioner other than a police 
medical practitioner unless—
(i) 	 it is not reasonably practicable for the request to made to a 
police medical practitioner; or
(ii) 	 it is not reasonably practicable for such a medical practitioner 
(assuming him to be willing to do so) to take the specimen.
(3)  It shall be lawful for a medical practitioner to whom a request is made under 
this section, if  he thinks fit—
(a) 	 to take a specimen of  blood from the person concerned irrespective of  
whether that person consents; and
(b) 	 to provide the sample to a constable.
(4)  If  a specimen is taken in pursuance of  a request under this section, the 
specimen shall not be subjected to a laboratory test unless the person from 
whom it was taken—
(a) 	 has been informed that it was taken; and
(b) 	 has been required by a constable to give his permission for a 
laboratory test of  the specimen; and
(c) 	 has given his permission.
(5) 	 A constable must, on requiring a person to give his permission for the 
purposes of  this section for a laboratory test of  a specimen, warn that person 
that a failure to give the permission may render him liable to prosecution.
(6) 	 A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to give his permission for a 
laboratory test of  a specimen of  blood taken from him under this section is 
guilty of  an offence.
(7)  In this section ‘police medical practitioner’ means a medical practitioner who 
is engaged under any agreement to provide medical services for purposes 
connected with the activities of  a police force.
8.—  Choice of  specimens of  breath
(1) 	 Subject to subsection (2) below, of  any two specimens of  breath provided by 
any person in pursuance of  section 7 of  this Act that with the lower 
proportion of  alcohol in the breath shall be used and the other shall be 
disregarded.
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(2) 	 If  the specimen with the lower proportion of  alcohol contains no more than 
50 microgrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  breath, the person who 
provided it may claim that it should be replaced by such specimen as may be 
required under section 7(4) of  this Act and, if  he then provides such a 
specimen, neither specimen of  breath shall be used.
29(2A) 	If  the person who makes a claim under subsection (2) above was required to 
provide specimens of  breath under section 7 of  this Act at or near a place 
mentioned in subsection (2)(c) of  that section, a constable may arrest him 
without warrant.
(3) 	 [Regulations may30] substitute another proportion of  alcohol in the breath for 
that specified in subsection (2) above.
31(4)  Regulations under subsection (3) may be made—
(a) 	 by the Secretary of  State, in relation to cases where the suspected 
offence is an offence committed in England and Wales;
(b) 	 by the Scottish Ministers, in relation to cases where the suspected 
offence is an offence committed in Scotland.
9.—  Protection for hospital patients
(1)  While a person is at a hospital as a patient he shall not be required [to co-
operate with a preliminary test32] or to provide a specimen [under section 7 
of  this Act33] unless the medical practitioner in immediate charge of  his case 
has been notified of  the proposal to make the requirement; and—
(a) 	 if  the requirement is then made, [it shall be for co-operation with a 
test administered, or for the provision of  a specimen, at the hospital34], 
but
(b) 	 if  the medical practitioner objects on the ground specified in 
subsection (2) below, the requirement shall not be made.
35(1A) While a person is at a hospital as a patient, no specimen of  blood shall be 
taken from him under section 7A of  this Act and he shall not be required to 
give his permission for a laboratory test of  a specimen taken under that 
section unless the medical practitioner in immediate charge of  his case—
(a) 	 has been notified of  the proposal to take the specimen or to make the 
requirement; and
(b) 	 has not objected on the ground specified in subsection (2).
(2)  The ground on which the medical practitioner may object is—
(a) 	 in a case falling within subsection (1), that the requirement or the 
provision of  the specimen or (if  one is required) the warning required 
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35 Subsections (1A)-(2) substituted for subs (2) by Police Reform Act 2002, s 56(2), in effect  1 October 
2002. 
by section 7(7) of  this Act would be prejudicial to the proper care and 
treatment of  the patient; and
(b)	  in a case falling within subsection (1A), that the taking of  the 
specimen, the requirement or the warning required by section 7A(5) of 
this Act would be so prejudicial.
10.— Detention of  persons affected by alcohol or a drug
(1) 	 Subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, a person required [under section 7 or 
7A36] to provide a specimen of  breath, blood or urine may afterwards be 
detained at a police station [(or, if  the specimen was provided otherwise than 
at a police station, arrested and taken to and detained at a police station) if  a 
constable has reasonable grounds for believing37] that, were that person then 
driving or attempting to drive a [mechanically propelled vehicle38] on a road, 
he would [commit39] an offence under section 4 [, 5 or 5A40] of  this Act.
(2) [Subsection (1) above does not apply to the person if  it ought reasonably to 
appear to the41] constable that there is no likelihood of  his driving or 
attempting to drive a [mechanically propelled vehicle42] [whilst–
(a)  the person’s ability to drive properly is impaired,
(b) the proportion of  alcohol in the person’s breath, blood or urine 
exceeds the prescribed limit, or
(c) the proportion of  a specified controlled drug in the person’s blood or 
urine exceeds the specified limit for that drug.43]
44(2A) 	A person who is at a hospital as a patient shall not be arrested and taken from 
there to a police station in pursuance of  this section if  it would be prejudicial 
to his proper care and treatment as a patient.
(3)  A constable must consult a medical practitioner on any question arising 
under this section whether a person’s ability to drive properly is or might be 
impaired through drugs and must act on the medical practitioner’s advice.
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42 Words in square brackets substituted by RTA 1991, sch 4 para 43, in force 1 July 1992.
43 Words in square brackets substituted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 6(3), to come into 
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44 Subsection (2A) inserted by Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 154(12), in force 1 July 
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11.— Interpretation of  sections 4 to 10
(1) 	 The following provisions apply for the interpretation of  [sections 3A to 1045] 
of  this Act.
(2)  In those sections—
	 46
47 “controlled drug” has the meaning given by section 2 of  the Misuse of  Drugs 
Act 1971,
“drug” includes any intoxicant other than alcohol,
“fail” includes refuse,
“hospital” means an institution which provides medical or surgical treatment for 
in-patients or out-patients,
“the prescribed limit” means, as the case may require—
(a) 	 35 microgrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  breath,
(b) 	 80 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  blood, or
(c) 	 107 milligrammes of  alcohol in 100 millilitres of  urine,
 or such other proportion as may be prescribed by regulations […48].
49“registered health care professional” means a person (other than a medical 
practitioner) who is—
(a) 	 a registered nurse; or
(b)	 a registered member of  a health care profession which is designated 
for the purposes of  this paragraph by an order made by the Secretary 
of  State.
50“specified” in relation to a controlled drug, has the meaning given by section 
5A(8).
51(2ZA) Regulations under subsection (2) may be made—
(a) 	 by the Secretary of  State, in relation to driving or attempting to drive, 
or being in charge of  a vehicle, in England and Wales;
(b) 	 by the Scottish Ministers, in relation to driving or attempting to drive, 
or being in charge of  a vehicle, in Scotland.
52(2A) 	A health care profession is any profession mentioned in section 60(2) of  the 
Health Act 1999 (c. 8) other than the profession of  practising medicine and 
the profession of  nursing.
(2B) 	 An order under subsection (2) shall be made by statutory instrument; and any 
such statutory instrument shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of  a 
resolution of  either House of  Parliament.
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force 1 April 2003.
50 Definition of “specified” inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56(2)(b), to come into force from 
a date to be appointed.
51 Subsection 2(ZA) inserted by Scotland Act 2012, s 20(7), in force 3 July 2012.
52 Subsections (2A) and (2B) inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 55(4), in force 1 April 2003.
(3)  [A person does not co-operate with a preliminary test or provide a specimen 
of  breath for analysis unless his co-operation or the specimen53]—
(a) 	 is sufficient to enable the test or the analysis to be carried out, and
(b) 	 is provided in such a way as to enable the objective of  the test or 
analysis to be satisfactorily achieved.
54(4)  A person provides a specimen of  blood if  and only if—
(a) 	 he consents to the taking of  such a specimen from him; and
(b)	 the specimen is taken from him by a medical practitioner or, if  it is 
taken in a police station, either by a medical practitioner or by a 
registered health care professional.
THE ROAD TRAFFIC OFFENDERS ACT 1988, SS 15, 34; 
EXTRACT FROM SCH 2, PT 1
15.— Use of  specimens in proceedings for an offence under [any of  sections 
3A to 5A55] of  the Road Traffic Act
(1) 	 This section and section 16 of  this Act apply in respect of  proceedings for an 
offence under [any of  sections 3A to 5A56] of  the Road Traffic Act 1988 
(driving offences connected with drink or drugs)57]; and expressions used in 
this section and section 16 of  this Act have the same meaning as in [sections 
3A to 1058] of  that Act.
(2) Evidence of  the proportion of  alcohol or any drug in a specimen of  breath, 
blood or urine provided by [or taken from59] the accused shall, in all cases 
[(including cases where the specimen was not provided [or taken60] in 
connection with the alleged offence)61], be taken into account [and–
(a) it is to be assumed, subject to subsection (3) below, that the proportion 
of  alcohol in the accused’s breath, blood or urine at the time of  the 
alleged offence was not less than in the specimen;
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53 Words in square brackets substituted by Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, sch 7 para 5(b), in 
force 30 March 2004.
54 Subsection (4) substituted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 55(5), in force 1 April 2003.
55 Words in square brackets inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 10(2), to come into 
force from a date to be appointed.
56 Words in square brackets inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 10(3), to come into 
force from a date to be appointed.
57 Words in square brackets substituted by RTA 1991, sch 4 para 87(2), in force 1 July 1992. 
58 Ibid.
59 Words in square brackets inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 57(1)(a), in force 1 October 2002. 
60 Words in square brackets inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 57(1)(b), in force 1 October 2002. 
61 Words in square brackets inserted by RTA 1991, sch 4 para 87(3), in force 1 July 1992. 
(b) it is to be assumed, subject to subsection (3A) below, that the 
proportion of  a drug in the accused’s blood or urine at the time of  the 
alleged offence was not less than in the specimen.62]
63(3)  [The assumption in subsection (2)(a) above64] shall not be made if  the 
accused proves—
(a)  that he consumed alcohol before he provided the specimen [or had it 
taken from him65] and—
(i)	 in relation to an offence under section 3A, after the time of  the 
alleged offence, and
(ii) 	 otherwise, after he had ceased to drive, attempt to drive or be 
in charge of  a vehicle on a road or other public place, and
(b)	 that had he not done so the proportion of  alcohol in his breath, blood 
or urine would not have exceeded the prescribed limit and, if  it is 
alleged that he was unfit to drive through drink, would not have been 
such as to impair his ability to drive properly.
66(3A) The assumption in subsection 2(b) above is not to made if  the accused 
proves–
(a) that he took the drug before he provided the specimen or had the 
specimen taken from him and –
(i)	 in relation to an offence under section 3A, after the time of  the 
alleged offence, and 
(ii)	 otherwise, after he had ceased to drive, attempt to drive or be 
in charge of  a vehicle on a road or other public place, and
(b) that had he not done so the proportion of  the drug in his blood or 
urine–
(i)	 in the case of  a specified controlled drug, would not have 
exceeded the specified limit for that drug, and
(ii)	 if  it is alleged that he was unfit to drive through drugs, would 
not have been such as to impair his ability to drive properly.
(4)  A specimen of  blood shall be disregarded [unless— 
(a)  it was taken from the accused with his consent and either—
(i)	 in a police station by a medical practitioner; or [a registered 
health care professional; or67] 
(ii) 	 elsewhere by a medical practitioner;
	 or
(b) 	 it was taken from the accused by a medical practitioner under section 
7A of  the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the accused subsequently gave 
his permission for a laboratory test of  the specimen.68]
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62 Words in square brackets inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 10(4), to come into 
force from a date to be appointed.
63 Subsection (3) substituted by RTA 1991, sch 4 para 87(4), in force 1 July 1992. 
64  Words in square brackets substituted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 10(5), to come 
into force from a date to be appointed.
65 Words in square brackets inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 57(2), in force 1 October 2002. 
66 Subsection (3A) inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 10(6), to come into force from 
a date to be appointed.
67 Words inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 57(3), in force 1 April 2003. 
68 Words in square brackets substituted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 57(3), in force 1 April 2003.
(5)  Where, at the time a specimen of  blood or urine was provided by the 
accused, he asked to be provided with such a specimen, evidence of  the 
proportion of  alcohol or any drug found in the specimen is not admissible on 
behalf  of  the prosecution unless—
(a) 	 the specimen in which the alcohol or drug was found is one of  two 
parts into which the specimen provided by the accused was divided at 
the time it was provided, and
(b) 	 the other part was supplied to the accused.
69(5A) Where a specimen of  blood was taken from the accused under section 7A of  
the Road Traffic Act 1988, evidence of  the proportion of  alcohol or any drug 
found in the specimen is not admissible on behalf  of  the prosecution unless—
(a) 	 the specimen in which the alcohol or drug was found is one of  two 
parts into which the specimen taken from the accused was divided at 
the time it was taken; and
(b) 	 any request to be supplied with the other part which was made by the 
accused at the time when he gave his permission for a laboratory test 
of  the specimen was complied with.
34.— Disqualification for certain offences
(1) 	 Where a person is convicted of  an offence involving obligatory 
disqualification, the court must order him to be disqualified for such period 
not less than twelve months as the court thinks fit unless the court for special 
reasons thinks fit to order him to be disqualified for a shorter period or not to 
order him to be disqualified.
70(1A) 	Where a person is convicted of  an offence under section 12A of  the Theft 
Act 1968 (aggravated vehicle-taking), the fact that he did not drive the vehicle 
in question at any particular time or at all shall not be regarded as a special 
reason for the purposes of  subsection (1) above.
71(2) Where a person is convicted of  an offence involving discretionary 
disqualification, and either—
(a) 	 the penalty points to be taken into account on that occasion number 
fewer than twelve, or
(b) 	 the offence is not one involving obligatory endorsement,
	 the court may order him to be disqualified for such period as the court thinks 
fit.
(3)  Where a person convicted of  an offence under any of  the following provisions 
of  the Road Traffic Act 1988, that is—
72(aa) 	 section 3A (causing death by careless driving when under the influence 
of  drink or drugs),
(a) 	 section 4(1) (driving or attempting to drive while unfit),
(b)	 section 5(1)(a) (driving or attempting to drive with excess alcohol), 
[...73]
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69 Subsection (5A) inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 57(4), in force 1 October 2002.
70 Subsection (1A) inserted by Aggravated Vehicle-Taking Act 1992, s 3(2), in force 1 April 1992.
71 Subsection (2) substituted by RTA 1991, s 29(2), in force 1 October 1992. 
72 Paragraph (aa) inserted by RTA 1991, s 29(3), in force 1 October 1992. 
73 Words repealed by Police Reform Act 2002, s 56(3)(a), in force 1 October 2002. 
74(ba)	 section 5A(1)(a) and (2) (driving or attempting to drive with 
concentration of  specified controlled drug above specified limit)
(c) 	 section 7(6) (failing to provide a specimen) where that is an offence 
involving obligatory disqualification,
75(d) 	 section 7A(6) (failing to allow a specimen to be subjected to laboratory 
test) where that is an offence involving obligatory disqualification;
	 has within the ten years immediately preceding the commission of  the offence 
been convicted of  any such offence, subsection (1) above shall apply in 
relation to him as if  the reference to twelve months were a reference to three 
years.
76(4)  Subject to subsection (3) above, subsection (1) above shall apply as if  the 
reference to twelve months were a reference to two years—
(a)  in relation to a person convicted of—
(i) 	 manslaughter, or in Scotland culpable homicide, or
(ii) 	 an offence under section 1 of  the Road Traffic Act 1988 
(causing death by dangerous driving), or
77(iia) 	 an offence under section 1A of  that Act (causing serious injury 
by dangerous driving), or
(iii) 	 an offence under section 3A of  that Act (causing death by 
careless driving while under the influence of  drink or drugs), 
and
(b) 	 in relation to a person on whom more than one disqualification for a 
fixed period of  56 days or more has been imposed within the three 
years immediately preceding the commission of  the offence.
(4A) 	 For the purposes of  subsection (4)(b) above there shall be disregarded any 
disqualification imposed under section 26 of  this Act or [section 147 of  the 
Powers of  Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 200078] or section 223A or 436A 
of  the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (offences committed by using 
vehicles) and any disqualification imposed in respect of  an offence of  stealing 
a motor vehicle, an offence under section 12 or 25 of  the Theft Act 1968, an 
offence under section 178 of  the Road Traffic Act 1988, or an attempt to 
commit such an offence.
79(4AA) For the purposes of  subsection (4)(b), a disqualification is to be disregarded if 
the period of  disqualification would have been less than 56 days but for an 
extension period added pursuant to—
(a)	 section 35A or 35C,
(b)	 section 248D of  the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, or
(c)	 section 147A of  the Powers of  Criminal Courts (Sentencing Act 2000.
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74 Paragraph (ba) inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 22, para 12, to come into force from a 
date to be appointed.
75 Paragraph (d) inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 56(3)(b), in force 3 December 2012.
76 Subsections (4) and (4A) substituted for subs (4) by RTA 1991, s 29(4), in force 1 July 1992. 
77  Paragraph (a)(iia) inserted by Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, sch 
27, para 5, in force 3 December 2012.
78  Words in square brackets substituted by Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, sch 9 
para 121, in force 25 August 2000.
79  Subsection (4AA) inserted by Coroners and Justice Act 2009, sch 2, para 90(2), to come into force 
from a date to be appointed.
80(4B) 	Where a person convicted of  an offence under section 40A of  the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 (using vehicle in dangerous condition etc.) has within the 
three years immediately preceding the commission of  the offence been 
convicted of  any such offence, subsection (1) above shall apply in relation to 
him as if  the reference to twelve months were a reference to six months.
(5) 	 The preceding provisions of  this section shall apply in relation to a conviction 
of  an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring, or 
inciting to the commission of, an offence involving obligatory disqualification 
as if  the offence were an offence involving discretionary disqualification.
(5A) 	 In relation to Scotland, references in this section to the court include the 
[justice of  the peace court81].
82(6) 	 This section is subject to section 48 of  this Act.
Extract from Schedule 2: Prosecution and Punishment of  Offences
Part 1: Offences under the Traffic Acts 
(1) and (2) Offence under	 (3) Mode of	 (4) Punishment	 (5) Disqualification	 (6) Endorsement	 (7) Penalty 
RTA 1988	 prosecution	 	 	 	       points
83s 3A, causing death by On [14 years84 ] or a fine Obligatory Obligatory 3–11
careless driving when under	 indictment	 or both
the influence of  drink or 
drugs
s 4(1), driving or attempting Summarily 6 months or level 5 Obligatory Obligatory [3–1185]
to drive when unfit to drive	 	 on the standard scale
through drink or drugs	 	 or both
 s 4(2), being in charge of  	 Summarily	 3 months or level 4	 Discretionary	 Obligatory	 10
a mechanically propelled	 	 on the standard scale 
vehicle when unfit to drive	 	 or both
through drink or drugs
 s 5(1)(a), driving or Summarily 6 months or level 5 Obligatory Obligatory [3–1186]
attempting to drive with	 	 on the standard scale
excess alcohol in breath,	 	 or both
blood or urine
 s 5(1)(b), being in charge	 Summarily	 3 months or level 4	 Discretionary	 Obligatory	 10
of  a motor vehicle with	 	 on the standard scale
excess alcohol in breath,	 	 or both
blood or urine
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80 Subsections (4B) and (5) inserted by Road Safety Act 2006, s 25(2), in force 24 September 2007. 
81  Words substituted by Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007, sch 1, para 7(d), 
coming into force on various dates in relation to different sheriffdoms.
82  Subsection (6) inserted by Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 (Powers of 
District and JP Courts) Order 2007, SI 2007 No 3480, art 2(1)(b), in force 10 December 2007. 
83 Entry inserted by RTA 1991, sch 2 para 7, in force 1 July 1992.
84 Words in square brackets inserted by Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 285(4), in force 27 February 2003.
85 Numbers substituted by RTA 1991, sch 2 para 8, in force 1 July 1992.
86 Numbers substituted by RTA 1991, sch 2 para 10, in force 1 July 1992.
87 s 5A(1)(a) and (2), driving Summarily 51 weeks88 or level 5 Obligatory Obligatory 3–11
or attempting to drive with	 	 on the standard scale
concentration of  specified	 	 or both
controlled drug above
specified limit
s 5A(1)(b) and (2), being	 Summarily	 51 weeks89 or level 4	 Discretionary	 Obligatory	 10
in charge of  a motor vehicle	 	 on the standard scale 
with concentration of	 	 or both
specified controlled drug
above specified limit
 s 6, [failing to co-operate	 Summarily	 Level 3 on the standard	 Discretionary	 Obligatory	 4
with a preliminary test90]	 	 scale
 s 7, failing to  Summarily (a) Where the  (a) Obligatory  Obligatory (a) [3–11 in 
provide a specimen	 	 specimen was 	 in a case	 	 91] a case
for analysis or laboratory	 	 required to ascertain 	 mentioned 	 	 mentioned
test	 	 ability to drive or	 in column	 	 in column
	 	 proportion of  alcohol	 4 (a)	 	 4(a)
	 	 at the time offender was	 (b) Discretionary	 	 (b) 10 in any
	 	 driving or attempting	 in any other case	 	 other case
	 	 to drive, 6 months or	 	 	
	 	 level 5 on the standard 	 	 	
	 	 scale or both;	 	 	
	 	 (b) in any other case, 
	 	 3 months or level 4 on
	 	 the standard scale or 
	 	 both
92 s 7A, failing to  Summarily (a) Where the test (a) Obligatory  Obligatory (a) 3–11 in
allow specimen 	 	 would be for	 in the case	 	 the case
to be subjected to	 	 ascertaining ability	 mentioned in	 	 mentioned
laboratory test	 	 to drive or proportion 	 column 4(a)	 	 in column
	 	 of  alcohol at the time 	 (b) Discretionary	 	 4(a) 
	 	 offender was driving 	 in any other	 	 (b) 10 in 
	 	 or attempting to drive, 	 case	 	 any other
	 	 6 months or level 5 on the		 	 case
	 	 standard scale or both	 	
	 	 (b) in any other case, 	 	 	
	 	 3 months or level 4 on the
	 	 standard scale or both	 	 	
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87 Entries in relation to s 5A inserted by Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56(4), to come into force from 
a date to be appointed. 
88  On conviction in England and Wales, or 6 months on conviction in Scotland. The reference to 51 
weeks is to be read as a reference to 6  months in relation to an offence committed before the 
commencement of  Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 281(5) (Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56(5)).
89  On conviction in England and Wales, or 3 months on conviction in Scotland. The reference to 51 
weeks is to be read as a reference to 3  months in relation to an offence committed before the 
commencement of  Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 280(2) (Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 56(6)).
90  Words in square brackets substituted by Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, sch 7 para 8, in 
force 30 March 2004. 
91 Numbers substituted by RTA 1991, sch 2 para 11, in force 1 July 1992.
92 Entry inserted by Police Reform Act 2002, s 56(5), in force 1 October 2002.
Age2.44.45: Ages to 44/45
	 1	 Age up to 44
	 2	 Age 45+
AgeSexgrp1.34: Age/sex34/35
	 1	 Male to age 34
	 2	 Male aged 35+
	 3	 Female to age 34
	 4	 Female aged 35+
AgeSexgrp2.44: Age/sex 44/45
	 1	 Male to age 44
	 2	 Male aged 45+
	 3	 Female to age 44
	 4	 Female aged 45+
AlcConBdown: Breakdown of  alcohol 
concentration answers
 1 Answer included the word “blood”
 2 Answer included the word 
  “breath”
 3 Answer included the word 
  “system” or “urine”
	 4	 Answer included a number only
	 5	 Answer did not quite make sense
AlcConPeople: Identifying people who 
answered/did not answer alcohol 
concentration
	 1	 Replied alcohol concentration in 
	 	 the body
	 2	 Did not reply alcohol 
	 	 concentration in the body
Ans01: 1st answer
	 1	 Quantified amount
 2 Don’t drink and drive
	 3	 Unquantified amount
	 4	 Concentration of  alcohol
	 5	 Consequences
	 6	 Variables
 7 Don’t know
	 8	 Refused to answer
	 9	 Non-classifiable/circular
Ans02: 2nd answer
	 1	 Quantified amount
 2 Don’t drink and drive
	 3	 Unquantified amount
	 4	 Concentration of  alcohol
	 5	 Consequences
	 6	 Variables
 7 Don’t know
	 8	 Refused to answer
	 9	 Non-classifiable/circular
Ans03: 3rd answer
	 1	 Quantified amount
 2 Don’t drink and drive
	 3	 Unquantified amount
	 4	 Concentration of  alcohol
	 5	 Consequences
	 6	 Variables
 7 Don’t know
	 8	 Refused to answer
	 9	 Non-classifiable/circular
ConsBdown: Consequences of  drink-
driving broken down
	 1	 Effects on quality of  driving
	 2	 Danger
	 3	 Consequences of  conviction
	 4	 Unspecified consequences
	 5	 Multiples of  the above
	 6	 Other
	 7	 None of  the above
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Appendix 2: Codings Used to Analyse the 
Opinions Survey Data
Listed below are the codings used to analyse the data generated by the Opinions Survey 
described in Chapter 8. They comprise variables,  further broken down into values, and are 
divided into those which I created, and those applied by ONS.
MY VARIABLES AND VALUES
ConsPeople: Identifying people who 
answered Consequences
	 1	 Mentioned the consequences of  
	 	 drink-driving
	 2	 Did not mention the consequences 
	 	 of  drink-driving 
DDDBdown: Breakdown of  don’t drink 
and drive replies
 1 Simple “don’t drink and drive”
 2 Personal rule is don’t drink and 
  drive
 3 Emphasis added, eg “simple”, “full 
  stop”, “at all”
	 4	 Reply advocating a zero limit
	 5	 Other answers of  interest 
	 	 (described in Chapter 8)
DDDPeople: Identifying people who 
answered don’t drink and drive
 1 Answered “don’t drink and drive”
 2 Did not answer “don’t drink and 
  drive”
Other: Other themes of  interest
	 1.	 Units of  alcohol mentioned
	 2.	 Difficulty of  interpretation 
	 	 mentioned
	 3.	 [deleted]
	 4.	 Lowness of  limit mentioned
	 5.	 None of  the above
QAmtBdown: Breakdown of  amount 
which can be drunk before driving
	 1	 Minimal
	 2	 One (glass of) wine
	 3	 One pint
	 4	 One unit
	 5	 One and a half  pints
	 6	 One and a half  units
	 7	 Two drinks or glasses
	 8	 Two (glasses of) wine
	 9	 Two pints
	 10	 Two units
	 11	 Two and a half  pints
	 12	 Three pints
	 13	 Three units
	 14	 Four units 
QAmtPeople: Identifying people who 
gave a quantified amount
	 1	 Gave a quantified amount
	 2	 Did not give a quantified amount
QAmtSimp: Simplification of  quantified 
amounts
	 1	 Less than 2 drinks
	 2	 Two or more drinks
QAmtTypeDrink: Type of  drink 
mentioned by those who gave a quantified 
amount
	 1	 Beer/lager/pints
	 2	 Wine
	 3	 Combinations/alternatives
	 4	 Units of  alcohol
	 5	 Unspecified
Safety: References to safety
	 1	 Mentioned safety or similar
	 2	 Did not mention safety or similar
Subjective: Subjective interpretation
 1 Reply included words such as “I” , 
  “me”, “personally”, suggesting 
  subjective/personal interpretation 
  of  the limit
	 2	 Reply did not suggest subjective/ 
	 	 personal interpretation of  the limit 
UnqAmtBdown: Unquantified amounts 
broken down
	 1	 Mentioned units
	 2	 Mentioned safety, impairment, 
	 	 unfitness
	 3	 Mentioned neither of  the above
UnqAmtPeople: Identifying people who 
gave an unquantified amount
	 1	 Respondents who gave an 
	 	 unquantified amount
	 2	 Respondents who did not give an 
	 	 unquantified amount
VarBdown: Breakdown of  influencing 
factors
	 1	 Gender
	 2	 Personal differences in general
	 3	 Strength/amount of  drink
	 4	 Time
	 5	 Whether food taken
	 6	 The complexity of  the issue
	 7	 Weight/mass
	 8	 Multiples of  the above factors
VarPeople: Identifying people who 
answered influencing factors
	 1	 Respondents who mentioned the 
	 	 variables
	 2	 Respondents who did not mention 
	 	 the variables
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Household
GORA: Government Office Regions
	 1 	 North East
	 2 	 North West
	 3 	 Yorkshire and the Humber
	 4 	 East Midlands
	 5 	 West Midlands
	 6 	 East of  England
	 7 	 London
	 8	 South East
	 9 	 South West
	 10 	Wales
	 11 	Scotland
NUMADULT: Total number of  adults
NUMCHILD: Total number of  children 
	 (aged under 16)
N1TO4: Children 0-4
N5TO10: Children 5-10
N11TO15: Children 11-15
NumDepCh: Dependent children (aged 
	 under 16 or aged 16-18, never married 
	 and not a foster child)
DVHSIZE: Total number of  people in the 
	 household
HHTYPB: Household Type B (Coded by 
	 interviewer)
	 1 	 One person only
	 2	 HRP married cohabiting with 
	 	 dependent child
	 3 	 HRP married cohabiting no 
	 	 dependent child
	 4 	 HRP lone parent with dependent 
	 	 child
	 5 	 HRP lone parent no dependent 
	 	 child
	 6 	 All others
HHTYPA: Household Type A (Computed)
	 1 	 1 Adult aged 16 to 64
	 2 	 1 Adult aged 65 or more
	 3 	 2 Adults aged 16 to 64
	 4 	 2 Adults, 1 aged 65 or more
	 5 	 3 Adults
	 6 	 1 or 2 child
	 7 	 3+ children
HHTYPE: Household Type B - grouped
	 1 	 One person only
	 2 	 Married cohabiting with 
	 	 dependent child
	 3 	 Married cohabiting no dependent 
	 	 child
	 4 	 Lone with dependent child
	 5 	 All others
TENGRP: Grouped Tenure
	 1 	 Owns outright
	 2 	 Owns mortgage
	 3 	 Rents Local Authority/Housing 
	 	 Association
	 4 	 Rents privately
	 5 	 Squatting
TEN1: Tenure (questionnaire variable)
	 1 	 Own it outright
	 2 	 Buying it with the help of  a 
	 	 mortgage or loan
	 3 	 Pay part rent and part mortgage 
	 	 (shared ownership)
	 4 	 Rent it
 5 Live here rent free (including rent 
  free in relative’s/friend’s property: 
  excluding squatting)
	 6 	 Squatting
TIED: Does the accommodation go with 
	 the job of  anyone in the household?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
LLORD: Who is your landlord?
	 1 	 the local authority/council/ 
	 	 Scottish Homes
	 2 	 a housing association, charitable 
	 	 trust or local housing trust
	 3 	 employer (organisation) of  a 
	 	 household member
	 4 	 another organisation
	 5 	 relative/friend (before you lived 
	 	 here) of  a household member
	 6 	 employer (individual) of  a 
	 	 household member
	 7 	 another individual private landlord
FURN: Is the accommodation provided:
	 1	 furnished
	 2	 partly furnished
	 3	 unfurnished
CARS: Car or van available to household?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
NUMCAR: How many cars and or vans 
	 are available to the household?
CAR Car or van available to the household
	 1 	 None
	 2 	 One
	 3 	 Two
	 4 	 Three or more
DVPAIDJO: Number of  members of  the 
	 household who have a paid job?
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THE ONS CLASSIFICATORY VARIABLES
Individual - demographic
RSEX: Sex of  Respondent
	 1 	 Male
	 2 	 Female
RAGE: Age of  Respondent
AGEX: Grouped Age
	 1 	 16 to 24
	 2 	 25 to 44
	 3 	 45 to 54
	 4 	 55 to 64
	 5 	 65 to 74
	 6 	 75 and over
AGEH: Grouped Age
	 1 	 16 to 17
	 2 	 18 to 19
	 3 	 20 to 24
	 4 	 25 to 29
	 5 	 30 to 34
	 6 	 35 to 39
	 7 	 40 to 44
	 8 	 45 to 49
	 9 	 50 to 54
	 10 	 55 to 64
	 11 	 65 to 74
	 12 	 75 or over
RELHRP: Relation to Household 
	 Reference Person
	 0 	 Household Reference Person
	 1 	 Spouse
	 2 	 Co-habitee
	 3 	 Son/daughter
	 4 	 Step-son daughter
	 5 	 Foster child
	 6 	 Son daughter-in-law
	 7 	 Parent
	 8 	 Step-parent
	 9 	 Foster parent
	 10 	 Parent-in-law
	 11 	 Brother or sister
	 12 	 Step-brother sister
	 13 	 Foster brother sister
	 14 	 Brother sister-in-law
	 15 	 Grand-child
	 16 	 Grand-parent
	 17 	 Other relative
	 18 	 Other non-relative
	 20 	 Civil partner
RESPMAR: Marital status of  respondent 
	 (De Jure)
	 1 	 Single, never married
	 2 	 Married living with spouse
	 3 	 Married separated from spouse
	 4 	 Divorced
	 5 	 Widowed
	 6 	 Civil partner
	 7 	 Former/separated civil partner
LIVEWITH: Living with someone in the 
	 household as a couple
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
DEFACTO: Marital status of  respondent 
	 (De Facto)
	 1 	 Married
	 2 	 Cohabiting
	 3 	 Single
	 4 	 Widowed
	 5 	 Divorced
	 6 	 Separated
	 7 	 Same sex cohabiting
	 8 	 Civil partner
	 9 	 Former/separated civil partner
DEFACT1: Grouped marital status of  
	 respondent (De Facto)
	 1 	 Married/cohabiting
	 2 	 Single
	 3 	 Widowed
	 4 	 Divorced/separated
	 5 	 Same sex cohabiting
	 6 	 Civil partner
	 7 	 Former/separated civil partner
RESPHLDR: In whose name is the 
	 accommodation owned or rented
	 1 	 This person alone
	 2 	 This person jointly 
	 3 	 NOT owner renter
PARENT: Are you or your spouse/partner 
	 the parent or guardian of  any children 
	 aged under 16 in the household?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
PARTOD: Can I just check, are you or 
	 your spouse/partner the parent or 
	 guardian of  any child aged 0-4 in the 
	 household?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
NATLD (E1 – 6) NATLD (S1 – 6) NATLD 
 (W1 – 6)
National Identity
	 1 	 English
	 2 	 Scottish
	 3 	 Welsh
	 4 	 Irish
	 5 	 British
	 6 	 Other
ETHNIC_MER: Ethnicity
	 1 	 White British
	 2 	 Any other White background
 3  Mixed – White and Black 
  Caribbean
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 4  Mixed – White and Black African
 5  Mixed – White and Asian
	 6 	 Any other Mixed background
 7  Asian or Asian British – Indian
 8  Asian or Asian British – Pakistani
 9  Asian or Asian British – 
  Bangladeshi
 10  Asian or Asian British – Any other 
  Asian background
 11  Black or Black British – Black 
  Caribbean
 12  Black or Black British – Black 
  African
 13  Black or Black British – Any other 
  Black background
	 14 	 Chinese
	 15 	 Any other ethnic group
EDAGECOR: Age left full time education
HIGHED1: Highest level of  education 
	 qualification
	 1 	 Degree or higher degree
	 2 	 Higher education qualification 
	 	 below degree level
	 3 	 A Levels or highers
	 4 	 ONC/BTEC
 5  O Level or GCSE equivalent 
  (Grade A – C)
 6  O Level or GCSE ( Grade D – G)
	 7 	 Other qualifications
	 8 	 No formal qualifications
HIGHED4: Highest level of  education 
	 qualification (4 groupings)
	 1 	 Degree or equivalent
	 2 	 Below Degree level
	 3 	 Other*
	 4 	 None (no formal qualifications)
* Including foreign qualifications (outside 
UK) and other qualifications.
QHEALTH1: How is your health in 
	 general?
	 1 	 Very good
	 2 	 Good
	 3 	 Fair
	 4 	 Bad
	 5 	 Very bad
LSILL: Do you have any long-standing 
	 illness, disability or infirmity? By long 
	 standing I mean anything that has 
	 troubled you over a period of  time or 
	 that is likely to affect you over a period 
	 of  time?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
ILLLIM: Does this illness or disability/do 
	 any of  these illnesses or disabilities
	 limit your activities in any way?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
SUMGROSS Annual gross income
 (1)  Up to £519
 (2)  £520 up to £1039
 (3)  £1040 up to £1559
 (4)  £1560 up to £2079
 (5)  £2080 up to £2599
 (6)  £2600 up to £3119
 (7)  £3120 up to £3639
 (8)  £3640 up to £4159
 (9)  £4160 up to £4679
 (10)  £4680 up to £5199
 (11)  £5200 up to £6239
 (12)  £6240 up to £7279
 (13)  £7280 up to £8319
 (14)  £8320 up to £9359
 (15)  £9360 up to £10399
 (16)  £10400 up to £11439
 (17)  £11440 up to £12479
 (18)  £12480 up to £13519
 (19)  £13520 up to £14559
 (20)  £14560 up to £15599
 (21)  £15600 up to £16639
 (22)  £16640 up to £17679
 (23)  £17680 up to £18719
 (24)  £18720 up to £10759
 (25)  £19760 up to £20799
 (26)  £20800 up to £23399
 (27)  £23400 up to £25999
 (28)  £26000 up to £28599
 (29)  £28600 up to £31199
 (30)  £31200 up to £33799
 (31)  £33800 up to £36399
 (32)  £36400 up to £38999
 (33)  £39000 up to £41599
 (34)  £41600 up to £44199
 (35)  £44200 up to £46799
(36)  £46800 up to £49399
(37)  £49400 up to £51999
(38)     £52000 or more
Individual – Employment related
WRKING: Paid work last 7 days ending 
	 Sunday
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
SCHM08: Govt. scheme for employment 
	 training
	 1 	 Work based learning for young 
	 	 people
	 2 	 New Deal
	 3 	 Work based learning for adults
	 10 	 Job skills
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	 15 	 Work track
	 21 	 Entry into employment
	 50 	 Any other training scheme
	 66 	 None of  these
	 97 	 Just 16 and no response
JBAWAY: Did you have a job or business 
	 that you were away from last week?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
OWNBUS: Unpaid work, in that week, for 
	 a business that you own?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
RELBUS: Unpaid work, in that week, for a 
	 business that a relative owns?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
LOOK4: Looking for work in last 4 weeks?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
STAR: Able to start work within 2 weeks?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
NOLOWA 1-9: Main reason for not 
	 seeking work
	 1 	 Waiting for the results of  an 
	 	 application for a job
	 2 	 Student
	 3 	 Looking after the family/home
	 4 	 Temporarily sick or injured
	 5 	 Long-term sick/disabled
	 6 	 Believes no job available
	 7 	 Not yet started looking
	 8 	 Other reasons
EVERWK: Have you ever had a paid job?
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
DVILO3a: DV for ILO in employment - 3 
	 categories
	 1 	 In employment
	 2 	 Unemployed
	 3 	 Economically inactive
(In employment includes people in a paid 
job, away from their job, on a government 
training scheme, doing unpaid work for 
their own/relative’s business, during the 
last week.)
DVILO4a: DV for ILO in employment - 4 
	 categories
	 1 	 In employment
	 2 	 Unpaid family worker
	 3 	 Unemployed
	 4 	 Economically inactive
FTPTW: Were you working...
	 1 	 Full-time
	 2 	 Part-time
STAT: Employee or self-employed?
	 1 	 Employee
	 2 	 Self-employed
SUPVISEe: Supervisory status
	 1 	 Yes
	 2 	 No
SOL: Working on own or have employees?
	 1 	 On own with partner(s) but no 
	 	 employees
	 2 	 With employees
EMPNO: How many employees at 
	 workplace (if  employee)?
	 1 	 1-24
	 2 	 25 to 499
	 3 	 500 or more
MPNE: How many people worked for your 
	 employer at the place where you work?
	 1 	 1-10
	 2 	 11-19
	 3 	 20-24
 4  Don’t know but under 25
	 5 	 25 - 49
 6  Don’t know but over 24 and under 
  500
	 7 	 50-499
	 8 	 500 or more
MPNS: How many people did you employ 
	 at the place where you work?
	 1 	 1-10
	 2 	 11-19
	 3 	 20-24
 4  Don’t know but under 25
	 5 	 25 - 49
 6  Don’t know but over 24 and under 
  500
	 7 	 50-499
	 8 	 500 or more
ES2000: Employment status
	 1 	 Self-employed: large establishment 
	 	 (25+ employees)
	 2 	 Self-employed: small 
	 	 establishment (1-24 employees)
	 3 	 Self-employed: no employees
	 4 	 Manager: large establishment 
	 	 (25+ employees)
	 5 	 Manager: small establishment 
	 	 (1-24 employees)
	 6 	 Foreman or supervisor
	 7 	 Employee (not elsewhere classified)
	 8 	 No employment status info given
NSSECB NS-SECB - long version 
	 (Operational categories)
	 1.0 	 Employers in large organisations
	 2.0 	 Higher managerial
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	 3.1 	 Higher professional (traditional) - 
	 	 employees
	 3.2 	 Higher professional (new) - 
	 	 employees
	 3.3 	 Higher professional (traditional) - 
	 	 self-employed
	 3.4 	 Higher professional (new) - 
	 	 self-employed
	 4.1 	 Lower professional & higher 
	 	 technical traditional) - employees
	 4.2 	 Lower professional & higher 
	 	 technical (new) - employees
	 4.3 	 Lower professional & higher 
	 	 technical (traditional) - self- 
	 	 employed
	 4.4 	 Lower professional & higher 
	 	 technical (new) - self-employed
	 5.0 	 Lower managerial
	 6.0 	 Higher supervisory
	 7.1 	 Intermediate clerical and 
	 	 administrative
	 7.2 	 Intermediate sales and service
	 7.3 	 Intermediate technical and 
	 	 auxiliary
	 7.4 	 Intermediate engineering
	 8.1 	 Employers (small organisations, 
	 	 non-professional)
	 8.2 	 Employers (small - agriculture)
	 9.1 	Own account workers (non- 
	 	 professional)
	 9.2 	 Own account workers 
	 	 (agriculture)
	 10.0 	Lower supervisory
	 11.1 	Lower technical craft
	 11.2 	Lower technical process 
	 	 operative
	 12.1 	Semi-routine sales
	 12.2 	Semi-routine service
	 12.3 	Semi-routine technical
	 12.4 	Semi-routine operative
	 12.5 	Semi-routine agricultural
	 12.6 	Semi-routine clerical
	 12.7 	Semi-routine childcare
	 13.1 	Routine sales and service
	 13.2 	Routine production
	 13.3 	Routine technical
	 13.4 	Routine operative
	 13.5 	Routine agricultural
	 14.1 	Never worked
	 14.2 	Long-term unemployed
	 15.0 	Full-time students
	 16.0 	Occupations not stated or 
	 	 inadequately described
	 17.0 	Not classifiable for other reasons
(Codes 1.0 to 13.5 are assigned to everyone 
who is currently employed OR who has 
ever worked – unless they are currently a 
full-time student. That is – ‘full-time 
student’ takes precedence over past 
employment.)
NSSECAC
NS-SEC – Analytic classes
	 1.1 	Employers in large organisations 
	 	 & higher managerial occupations
	 1.2 	Higher professional occupations
	 2.0 	Lower professional and higher 
	 	 technical occupations
	 3.0 	Intermediate occupations
	 4.0 	Small employers and own account 
	 	 workers
	 5.0 	Lower supervisory and technical 
	 	 occupations
	 6.0 	Semi-routine occupations
	 7.0 	Routine occupations
	 8.0 	Not classified
NSECAC5: NS-SEC – 5 classes
	 1 	 Managerial and professional 
	 	 occupations
	 2 	 Intermediate occupations
	 3 	 Small employers and own account 
	 	 workers
	 4 	 Lower supervisory and technical 
	 	 occupations
	 5 	 Semi-routine and routine 
	 	 occupations
	 6 	 Not classified
NSECAC3: NS-SEC – 3 classes
	 1 	 Managerial and professional 
	 	 occupations
	 2 	 Intermediate occupations
	 3 	 Routine and manual occupations
	 4 	 Never worked and long term 
	 	 unemployed
	 5 	 Not classified
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Quantified Amounts of  Alcohol
1. "One glass wine/half  lager"                 
2. 1 drink of  alcohol                                 
3. 1 glass of  alcohol is OK if  you are 
eating at the same time                         
4. 1 glass of  wine allowed before 
driving                                                   
5. 1 glass of  wine or 1 drink                     
6. 1 pint in 48 hrs is ok.                            
7. 1 pint is enough                                    
8. 1 pint of  beer /depends                       
9. 1 pint of  lager                                       
10. 1 pint of  lager is the drink drive 
limit                                                      
11. 1 small glass of  wine to be in limit       
12. 1 unit of  alchohol is safe to drive          
13. 1.5 pints of  beer                                   
14. 1.5 pints of  lager                                   
15. 1.5 units of  alcohol                               
16. 1glass of  wine my personal limit          
17. 2 glasses of  wine                                   
18. 2 glasses of  wine or a pint of  beer        
19. 2 glasses of  wine over a couple of  
hours                                                    
20. 2 pints                                                   
21. 2 pints but to me should not drink at 
all if  you drive                                      
22. 2 pints of  beer is the limit as far as 
I'm concerned                                      
23. 2 pints of  lager/beer limit on 
driving a car                                          
24. 2 pints of  normal strength beer is 
the limit-4 units of  alcohol                   
25. 2 pints or something                             
26. 2 UK units allowed                               
27. 2 units                                                   
28. 2 units                                                   
29. 2 units                                                   
30. 2 units                                                   
31. 2 units and allowed to drive. 
personally zero tolerance                      
32. 2 units but that depends on your 
weight and sex and what you can 
handle.                                                 
33. 2 units for a woman                              
34. 2 units of  alcohol                                  
35. 2 units of  alcohol                                  
36. 2 units of  alcohol                                  
37. 2 units of  alcohol=2small 
wineglasses/1 small spirits/1pint          
38. 3 halfs of  bitter                                     
39. 3 pints of  beer, I think you are 
allowed to drive                                    
40. 3 units of  alcohol is the limit you 
can drink                                              
41. a bottle of  beer maximum.                   
42. a couple of  units, one or two units       
43. a glass of  something, do one thing 
or the other (husband is teetotal)          
44. a glass of  wine                                      
45. a pint of  beer is ok with food, but 
no more same basis with wine              
46. About 2.5 pints or 3 glasses of  wine.  
Should not be any higher.                     
47. about a pint and a half  is the limit       
48. always known it as 2pts for a man        
49. anything in excess of  4 units or 
something like that                               
50. anything over a pint                              
51. anything over one unit of  alcohol 
means you cannot drive                        
52. can have 1 drink & drive                      
53. can't drink more than 2 pints of  
beer                                                      
54. can't have more than one drink if  
going to be driving                                
55. Consumsion of  in excess of  2 units 
of  alcohol is                                         
56. could have no more than one unit to 
be over the imit                                     
57. do not drink more than 1 and a half 
units for women and 2 for men            
58. do not drink or drive if  you have 
had more than 1 glass of  wine             
59. does it matter that I am not a driver 
(have a licence but not driven for 
years) - 3 units of  alcohol - maybe 
that is for women but I don't know      
60. don't drink anymore than a pint           
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61. don't drink more than 1 glass of  
wine & drive                                         
62. don't drink more than 1 pint of  beer 
before driving                                      
63. don't drive when you drunk more 
than 2 units                                           
64. don't drive when you've had more 
than 1 1/2 pints beer                            
65. don't have more than one drink           
66. dont drink more than 2 pints of  
beer or 2 glasses of  wine.                      
67. drink no more than 2 pints of  beer 
no more than 3.8% alcohol                  
68. drinking more than 2 units of  
alcohol, and not in control of  what 
you are doing                                       
69. for a female 1 glass of  wine 125ml 
limit but depends on body type and 
mass                                                     
70. for me it means only drinking one 
glass of  wine when you go out              
71. for women 2 units and men 4? I 
dont know                                             
72. Generally just one drink I would say 
but I don't bother if  I'm driving to 
be honest.                                             
73. gnly a couple of  drinks, but 
everyone's limit is different.                  
74. half  a pint of  beer or 1 glass of  
wine                                                     
75. half  pint of  beer                                   
76. I believe it to be no more than 2 
units of  alcohol which equates to 
one pint of  beer                                   
77. I believe it's 2 or a pint of  beer             
78. I believe the limit don't know the 
expression I understaand is a pint 
would would be alright but 
personally I don't think you should 
drive at all.                                          
79. I can have a small drink and drive.       
80. I can only have a can of  stella, and 
it takes long for the body to get rid 
of  it.                                                     
81. I feeI could have one glass of  wine 
and drive a car, but happily do it 
very seldom                                          
82. I have one drink only                            
83. I know one glass of  wine is the limit     
84. I limit myself  to one pint when 
driving                                                  
85. I never have more than one unit 
myself  and know that keeps you 
under the limit                                     
86. I think it's a pint of  beer or a glass 
of  wine                                                 
87. I think you can have a pint and no 
more                                                     
88. I will only drink 1 to 2 units when 
drivng but usually none                        
89. I won't have more than one drink 
when I am driving                                
90. I would never drink more than 2 
pints & drive. It's 4 units                       
91. i wouldn't have more than two 
glasses of  wine and the drive                
92. I'm allowed up to 2 units, I think.         
93. if  I have more than 2 units of  
alcohol I cannot drive                           
94. if  you drink over 1 glass of  wine and 
drive you're liable to cause accidents  
or death                                               
95. if  you have 1 pint you are ok                
96. if  you have more than a glass of  
wine you could be over the drink 
drive limit                                             
97. in sense of  what you actually have 
to drink, its a couple of  glasses of  
wine                                                     
98. it doesn't take much to exceed limit, 
will not drive after more than say 
one beer                                               
99. it isn't no drink - I'd have one drink 
but no more                                         
100. it means 2 pints of  lager to me 
spirits or wine I dont know                   
101. it means one glass of  wine- know it 
means also a certain no. of  
milligrams allowed but not sure how 
many.                                                   
102. it means quite a low level of  alc. 
consumpt. for me I should not drive 
when I've had more than 1 glass of  
wine.                                                    
103. it means there is a certain limit of  2 
units per person before thay are 
classed as over the limit                       
104. it means you can get away with 
having one drink but I think its safer 
not to have anything at all                   
105. it means you can only drink I think 
men can drink about a pint before 
they drive and women is about the 
same I suppose                                     
106. it means you can only have 1 unit 
before you can drive                             
107. it's about 1.5 pints of  beer and a 
small glass of  wine if  I'm driving I 
don't drink anyway.                              
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108. It's fair but I drink at home but if  I 
drink out 2 pints is enough                   
109. it's no more than a pint for a woman 
so I dont drink and drive                      
110. its no more than 2 units and varies 
for women and men                             
111. less than 2 units                                     
112. less than two units of  alcohol               
113. limit for me is 2 pints or more, but 
there's no set limit, differs from 
person to person                                  
114. limit of  one unit of  alcohol before 
you shouldn't drive                               
115. low limit of  a pint of  beer                    
116. max of  two pints beer normal 
strength                                                 
117. maximum of  one drink                        
118. maximum two units (two halves)          
119. means a glass of  wine, can have one 
drink before you drive                          
120. Means that you should not have 
more than one glass of  anything 
and drive, you should be aware that 
any alcohol affects your brain and 
your reactions                                     
121. means you can have one or two 
units and that's it                                   
122. More than 1 glass of  wine                    
123. more than 1 small drink                       
124. more than 2 pints or over 80mg in 
your blood                                             
125. more than one pint will be over the 
limit.                                                     
126. more than one pint you do not drive    
127. more than three pints of  beer puts 
you over the limit to drive                     
128. Mustn't exceed more that 1.5 pints 
of  beer, 3 shorts                                    
129. n more than 2 pints of  beer. I never 
drink shorts out of  the home. I think 
it depends on the individuals 
constitution. I know people who do 
not show any signs of  having been 
drinking.                                              
130. no more than 1 pint                              
131. no more than 1 pint if  driving 
myself                                                    
132. no more than 2 pints                            
133. no more than 2 pints of  average 
beer and driving                                   
134. no more than 2 pints of  beer.               
135. no more than 2 units                            
136. no more than 2 wines                           
137. no more than a glass of  wine                
138. no more than a pint                              
139. no more than a pint                              
140. no more than a pint or a couple of  
shorts or a glass of  wine                       
141. no more than one pint                          
142. no more than two pints of  lager           
143. not drink any more than a pint.           
144. not have more than one drink when 
I was out and driving                            
145. not over one pint                                   
146. not to drink more than 2 units of  
alcohol                                                 
147. officially I think it's two and a half  
pints of  beer, thatis 80 millilitres           
148. one and a half  pints of  resonable 
strength not strong beer, or a glass of 
wine                                                     
149. one drink before you can drive 
safely                                                    
150. one drink is more than enough             
151. one glass of  lager is personal limit        
152. ONE GLASS OF WINE                     
153. one glass of  wine - even that is too 
much                                                    
154. one glass of  wine or lager is the limit 
and still be able to drive. any more 
would over the limit                             
155. one or two drinks                                  
156. one or two maximum drinks before 
you dirve or none                                  
157. one pint                                                 
158. one pint                                                 
159. one pint and that's it; but diverts 
police activity from more serious 
crime                                                    
160. one pint is the limit if  you're driving    
161. one unit of  wine and two unit of  
beer                                                      
162. only 1 drink acceptable                         
163. only 1 glass of  wine will put you 
over the limit!                                        
164. only one drink                                       
165. only one pint and then you will be 
able to drive but no more                     
166. over 1 pint of  beer                                
167. pint for a girl                                         
168. probably 2 units of  drink =2 small 
glasses of  wine or a small beer 
would deter me from driving               
169. Probably about 2 pints ish and not 
really sure what exact limits are            
170. probably one pint of  beer or two 
small whiskies                                        
171. roughly two pints.                                 
172. safe to have one pint,                            
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173. shoudn't drink more than 2 pints of  
beer when driving                                 
174. SHOULDN'T HAVE MORE 
THAN ONE GLASS OF WINE 
OR HALF A PINT OF BEER 
BEFORE DRIVING                          
175. small glass of  wine -woman or pint -
man. I don't drink and drive                 
176. that you shouldn't legally have more 
than 2 units and drive                           
177. the limit at which we can drink and 
still be able to drive, ie 2 pints              
178. the limit which driver not go over - 
one small bottle of  beer                        
179. the limit would be one & a half  
pints of  bitter, I wouldn't drive with 
anything over that, which I think is 
3 units                                                  
180. the number of  units you drink 2 
181. the small amount of  alcohol you 
can consume and still be allowed to 
drive legally                                             
182. thers a maximum amonut you 
should drink, and it's two units             
183. to be safe to other people, to be in 
control of  your actions. have 
restraint. drink 1 glass or not drink 
at all to be in the limit                          
184. two drinks are a max if  you are 
driving                                                  
185. two glasses of  wine over the meal         
186. two pints                                               
187. under 2 units isn't it                              
188. you are allowed a certain amount 
but it's a miniscule amount                   
189. you are not allowed to drink more 
than 2 units of  alcohol and drive         
190. you can drink 1 glass of  wine               
191. you can drink 1 small glass of  wine 
or 1/2 pint beer before driving             
192. you can have a maximum of  one 
drink if  driving, but if  I was driving 
I wouldn't touch any                            
193. you can have so many units before 
you can't drive I think it's about a 
pint                                                       
194. you can't exceed two units but I 
wouldn't exceed one unit as it is too 
high a risk                                            
195. you have to drink very little                  
196. you have up to 2 pints depending on 
your build. over 2 pints is against 
the law.                                                 
197. you shouldn't drink more than 1 
pint of  beer and then drive                   
198. you shouldn't drive a vehicle after 
more than one or two units of  
alcohol depending on your 
physiology                                            
199. you're only allowed 2 pints    
“Don’t Drink and Drive”                          
200. "Drinking any alcohol while driving 
is not acceptable."                                 
201. absolutely no alcohol                            
202. any amount of  drink and to drive is 
wrong                                                   
203. best thing to do is not drink 
anything at all-mostly I drink one 
glass of  wine -they should change it 
to no drinking whilst driving               
204. do not drink and drive                          
205. do not drink and drive                          
206. do not drink and drive                          
207. do not drink and drive                          
208. do not drink ANYTHING if  you 
want to drive                                         
209. do not entertain drinking and 
driving                                                   
210. doesn't drink and drive at all                
211. don't do it                                              
212. don't do it                                              
213. don't drink                                            
214. don't drink                                            
215. don't drink                                            
216. don't drink and drive                            
217. don't drink and drive                            
218. don't drink and drive                            
219. don't drink and drive                            
220. don't drink and drive                            
221. don't drink and drive                            
222. don't drink and drive                            
223. don't drink and drive                            
224. don't drink and drive                            
225. don't drink and drive                            
226. don't drink and drive                            
227. don't drink and drive                            
228. don't drink and drive                            
229. don't drink and drive                            
230. don't drink and drive                            
231. don't drink and drive                            
232. don't drink and drive                            
233. don't drink and drive                            
234. don't drink and drive                            
235. don't drink and drive                            
236. don't drink and drive                            
237. don't drink and drive                            
238. don't drink and drive - one glass of  
wine max                                             
239. don't drink and drive at all                   
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240. don't drink and drive or just have 
one & it depends on what drink           
241. don't drink anything and drive! even 
though you are able to drink a small 
amount and drive it's not wise             
242. don't drink anything if  planning to 
drive                                                     
243. don't drink at all                                    
244. don't drink at all                                    
245. don't drink at all when driving             
246. don't drink at all when driving             
247. don't drink if  you are going to drive!    
248. don't drink when you're driving            
249. don't drive after drinking any 
alcohol                                                  
250. don't ever drink not even one glass       
251. don't have a drink if  you are drivig      
252. dont drink and drive                             
253. dont drink and drive                             
254. dont drink when you go out driving     
255. dont drive at all if  drank something     
256. drink nothing alcoholic if  you are 
driving                                                  
257. drivers should never drink there 
should be a total ban nil alcohol.          
258. either drink or drive                              
259. essentialy shouldnt do it however 
there's a certain level of  units which 
is acceptable a glass of  wine or half  
a pint                                                    
260. For me personally it would be never 
to drink and drive                                 
261. having lived abroad where zero 
tolerance is applied I keep to the 
formula drinking= NO driving.           
262. I do not drink and drive and the 
limit should be zero                              
263. I do not drink at all if  I am going to 
drive                                                     
264. I don't drink and drive at all.                
265. I don't drink if  I am driving                 
266. I don't drink if  i'm going to drive - I 
don't know what the exact limits are.   
267. I don't think you should drink at all 
if  you are driving                                 
268. I dont do it full stop                              
269. I dont drink and drive at all. you 
cant have morem than 2 pints for a 
fella. I dont know for a woman            
270. I dont drink and drive I only drink 
at home                                                
271. I dont drink and drive. It says you 
can have a pint or glass of  wine and 
I really dont think you should be 
allowed anything.                                 
272. I dont think you should drink 
anything if  driving                                
273. I hink you shouldn't drink at all if  
you're driving, because you never 
know how it might affect you, for 
instance if  you're tired or haven't 
eaten, and i don't think that's a risk 
i'd want to take                                   
274. I would never have one drink and 
drive-people who drink often might 
not be affected by drink                       
275. I wouldn't drink at all and then 
drive - it puts other lives in danger. 
levels of  alcohol intake affect people 
differently                                             
276. I'm against drinking and driving          
277. if  I am going to drive I don't drink. 
not worth the risk                                 
278. if  I am going to drive I won't drive. 
I don't know the particular amount 
of  units which woudl make it illegal    
279. if  I drive I don't drink                           
280. if  I drive I dont drink. better to be 
safe than sorry                                     
281. if  I go out for a drink I never  take 
the car                                                  
282. if  I'm driving I dont drink                    
283. if  we go out one of  us will stay 
alcohol free                                           
284. if  you are driving it should be zero       
285. if  you are going to drive a car you 
shouldn't drive at all                             
286. if  you are going to drive do not 
drink including from night before        
287. if  you drink don't drive                         
288. if  you drink dont drive                          
289. if  you drink you can't drive                  
290. if  you drink you don't drive                  
291. if  you drink you don't drive,                 
292. if  you drink you don't drive. simple      
293. If  you drink you must not drive            
294. if  you drink you should not drive         
295. if  you drink you shouldn't drive full 
stop                                                      
296. if  you habe a drink you dont drive 
at all                                                     
297. If  you have any alcohol of  any 
quantity that is drink driving                
298. in essence if  driving never drink, use 
a designated driver                               
299. it is not acceptable to drink anything 
at all when driving                               
300. it means don't drink and drive, there 
is no safe limit                                      
301. it means don't drink to me                    
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302. it means I wouldnt drink at all for 
simple reason that car is a lethal 
weapon, and to kill a child even with 
a small amout of  alcohol-well they 
should be hung.                                   
303. It means if  you drive you do not 
drink alcohol, none at all that's it         
304. it means no alcohol at all if  I`m 
going to drive.                                       
305. Just don't drink alchol and drive, full 
stop!!                                                    
306. leave the car at home if  you've had 
a drink                                                  
307. limit is you should not drink at all 
but it is what the body can take            
308. means complete abstenance when 
you are driving                                      
309. means don't drink at all when 
driving                                                   
310. means I wouldn't have a drink if  I 
was driving                                           
311. means that you don't drink at all. I 
don't believe that you should drink 
any alcohol if  you're going to drive.    
312. means you shouldn't drink & drive       
313. my limit is zero and I just wouldn't 
drink and drive the limit should be 
zero                                                      
314. never drink and drive                           
315. never drink and drive                           
316. never drink and drive                           
317. never drink and drive but I might 
have a small glass of  wine that 
would be within the limit                     
318. Never drink and drive if  I'm driving.    
319. nil alcohol/should not be a limit          
320. no alcohol                                             
321. no alcohol at all                                    
322. No alcohol at all                                   
323. no alcohol if  driving                             
324. no drink                                                
325. no drink is acceptable.                          
326. no drink whatsoever                             
327. no drink while your driving                  
328. no drinking alcohol twelve hours 
before driving                                       
329. no drinking and drive                           
330. no drinking at all when driving            
331. no drinking at all when driving            
332. no drinking at all when driving            
333. no drinking at all with driving. I 
dont know where they are with the 
present limits e.g. no. of  units 
supposedly allowed.                             
334. no drinking at all. 2 pints limit years 
ago, but there's never been a limit        
335. none                                                      
336. none for the road                                  
337. Not diving at all if  you have had a 
sip of  alcohol                                       
338. Not drink and drive at all                     
339. not drink at all                                      
340. not to drink                                           
341. not to drink at all or very little              
342. nothing                                                 
343. nothing                                                 
344. people should not drink and drive        
345. people who drink should not drive       
346. personally I don't drink and drive 
people don't know what a unit is  - 
it's not marketed very well                   
347. safety and just don't drink and drive    
348. serious shoudn't drink and drive           
349. shoudn't drink and drive                       
350. should be no alcohol                             
351. should be zero                                       
352. should be zero                                       
353. should not drink and drive                   
354. should not drink and drive                   
355. should not drink at all & drive              
356. should not drink at all when driving     
357. should not drive after drinking             
358. shouldn't be any drinking at all 
when driving                                         
359. shouldn't drink & drive                         
360. shouldn't drink and drive at all-
shouldn't overdrink and drive - but 
shouldn't do it at all                             
361. shouldn't drink and drive. Its 
dangerous                                             
362. shouldn't drink at all if  you are 
driving                                                  
363. shouldn't drink whilst driving               
364. shouldn't drive at all                             
365. understanding of  the laws, but as 
my attitude is that you should not 
drink and drive anyway it doesn't 
matter what the limit is because I 
wouldn't drink and drive.  if  pressed 
I would say no more than 2 units 
before driving                                
366. very important-not to drink and 
drive as it casues havoc on the 
roads-teenagers especially using 
roads like a race track-should be 
stamped down on                               
367. well I agree with it - I never drink 
and drive - would not entertain it         
368. well I don't drink drive                          
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369. well I just will not drive if  I have 
had a drink - just wont have one 
drink                                                    
370. well I never have a drink when I 
drive                                                     
371. You can't drink & drive.                        
372. you don't drink and drive                     
373. You just don't drink and drive, you 
just don't do it                                      
374. You must not drink & drive.                 
375. you shouldn't drink and drive at all, 
but if  you do the limit is 2 pints            
376. you shouldn't drink at all - you don't 
know the effect of  alcholol on 
individuals                                            
377. zero                                                       
378. zero alcohol before driving,                  
379. ZERO ALCOHOL IF I'M GOING 
TO DRIVE                                          
380. zero limit                                               
Unquantified Amounts                              
381. allowed number of  units                       
382. amount allowed to drink to be able 
to drive                                                 
383. amount of  alcohol you can drink 
without causing any serious 
disability on your driving                     
384. amount of  units but more 
complicated dependending on the 
person. Depends on alcohol levels in 
blood                                                    
385. amount of  units that can be 
consumed before driving                      
386. an amount by which you could 
safely drink and safely drive                  
387. Don't drive after drinking a certain 
amount of  units                                    
388. how many units a person can take 
into their body before they are 
incapable of  driving                            
389. how much alcohol is consumed that 
is legal and still be able to drive            
390. how much alcohol we safely 
consume                                                
391. how much alcohol you can consume 
before you are deemed unsafe to 
drive a car                                            
392. how much u r allowed to drink & 
drive                                                     
393. how much you are allowed before 
you can not drive safely                        
394. how much you can drink and still 
drive legally                                           
395. how much you can drink and still 
drive without putting yourself  and 
others at risk                                        
396. How much you have drunk and the 
amount you can drink within the 
limit                                                      
397. I'm very careful about drinking and 
driving  -  so many units                       
398. is amount of  units you can have 
before you cant go on the road             
399. it is a formal limit of  alcohol you 
can drink before exceeding limit to 
drive                                                     
400. it is the amount of  alcohol I drunk       
401. it means however unit limit you are 
allowed before you can drive                
402. it's so many units                                   
403. it's the amount of  units of  alcohol 
that you can drink to enable you to 
drive safely                                           
404. it's the amount of  units you can 
have in milliletres;  you have to limit 
them                                                     
405. It's the legal level of  alcohol that 
you can consume                                  
406. it's the number of  units that men 
and women are permited to drink 
and still be capable of  driving             
407. its the limit or boundary that a 
person should not cross upon 
consumption of  alcohol                       
408. just the limit you can drink and 
shouldn't exceed when you are 
driving                                                  
409. keep consumption of  alcohol below 
legal limit                                             
410. limit set by the government which is 
a set number of  units which they 
think are safe                                        
411. limit the amount of  alcohol that you 
are allowed before exceeding the 
limit to drive                                        
412. limit to what you can drink and then 
drive properly                                      
413. limit to what you can drink before it 
is illegal to do so                                   
414. maximum amount a person can 
drink without being over the limit 
legally                                                   
415. maximum amount that you can 
drink before driving a car                     
416. means how many units allowed 
before over drink drive limit but 
don't drink and drive myself                 
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417. means the amount of  alcohol you 
can have before you are unable to 
drive a car                                            
418. not to drink more than 
recommended limit before driving       
419. not to go over units                               
420. number of  units                                    
421. quantity of  alchol before it affects        
422. so many units before driving, I never 
drink before driving.                             
423. so many units to consume before it's  
over the limit. I don't know the 
quantities.                                            
424. the acceptable level of  drink one 
can have and still drive legally              
425. the amount of  alchohol you able to 
drink before driving                              
426. the amount of  alcohol above which 
your abilities to drive would be 
significantly impared depends of  
various factors weight, haveing 
eaten. how much you are drinking      
427. the amount of  alcohol consumed 
without being over the top                    
428. the amount of  alcohol units 
consumed before being unsafe to 
drive                                                     
429. the amount of  alcohol you are 
allowed to consume before driving - 
430. the amount of  alcohol you can 
drink and drive at                                
431. the amount of  alcohol you can 
drink and still be below legal limit        
432. the amount of  alcohol you can 
drink and still drive safely                     
433. the amount of  alcohol you can 
drink before being over the limit          
434. the amount of  alcohol you can 
drink to safely drive a car                     
435. the amount of  alcohol you can 
legally consume to stay within the 
law                                                       
436. the amount of  alcohol you can take 
before you are unable to drive   
437. the amount of  alcohol you drink          
438. the amount of  units of  alcohol that 
you shouldn't be over to drive               
439. the amount that it is safe to drink 
and still drive                                       
440. the amount the amount of  alcohol 
that you should not consume and 
then continue to drive                          
441. the amounts of  units you drink prior 
to driving                                             
442. THE CERTAIN AMOUNT 0F 
ALCOHOL YOU CAN DRINK 
AND STILL DRIVE -                         
443. the legal limit of  how much you can 
drink before driving                              
444. the limit of  alcohol you take then 
cannot drive                                          
445. the limit on the alchohol you can 
consume                                                
446. the maximum limit I could take 
before exceeding the limit to drive       
447. the number of  units you are allowed 
to consume                                           
448. the point at which you have too 
much alcohol and are imparied to 
drive                                                     
449. the units you are allowed to 
consume. I know it's changed hasn't 
it.  I wouldnt know how many units 
it was. I think you're only allowed 
one pint or 1 small glass of  wine.       
450. there is a limit of  a given ammount 
which if  you exceed it is illegal I 
don't drink at all when driving and 
whoever exceeds it should be 
severely punished      
451. there is a limit, of  how much you 
can drink and drive                             
452. there's a limit to what you're able to 
drink if  you're then going to drive 
and that limit's defined by units           
453. they should not got over the limited 
units                                                     
454. units of  alcohol  allowed  before 
driving                                                  
455. units of  alcohol you drink before 
you are over the limit                            
456. what you are able to drink then not 
drive. but shouldn't drink and drive 
at all                                                     
457. where you can drink so many units      
458. you can only consume a certain 
amount of  units                                    
459. you get a limit that you're not 
supposed to drink more than and 
drive        
Concentration of  Alcohol                         
460. 35 in breath, 80 in blood, possibly 
107 in urine                                         
461. 35mg of  alcohol per 100ml of  blood    
462. 35mgs of  alcohol in 100ml of  
breath                                                    
463. 35mils of  alchol in 100mills of  
blood                                                    
THE DRINK- AND DRUG-DRIVING OFFENCES
364
464. 50 mg of  alcohol per, about a glass 
of  wine or beer                                     
465. 80 miligrams of  alchol (about 2 
drinks)                                                  
466. 80 milligrammes of  alcohol per 
something of  blood                               
467. 80 milligrams of  alcohol to 50 
millilitres of  blood                                
468. 80ml per 100ml blood                          
469. a certain volum of  alcohol in your 
system that is unacceptable                  
470. a measure of  alcohol in your blood      
471. about 35 per cent I think I don't 
take the car out when I go for a 
drink                                                    
472. amount of  alchol in blood 80 mlg 
per litre of  blood                                   
473. amount of  alcohol as a percentage 
of  blood                                               
474. amount of  alcohol in blood above 
which you are considered to be a 
drunk driver                                         
475. amount of  alcohol permitted in yr 
blood or breath                                     
476. amount of  alcohol you can have in 
your body                                              
477. cannot exceed 35ml in breath              
478. certain amount of  alcohol in blood      
479. driving whilst having 70 or 80 on 
breathaliser scale                                   
480. Driving with alcohol in your system     
481. having only a small amount of  
alcohol in the blood to be able to 
drive                                                     
482. hch alcohol, you have in your blood 
per millilitre it doesn't matter how 
much you think you have had to 
drink                                                    
483. I know there is technical aspect I am 
not sure what it is..parts per ml etc 
we know not to have more than one.   
484. if  you are breathalised it's the 
number of  units in your blood - and 
there is a cut off  point - DK what it 
is                                                           
485. illegal blood alcohol limit over 
which you must not drink                     
486. in their system and still be allowed 
to leglly allowed to drive - about 2 
units - though not sure what that 
means                                                   
487. is it 80 milligrams? oh no now it's on 
breath isn't it? don't know the 
number but 2 pints can put you over 
& need to account for last night's        
488. it is the legal maximun blood 
alcohol level that is acceptable to 
drive                                                     
489. IT MEANS 80 MILLTERS OF 
ALCHOL, 2 SMALL DRINK, 2 
GLASSES OF WINE                         
490. it means a limit of  micrograms in a 
measured state in alcohol                     
491. it means the amount of  alcohol in 
your blood when you're driving            
492. it means the milligrams of  alcohol 
per litre of  blood                                   
493. it means you can't have more than 
35mg of  alcohol per 100mg of  
blood                                                    
494. it's 35 milligrammes in your breath      
495. it's 35... 2 units of  alcohol                     
496. legal definition of  a certain 
concentration of  alcohol in the 
blood                                                    
497. level of  alcohol in blood                       
498. level of  alcohol in blood stream            
499. level of  alcohol in the blood which 
equates to approx 2 units                      
500. limit beyond where the alcohol in 
blood impairs safe driving                    
501. limit of  alcohol in system at the time 
your stopped                                        
502. Maximum permitted allowance of  
alcohol in the blood before it 
becomes punishable.                            
503. milligrams of  alcohol in your blood. 
Content of  alcohol in your blood 
stream                                                  
504. not allowed more than 80 
milligrams of  alcohol in your blood     
505. not going over a specific amount of  
alcohol in the blood and not being 
capable of  driving safety                      
506. not having a certain amount of  
alcohol in your blood before being 
charged with drink and driving           
507. not more 80 mg in blood                      
508. Number of  units of  alcohol in 
bloodstream                                          
509. set at the level of  alcohol in your 
blood                                                    
510. statutory breath test limit                      
511. the amount of  alcohol allowed in 
the blood                                               
512. the amount of  alcohol in blood            
513. the amount of  alcohol in your blood 
above which it's illeagl to drive             
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514. the amount of  alcohol that can be 
present in your blood before you are 
over the limit                                        
515. the amount of  alcohol you can have 
in your blood stream whilst being in 
charge of  a car                                     
516. the drink drive limit means to me 
the set amount of  alcohol you are 
allowed to have in your bloodstream 
if  you drive. I dont drink and drive     
517. the numer of  milligrams per volume 
of  blood depends on size and 
whether they have eaten, okay for 
one pint, but probably 2 pints may 
be ok - probably okay to drink            
518. the units of  alcohol in your blood 
system                                                  
519. trines the level of  alch. in the blood. 
I dont think they have yet found a 
satisf. way that the ord. man in the 
street can understand how that 
figure relates to his own 
consumption.                                      
520. You can only have a certain 
percentage of  alcohol per blood   
Consequences                                             
521. being incapable of  controlling a 
vehicle properly through alcohol          
522. Dangerous                                            
523. drinking too much alcohol to 
concentrate and be aware of  own 
driving ability                                         
524. if  you drink too much you may 
loose liberty, job                                    
525. if  you get caught over the limit you 
lose your licence and perhaps job         
526. It curbs your social activities                 
527. it is to still be capable normaly 
driving a car without loosing control    
528. loss of  license                                        
529. people very aware of  consequences 
of  drink driving but still do it. I'm 
very against drink driving.                   
530. people who have died or have killed 
innocent because they have drank 
and exceeded legal limit                      
531. you can kill somebody plus you lose 
your license plus you could get jailed  
Variables                                                      
532. does not take into account all the 
variabilities of  the effect of  alcohol 
on an individual basis and it does 
not allow any judgement on an 
individual basis                                   
533. it means different things to different 
people but you can take a small 
amount and still drive                          
534. it varies and I'd rather not risk it          
535. it's very vague, dont drink and drive     
536. its very compicated I dont know its 
the units we were having this 
conversation awhile ago my 
husband can drink more he's a 
bigger build Idon't drink at all if  I'm 
drivi ng                                                
537. no limit - amount varies from 
person to person                                   
538. you have to know how much you 
can drink to make you fit to drive     
“Don’t Know”                                             
539. do not know but never drink and 
drive                                                     
540. don't know                                            
541. don't know drink drive limits but do 
not drink and drive.                              
542. don't know limit                                    
543. don't know the limit                              
544. I really don't know - I never drink 
and drive                                              
545. I wouldn't have a clue. I've never 
ever drank and drive.                            
546. I'm never sure so I don't do both          
547. it just means you're over the limit to 
drive I don't know what the limits 
are                                                        
548. no idea                                                  
549. nobody knows what the drink drive 
ruling is                                                
550. not allowed to drink & drive. not 
sure how much you can have to 
drink before over drink                        
551. not sure of  limits    
Refusals to Answer                                     
552. 999999 Refusal                                     
553. 999999 Refusal                                     
554. 999999 Refusal                                     
555. 999999 Refusal                                     
556. 999999 Refusal                                     
557. 999999 Refusal   
Non-classifiable                                           
558. acceptable to have a drink-drive 
limit                                                      
559. amount of  alcohol per unit                  
560. appropriate to fitness for driving          
561. don't drive if  you are over the limit      
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562. ensuring you are below the legal 
limit when driving or in charge of  a 
vehicle                                                  
563. good idea to stick to a limit      
564. how comfortable you feel about 
getting into a car after having a 
drink                                                       
565. I dont think that if  you are driving 
you couldn't drink.                                
566. I respect the limit and practice it          
567. is level at which you are able or not 
to drive                                                 
568. it's a measure of  alcohol which is 
considered safe to drive                        
569. It's out of  proportion, the units are 
wrong.                                                  
570. it's the amount of  alcohol which the 
law sets at which u become unfit to 
drive safely                                           
571. legal limit of  alcohol before you 
break the law                                        
572. level of  alcohol acceptable for safe 
driving                                                  
573. level of  resposible driving                     
574. limit allowed to drink & drive. Don't 
know what it is.                                    
575. limit at which you can safely drive        
576. limit is too high should be brought 
down, it's a level in law that is too 
high                                                      
577. MAXIMUM  DRINK AND 
DRIVE ACCORDING TO 
LEGAL UNITS                                   
578. means not to drive over the drink 
limits set down -AE                               
579. no excess alcohol if  driving                  
580. NOT BEING RESPONSIBLE IF 
YOU DRINK AND DRIVE               
581. not driving whilst over the limit.           
582. not to exceed more than the limit 
for driving                                            
583. nothing because I don't drive 
anymore                                                
584. over the limit of  driving                        
585. The amount of  alcohol I can legally 
drive                                                        
586. the amount of  drink under the law      
587. the limit that you can't drive over           
588. there is a set limit for beyond which 
you cannot drive                                   
589. you are not allowed to drive over the 
limit 
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